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Note on Translation and Transliteration 
 
 
Excerpts from Armenian, Russian and French sources quoted in this dissertation are translated by 
the author. 
 
In general, this dissertation uses the transliteration scheme for Armenian adapted by the Journal 
of Society for Armenian Studies from the Library of Congress’s Cataloging Service, Bulletin 121, 
Spring, 1977. It is based on Classical Armenian and Eastern Armenian pronunciation. 
  
Ա ա  A a  
Բ բ  B b  
Գ գ  G g  
Դ դ  D d  
Ե ե  E e 
Զ զ  Z z  
Է է  Ē ē 
Ը ը  Ě ě 
Թ թ  T‘ t‘ 
Ժ ժ  Zh zh 
Ի ի  I i 
Լ լ  L l 
Խ խ  Kh kh  
Ծ ծ  Ts ts 
 
 xii 
Կ կ  K k  
Հ հ  H h 
Ձ ձ  Dz dz 
Ղ ղ  Gh gh 
Ճ ճ  Ch ch 
Մ մ  M m  
Յ յ  Y y 
Ն ն  N n 
Շ շ  Sh sh 
Ո ո  O o 
Չ չ  Ch‘ ch‘ 
Պ պ  P p 
Ջ ջ  J j  
Ռ ռ  Ṙ ṙ 
Ս ս  S s  
Վ վ  V v 
Տ տ  T t 
Ր ր  R r 
Ց ց  Ts‘ ts‘  
Ւ ւ  W w  
Փ փ  P‘ p‘  
Ք ք  K‘ k‘  
Եւ եւ  Ew ew (or Ev ev) 
Օ օ  Ō ō 
Ֆ ֆ  F f 






The following categories are exceptions from this general approach: 
a. Western Armenian proper names, which are transcribed in their accepted forms in 
English or French (e.g. Hratch Dasnabedian as opposed to Hrach Tasnapetian, Sarkis 
Varzhabedian as opposed to Sargis Varzhapetian, Sarkis Dkhruni as opposed to Sargis 
Tkhruni, and so on); the transliterated forms of such names are given in parentheses 
following their first time use. 
b. Titles of Armenian language newspapers or organizations in Lebanon, France and the 
United States, which are transliterated according to their official English or French forms 
(e.g. Haratch as opposed to Harach‘, Mardgotz as opposed to Martkots‘, Gotchnag as 
opposed to Koch‘nak, Achkhar as opposed to Ashkharh, Aztag as opposed to Azdak, Nor 
Seround as opposed to Nor Serund and so on). 
c. Names of the Armenian political parties, which are transcribed as Hnchak/Hnchakyans 
(instead of Hnch‘ak/Hnch‘akyan), Dashnak/Dashnaktsutyun (as opposed to 
Dashnakts‘ut‘yun) and Ramkavar (as opposed to Ṙamkavar).  
 
No changes are made in direct quotes. Therefore, sometimes the names of Armenian political 
parties or Armenian proper names may be spelled differently in direct quotes (e.g. Dashnag, 
Tashnag, Tashnak as opposed to Dashnak; Ramgavar as opposed to Ramkavar; Hunchak, 
Hnchag as opposed to Hnchak). 
 
For Russian language titles, this dissertation uses the transliteration scheme of the Library of 
Congress. 
А а  A  a  
Б б  B b  
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В в  V v  
Г г  G g  
Д д  D d  
Е е  E e  
Ё ё  Ë ë  
Ж ж   Zh zh  
З з   Z z  
И и  I i 
Й й  Ĭ ĭ 
К к  K k 
Л л  L l 
М м  M m  
Н н  N n  
О о  O o  
П п  P p  
Р р  R r  
С с  S s  
Т т  T t  
У у  U u  
Ф ф  F f  
Х х  Kh kh  
Ц ц   TS	  ts 
Ч ч   Ch ch  
Ш ш  Sh sh  
Щ щ  Shch shch  
ъ   ʺ″ (hard sign)   
ы  y  
ь   ʹ′ (soft sign)  
Э э  Ė ė 
Ю ю  IU iu 






This dissertation explores the conditions and actions that led to the transformation of a post-
genocide Armenian dispersion into a transnational diaspora. Over time, banishment and 
mistreatment had forced large numbers of Armenians to abandon their ancestral homes in the 
Ottoman Empire. The most decisive manifestation of such displacement was the deportations 
and wholesale massacres during WWI, retrospectively defined as genocide, which resulted in 
large concentrations of survivors in the Middle East, Europe and the Americas. Using histories of 
Armenian communities and institutions, the Armenian language periodical press, and the 
information acquired through in-depth interviews with notable diaspora Armenians in Lebanon, 
France and the United States, this study analyzes the formative impact that changing 
international and host-country specific socio-political conditions have had on the ways in which 
Armenian elites and institutions defined and redefined their attitudes towards Soviet Armenia; 
how competing discourses on conceptions of the Armenian homeland, diasporic identities and 
incompatible ideologies and orientations towards Soviet Armenia clashed and led at once to the 
emergence of different forms of Armenian identity and to a transnational schism in the Armenian 
diaspora. It suggests that while genocide recognition after the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Armenian genocide in 1965 introduced a shared ground between the formerly hostile Armenian 
camps, by the mid-1980s, the prevailing institutional divisions produced homeland-centered and 
diaspora-centered paradigms of diasporic belongings. Throughout, this research considers the 
ways in which institutions and leaders aspired to forge and project transnationally coherent, 
 
 xvi 
aspirational Armenian identities, to which they worked to rally their constituencies, and 
juxtaposes these efforts to the actual subjectivity and fluidity of Armenian diasporic identities 
and self-images of subsequent generations, shaped under different host-country contexts. 
 
This study draws on theoretical and methodological principles developed in diaspora studies, as 
well as transnationalism and globalization. It contributes to social constructivist perspective in 
diaspora studies by stressing the role of elites and institutions in the formation of the post-
genocide Armenian diaspora and diasporic identities, and equally emphasizing the influences of 









In the course of the second millennium CE, the Armenians lived through three major traumatic 
and cataclysmic experiences of chiefly involuntary exodus, forcible exile and violent deportation 
and dispersion, each of which, in the course of time, evolved into a distinct diaspora of quite 
dissimilar entities. In the first instance, a very large number of Armenians left their homeland, 
some voluntarily but most involuntarily as a result of the policy of annexation Byzantium 
pursued towards the medieval Armenian kingdoms in the eleventh century. The second exile and 
deportation from ancestral homes was experienced in 1604, during the Ottoman-Safavid wars, 
when Shah Abbas the Great of Persia forcibly drove the Armenians of the borderland regions to 
the interior of his realm. The third and perhaps the largest dispersion of Armenians occurred 
during WWI, due to the forced deportations and genocidal policies of the Ottoman Young Turk 
government.  
 
In the first dispersion, moving in a westerly and southwesterly directions, the Armenians settled 
in Cappadocia and Cilicia, along the northeastern tip of the Mediterranean. A few ambitious 
Armenian soldiers seized a number of Byzantine fortresses in the region and some managed to 
set up a political structure, a principality in Cilicia, which in 1199 was recognized as a kingdom.  
This was a new home away from home, a diaspora state par excellence, and a rare feat in the 
history of diasporas. Shortly before and following the collapse of this kingdom in 1375, smaller 
 
 2 
Armenian communities rose in towns stretching from Armenia proper to the western shores of 
Asia Minor, other Armenian settlements emerged in Cyprus, Greece and Italy. Parallel flows of 
Armenians to the north and northwest, gave birth to many Armenian diasporic settlements in 
Russia and Eastern Europe.  
 
The second dispersion of the Armenians occurred after the expanding Ottoman and Safavid 
empires in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries absorbed Armenia proper and Armenian 
communities in Asia Minor. The exile during Shah Abbas the Great created Armenian diasporic 
settlements in Isfahan and northwestern parts of Iran. New Julfa, the Armenian suburb in 
Isfahan, shone as a leading mercantile and cultural center in the seventeenth century. Later on, 
with the deteriorating conditions in Iran, some Julfa Armenians moved eastward, establishing 
Armenian settlements in India, China and elsewhere in Asia. When the treaty of Zuhab of 1639, 
concluded between the Safavids and the Ottomans, finally put an end to their decades-long 
rivalry and wars in the region of historic Armenia, the Armenians to the west of the line of 
demarcation (the Western Armenians) remained under Ottoman control, and those to its east (the 
Eastern Armenians) under Persian dominion. Peace in the region was disrupted four major times 
in the ensuing 275 years: in the 1720s, during the local rebellion of Davit‘ Bek in the southeast 
of contemporary Armenia; in 1826-28, when the Russians wrested from Persia the Khanate of 
Erivan (its area roughly corresponded to that of contemporary Republic of Armenia); during the 
Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-78 (with the Russians seizing control of Kars and Ardahan in the 
east); and, in WWI, when the dispersed survivors of the genocide formed a new, diaspora, which 




The massive dispersion of Armenians surviving the deportations and genocide in the Ottoman 
Empire during WWI gave birth to Armenian settlements in many countries and increased the 
numbers of already settled Armenians in others. In a relatively short span of time some of these 
settlements turned into identifiable communities in many host countries. By focusing on 
countries where Armenians have maintained significant presence since their establishment in 
large numbers through the twentieth century, namely on France in Europe, Lebanon in the 
Middle East and the United States, this dissertation analyzes, from a historical-sociological 
perspective, the process of the transformation of the post-genocide Armenian dispersion into a 
diaspora. It in particular examines, in a comparative framework, the complex (inter)relations 
between host-countries, the Armenian homeland and the Armenian dispersion in the course of 
the twentieth century until the era of perestroika in the USSR in the mid-1980s,1 and explores 
how these (inter)relations, host-country conditions and different perceptions of homeland by 
diasporic elites, institutions and organizations, influenced the ways in which various Armenian 
refugee groupings and organizations developed shared perceptions of Armenianness, and 
discourses and relations extending beyond the boundaries of host-countries. Rather than taking 
the concepts of homeland and host-countries as unchanging and given realities, this work 
explores the changing international and national conditions in host-countries and the dynamics in 
the perceptions of homeland under the influence of these changing contexts and in response to 
certain developments and policies in Soviet Armenia and the USSR in general. 
                                                
1 The era of perestroika was a series of economic and political reforms introduced by the last leader of Soviet 
Union, Michail Gorbachev. It is widely believed that these reforms eventually led to the dissolution of the USSR in 
1991. The political relaxation in the USSR under Gorbachev’s perestroika created conditions for the resurfacing of 
nationalist movements in many constituent republics. The movement in Soviet Armenia, initially rallied around the 
demands for the unification of Armenian populated region of Nagorno-Karabagh within the structure of neighboring 
Soviet Azerbaijan, gradually grew into independence movement. In September 1991 Armenia was declared 
independent. All these events created qualitatively new conditions in Armenia-Diaspora relations, which is beyond 





This dissertation is the first extensive scholarly work that analyzes the post-genocide Armenian 
diaspora through the recent conceptual frameworks in diaspora studies. The academic field of 
diaspora studies is relatively new, and most of the scholarly contributions to the field have been 
made since the 1980s and proliferated particularly in the 1990s (Cohen 2008, xv; Braziel and 
Mannur 2003, Tölölyan 1996b, 3-4; Sheffer 2003, 5). Theorizing diaspora has since been a task 
and challenge for many scholars. Debates are still ongoing as to whether theoretical abstractions 
on diaspora are, first of all, possible; secondly, whether they can have any meaningful practical 
application because of the enormous diversity of people and groups that are designated as 
diasporas;2 and, lastly, on the limits and contexts of the application of the term diaspora in the 
scholarly debate and in public discourse.3  
 
Several different approaches have been made to define the term “diaspora.”4 The essentialist or 
ideal-type approaches offer some characteristics, which distinguish diasporas from all other 
forms of dispersions (Safran 1991; cf. Butler 2001; Cohen 2008).5 The social constructivist 
                                                
2 Jana Braziel and Anita Mannur think diaspora studies “need to move beyond theorizing how diasporic identities 
are constructed and consolidated and must ask, how are those diasporic identities practiced, lived, and experienced” 
(Braziel and Mannur 2003, 9). In a similar vein Brent Edwards questions the applicability of theoretical abstractions 
in the case of the African diaspora and in his analysis focuses instead on discursive practices that “frame blackness 
as an object of knowledge beyond nation-state” (Edwards 2009, 12-13; 67). 
3 In one of his articles Khachig Tölölyan expresses concern about some “wholly inappropriate” applications of the 
term diaspora, among which he mentions “the Californian diaspora in Seattle,” or “the egg cream diaspora” 
referring to a bottling of a beverage to serve new markets beyond New York (Tölölyan 1996b, 10). 
4 The term ‘diaspora’ derives from Greek dia- (across) and spierien (saw, disperse, or scatter seeds). It was initially 
used in the Septuagint – the Greek translation of the Torah – and in the Greco-Roman world with reference to the 
Jews, who were scattered around because of the Babylonian conquest of Palestine and the destruction of the First 
Temple in 586 BCE, which was rebuilt in 516BCE, and the subsequent rebellion against the Romans, and the 
destruction of the Second and the last Jewish Temple in 70 CE. Until recently, to nearly the 1960s, the Jewish 
centered definition prevailed in the scholarly discourse (cf. Tölölyan 1996b: 10-12). The Armenian word for 
‘diaspora’ is ‘sp‘iwṙk‘’ (or ‘sp‘yuṙk‘’ in Eastern Armenian orthography). It is the plural form of ‘sp‘ir/sp‘iwr’ (to 
disperse, to saw) (Achaṙyan 1979, 287, Jahukyan 2010, 698) 
5 Safran (1991: 83-84) particularly suggested that all “expatriate minority communities” may constitute a diaspora, 
if the members of that community share the following features: 
 
 5 
perspective in diaspora studies, which developed more recently, rejects all essentialist 
approaches and calls for focusing on the formation of diasporic identities instead (cf. Cohen 
2008, 11). Such works have suggested a rethinking of the term “diaspora.”6 The proponents of 
this approach concentrate on issues such as how and against what diasporas define themselves 
(Clifford 1994, 307); how diasporic identities are “produced and reproduced,” but “never 
complete, always in process” (Hall 1990, 235), or how they are “practiced, lived and 
experienced” (Braziel and Mannur 2003, 2-3; Tölölyan 1996b, 9); how discursive practices 
construct diaspora identities and frame them “as an object of knowledge beyond nation-state” 
(Edwards 2009, 12-13, 67); or, how those transnational practices form diasporic identities and 
belongings (Gilroy 1993, 15-6; Gopinath 1995, 304; Lazarus 1995, 332). Rather than 
constructing definitions, Kim Butler proposes a type of diasporan study, with its focus on 
“reasons for, and conditions of, the dispersal; relationship with the homeland; relationship with 
hostlands; interrelationships within communities of the diaspora; and comparative studies of 
                                                                                                                                                       
1. “they or their ancestors have been dispersed from a specific original “center” to two or more 
“peripheral,” or foreign, regions 
2. they retain a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland – its physical 
location, history, and achievements; 
3. they believe that they are not – and perhaps cannot be – fully accepted by their host society and 
therefore feel partly alienated and insulated from it;  
4. they regard their ancestral homeland as their true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their 
descendants would (or should) eventually return – when conditions are appropriate; 
5. they believe that they should, collectively, be committed to the maintenance or restoration of their 
original homeland and to its safety and prosperity; and 
6. they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their 
ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such 
relationship.” 
6 One of the pioneers of the “rethinking” is Khachig Tölölyan. In 1996 Tölölyan (1996b: 3) argued that there is a 
shift in the last few decades after 1960s, when communities formerly known as exile groups, overseas communities, 
ethnic and racial minorities, now are re-named as diasporas. He explains the reasons why this transformation 
occurred, which he finds to be “the result of change in the politics of discursive regimes as well as the product of 
extra-discursive phenomena.” In this and many other articles he goes on to discuss the “discursive” as well as 
“extra-discursive” practices that transform dispersions into diasporas (cf. Tölölyan 1996a; 1996b; 2000; 2002; 
2006). Based on such rethinking, he comes to conclude that dispersion communities can transform into a diaspora 
“only when they insist on sustaining a community and maintaining a traditional identity or, if that fails, retaining 
traits that underscore their difference from the majority society around them and emphasize their similarity to kin in 




different diasporas” (2001, 195). If the purpose of the “ideal type” instrumentalist definitions was 
the differentiation of diaspora from other forms of dispersion such as migrant communities, 
ethnic, racial and religious minorities and so on, the purpose of the new approach is not so much 
the differentiation as the description of the process of transformation from dispersion to 
diaspora. The representatives of the latter approach now focus both on the fact that not all 
refugee and migrant communities develop into a diaspora, and on the ways in which they too, 
conversely, get transformed into a diaspora. Such rethinking shifted the focus onto the ways and 
conditions under which dispersions transform into diasporas (cf. Tölölyan 2007, 648-51). It is 
from this perspective, that the present dissertation addresses the transformation of the post-
genocide dispersion of Armenians into a diaspora. By exploring the dynamics of diaspora 
formation and by emphasizing the social constructedness of the Armenian homeland, diaspora 
and diasporic identities, it engages the ongoing rethinking in diaspora studies.  
 
The major contribution of this work on the Armenian diaspora is, in general, to the literature of 
diaspora studies. Some prominent scholars have addressed the Armenian as one of the earliest 
diasporas, mostly in comparison to the Jewish archetypal diaspora. Although some scholars 
hesitate to consider the Armenian an archetypal diaspora, it is still considered as one of the oldest 
‘archetypal’ diasporas (Armstrong 1976, 394; Safran 1991, 84-85; Sheffer 2003, 48). In his 
typology of diasporas Robin Cohen (2008, 16-18) distinguishes between five types of diasporas: 
victim, labor, imperial, trade and deterritorialized diasporas. He classifies the Armenians as a 
“prototypical” and “victim” diaspora along with the Jews and the Africans, all of which share 
two main elements: “the traumatic dispersal from an original homeland” and “the salience of the 
homeland in the collective memory of a forcibly dispersed group” (ibid., 2-4). Gabriel Sheffer 
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(2003, 48) agrees with Cohen that Armenian, Jewish, and Greek diasporas share certain 
similarities as “historical” diasporas, but argues that they cannot be categorized according to 
“static sociological/functional criteria so as to regard them as “labor,” “middlemen,” “trade,” or 
“imperial” diasporas.”7 Instead, Sheffer differentiates between the stateless and state-linked 
diasporas and argues that until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Armenians represented a 
“stateless” diaspora (2003, 148-9, 154-5). Such generalized perceptions and classifications of 
diasporas, even if for analytical purposes, often overemphasize certain continuities and 
overshadow the dynamics and discontinuities within diasporas. In the case of the Armenian 
diaspora, as this work will demonstrate, the post-genocide dispersion, accompanied by the fall of 
the Republic of Armenia (1918-1920), first of all produced certain ruptures with the historical 
Armenian diaspora. The massive outflow of Armenians from ancestral lands created many 
Armenian settlements in the countries of Western Europe, the Americas and elsewhere, where 
Armenians had not had any significant communal and institutional presence prior to the 
twentieth century. The establishment and active role of Armenian political parties in the 
emerging Armenian settlements produced certain continuities peculiar to the post-genocide 
Armenian diaspora. The rest of the diaspora, particularly that of the USSR, remained largely 
detached from these developments. Secondly, the existence of Soviet Armenia (1920-1991) and 
its intermittent political involvement in the diaspora led to the emergence of certain traits of both 
state-linked and stateless Armenian diasporas, as in Sheffer’s framework, but contrary to his 
perception that Armenians were a stateless diaspora.    
 
                                                
7 While it is undeniable that the Armenian diaspora was formed as a result of mostly forced deportations of 
Armenians from their ancestral lands, classifying them as a “victim” diaspora obscures some other aspects of the 
Armenian diaspora, part of which, for example, developed certain traits of a “trade” diaspora in the seventeenth-
eighteenth centuries (cf. Aslanian 2011). 
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The second major contribution of this dissertation is to the body of literature focusing 
exclusively or substantially on the Armenian diaspora. The Armenian diaspora has attracted the 
attention of many historians, sociologists, anthropologists, and political scientists. Works in this 
field can be divided into five major categories: 
1. Historical surveys of Armenian expatriate communities;  
2. Histories of Armenian communities in certain countries, regions/states, cities/towns; 
3. Histories of the Armenian church and Armenian political, compatriotic, and other 
organizations, active outside Armenia; 
4. A few sociological, psychological, anthropological, political science and comparative 
studies on particular Armenian communities in certain countries; 
5. Histories and theorizations of the Armenian diaspora. 
 
General histories of Armenian colonies/communities include Hay gaght‘akanut‘yan patmut‘yun 
[The History of Armenian Diaspora8 [sic]] by Hrach‘ya Achaṙyan,9 Patmut‘yun hay 
gaght‘akanut‘yan [History of Armenian Migrations] in 3 volumes (1941, 1955, 1961) by Arshag 
Alboyajian (Arshak Alpoyachian), Hamarot urvagits hay gaght‘avayreri patmut‘yan [A Concise 
Outline of the History of Armenian Colonies] in 2 volumes (1964, 1967) by Ashot Abrahamyan, 
Hamarot patmut‘iwn hay gaght‘avayreru [A Concise History of Armenian Colonies] (1983) by 
Hagop Atigian (Hakob Atikian), and Ejer hay gaght‘avaireri patmut‘yan [Notes on the History 
of Armenian Colonies] under the editorship of V. Barkhudaryan and Z. Yekavian (1996), and 
Hay gaght‘ashkharhi patmut‘yun (mijnadarits‘ minchev 1920t‘.) [History of Armenian Colonies 
                                                
8 History of Armenian Emigrations would be a more accurate translation, but the English version of the title in the 
book is The History of Armenian Diaspora. 




(From the Middle Ages to 1920] under the editorship of Vardges Mik‘ayelyan (2003). All these 
works focus predominantly on the pre-genocide Armenian diaspora and describe in great detail 
the formation of historical Armenian diasporic settlements, Armenian institutions, printing and 
the periodical press in various countries or parts of the world. The post-genocide dispersion is 
briefly touched upon only in some of these works (see Abrahamyan (1967), Mik‘ayelyan (ed.) 
(2003)). To this body of literature should be attributed Hay Sp‘yuṙk‘ hanragitaran [Encyclopedia 
of the Armenian Diaspora] (2003). Each of the essays briefly outlines the history of Armenian 
settlement in the country under discussion and provides details on the numbers and 
concentrations of Armenians in various towns, cities and regions of the country, as well as on 
Armenian religious, cultural, educational, political and other communal institutions and 
organizations operating in those communities. Articles on various countries are complemented 
with special essays on major Armenian institutions and organizations operating in the Armenian 
diaspora. All of the essays are mostly factual, informative and descriptive, serving as a source of 
general reference.  
 
The second cluster of literature on the Armenian diaspora includes histories of specific Armenian 
diasporic settlements. These works range from scholarly articles on Armenian settlements in 
certain towns and cities to larger volumes on Armenian diasporic settlements in certain states, 
regions and host-countries, some by scholars, some by journalists or other intellectuals.10 The 
Armenians in America by Vartan Malcom (c1919), Torn Between Two Lands: Armenians in 
                                                
10 See, for example, Hagop Deranian, “Worcester is America” (1987), Thomas Greenshields, “The Settlement of 
Armenian Refugees in Syria and Lebanon 1915-39” (1981), Martine Hovanessian, “Présence arménienne en France: 
une immigration en exile, la diaspora du XXe siécle” (2003), Robert Mirak, “The Armenians in America” (1997), 
Ara Sanjian, “The Armenian minority experience in the Modern Arab World” (2001), Anahide Ter-Minassian, “Les 




America, 1980 to World War I by Robert Mirak (1983) and Amerikayi Miats‘yal Nahangneri hay 
gaghut‘i patmut‘yuně [History of the Armenian Community in the United States] by K‘narik 
Avagyan (2000) are based on archival material and provide detailed histories of Armenians’ 
settlement and community building in the United States especially in the course of the nineteenth 
century and through the early 1920s. The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of 
a Social and Ideological Conflict by Sarkis Atamian (1955) is another interesting contribution to 
the history of the Armenians in the Untied States. Methodologically, this work is based on 
sociological and social-psychological theories, but it lacks impartiality. In his analysis of the 
Armenian intra-communal conflict in the United States, Atamian held biased views, as he was an 
active representative of one of the conflicting sides. His political affiliations undermine his 
occasionally insightful analysis of the conflict. The Armenian Americans by David Waldstreicher 
(1989) also provides a brief but valuable overview of the Armenian-Americans in the twentieth 
century. Apart from these general studies of Armenians in the United States, some specific works 
on Armenians in certain regions and states, like New England (Mamigonian 2004) or California 
(Kooshian 2002; Jendian 2008), or even towns, like Fresno (Bulbulian 2000), also have also 
appeared recently.  
 
Armenian diasporic communities in Europe, particularly in France, have also attracted the 
attention of several intellectuals and scholars. One of the more comprehensive histories of the 
Armenian diaspora in France is provided by Levon Ch‘ormisian (1975) in the fourth volume of 
his multivolume study of the History of Western Armenians from the 1870s to the 1970s.  As a 
self-trained historian, a notable social-political activist in the Armenian diaspora in France and 
the editor of several Armenian newspapers, Ch‘ormisian produced a nuanced history of the 
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establishment and functioning of the Armenian community in France with an impressive analysis 
of conflicts and disagreements within the community. Ch‘ormisian’s involvement in several 
French Armenian organizations, the shift in his political views and affiliations from anti-Soviet 
to pro-Soviet in the 1940s, left its imprint on his perceptions and, often, on his impartiality, but 
his work still presents quite a valuable source on the Armenian diaspora in France. La 
Communauté arménienne de France. 1920-1950 by Cyril Le Tallec (2001) is a more balanced 
scholarly account of Armenians in France. The book provides the history of Armenians’ 
settlement in France in the 1920s, describes in great detail the difficulties of Armenian 
integration into the host society, the establishment of Armenian institutions and organizations in 
France, the activities of Armenians during WWII and the community’s relations with Soviet 
Armenia. A more recent Les Arméniens en France: du chaos à la reconnaissance by Claire 
Mouradian and Anouche Kunth (2010) deals with the question of Armenians’ integration into 
French society. In the first part of the book, Mouradian discusses the history of the Armenians’ 
settlement in France from the first arrivals to the large influx of refugees following the genocide 
in the Ottoman Empire during WWI. The book demonstrates how Armenian genocide survivors 
went from rejection to assimilation and successful integration into the French society, how their 
identities were shaped and reshaped, and how Armenianness was defined and redefined in 
France. It also demonstrates how the French Armenian diaspora should be understood as a 
composite whole, across multiple divisions - social, political, regional, and subject to constant 
reconfiguration (ibid., 27). Apart from these general works, a number of other studies have been 
devoted to Armenian settlements in Marseille (Boghossian 2004, 2005; Belmont 2004), the 
Rhône-Alpes region (Boudjikanian-Keuroghlian 1978), Alfortville (Ananian 1999), Saint 
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Étienne (Lauras 2006), Decines (Bardakdjian 1989), Issy-Les-Moulineaux (Hovanessian 1992), 
Paris (Ter-Minassian 1994) and elsewhere in France.  
 
The Armenian communities in the Middle East have been studied too. Siriayi yev Libanani 
haykakan gaght‘ojakhneri patmut‘yun (1841-1946) [History of Armenian Colonies in Syria and 
Lebanon (1841-1946)] by Hovhannes Top‘uzyan (1986) provides details on Armenian 
emigration to Syria and Lebanon since Ottoman times, through the genocide in WWI. It has 
sections on the demographic distribution of Armenian refugees and on cultural, educational, 
political and other Armenian organizations. It discusses the problems of social-economic and 
political integration of Armenians, as well as the internal disagreements, tensions and conflicts. 
Nicola Migliorino’s (Re)Constructing Armenia in Lebanon and Syria. Ethno-Cultural Diversity 
and the State in the Aftermath of a Refugee Crisis (2008) provides a balanced account of 
Armenian communities in Syria and Lebanon. The book focuses on the formation of the post-
genocide Armenian communities in Lebanon and Syria and addresses the issues of social, 
political, economic and cultural integration of Armenians in both countries. It seeks to answer 
the question of “how a community of ‘different’ people” could successfully find its place “in the 
contemporary Middle East without being either assimilated or excluded” (p. 2). Emphasizing the 
peculiarities of the integration of Armenians in Lebanon and Syria, Migliorino’s analysis falls 
short of addressing the problems of homeland in the perceptions of Armenians in Lebanon. In 
spite of mentioning (Re)-Constructing Armenia in the title of the book, the author does not 
engage in analyzing identity construction in host-countries like Lebanon or Syria and does not 
consider whether the (re)-construction of Armenia was in any way in conflict with the existence 




The third cluster of research on the Armenian diaspora includes various histories of Armenian 
institutions and organizations active outside Armenia. This category includes histories of 
Armenian compatriotic societies,11 general histories of Armenian political and charitable, athletic 
and other organizations,12 and histories of the Armenian Church in the diaspora.13 Works in this 
category, while not addressing the Armenian diaspora directly, provide invaluable details on the 
transnational network and activism of Armenian institutions and organizations, crucial for 
understanding the functioning of a diaspora. They have to be acknowledged in general as 
relevant secondary sources for Armenian diaspora studies, but the analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of individual works lies beyond the scope of this brief literature review, as these 
works only indirectly address the overall issues of the Armenian diaspora.  
 
The fourth cluster of literature encompasses some sociological, anthropological and political 
science studies focusing on particular aspects of various Armenian diasporic settlements and 
communities. Symbol, Myth, and Rhetoric: The Politics of Culture in an Armenian-American 
Population (1989) by Jenny Phillips provides an insightful anthropological account of the 
                                                
11 See Alboyajian, Patmut‘iwn hay Kesarioy [A History of Armenian Caesarea (Kayseri)] (1937); Eghiayan, 
Adanayi hayots‘ patmut‘iwn. [History of Adana Armenians] (1970) and Minassian, Patmagirk‘ Kiwrini. [History 
Book of Gürün] (1974). Most of these works only partially are relevant in addressing the post-1915 period. 
12 See Antreassian, Patmut‘iwn Ramkavar azatakan kusakts‘ut‘ean Amerikayi arewmtean shrjanaki [History of the 
Armenian Democratic Liberal Party Western Region USA] (1981), Dallak‘yan, Ramkavar azatakan kusakts‘ut‘yan 
patmut‘yun. [History of Liberal Democratic Party] (1997, 2007), Dasnabedian, History of the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutiun 1890/1924 (1990); Djizmedjian (Chizmechian), Patmut‘iwn amerikahay 
k‘aghak‘akan kusakts‘ut‘eants‘: 1890-1925. [History of the American-Armenian Political Parties: 1890-1925] 
(1930); Kitur, Patmut‘iwn S. D. Hnchakean kusakts‘ut‘ean, 1887-1962 [History of the Social-Democratic 
Hnchakyan Party] (1962-63); Melk‘onyan, Haykakan baregortsakan ěndhanur miut‘yan patmut‘yun [History of the 
Armenian General Benevolent Union] (2005), and other works. 
13 Such as Arzumanian, Azgapatum: History of the Armenian Nation (1997); Eghiayan, Zhamanakakits‘ patmut‘iwn 
kat‘oghikosut‘ean hayots‘ Kilikioy 1914-1972 [Contemporary History of the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia] 





Armenian-American community. By analyzing symbols, myths and rhetoric, as well as conflicts 
and schisms produced by Armenian political factions in the United States, her work sheds an 
important light on how the political tensions and conflicts between the Armenian political parties 
affected everyday relations of their sympathizers or people and families not involved in 
Armenian political affairs at all. Through interviews with representatives of various Armenian-
American diasporic organizations as well as with Armenians born and raised in the Middle East 
and the Untied States, Phillips was able to address the conflicting perceptions of Armenianness 
produced in the Middle East and the United States with all the attendant consequences of 
stereotyping and exclusions.  
 
Anny Bakalian’s The Armenian-Americans: From Being to Feeling Armenian (1993) and 
Martine Hovanessian’s Le lien communautaire: trois générations d’Arméniens (1992) mostly 
address the diasporic identities of the American and French-born generations from a more 
sociological viewpoint. These studies are quite similar in approach and scope. Despite the 
limitations of sociological surveys and samples, some of the conclusions in both studies are 
comparable, suggesting that they may be applicable beyond the limits of the studied 
communities. Bakalian analyzes the identities of American-born generations of Armenians based 
on quantitative surveys conducted in New York and New Jersey and some qualitative interviews 
in the 1980s. The book argues that the Armenian-Americans transformed from “being Armenian 
to feeling Armenian” and that later generations developed a “symbolic” identity as opposed to 
the traditional markers of identity. One of Bakalian’s major points is that American born 
Armenians have the freedom to decide their personal identities: “They may choose to be 
Armenian, Armenian-American, American-Armenian, American, or whatever else they want” 
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(Bakalian 1993, 6-7). Hovanessian’s conclusions drawn from the study of the French-born third 
and fourth generations in Issy-Les-Moulineaux are quite similar. “In the absence of territorial, 
economic, linguistic unity,” writes Hovanessian, “being an Armenian” constitutes a choice. 
Some choose to learn the language, others prefer working with other Armenians, or joining 
Armenian organizations, practice their oriental cuisine, or travel to Armenia (Hovanessian 1992, 
260-1). Both works shed an important light on individual aspects of identity formation and the 
importance of the time factor in the definition of Armenianness. Both argue that the generations 
born in the Untied States and France gradually distance themselves from traditional Armenian 
diasporic institutions, organizations and identities. One of Bakalian’s important conclusions is 
that the Armenian-American community is “not a monolithic structure” and therefore it is more 
appropriate to speak of “sub-communities”, which “are crisscrossed by allegiances to place of 
birth, by recency of immigration; by religious affiliation; by political and ideological sympathies; 
by age; by life-style and interest; and by education, occupation, and income levels” (ibid. 428-9). 
While valuable, both works produced in the early 1990s did not benefit from the more recent 
debates and discourses in diaspora studies. Arguing that “assimilation and identity in the United 
States go hand in hand” and that “late-generation Armenian-Americans are less and less likely to 
know and practice the subculture of their immigrant parents and grandparents,” Bakalian 
believed that this category of people did not constitute a diaspora anymore, as they had “no 
intention of settling elsewhere” (ibid. 101, 347). Hovanessian, by contrast, while agreeing with 
Bakalian that generations born in France “accelerated the process of integration” and 
assimilation, still did not completely exclude the third and fourth generations from the diaspora 
in part because she did not privilege the importance of the myth of return to the homeland as 




Since the early 1960s, several scholarly works have been devoted to different aspects of the 
Armenian community in Lebanon, as the Lebanese Armenians had developed distinct and strong 
community structures and, at the same time, have become socially, politically and economically 
integrated in the Lebanese social fabric. Zaven Messerlian’s Masters thesis, entitled Armenian 
Representation in the Lebanese Parliament (1963) is an oft-quoted source, providing valuable 
details on Armenian participation in the Lebanese parliamentary elections since 1934. Nikola 
Schahgaldian’s PhD dissertation, The Political Integration of an Immigrant Community into a 
Composite Society: The Armenians in Lebanon, 1920-1974 (1979) presents a more 
comprehensive analysis of how different Armenian confessional communities integrated into 
Lebanon’s political fabric. Schahgaldian’s approach is valuable as he examines the political 
integration of Armenians in Lebanon by taking into consideration the influences of the ethnic 
policies and resulting politics of Soviet Armenia in the diaspora, as well as the peculiarities of 
the Lebanese political culture during the years of the French Mandate (1920-1943) and after the 
independence of Lebanon (1943-1974). Tsolin Nalbandian’s more recent dissertation, entitled 
Fashioning Armenians in Lebanon, 1946-1958 challenges Schahgaldian’s work, because it 
“maintained the existence of two impermeable distinct groups, the Armenian and the Lebanese, 
inferring that the latter was more “native” than the other,” and for separating Armenians from 
other Lebanese in that sense (Nalbandian 2011, 18). In her study, Nalbandian accentuated the 
“formative contributions” of Armenians to Lebanese national life, challenging both Armenian 
and Lebanese historiographies “which deny Lebanon’s Armenians a meaningful role in the 
fashioning of the Lebanese nation-state” (ibid., 1). Although limited in scope both spatially and 
temporally, as the work focuses exclusively on Lebanon in the period of 1946-1958, 
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Nalbandian’s approach challenges the essentialist perceptions of concepts such as homeland and 
nation. Among other findings, her work reveals how in a short span of time different and 
competing perceptions of homeland, authority, the Armenian, the National, and the Armenian 
Other, were constructed by various Armenian media outlets in Lebanon. The work also takes into 
consideration transnational and diasporic influences on Armenian affairs in Lebanon, and 
emphasizes the dynamics within the Lebanese Armenian community.  
 
Finally, several theoretical works dealing specifically with the problems of Armenian diaspora in 
general constitute the fifth cluster of literature. Chronologically, the first major publication on 
this subject was Hay sp‘yuṙk‘i patmut‘yun (hamaṙot aknark) [History of the Armenian Diaspora 
(A Brief Outline)] by Kaṙlen Dallak‘yan. The work was originally published in 1998 and revised 
and updated in the second edition of 2004. The study focuses on the modern and contemporary 
Armenian diaspora in the twentieth century. Dallak‘yan was a high ranking Communist Party 
official in Soviet Armenia, who, among other positions he held, towards the end of his career 
was the head of the Committee of Cultural Relations with Diaspora Armenians in Soviet 
Armenia (1985-1991) and a member of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia. His work 
is a valuable source for the scholars of the Armenian diaspora, as the author’s active involvement 
in the making and implementation of policies towards the Armenian diaspora certainly illustrates 
his theorization on the Armenian diaspora. Contrary to Sheffer’s argument on Armenians being a 
“stateless” diaspora until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Dallak‘yan’s account is based on the 
premise that Soviet Armenia was the homeland of the Armenians.14 While Dallak‘yan’s account 
                                                
14 Dallak‘yan was the advocate of Soviet Armenia and the USSR. From a more Marxist perspective, he defined four 
historical phases in the relations of homeland and diaspora, based on the policies of the homeland (Soviet Armenia) 
towards the diaspora. In the author’s perception, phase one, roughly from 1921 to the mid-1920s, is defined by the 
principle of “National Unity.” Homeland policies encouraged national unity in the diaspora in support of Soviet 
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briefly touches upon major developments in the diaspora, the work is less sensitive towards the 
competing and different perceptions of homeland in local and transnational diasporic discourses 
and overlooks how they affected the activities of diasporic organizations and the construction of 
diasporic identities.  
 
The recent book by Laurance Ritter, La longue marche des Arméniens: histoire et devenir d’une 
diaspora (2007) analyzes the contemporary Armenian diaspora and diasporic identities. The first 
chapter provides brief discussions of Armenian diasporic identities and communal structures in 
Lebanon, Georgia, North America, France, Russia and Turkey. One of the chapters in the first 
part argues that “Armenians lived as a diaspora in Karabagh” during the Soviet period (2007, 
112). Such an approach suggests that the author generally was guided by a perception of a 
diaspora, similar to that which Walter Conner formulated as “that segment of people living 
outside the homeland” (Conner 1986: 16). Following Martine Hovanessian and some other 
scholars, Ritter considers time as the most decisive criterion for assessing a diaspora (Ritter 
2007, 132). Even though the book does not specifically focus on the post-genocide Armenian 
diaspora, the proposed theoretical model of diaspora formation approximately corresponds to the 
“three generations” of genocide survivors: the first phase is characterized as exile, the second 
phase as integration, and the third phase as diaspora (cf. ibid., 136-7). The subsequent chapters of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Armenia (Dallak‘yan 2004, 23-7). The author defines phase two, from the mid-1920s until the 1940s, by the 
principle of “Class Stratification.” The homeland’s policies in the diaspora encouraged factionalism according to 
class affiliations, gradually alienating almost all Armenian diasporic organizations (ibid. 27-45). Phase three extends 
from the 1960s until the 1980s, and is defined by the principle of “Political Stratification.” Homeland policies from 
the 1960s reestablished relations with the pro-Soviet and pro-Soviet Armenia diasporic Armenian organizations, but 
continued alienating the anti-Soviet political factions (ibid. 45-8). Finally, the fourth phase in the relations of the 
homeland and diaspora begins with the independence of Armenia in 1991. The author defines phase four by the 
principle of “Unconstrained Relations.” The establishment of a democratic regime in independent Armenia created 
conditions for the unconstrained relations of all diasporic organizations, regardless of political views and class 
affiliations, with the homeland, the new Republic of Armenia (ibid. 49-51). In the second and third chapters, the 
author provides a brief history of the Armenian dispersion, explores the establishment of Armenian organizations in 
the diaspora, and discusses their struggles and conflicts in the diaspora. The fourth and final chapter provides brief 
histories of Armenian settlements in different countries. 
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the book focus more on post-Soviet Armenia and on the construction of diasporic identities in 
the relations with Armenia. Historical developments throughout the twentieth century and 
processes defining the transnational dynamism in the diaspora are largely left out of the scope of 
the book.  
 
Drawing on a huge body of theoretical literature in diaspora studies, Chapter 6, “Different 
Identities: Soviet Armenians, Diaspora Armenians, 1921-87” and Chapter 7, “Strengthening 
National Identity, Soviet Style, 1921-87” of Razmik Panossian’s monograph The Armenians: 
From Kings and Priests to Merchants and Commissars (2006) provide a substantial analysis of 
the post-genocide Armenian diaspora. One of the important contributions to the understanding of 
diasporic developments in Panossian’s work is the theorization of different perceptions of 
homeland in the diaspora. Without delving into historical analysis on how different perceptions 
of homeland had developed in the diaspora, Panossian acknowledges the fact that “homeland” 
could represent different things for a “typical diasporan Armenian,” ranging from the ancestral 
village in the Ottoman Empire to the “city of birth in the Middle East (or elsewhere), the country 
of residency or citizenship, present day Armenia, or the ideal of an Armenia to be” (ibid., 316).   
 
The major object of Panossian’s analysis is the Armenian nation. He defines nation in very 
abstract terms as “a modern entity, based on a subjective sense of political belonging, but rooted 
in objective - and often pre-modern - factors such as myths, symbols and cultural markers” 
(Panossian 2006, 28). Panossian suggests that nations “must have some sort of political structure 
that ties its members together,” which can be “states (as is the case with the ‘established’ 
nations), or … community structures (as the case with diaspora nations)” (ibid., 28-29). 
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Allowing for the possibility of “diaspora nations” in chapter 6, Panossian juxtaposes the “Soviet 
style nation-building” to the “diaspora style nation-building” in the 1920s and 1930s to argue 
that  
 
…under the leadership of competing organisations, a heterogeneous group of people with fundamental 
differences in terms of regional identity, religion (Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant), language (Armenian, 
Turkish, dialects), occupation and class, social status (refugees, assimilated elites, intellectuals), political 
loyalties and cultural influences from host-states were moulded into a relatively coherent community with a 
collective consciousness as a diasporic nation [emphasis in original] (ibid., 292). 
 
Panossian ascribes to the diaspora, particularly to the diasporic elites (leadership) and 
institutions, the capabilities necessary to produce a nation. In his discussion of the post-genocide 
Armenian diaspora the role of “political elites,” “nationalist leaders” and diasporic institutions is 
considerably overestimated. Elites and institutions certainly played an important role in the 
formation of Armenian diasporic communities, in the establishment and functioning of various 
Armenian diasporic organizations and in the production of Armenianness in different countries, 
but these cannot be overemphasized at the expense of the social-political conditions in host 
countries and the policies of Soviet Armenia in the diaspora; while acknowledged, they are given 
less importance in the book. 
 
Secondly, while Panossian acknowledges that “different Armenian groups around the world 
engaged in differing processes of identity formation in the post-Genocide period” (ibid., 292), 
certainly not all of these processes led to the formation of a diasporic nation. His book privileges 
the Armenians of Lebanon and the Armenianness produced in Lebanon in the 1920s and 1930s, 
which in Panossian’s conviction became the “standard” by which identity was measured 
throughout the post-Genocide diaspora” (ibid., 305).  Rather than addressing how and in what 
particular ways it became the standard, Panossian juxtaposes it with the symbolic Armenianness, 
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described by Anny Bakalian. To him, symbolic Armenianness produced in the West a “fractured 
identity” insofar as it was “evolving in various directions in various communities.” Panossian 
does not exclude the symbolic Armenians from being part of an Armenian nation. Downplaying 
the diversity of Armenianness produced in Lebanon, as well as the diversity of diasporic 
identities in general, Panossian’s work emphasizes the phenomenon of a diasporic nation and the 
subjective sense of belonging of all Armenians in the entire diaspora and Soviet Armenia, 
regardless of enormous differences, to one Armenian nation.15   
 
Khachig Tölölyan is the most prominent scholar, who has contributed to the study of Armenian 
diaspora significantly and whose several articles have been groundbreaking in the field of 
diaspora studies. Tölölyan’s views on Armenian diaspora are dispersed in several articles and 
brochures rather than combined in a single monograph. In Tölölyan’s theorization, the Armenian 
diaspora is analyzed as the “paradigmatic Other of the nation state,” although he acknowledges 
that “transnational communities” such diasporas are, may act as nation-states’ “ally, lobby, or 
even, as in the case of Israel, its precursor” (1991b, 5). In his conviction, “[w]hereas diasporas 
have long been conceived of in relation to the triangle of homeland, hostland and diaspora, they 
are now conceptualized as part of a transnational network and a global space” (2002: 30). With 
the recent proliferation of the discourse of transnationalism in diaspora studies, as Tölölyan 
argues, “the prevailing orientation towards the nation-state” no longer serves as the “analytical 
strait-jacket” for the study of diasporas (ibid., 37). While in practice Tölölyan acknowledges that 
“each twist of Soviet nationalities policy” in Soviet Armenia towards the diaspora “had its 
                                                
15 In the conclusion of chapter 6, Panossian argues that “Armenians are presently divided between various sets of 
institutions, polities, imaginations, cultures etc., each set itself fragmented along political lines. But they all maintain 




consequences in the [Armenian] diaspora” (2000, 121), and that debates of the homeland 
constituted part of the diasporic discourses (2006; 24-5), he focuses mostly on dynamic 
processes in the Armenian diaspora, without analyzing its orientation towards the Armenian 
state, whether Soviet or independent.  
 
Tölölyan’s major argument in regard to the post-genocide Armenian diaspora is that the exilic 
nationalism of the first generations was replaced by diasporic transnationalism of the later 
generations. He defines exilic nationalism as expressed in the hopes of Armenian elites and 
institution for return to the ancestral lands, and diasporic transnationalism as the realization of 
the permanence of the diaspora (2000, 107-8; 2002, 9; 2006, 13-4). In the second phase of 
diasporic transnationalism, elites and institutions become less important vis-à-vis “the massive 
new transnational migrations of the post-1965 period” (2006, 9-10).  
 
After the independence of Armenia (1991), as Tölölyan observes, certain diasporic elites 
(including himself), have begun to affirm that Armenians worldwide constitute something other 
than a transnational diaspora, more than a collection of different communities in the diaspora. If 
for Panossian this was the subjective sense of belonging to an Armenian nation, for Tölölyan it 
makes “less sense to speak of an Armenian nation - with its implications of unity and essence,” 
and therefore, he introduces the idea of an Armenian transnation. The Armenian transnation 
consists of the Republic of Armenia, the region of Nagorno-Karabakh and the diaspora, “itself 
enormously heterogeneous,” and is “…animated by many interactions and exchanges” between 




Regarding diasporic identities, Tölölyan differentiates between three groups of Armenian 
“ethnics” in the United States: fully assimilated Americans of Armenian descent; true ethnics, 
“who acknowledge their Armenian descent and display “ethnic pride” symbolically, retain 
voluntary associations with communal organizations … but are emphatically American at the 
same time;” and diasporic Armenians, “who are vital to the struggles over communal self-
definition. They give their various forms of allegiance to an Armenian nation…” (Tölölyan 
1996a, 24-5; 2005, 45). The diasporans are committed activists, core members of the 
community, who hold multi-local concerns and affiliation and who  
staff and found organizations that have specifically diasporan concerns: they lobby for or against the 
homeland government…, or raise funds for the homeland,… or struggle to mobilize a transnational 
religious community in the service of a new homeland movement… They tend to be citizens of one country 
who also think of themselves as members of a transnational political and cultural community… (Tölölyan 
1996b, 18). 
 
In a later article, Tölölyan adds one more group to the list, which are the recent ethnic migrants, 
who are not assimilated, not involved in local diasporan organizations and not active in diaspora 
matters but still maintain their homeland identities and close relations with the homeland (2000, 
113). 
 
If in theory Tölölyan’s differentiation of the Armenian “ethnics” is quite appealing, in practice 
often it is hard to differentiate between fully assimilated, true ethnics and diasporans. If someone 
is not involved in any diasporic organizations, is not active in the life of diaspora, does not speak 
Armenian, occasionally, but not consistently, gets involved in programs with the homeland, is 
he/she a diasporic Armenian or a true ethnic? Or if someone has not been active in the diaspora 
for many years, and then he/she decides to be more involved in diasporic life and homeland 
related activities, is he/she a diasporan or again a true ethnic? Such observations suggest, and as 
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Tölölyan (1996b, 17-19) also noted, that in practice, diasporic identities are fluid, as people tend 
to change especially in the age of transnationalism and advanced communications.   
 
While Tölölyan’s theoretical and methodological contribution to the field of diaspora studies is 
undeniable, both his works and the literature on Armenian diaspora, in general, left the historical 
and sociological aspects of the transformation of the post-genocide Armenian dispersion into a 
diaspora unaddressed. The following questions, which this dissertation intends to address, have 
remained largely out of scholarly discussions in the field: 
• How and under what conditions did the vast dispersion of Armenians following the 
deportations and genocide transform into a diaspora? 
• How did conditions in specific host-countries impede or conduce the activities of 
diasporic elites, the formation and (transnational) activism of Armenian institutions? 
• How did international and national social-political developments influence the Armenian 
diaspora over time? 
• Why and in what ways did some Armenian diasporic institutions succeed in developing 
strong transnational networks, while others remained locally organized at best or 
disappeared in many countries? 
• What have been the prevailing perceptions of homeland, how they have been constructed 
and what was their influence on dynamic processes in the diaspora?  
• In what ways did the twists and turnings of Soviet nationalities policies influence the 
dynamic processes in the Armenian diaspora? 
• How did some forms of Armenianness and identities, as proposed by Panossian, become 




The present dissertation aims to fill this gap in the existing literature on the Armenian diaspora. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the major processes, turning points, and discourses 
in the formation and functioning of the post-genocide Armenian diaspora. It seeks to achieve this 
by comparatively exploring dynamic processes in major settlements of Armenians in three 
countries - the United States, France and Lebanon; by exploring the policies of the homeland 
state (Republic of Armenia (1918-1920) and Soviet Armenia (1920-1991)) and their influences 
on diasporic elites and institutions; by examining the activities of elites and institutions in 
response to dynamic international, national and homeland conditions and policies; and by 
addressing discourses, identities and continuities shaped transnationally across the borders of 
(nation)-states. It is not the intention of this work to provide a comprehensive history of 
Armenian settlements and communities or Armenian organizations in Lebanon, France and the 
Untied States. However, histories of the settlement of Armenians in the United States, France 
and Lebanon are discussed in so far as they help to comparatively analyze the peculiarities of the 
paths of integration, which the Armenian immigrants and refugees had to take under the 
prevailing social-political conditions in each of those countries. Similarly, histories of Armenian 
diasporic institutions and organizations are discussed in so far as they were instrumental in the 
establishment of transnational networks and production of transnational discourses on 
Armenianness and the Armenian homeland, as they served as channels for promoting certain 
values, identities, ideologies, orientations and political agendas in the diaspora. 
 
The main thesis of this dissertation is that the transformation of the post-genocide Armenian 
dispersion into a diaspora occurred thanks to the efforts of Armenian elites and institutions, but 
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that it was equally determined by policies pursued by the country engaged in promoting itself as 
the homeland, Soviet Armenia and, perhaps more importantly, by the changing and multiple 
influences of host-country specific and international social-political conditions. The latter also 
influenced the ideologies and policies of the elites and institutions, and significantly determined 
the strengths and weaknesses of these institutions locally, in host-countries, and transnationally 
in the diaspora. This dissertation emphasizes the combination of various local, national, 
international and transnational factors, as well as some personal and organizational peculiarities 
of Armenian elites and institutions, which produced certain transnational ideologies and 
orientations towards Soviet Armenia and discourses on homeland and diasporic identifications. 
By focusing on such important diasporic institutions as compatriotic societies, the Armenian 
Church, political parties, and institutions created by Soviet Armenia for dealing with Armenians 
in the diaspora, throughout the work this dissertation highlights the tensions and conflicts within 
and among these institutions, which, under the influence of changing international and local 
conditions in host-countries, contributed to the formation of the Armenian diaspora and produced 
transnational loyalties and belongings. The radical transnational split in the post-genocide 
Armenian diaspora occurred as a result of such struggles of the elites and institutions; conflicting 
perceptions of the Armenian homeland and of its national symbols, such as the flag; and tensions 
arising from the policies of host-countries, which directly or indirectly encouraged or 
discouraged certain orientations and transnational loyalties. After 1965, the genocide recognition 
became a shared ground between the formerly hostile Armenian camps. The diasporic elites and 
organizations have slowly developed some ability to put aside hostilities and occasionally unite 
in efforts to commemorate the Armenian genocide. Yet the institutionalized divisions continued 
to prevail, (re)producing the incompatible identifications and identities, policies and programs, 
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discourses and disunities. The bifurcated self-perceptions of Armenians, between those who 
accepted Soviet Armenia as the homeland, and those who envisioned a more abstract homeland 
to be attained in the future, continued producing discourses centered on the homeland (Soviet 
Armenia) or the diaspora, were reflected in their youth oriented projects, and gave rise to 
homeland-centered and diaspora-centered paradigms of diasporic belongings.   
 
The emancipatory social movements of the 1960s in Europe and the Untied States and the crisis 
in the Middle East, accelerating the East-West migration waves, have revealed yet new tensions 
within Armenians originating from different countries. Varying expressions of Armenianness 
produced in different countries, even in some cases under the influence of the same transnational 
diasporic institutions, came into contact and conflict in the West. This was expressed in the clash 
of identities among Armenians originating from various countries in the Middle East and 
between them and local French- or American-born second and third generations. Stereotyping 
and mutual labeling drew certain symbolic boundaries between Armenians originating from 
different countries, and often materialized in organizations founded and staffed exclusively by 
members of these Armenian subethnic communities. Moving beyond typologies and privileging 
certain forms of Armenian diasporic identities, as Panossian does with the Armenianness 
produced in Lebanon or Tölölyan with the diasporan type, this dissertation stresses, on the one 
hand, the dynamic processes, contexts in host-countries and policies in the changing homeland, 
which determined the diversity of diasporic identifications and belongings and, on the other 
hand, the instrumental role of Armenian institutions in promoting transnational paradigms of 






The theoretical framework for this study is based on the prevailing debates in diaspora studies. It 
partly follows the framework proposed by Kim Butler (2001), but rather than favoring this 
“triangle” approach of homeland, host-country and diaspora, or discourses of transnationalism 
and transnational and global social spaces, this dissertation attempted to situate the analysis of 
the Armenian diaspora within and between both analytical perspectives. The “triangle” approach 
is indispensable when studying how certain dispersions transform into a diaspora (cf.	  Butler	  
2001,	  207;	  Sheffer	  1986,	  1). Without addressing the problems of homeland, conditions in host-
countries, as well as the intentions, ideologies and perceptions of diasporic intellectuals, elites 
and organizations, it would be impossible to analyze how exactly certain immigrant or refugee 
populations established in a foreign country were able to produce and retain distinct identities, 
establish various organizations and engage in relations with their kin in other countries and in the 
homeland. On the other hand, discourses of transnationalism are indispensable when studying 
how diasporas are capable of producing independent political agendas and engage in lobbying 
activities in their respective host-countries.   
 
The fieldwork was conducted in three countries - Lebanon, France and the United States - in the 
course of two years from 2012 until 2014. The choice of these three countries was determined by 
two reasons. First of all, Armenians in all three countries had maintained identifiable presence 
since their settlement with their institutions and organizations, periodical press, and generations 
directly or indirectly involved in organizations and institutions. Secondly, the activities of 
Armenian elites and organizations especially in these countries have had long-lasting 
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transnational resonance and repercussions in the post-genocide Armenian diaspora throughout 
the twentieth century. The present dissertation is based on about 150 interviews (each lasting 
about an hour) conducted by the author with the leaders of various Armenian organizations and 
other notable representatives of the second and third generations in these three countries; 
numerous newspaper articles photographed by the author in various Armenian newspaper 
collections in Lebanon, France and the United States; as well as number of other publications 
produced by the eyewitnesses, immediate participants of the events, and by the diasporic elites. 
 
Because the archives of Armenian diasporic organizations are not accessible, articles published 
in their official organs in various countries or pamphlets authored by their respective leaders and 
juxtaposing those publications with their opponents’ criticism on given subjects, were 
indispensable for providing a more balanced analysis of the events. The major newspapers 
consulted in Lebanon were Aztag (1927 - present), Ararad (1937 - present) and Zartonk (1937 - 
present), the official organs of the three Armenian political parties. In France, Haratch (1925-
1940, 1945-2009) and Achkhar (1960-2012) although formally not affiliated with any of the 
Armenian organizations, informally represented the conflicting political viewpoints of the 
Dashnaks and Communists. Apart from these two, several issues of Arshav (1932), the unofficial 
organ of the Armenian pro-Communists in the 1920s, and Anahit (1929-1940, 1946-1949), a 
literary journal run by one of the leaders of the Armenian Democratic Liberal (Ramkavar) party 
had also been studied. Hairenik Monthly (1922-1970) and the Armenian Review (1948-present) 
especially in the period of 1948-1965, represented the official line of the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation (the Dashnak party) in the Diaspora, as most of its leaders occasionally 
contributed lengthy analytical and ideological pieces. The dissertation extensively makes use of 
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articles published especially in these journals. Apart from these two, several issues of the 
Dashnak weekly and daily organs, like Hairenik (1899-present) in Boston and Asbarez (1908-
present) in California, the independent Armenian Reporter International (1967-2014), Armenian 
Mirror-Spectator (1932 - present) affiliated with the Ramkavar party also have been consulted.  
 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The chapters are organized chronologically and 
thematically. Chapter one, Defining Homeland, provides the historical background in the 
nineteenth century. The first section in the chapter argues that a certain territorial image of the 
Armenian homeland was constructed and promoted by Armenian intellectuals and public 
activists from the 1850s. It was formally recognized in the void Treaty of San-Stefano, following 
the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, and was incorporated in the programs of the Armenian 
political parties emerging in the second half of the 1880s. In the second section, the chapter goes 
on to argue that the Sovietization of Armenia in 1920 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, left 
the Armenian political parties, now all operating exclusively in the diaspora, with an existing 
Soviet state and with their unrealized dreams to achieve the large independent Armenia they had 
imagined. 
 
Chapter two, Host-Country Conditions, Dispersion of Armenians, and the Prospects for 
Community Building in the United States, France and Lebanon, analyzes comparatively the 
dispersion of Armenians, social-political and economic contexts in the United States, France and 
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Lebanon, the patterns of settlement, political and social integration of Armenian immigrants and 
refugees, as well as the efforts of the diasporic elites to establish community organizations. The 
major argument in this chapter is that while the diverse groups of Armenians tended to regroup 
and reestablish their community life in host-countries according to their family and compatriotic 
ties, international and country specific contexts in many ways determined the possibilities and 
peculiarities of community building and the construction and transmission of identities in each of 
these countries. The chapter emphasizes the dialectal and confessional diversity of Armenian 
immigrant and refugee groups and how the patterns of dispersion and settlement within certain 
countries produced in many cases compatriotic settlements of Armenians originating from the 
same village, small town or region in the Ottoman Empire. After settling in usually close-knit 
compatriotic settings, these communities produced truly diasporic transnational networks to help 
their compatriots back in the homeland (narrowly defined, as the native village or town in the 
Ottoman Empire), or, after the great dispersion, elsewhere in the diaspora.  
 
Chapter three, In Search of Armenia Between the Two World Wars, examines the process of the 
reorganization of Armenian political parties in the diaspora and their orientations towards the 
Armenian homeland in the interwar period. By analyzing political conditions in the Untied 
States, France and Lebanon, policies and participation of the Soviet Armenian Committees of Aid 
to Homeland in the formation diasporic communities, this chapter particularly addresses the 
emergence and institutionalization of pro- and anti-Soviet political orientations among the 
Armenian political parties in the diaspora and tensions, disagreements and struggles of the 
Armenian political parties for power within different Armenian communities. Rather than 
treating the political parties as monolithic entities, this chapter stresses the internal dynamics 
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within the parties and how these processes eventually led to the institutionalization of certain 
attitudes towards the Soviet regime and certain perceptions of the Armenian homeland. The 
second and third parts of the chapter analyze how the political parties gained growing influence 
within the Armenian communities in the host-countries by attempting to control other communal 
institutions and organizations, like churches or compatriotic societies, by establishing schools, 
wherever possible, or by taking control over the existing Armenian schools. It also sheds light on 
how in Lebanon, particularly, due to more favorable social-political conditions, Armenian 
organizations became instrumental in the forging of the diverse refugee masses into more 
homogeneous Armenophone masses, albeit with different/conflicting perceptions of the 
homeland, the nation and national symbolism. The major argument in the chapter is that 
Armenian political parties developed different perceptions on the Armenian homeland and 
Soviet Armenia, and produced, therefore mutually exclusive values, symbolism and loyalties. 
The clash of exclusive orientations took different shapes in different countries, causing an intra-
communal schism in the United States, and intra- and inter-organizational conflicts and schisms 
in France and Lebanon. 
 
Chapter four, From Exclusions and Violent Schism to Joint Commemorations of the Genocide, 
addresses the process of transnational polarization of the Armenian diaspora. The chapter 
analyzes the rapidly changing international conditions and how they influenced the political 
courses of the Armenian diasporic factions during WWII and the Cold War. The major argument 
of the chapter is that if the pro-Soviet factions took advantage of the unprecedented coalition of 
particularly the United States and Soviet Union to discredit the anti-Soviet Armenian political 
organizations and to benefit from it, the Cold War provided conditions for the resurgence of the 
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anti-Soviet faction. The struggle between diasporic Armenian pro- and anti-Soviet factions, the 
former represented by several political and non-political organizations, and the latter represented 
mostly by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (the Dashnak party) and its affiliate 
organizations, acquired new transnational dimensions especially after 1947. Taking advantage of 
the prevailing anti-Sovietism in the Untied States and Western Europe, directly and indirectly 
encouraged by American and Western European backing and support, the anti-Soviet offensive 
of the Dashnaktsutyun in several host-countries eventually led to the radical split within the 
Armenian (Apostolic) church in the Middle East and to a transnational schism in the post-
genocide Armenian diaspora. The last part of the chapter analyzes the changes in Soviet policies, 
international conditions, as well as the establishment of genocide recognition in the political 
agendas of Armenian political parties, which combined led to the attempts of rapprochement 
among the Armenian political parties and hostile factions. The 1965 joint commemorations of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide were unprecedented, and became a turning 
point marked by at least nominal transnational unity among all Armenian political factions. 
 
Chapter 5, Divided in Unity: Armenian Factions, Diasporic Identities and Subethnic 
Communities in France and the United States, argues that even if the year 1965 marked the 
symbolic beginning of a process of formal rapprochement between the hostile camps,  even if the 
genocide recognition provided a shared ground between these camps, institutional dividedness in 
the Armenian diaspora and transnational rivalry among Armenian political factions continued. In 
the first part, the chapter examines the emergence and transnational competition of radical 
Armenian organizations in the diaspora and the effects of their activities on host-country 
policies, as well as on Armenian diasporic factions. The second part largely addresses another 
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aspect of the disunity in the Armenian diaspora by exploring how Armenianness, produced 
especially in Lebanon, became dominant within many diasporic organizations and came to be 
promoted by several Armenian transnational organizations and institutions in the diaspora. This 
section emphasizes the heterogeneity of diasporic identities by analyzing clashes of identities in 
France and the Untied States, where a number of new Armenian immigrants had settled since the 
1960s from the Middle East and Soviet Armenia. The chapter concludes by analyzing how 
certain continuities in transnationally divided Armenian diaspora eventually produced homeland-
centered and diaspora-centered paradigms, both of which self-reflexively address the problems 









Homeland, whether in the form of a (nation-) state or as an imaginary or mythical concept, 
constitutes an important attribute of a diaspora. This chapter provides a historical background to 
the post-genocide Armenian dispersion and to the concept of homeland, which will become a 
central matter of debates in the post-genocide diaspora. It analyzes the conditions under which 
the Armenian homeland was imaginatively, and somewhat imaginarily, restored and defined in 
Armenian political discourse and in the programs of Armenian political parties; explores the 
rapidly changing international, imperial and Armenian affairs during WWI and its aftermath, 
which made a great impact on the realization of the Armenian homeland; and addresses the 
conflicts and tensions among Armenian political parties and factions related to the perceptions of 
homeland and its representation. In the first part, the chapter argues that a certain territorial 
image of Armenia, the homeland, was constructed and promoted by the Armenian intellectuals 
and political parties. It does so by analyzing the changing conditions in the Russian and Ottoman 
empires in the nineteenth century and the discourse produced by Armenian intellectuals and 
political parties. In the second part, the chapter goes on to argue that this image of homeland 
came into conflict with the actualized Republic of Armenia (1918-1920) by examining the 
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uncertainty of the Armenian political factions around the status of the Republic of Armenia in 
relation to the envisioned homeland. The sources used for the reconstruction of the Armenian 
homeland as it had been imagined by the Armenian intellectuals and political party leaders, 
consist mostly of the programs of Armenian political parties, peace treaties, and newspaper 












The Struggle for the Homeland: Armenia in the Nineteenth Century  
 
The annexation of the Khanates of Erivan and Nakhijevan by the Russian Empire, following the 
Russo-Persian war of 1826-1828, marked the beginning of a new era in the political, social and 
cultural realities of the region. Under the influence of a Christian Slavic culture, reform 
movements in the Russian Empire, and larger processes of enlightenment and secularization in 
Europe, the socio-political context underwent rapid change for the Armenians. The social 
environment was now conducive for the development of an Armenian liberation-minded, 
socialist intelligentsia and literature.16 The Russian dominion over Armenians gave rise to a 
generation of educated, liberal minded Armenians, who quickly became the active proponents of 
secularization, enlightenment and modernization. Shortly after the absorption of Eastern 
Armenia by the Russian empire, some Armenians began taking advantage of the advanced 
educational opportunities, provided by the tsarist regime. Receiving education in the leading 
universities of Russia and Germany, these young intellectuals made significant contributions to 
the advancement of education in their native Armenian communities and to the formation of a 
modern, secular Armenian identity (cf. Khachaturian 2009: 1-25).   
 
In the Ottoman Empire, Armenians continued as an ethno-religious community (millet), enjoying 
a certain degree of autonomy in communal matters, but remained inferior to the Muslims in the 
Empire in the realms of politics, administration and the military (cf. Barsoumian 1997, 182-3). 
                                                
16 For a detailed study of the influences of the developments in Imperial Russia on the formation of modern 
Armenian identity see Khachaturian (2009). 
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The Ottoman reforms, initiated by Sultan Mahmud II in 1830s, held the promise of equality for 
all subjects of the empire before the law, of which the Armenians hoped to highly benefit 
(Findley 2008, 18; Shaw and Shaw 2002, 59-61, 55; Akçam 2006, 28-35, 79; Barsoumian 1997, 
182-3). The subsequent Reform Edict of 1856, which aimed at reorganizing the millet system 
urged the millets to reform their structures and involve laymen in the internal affairs of the millet 
(Akçam 2006, 30; Barsoumian 1997, 180-2). Several years of disputes and discussions between 
liberal constitutionalists and conservative anti-constitutionalists in Constantinople eventually 
produced the Armenian National Constitution, which was finally adopted by the Armenian 
Patriarch (1860) and approved by the Sultan in 1863 (cf. Ormanian 2001, 4018-4020; Libaridian 
1987, 114-5; 2007, 62-3; Barsoumian 1997, 198). With much enthusiasm some Armenians began 
advocating equality for Armenians in the Ottoman Armenian provinces, thereby initiating a 
discourse on the Armenian homeland.  
 
The urgency of the conditions of Armenians in the provinces was brought to the attention of 
Armenians in Constantinople and elsewhere primarily thanks to the efforts of the bishop 
Mkrtich‘ Khrimian (1820-1907).17 Khrimian was inspired but concerned with the stalled 
Tanzimat reforms and quite disappointed of the ignorance of Constantinople Armenians of the 
situation of Armenians in the provinces. He founded the Artsvi Vaspurakan (Eagle of 
Vaspurakan) monthly in 1855 in Constantinople, and moved it to his birthplace in Van the next 
year. In the course of almost a decade (from 1855 until 1863) Khrimian and his disciples 
published a number of essays in Artsvi Vaspurakan on the history of the Armenians, patriotism, 
the dire conditions in the homeland – Armenia, by which they referred to Armenian provinces. In 
                                                
17 Khrimian was a native of Van. His accomplishments promoted him to the rank of the Patriarch of Constantinople 
in 1869 (until 1873). He was later elected Catholicos of all Armenians (1892-1907). 
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doing so, they intentionally promoted the provinces as the Armenian homeland and called on the 
Armenians to return to their birthplaces. Khrimian believed that through education and 
adherence to the Armenian Constitution the unfair treatment of Armenians in the homeland 
would end. 
 
In 1869 Khrimian was elected Patriarch of Constantinople. This strong advocate of the Armenian 
constitution and education in the provinces (homeland) now occupied the highest possible 
Armenian office in the Ottoman Empire to be able to implement the Constitution. Four years 
later, on August 3, 1873, Khrimian announced his resignation at the Armenian National 
Assembly session. In the resignation speech he admitted that he had agreed to leave everything 
behind and move out from the homeland, because he had honestly believed that, as Patriarch, he 
could achieve his goals (Khrimian [1873] 1910, 6). But before long he had found himself in 
violation of some of the principles of the “law of national reforms.” Moreover, shortly after his 
election, Khrimian became the active proponent of constitutional reforms and was even labeled 
by some adherents of the Constitution as an anti-constitutionalist (ibid., 18-9). Khrimian 
confessed in the speech that he could not achieve his goal, because “the councils provided by the 
Constitution [were] never enough to meet the needs of the [Armenian] people.” However, he still 
hoped some Constitutional reforms could make the “administrative machine” move, if the 
Patriarch could receive more executive power (ibid., 11; 23).  
 
Khrimian’s hopes remained unrealized because the institutionalized millet system in the Ottoman 
Empire was inherently in contradiction to the promises of certain equality among all the subjects 
of the Empire in the Reform Edict. Without the good will of the Sultan, the Armenian 
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Constitution could not change the life of Armenians in any significant way (Libaridian 1987, 
155-62). The implementation of the Reform Edict in the Empire remained solely at the discretion 
of the Sublime Porte. As Shaw and Shaw (2002, vii-viii) argued in their study, “though the 
Tanzimat reforms were accompanied by an extension of the principle of representative 
government, ironically they culminated in the sovereign autocracy of Abdulhamid II (1876-
1909)…”  
 
The reluctance of the Sublime Porte to implement the promised equality among the imperial 
subjects prompted the Armenians to think of alternative ways of ending the suffering of 
Armenians in the provinces. The Russian victory in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 offered a 
possibility for the Armenians to seek external assistance in this matter. The successor of 
Khrimian, Patriarch Nerses Varzhapetian, and the Armenian National Assembly petitioned the 
supreme commander of the Russian Army, Grand Duke Nicholai Nikolaevich, to include a 
provision on Armenians in the peace treaty with the Ottomans (Hovannisian 1997a, 208; cf. 
Kostandyan 2008, 236-7, Ormanian 2001, col. 4342). Subsequently, the treaty of San Stefano, 
singed between Russia and the Sublime Porte on March 3, 1878, addressed the issue of 
Armenians in Article 16: 
As the evacuation by the Russian troops of the territory which they occupy in Armenia, and which is to be 
restored to Turkey, might give rise to conflicts and complications detrimental to the maintenance of good 
relations between the two countries, the Sublime Porte engages to carry into effect, without further delay, 
the improvements and reforms demanded by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by Armenians, 
and to guarantee their security from Kurds and Circassians (Holland 1885, 343)  
 
The treaty was not implemented, however, as the European powers fearful of the increasing 
Russian presence in the Ottoman Empire intervened and made the parties renegotiate the 




Inspired by the treaty of San-Stefano and hoping to get even more specific article passed in the 
new treaty, the Armenian patriarchate developed a project of reforms in the Armenian provinces. 
The document was produced in 1878 and was circulated by the unofficial Armenian 
representatives among the delegates of the Berlin peace conference. The bilingual document in 
Armenian and French, printed in Constantinople, was titled Project of Laws for Ottoman 
Armenia (Tsragir kazmakerpakan kanonagri Osmanyan Hayastani/Projet de réglement 
organique pour l’Arménie Turque). The document defined Armenia territorially, according to 
which the future Armenia would include the Vilayets of Erzurum and Van entirely, the northern 
part of the Vilayet of Diarbekir (which was to the East from the sanjak of Kharberd (Harput) 
until the River Euphrates), the sanjak of Arghana (Ergani), the northern part of the sanjak of 
Seghert (Siirt), as well as the harbor of Rize between Trebizond and Batumi in order to facilitate 
commerce (Tsragir 1878, 8(9)). The document envisioned full autonomy for Armenia within the 
structure of the Ottoman Empire with an Armenian governor general appointed by the Sublime 
Porte. The governor was to reside in Erzurum and would be invested with full executive power 
in Armenia. The Projet endowed him with the authority to provide the security in the region, to 
collect taxes, to appoint local administrators, judges and preside over the general assembly (ibid., 
8(9)).18 The document also proposed certain regulations in the relations between Armenians and 
Muslims by suggesting mixed Christian-Muslim militias, separate Sharia courts for the Muslims 
and secular courts for the Christians or Christian-Muslim disputes (ibid., 12(13)).   
 
                                                
18 The document, unfortunately, does not include a map of the envisioned Armenia. It should be noted, however, 
that the described territories of Armenia did not encompass all the six vilayets, where Armenian constituted large 
numbers (Map 1.1). 
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 The peace treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia and Turkey 
“for the Settlement of Affairs in the East” signed in Berlin on July 13, 1878, however, dismissed 
all the petitions and claims of Armenians. Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin significantly revised 
Article 16 of the San Stefano Treaty and dropped the word Armenia altogether: 
The Sublime Porte undertakes to carry out, without further delay, the improvements and reforms demanded 
by local requirements in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians, and to guarantee their security against 
the Circassians and Kurds. It will periodically make known the steps taken to this effect to the Powers, who 
will superintend their application (Holland 1885, 306). 
 
Despite the unfavorable for the Armenians outcome, the treaties concluding the Russo-Turkish 
war of 1877-1878 made a significant impact on the emergence of radical ideologies among 
Armenians. If before the Russo-Turkish war the necessity of resorting to arms, resistance, 
struggle were not seen and preached as preferable options for achieving national goals in the 
Ottoman Armenian provinces, the post-war treaties, first promising an autonomous Armenia then 
downgrading the autonomy to some mere reforms, made the Armenian delegates, headed by 
Khrimian, rethink their beliefs. After returning from Europe, the Hayrik (father), as Khrimian 
had become known among Armenians, gave a controversial speech in Constantinople, which 
some scholars argue was the “prescription that produced the Armenian revolution” (Libaridian 
1987, 161; cf. Nalbandian 1963, 29). Khrimian’s sermon described the events at the Berlin 
conference in a metaphorical language. He compared the process of negotiations at the 
conference with an Armenian dish, harisa.19 As he explained, the delegations of “small and 
oppressed” nations who had arrived with “swords,” used them as “iron ladles” to get their share 
of harisa. The ladle of Armenians was made of a paper and, therefore, they could not get 
anything (Achemian 1929, 511-2).20 “There is no room for supplications or petitions when 
                                                
19 Harisa is an Armenian porridge dish usually made of barley and chicken or lamb. 




matters are decided by guns,” Khrimian allegedly stated afterwards21 (quoted in Libaridian 1987, 
160; cf. Achemian 1929, 512). The Sermon on the Sword, as Libaridian (1987, 160) has 
characterized the speech, made a big impression especially on revolutionary minded youth. 
Whether or not Khrimian’s sermon was a call for individual or collective armed resistance or 
revolution, it produced much resonance among the Armenians even beyond the borders of the 
Ottoman Empire.22 
 
Map 1-1. Ottoman Armenian Provinces, 1878-1914  
(Source: Hovhannisian 1997a, 205) 
 
                                                
21 Khrimian’s speech was reconstructed by some eyewitnesses retrospectively. First time it was published in Hay 
Sirt [Armenian Heart] weekly in Marseille by Manuel Mirakhorian in 1927 (cf. Achemian 1929, 514fn). Hayk 
Achemian (1929, 511) quoted the eyewitness account of Khachig Khan Sarajian. It is possible that the recorders of 
the speech might have misremembered or altered Khrimian's words. But it is equally possible that Khrimian actually 
used these words. After all, his speech did not appear in local Armenian language newspapers at the time, which 
indicates that they might have feared a harsh response from the Sublime Port. 
22 In his doctoral dissertation work, The Ideology of Armenian Liberation, Libaridian (1987, 165-66) argues that 
Khrimian’s message “remained vague, as he did not say what he meant.” Louise Nalbandian, (1963, 29), however, 
believed that Khrimian’s sermon was “an indirect appeal for the use of arms – “iron spoons” – the means 
successfully adopted by Balkan revolutionaries.” 
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Homeland in the Programs of Armenian Political Parties (1880s – 1890s) 
 
After the Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, the Armenian Question was no longer the internal 
issue of the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Berlin involved the European powers, which took 
certain responsibility to “superintend” the application of the reforms. Armenians were not 
attributed any active role in the treaty, but the internationalization of the Armenian question by 
the treaties mobilized Armenians as well. The secular discourse on Armenian nation developing 
among Eastern Armenians in the Russian Empire, in parallel to the Ottoman reformations since 
the mid-nineteenth century, began to address more intensively the problems of Armenians in the 
Ottoman Armenian provinces after the peace treaties. The growing propaganda of some 
Armenian intellectual circles of the necessity of resistance and self-defense created fertile 
grounds for the emergence of Armenian clandestine organizations, culminating in three political 
parties.  
 
Chronologically, the first Armenian political party was founded in Van in 1885. The formation 
of the party was associated with the name of Mkrtich‘ P‘ortugalian. P‘ortugalian had been a 
teacher and an educator in Constantinople, was one of the directors of the Araratian educational 
society23 and for a short period of time an editor of an Armenian language periodical in 
Constantinople24 (Poghossian 1957, 215-16; Leo 1987, 591). In the 1870s, he moved to Van and 
                                                
23 The founding of educational societies was part of the enlightening mission of some Armenian intellectuals in the 
second half of the nineteenth century. Araratian, Kilikian and Dprotsasirats-Arevelian were three of the most notable 
Armenian educational associations of the time in the Ottoman Empire. These societies merged to create the United 
Armenian Society (Association) in June 1880, which aimed at establishing schools and educational institutions in 
“Armenia and Cilicia,” i.e. the densely populated Armenian provinces in the Ottoman Empire. By 1884 the	  United	  
Society had created branches in 16 provinces and established 24 schools in various Armenian villages and towns 
throughout the Empire (Poghosian 1957, 36-7; cf. ibid., 103-5, 215-42; Aghayan et al. 771-72). 
24 P‘ortugalian was the editor of the periodical Asia for only eleven months from December 1873 to October 1874. 
From his democratic stand, he represented the interests of the common people. P‘ortugalian was mostly critical of 
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worked as an educator, encouraged and fully supported by Khrimian. Meanwhile in 1876 he 
made a trip to Tiflis to meet with some Russian Armenian activist intellectuals and to solicit 
some support for the Araratian society. The meeting with Grigor Artsruni, a prominent liberal-
minded Russian Armenian intellectual and newspaper editor, proved to be fruitful. As 
P‘ortugalian later recalled, it was in the meeting with Artsruni, that they decided to relocate the 
center of activities of the Araratian society from Constantinople to Van (see Leo 1987, 592). 
After his return to Van in 1876, P‘ortugalian became one of the regular contributors of Grigor 
Artsruni’s Mshak weekly,25 under the pen name ‘Hrant’, providing correspondence on the 
situation of Armenians in Van. At the same time, P‘ortugalian began spreading Mshak’s 
liberalism and secular nationalism in Van. Upon his return to Van, P‘ortugalian became very 
influential for his advanced views, radical teachings and for propagating the ideas of self-defense 
and resistance among the Armenian youth (Kitur 1962, 26-7; cf. Nalbandian 1963, 92-3). The 
intensifying anti-Armenian measures in the Ottoman Armenian provinces following the Russo-
Turkish war soon led to the exile of P‘ortugalian and Khrimian from Van. P‘ortugalian ended up 
in Marseille, where he started the periodical Armenia in 1885. His former students started the 
Armenakan party, naming the party after P‘ortugalian’s Armenia (Aghayan et al. 1981, 186-7; 
Libaridian 1986, 221-24; 235-36; Nalbandian 1963, 90-97). The program of the Armenakans 
stated that the organization was based on the principles “preached by Armenia” and aimed at 
disseminating its ideology. The purpose of the party was to “…win for the Armenian people in 
Turkey the right to rule over themselves through revolution…” (quoted in Ghazarian 1988, 13; 
cf. Nalbandian 1963, 97). Among the methods of achieving the purpose, the Armenakan program 
                                                                                                                                                       
the Patriarchate and National Assembly because of their inability to improve the conditions of ordinary people 
(Madoyan 1975, 105-7) 
25 Mshak [Tiller, Cultivator] was established by Grigor Artsruni in 1872. Artsruni was the editor of Mshak until his 
death in 1892. The paper was especially popular in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Turkish war, within both 
the Russian and Ottoman Armenian circles (cf. Leo 1987, 585). 
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envisioned using “revolutionary literature, excellent education, […] military and disciplinary 
training, promoting sentiments of self-defense [...] prepare the people for a general movement, 
especially when the external conditions (the disposition of foreign powers and neighboring races) 
seem to be favorable for Armenians” (quoted in Ghazarian 1988, 13; cf. Nalbandian 1963, 98). 
There activities, however, remained local, mostly in the province of Van/Vaspurakan. 
 
The second Armenian political party, which was established in 1887 in Geneva, became far more 
important in terms of the numbers, scope and geography of activities, than the Armenakans. The 
founders of the Hnchakyan party, a group of Eastern/Russian Armenians, were directly 
influenced on the one hand by the teachings of Marxism and Russian socialist revolutionary 
movements of the mid-19th century, and, on the other hand, by P‘ortugalian and his Armenia. 
Avetis Nazarbekian (1866-1939), the leader of the group, was born in Tiflis, spent a few years in 
St. Petersburg as a student, where he was involved with the most influential Russian 
revolutionary party of the time Narodnaia Volia (People’s Will) (cf. Khurshudyan 2000: 22-3; 
Daly 2006, 639). In the years of reaction and persecutions in the Russian Empire under 
Alexander III (1881-1894),26 he had to flee the capital of the Russian Empire to Europe. Through 
his affiliation with Russian revolutionary movements, Nazarbekian had been exposed to the 
teachings of such Russian dissident social-revolutionaries and intellectuals, as Alexander Herzen, 
Nikolaĭ Ogarëv, Nikolaĭ Chernyshevskiĭ, Peter Kropotkin and others. In 1886-1887 Nazarbekian 
was actively publishing in Armenia and his intention was to start a political organization with 
P‘ortugalian (Khan-Azat 1927a, 71; Nalbandian 1963, 104-5). After P‘ortugalian made clear that 
                                                
26 The assassination of Alexander II in 1881 by Narodnaia Volia initiated the most reactionary years in the Russian 
Empire. Under Alexander III, the imperial authorities attempted to administratively centralize the empire and to 
suppress national movements by enforcing certain degree of cultural Russification on all subjects (Kappeler 2001, 
283; cf. Wortman 2000, 237, 526; Stalianus 2007, 11-2). 
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he was not interested, Nazarbekian started the party with his fiancé Maro Vardanian (1864-1941) 
and four other Russian Armenians in Geneva. The program of the Hnchakyans, published in the 
party organ Hnchak [Bell] in 1888, declared the distant and immediate objectives of the party. 
The distant objective, or the ideal of the Hnchakyan party was achieving socialism for the 
Armenian people. The focus in the program was on the sufferings and slavery of Armenians in 
Ottoman Armenia. “In order to save the people from their miserable conditions and in order to 
put them on the right track leading to socialism,” the Hnchakyans believed it was important to 
acquire democratic national independence in Ottoman Armenia. The Hnchakyan program 
expressed a concern that if the Armenian people did not acquire independence, they would end 
up becoming part of some other despotic “exploiter state” (Hnchak 1888, N11-12).  
 
By the 1890s among the progressive and liberal-minded Russian Armenian youth the orientation 
towards the liberation of Ottoman Armenia had already been established. In 1889, the 
Hnchakyans sought to organize a local branch in Russian Transcaucasia. The arrival of Ruben 
Khanazat (1862-1929), one of the co-founders of the Hnchakyan party, in Tiflis sparked much 
enthusiasm among the Armenian youth. But the meetings with local Armenian groupings 
revealed the conflicting priorities in ideologies and tactics. If Khanazat preached for a socialist 
revolution in Ottoman Armenia, the Transcaucasian Armenians thought that Armenians in 
Turkey should be prepared to resist the Kurdish plunderers. Grigor Artsruni, who had 
consciously distanced himself from actively leading the Armenian revolutionary minded 
groupings because of his fear for Mshak,27 nevertheless participated in the meetings. He was 
                                                
27 The Tsarist oppressions and Russification policies in Transcaucasia under Alexander III specifically targeted the 
Armenians, as the latter had been more privileged in comparison to other people in the region. The ukaz of 1884 
ordered the closing of the Armenian schools, which was implemented in 1885, and the Russian censorship 
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trying to persuade the Hnchakyan delegates to abandon their socialist program and join others in 
the liberation of the Armenian people (Khudinyan 2006, 133). Some others argued that the 
Armenian cause was a national cause for all classes of the people, while the socialist program 
could potentially repel the assistance coming from wealthy Armenians (Khan-Azat 1927b, 128).  
 
The Hnchakyan demonstration of 1890 in Constantinople, however, stimulated much resonance 
in Transcaucasia and gave impetus to many revolutionaries to form a new organization. After 
long debates, the Armenian revolutionary groupings of Transcaucasia agreed to unite their 
efforts in a single revolutionary organization. The Federation of Armenian Revolutionaries was 
founded in the summer of 1890 by Kristap‘or Mik‘ayelian, Simon Zavarian, Step‘an Zorian and 
several other activists. They aimed at uniting all Armenian revolutionaries, regardless of their 
ideological differences, under an umbrella organization. In their negotiations with the 
Hnchakyans, the committee reached an agreement to have two official organs — the Hnchak in 
Geneva and the Droshak (Flag or Banner) in Tiflis (Nalbandian 1963, 155-56; Walker 1990: 68; 
Hovhannisyan 1997, 215; Khudinyan 2006, 215-16). The Manifesto of the Federation, printed as 
a circular of Droshak in 1890, declared that the aim of the Dashnaktsutyun (Federation) was to 
unite the efforts of all Armenians by connecting all the Armenian centers in order to reach the 
“political and economic liberation of Ottoman Armenia.” The Manifesto called on Armenians 
everywhere to join the struggle, regardless of age, gender, occupation, wealth, social status, 
confessional affiliation. The rich, the poor, the peasants, the women, the elderly and even the 
clergy were called on to join the national struggle.28 From this document and the subsequent two 
                                                                                                                                                       
threatened to close down periodicals associated with the dissident revolutionary movements. Therefore Artsruni had 
to take a more moderate position (cf. Nalbandian 1963, 144-48; Suny 1997a, 131; Khudinyan 2006, 175) 




other circulars published in 1891, it became clear that socialism was not going to be one of the 
strong underlying ideological tenets of the Federation. Not surprisingly, the Hnchakyans severed 
ties with the newly formed Federation in less than a year. In the issues of May 18 and June 5 
1891, the editors of Hnchak (1891 N6, 8; N7, 8) officially denied any connection with the 
Dashnaktsutyun: “the [Hnchakyan] party has never been part of … “the Dashnaktsutyun” and 
there is no unity and no connection [with them].” Thereby the short-lived cooperation between 
the Hnchakyans and the Dashnaktsutyun ended. While the Hnchakyan leaders in Geneva could 
not subordinate the struggle for socialism to national struggle, the leaders of the Federation were 
ready to subordinate their struggle against Tsarism to the liberation of Ottoman Armenians from 
the Ottoman yoke (Suny 1997a, 132; cf. Khudinyan 2006, 217-18).  
 
The First General Congress of the Federation convened in June 1892 in Tiflis. The Congress 
adopted the program and now, after the secession of the Hnchakyans, the Federation of 
Armenian Revolutionaries was renamed to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Hay 
heghap‘okhakan dashnakts‘ut‘yun, hereafter the Dashnaktsutyun or the Dashnak party)  
(Khudinyan 2006, 250; Nalbandian 1963, 166). The lengthy introduction of the 1892 program 
began with the discussion of socialist principles and the criticism of the European countries, 
which were yet to bring about the envisioned “fraternity, liberty and equality” to people in their 
countries. Despite expressing conviction that the exploitation of the working class would end 
someday in all countries, the authors did not want to impose any “utopian doctrines” on 
Armenians and, instead, intended to create a more “viable program” by focusing on conditions in 
Armenia under the Ottomans (Droshak 1894 N10, 2).29  
                                                
29 The program of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was printed in 1892 and reprinted in N11 and 12 of 




The purpose of the Dashnaktsutyun, as formulated in the program, was to “…achieve political 
and economic freedom of Ottoman Armenia by means of rebellion…” (Droshak 1894 N11, 2). 
The program envisioned a “free Armenia” in future with democratic government, free elections, 
equality of all nationalities before the law, equal economic opportunities for everybody, 
compulsory education, strong rural and artisan communities. The program did not use the word 
“independence” in relation to Armenia, which had been explicitly mentioned in the program of 
the Hnchakyans (cf. Nalbandian 1963, 169; Hovannisian 1997a, 216). The intention of the 
Dashnak leaders was clarified further in a series of articles published in Droshak under the title 
of “Ayb u Ben” (ABC). The editors of Droshak juxtaposed the concepts of freedom and 
independence and did not see independence as the necessary condition for achieving significant 
reforms. In response to the Hnchakyans’ immediate goal, they believed reforms and freedom in 
Armenia would be possible to achieve without necessarily having an independent Armenian 
government or an independent Armenian state as a precondition (Droshak 1893 N5, 1). The 
Dashnaktsutyun’s focus on the freedom, rather than independence of Ottoman Armenia, the 
prioritizing of nationalism over socialism defined largely against the Hnchakyan immediate 
objective of acquiring independence in Ottoman Armenia and distant objective of achieving 
socialism, determined the growing popularity of the Dashnaktsutyun among Armenians. After a 
brief period of stormy activities, the Hnchakyan party, in contrast, began declining due to the 
failure to achieve any progress in the pursuit of Armenian reforms and because of the growing 




By 1896, the Hnchakyans had organized two major demonstrations in Constantinople in 1890 
and 1895, and revolts in the villages of Sasun (August 1894) and Zeytun (October 1895) in the 
Ottoman Empire. The revolutionary activities of the party within the Ottoman Empire attracted 
many young Ottoman Armenian activists. Far from being inspired by Nazarbekian’s ideas of 
building socialism in future Armenia, most Ottoman Armenians joined the party primarily 
because of its immediate objective — struggle for the independence of (Ottoman) Armenia (cf. 
Kitur 1863, 40; Damadian 1985, 89; Nalbandian 1963, 117). The massive incidents did not entail 
any real progress in the Armenian Question, but claimed many casualties on both Armenian and 
Turkish sides. One of the consequences of the Hnchakyan activities was the pressure of the 
European powers on Abdul Hamid II to sign the Armenian Reform Program in 1895. Instead of 
facilitating the reforms, the European intervention provoked Abdul Hamid’s anger, which led to 
large-scale massacres of Armenians in the provinces in 1895-96 (cf. Nalbandian 1963, 118-28; 
Hovhannisyan 1968, 31-2; Hovannisian 1997a, 220-26). Amid the crisis, tensions between the 
proponents of socialism and nationalism resurfaced in 1896 within the party. While the 
Nazarbekians (Avetis and Maro) and their faction insisted on socialism, their opponents thought 
the European powers were reluctant to support the Hnchakyans and the Armenian Cause because 
of socialism (cf. Nalbandian 1963, 128-30; Hovhannisyan 1997, 226; Kitur 1962, 267). One of 
the leaders of the anti-Nazarbekian faction, Arp‘iar Arp‘iarian strongly expressed against 
socialism, arguing that the pursuit of socialism was an impediment to reaching the goal of 
national liberation: “The war, whether declared or putative against the more or less wealthy 
class, had been detrimental, too,” wrote Arp‘iarian in 1896.30 As he explained, the wealthy 
                                                
30 Arp‘iarian’s short novel Karmir Zhamuts (The Crimson Offering) (1909), which is about the events of 1890-1896, 
demonstrates that he actually thought the wealthy Armenians could change and they could have very important 
contribution to the national cause. The novel depicts the conflict between a wealthy Armenian Effendi, who believes 
in loyalty and servitude, and a young Armenian priest from the Armenian provinces (Armenia in the text), who 
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Armenians realized that if the Turkish government could claim part of their wealth, the 
Hnchakyans threatened to confiscate their entire wealth; therefore they would not be interested in 
supporting the Hnchakyans (quoted in Shahpaz 1987, 190). The growing tensions led to the split 
of the Hnchakyan party in 1896. In order to distinguish itself from the Nazarbekian faction the 
splinter faction became known as the Reformed (Verakazmyal) Hnchakyan Party in 1898 (cf. 
Hovhannisyan 1968, 32-3; Kitur 1962, 269-74). The split in 1896 became quite detrimental and 
ended “the most active era” of the Hnchakyan Party (Nalbandian 1963, 127; cf. Kitur 1962, 272-
73, Damadian 1985, 99). 
 
The problems of balancing between socialism and nationalism and the prioritization of 
independence or autonomy of Armenia, the preference for socialist revolution or national 
rebellion constituted the most significant areas of disagreement among the Armenian 
revolutionary political parties in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Disagreements, 
exacerbated by personal ambitions, eventually turned the Armenian revolutionary parties into 
rivals, rather than allies in the pursuit of the Armenian national cause. Despite the profound 
disagreements, in their programs and activities the parties shared a common perception of 
Armenia, the homeland. The activities of all of the Armenian parties — the Armenakans, the 
Hnchakyans (including the Reformed Hnchakyans after 1896-98) and the Dashnaks, focused on 
Ottoman Armenia as it had been outlined in the Treaty of San Stefano. Even if they had any 
implicit territorial aspirations against the Russian and Persian empires, their explicit agitation 
and activities targeted the Ottoman Armenia, to which all of them referred to as Armenia, the 
                                                                                                                                                       
preaches liberation and self-defense. While the Effendi is hostile to the priest in the beginning, closer to the end of 
the novel he comes to realize that the salvation of Armenians is impossible without armed resistance. At the end of 
the novel the conservative believer of loyalty and servitude makes a donation to the priest and instructs him to buy 
“powder and guns” for the people (Arp‘iarian [1909] 1950, 54) 
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homeland. But the changing international and domestic conditions in the Ottoman and Russian 
Empires in the first few decades of the twentieth century, as the following section will discuss, 




Homeland Redefined?  
World War I, the Loss of Ottoman Armenia and the Republic of Armenia  
 
The Young Turk revolution of 1908 generated much enthusiasm among Armenians, with many 
of them hailing the restoration of the Ottoman Constitution.31 Following the revolution, the 
Armenian political parties put down their arms and abandoned violence, hoping that the Ottoman 
Constitution would pave the way for reforms in the Armenian provinces and for the much 
anticipated solution of the Armenian question. The Dashnaks believed the solution could be 
achieved by aligning with the Western educated leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress 
(the Young Turks) (cf. Atamian 1955, 158; Libaridian 2004, 144). Most of the Armenakans 
believed it was time to resort to the constitutional means of struggle and joined the newly 
founded Armenian Constitutional Democrat Party (Hay sahmanadrakan Ramkavar 
kusaktsut‘yun). The purpose of the new Armenian party was to make the restored constitution in 
Turkey more democratic, to work peacefully towards the maintenance and development of 
Armenian identity in Turkey, rejecting any separatism (Dallak‘yan 1999: 5). The Hnchakyans, in 
their sixth World Congress of 1909, also decided in favor of the legal, constitutional path in the 
Ottoman Empire. The Congress, however, found the Young Turk top-down nationalist policies 
of forging an Ottoman citizenry unacceptable. The Young Turks’ nationalism was interpreted by 
the Hnchakyan Congress as an attempt to “denationalize the constituent non-Turkish subjects” of 
the Ottoman Empire and “assimilate them into Turkish nation under the general concept of an 
Ottoman” (Kitur 1963, 324). The Congress reemphasized the right of nations to self-
                                                
31 The Ottoman Constitution was promulgated by Abdul Hamid II in 1876 and abrogated a year later with the 
outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war. 
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determination and decided to struggle against the Young Turk ideology of “denationalization” 
(quoted in Kitur 1962, 324). In the same Congress, after abandoning the revolutionary tactics, the 
party was renamed to Social Democrat Hnchakyan Party (cf. Kitur 1962: 323-29; 343; 348).  
 
To the great disappointment of the Armenian political parties, the Armenian question was solved 
in a way, which was not at all anticipated in their plans for a better future. After ceding territories 
in Africa to Italians in the war of 1911, losing many of the European possessions to the Balkan 
defeats in 1912-1913, the Young Turk Ottoman officials where overwhelmed when the European 
powers and Russia imposed a plan of reforms in Ottoman Armenia in 1914. Under pressure, the 
Young Turk administration had to sign the Reform Act on February 1914. The Act envisioned 
the creation of two administrative units out of the six Armenian provinces, to be governed by 
European inspectors-general. The Young Turks realized that the loss of control on provinces in 
Eastern Anatolia, could eventually lead to the loss of those lands as well (cf. Hovannisian 1997a, 
236-37). The outbreak of the war in 1914 provided a perfect occasion to solve the Armenian 
question permanently. Under the cover of war, the Young Turks initiated and implemented 
deportations and massacres of the Armenian population on the lands, which all the Armenian 
political parties for two decades had been promoting as the homeland, the Armenia, as well as in 
some other parts of the Ottoman Empire.  
 
At the conclusion of World War I the Armenian homeland in Turkey was mostly devoid of its 
Armenian population. Most Armenians fell victim to the genocide, while the survivors were 
exiled from their native lands. In Transcaucasia, following the collapse of the Russian Empire in 
1917, the disintegration of the short-lived independent Transcaucasian Federation in May 1918, 
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and the declaration of independence by Georgia on May 26 and Azerbaijan on May 28,32 the 
representative body of the Russian Armenians reluctantly declared on May 30: 
In view of the dissolution of the political unity of Transcaucasia and the new situation created by the 
proclamation of the independence of Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Armenian National Council33 declares 
itself the supreme and only administration for the Armenian provinces. Due to certain grave circumstances, 
the National Council, deferring until the near future the formation of an Armenian national government, 
temporarily assumes all governmental functions, in order to pilot the political and administrative helm of 
the Armenian provinces (quoted in Walker 1990, 256-57). 
 
While acquiring a de-facto independence, the actual independence of an Armenian republic went 
unmentioned in the statement (cf. Hovannisian 1971, 33). Rather than being officially claimed in 
the declaration, the designation “Republic of Armenia” was applied and ascribed to a small 
independent land in Transcaucasia in the treaty of Batum on June 4, 1918, the title of which read: 
“The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Republic of Armenia and the Ottoman 
Empire” (cf. Hovannisian 1971, 33-8; Walker 1990, 257). The Treaty of Batum, albeit never 
ratified by the Republic of Armenia or Ottoman Empire, became the first international document 
recognizing the existence of a nominally independent Republic of Armenia (Map 1.2). The 
actual declaration of independence was issued only one year later, during the celebration of the 
first anniversary of the Republic of Armenia.34 
                                                
32 For detailed discussion of the Russian revolutions and developments in Transcaucasia, see Hovannisian (1971, 
15-39; 1997b, 296-97); Walker (1990, 243-57). 
33 Armenian National Council was the executive of the Armenian National Congress. The Congress comprised the 
representatives of all Russian Armenian political parties, except the Bolsheviks. The Congress convened on 1917 
and became the spokesman of the Armenian people in Transcaucasia. The Dashnaks were the majority in the 
congress, followed by the Populists, Social Revolutionaries, Social Democrats and non-partisans (Vrats‘ian 1928, 
31-2; Hovannisian 1971, 16-8). 
34 Simon Vrats‘ian, one of the participants of most of these events and the last prime minister of the Republic of 
Armenia before the Sovietization in 1920, confirms that the independence of Armenia was actually declared on May 




Map 1-2. Republic of Armenia (1918-1920) 
(Source: Hewsen 2001, 236) 
 
In parallel to the unfolding events in Transcaucasia, an independent Armenian initiative 
continued the pursuit of the (Ottoman) Armenian Cause in Europe. At the conclusion of the First 
Balkan War in 1912, the Catholicos of Armenians Georg V had initiated an Armenian 
representation in Europe. He had appointed Boghos Nubar, the son of the finance and foreign 
minister of Egypt and the former director of Egyptian State Railways, as the representative of the 
Armenian people in Europe. Aside from his European connections, Boghos Nubar was a 
renowned philanthropist as the founder and president of the Armenian General Benevolent 
Union (AGBU).35 A group of Armenians, who gathered around Boghos Nubar, had formed what 
                                                
35 Boghos Nubar founded the AGBU in 1906 in Cairo, Egypt, in response to the worsening conditions of Armenians 
in the Ottoman Empire. The objectives of the organizations were “to assist in the intellectual and moral development 
of the Armenian people, … to ameliorate their material and economic condition, … “encourage and support any 
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came to be known as the Armenian National Delegation. After WWI, under the leadership of 
Boghos Nubar, the Armenian National Delegation had refocused its activities on claiming the 
Armenian lands from the Ottoman Empire (Hovannisian 1971, 257). In the post WWI context, 
the Armenian National Delegation saw itself as sort of a “government of exiles,” the 
representative of all Armenians now massacred and dispersed from their ancestral lands (cf. 
Tölölyan 1991a, 177-78). The independence of the Transcaucasian Republic of Armenia in 1918 
created some tensions for the Armenian National Delegation and for Boghos Nubar. For people 
and organizations, who sought the creation of Armenia in place of the Armenian provinces in the 
Ottoman Empire, the Transcaucasian Republic of Armenia could not represent the Armenia, the 
homeland. As an expression of such discontent, Boghos Nubar, the Hnchakyans, the Sahmanadir 
Ramkavars and other Ottoman Armenians often refrained from using the expression “Republic 
of Armenia” instead referring to it as the “Araratian Republic” (cf. Kitur 1963, 149-50; 158-63; 
Hovannisian 1971, 259). Several months after the de facto independence of Armenia, in 
November 1918, Boghos Nubar declared on behalf of the Armenian people “the unification of all 
historic Armenian territories” (Hovannisian 1971, 258).  
 
The Congress of Western (Ottoman) Armenians, convened in Erevan in February 1919, drawing 
on Boghos Nubar’s declaration, advocated for the Free and United Armenia and adopted a 
resolution expressing “confidence in His Excellency Boghos Nubar Pasha’s first cabinet of Free 
and United Armenia” (quoted in Hovannisian 1971, 452). The Congress was followed by the 
                                                                                                                                                       
action which could produce these ends” (AGBU 1948, 34; Melk‘onyan 2005, 37). To reach these goals, the AGBU 
aimed “to establish or subsidize schools, libraries, trade schools, workshops, hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages and 
other institutions of the kind…, provide assistance to needy Armenians in the homeland without distinction of 
religious faith, … assist the peasantry … with land, seeds, animals, and implants …, encourage the progress of local 
industries, disseminate knowledge in modern agriculture and … extend immediate help to victims of famines, fires 
and any other disasters” (quoted in Mirak 1983, 176). 
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pan-Armenian National Congress, summoned in Paris from February 24 to April 22 of 1919. The 
National Congress, chaired by Boghos Nubar, had representatives from all Armenian political 
and national bodies, including some distinguished leaders and representatives of the Republic of 
Armenia. The Congress confirmed the importance of the “creation of a united Armenia” 
(Hovannisian 1971, 454-58).  
 
The participants of the pan-Armenian National Congress, the representations from all over the 
world and from the Republic of Armenia, seemed to make the decisions of the congress and the 
leadership of Boghos Nubar legitimate. Yet, about a month later, the Dashnak dominated 
government of the Republic of Armenia made a declaration on May 28, 1919, which read, in 
part, as follows:  
To restore the integrality of Armenia and to secure the complete freedom and prosperity of her people, the 
Government of Armenia, abiding by the solid will and desire of the entire Armenian people, declares that 
from this day forward the divided parts of Armenia are everlastingly combined as an independent political 
entity. 
…Now, in promulgating [the] act of unification and independence of the ancestral Armenian lands located 
in Transcaucasia and the Ottoman Empire, the Government of Armenia declares that the political system of 
United Armenia is a democratic republic and that it has become the Government of this United Republic of 
Armenia.  
Thus, the people of Armenia are henceforth the supreme lord and master of their consolidated fatherland, 
and the Parliament and Government of Armenia stand as the supreme legislative and executive authority 
conjoining the free people of united Armenia… (quoted in Hovannisian 1971, 461-2) 
 
The statement, which was the actual and official declaration of the independence of the Republic 
of Armenia, went beyond confirming the de facto independence, and proclaimed the “unification 
and independence of the ancestral Armenian lands located in Transcaucasia and the Ottoman 
Empire.” The reference to the “consolidated fatherland” and United Armenia was drawing 
directly upon the earlier statements of Boghos Nubar, the Western Armenian Congress and the 
Armenian National Congress. More importantly, through the declaration, Dashnak dominated 
government in Armenia claimed to be the “supreme legislative and executive authority” of the 
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United Armenia and thereby undermined Boghos Nubar’s leadership and the legitimacy of the 
Armenian National Delegation. The decision of the leaders of the Republic led Boghos Nubar to 
conclude: “a coup d’état had been staged in Erevan” (Hovannisian 1971, 468). The political 
conflict over the future leadership of the United Armenia that was ripening in the following 
summer between the Dashnaktsutyun and the Armenian National Delegation, dominated by the 
Ramkavars, predetermined the tensions between these political groups in the dispersion. While 
the Armenian National Delegation continued actively participating in peace conferences in the 
course of 1920, it was Avetis Aharonian, the representative of the independent Republic of 
Armenia and the leader of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, who was invited to sign 
the treaty of Sèvres in August 10, 1920 (Hovannisian 1996, 372). By then, most of the European 
powers had at least de facto recognized the independence of the Republic of Armenia and its 
delegation as the legitimate representative of the Armenian people. 
 
The treaty of Sèvres, signed between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers, was the 
success of the Armenian and the Armenophile missions36 in Europe and America. According to 
the treaty, Turkey recognized “Armenia as a free and independent state” (Article 88), the borders 
of which remained to decided by the President of the United States of America in the vilayets of 
“Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis… (Article 89)” (Martin 1924, 814-15).  
 
By the time the President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson submitted the map of the 
independent Armenia in November 1920 (Map 1.3), the Republic of Armenia had been trying to 
                                                
36 The American Committee for the Independence of Armenia (ACIA) was one of such organizations, most of the 
members of which were non-Armenians. On February 24, 1919 the Committee sent a petition to the President of the 
Untied States, Woodrow Wilson, which signed by 20,000 protestant rectors and ministers and catholic priests. They 
petitioned for securing and insuring “the Independence of Armenia, including the six Vilayets, Cilicia and the 
littoral of Trebizond in Turkish Armenia, Russian Armenia and Persian Armenia” (Petition 1919). 
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resist the offensive of the Kemalist Turkish army37 and the Bolshevik pressures from north. Less 
than two weeks after the announcement of the Wilsonian Armenia, the Dashnak delegates in 
Moscow handed-over power to the Bolsheviks on the midnight of December 2, 1920, and the 
Dashnak negotiators with the Kemalists were forced to sign the humiliating treaty of 
Alexandropol the same day, by which Armenia denounced the Treaty of Sèvres and all territorial 
claims against Turkey (cf. Walker 1990, 322). Although the transfer of power to the Bolsheviks 
annulled the Treaty of Alexandropol, in the following year the leadership of Soviet Armenia, 
along with the representatives of Soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan, signed the treaty of Kars with 
Turkey, which officially denounced all previous treaties and established the borders of modern 
Armenia (Walker 1990, 394). The Sovietization of Armenia, the Treaty of Kars and the other 
victories by Mustafa Kemal against Greeks and in Cilicia, made the European powers to 
renegotiate the Treaty of Sèvres. The new treaty, concluded in Lausanne in 1923, recognized the 
new republican regime in Turkey, with borders far more extensive than those prescribed at 
Sèvres, without making any reference to Armenia.  
 
                                                
37 After assuming the command of the defeated Ottoman army, Mustafa Kemal reorganized these units to resist 
further dismemberment of what had remained from the Ottoman Empire. The emergence of modern Turkey owes to 




Map 1-3. The Boundary Between Turkey and Armenia, Prepared by Woodrow Wilson, 1920  





The conclusion of the Treaties of Kars in 1921 and Lausanne in 1923 sealed the Armenian 
Question. The Armenian homeland, as the Armenian political parties had envisioned it, was lost 
to the Republic of Turkey. The ultimate failure of the Armenian ethno-territorial nationalism to 
create an Armenian state on lands promoted as the homeland was accompanied by an unexpected 
emergence a small part of Armenia as a country, which bore the name Republic of Armenia until 
November 1920, and which became Soviet Armenia afterwards. While in the post-Lausanne 
environment the hope for regaining the homeland and returning home was fading, the existence 
of the Soviet republic of Armenia within the federal structure of the Soviet Union provided new 
grounds for the rethinking, re-evaluation and discoursive reconstruction of the Armenian 
homeland. New discourses and debates on the Armenian homeland gradually took shape in the 
relations of Soviet Union/Soviet Armenia and the post-genocide Armenian diasporic 
communities. As it will be argued in subsequent chapters, various Armenian organizations and 
groupings developed different and often conflicting perceptions of the homeland in the diaspora. 
Whereas some groups and organizations promoted Soviet Armenia as the new Armenian 
homeland, others advocated for the liberation of Western Armenia (in Turkey), while the 
ordinary Armenian immigrants and refugees developed local perceptions of homeland in the 
emerging compatriotic settlements in host-countries. Not necessarily mutually exclusive, the 
orientation towards the homeland, whether in the form of an existing state (Soviet Armenia), in 
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the form of an imaginary38 state (Western Armenia) or in the form of native towns and villages, 
substantially determined the ways, in which the post-genocide Armenian diasporic organizations 
defined allegiances, course of activities, identities and transnational belongings, as the following 
chapters will discuss in detail.  
 
 
                                                
38 Imaginary in this context should be read as not existing on the political map as an independent, semi-independent 
or an autonomous country. 
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Chapter 2  
 
Host-Country Conditions, Dispersion of Armenians and the Prospects for 
Community Building in the United States, France and Lebanon  
Introduction 
 
In parallel and in response to the deteriorating conditions in the Ottoman Empire, large number 
of Armenians had been leaving the homeland since especially the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. By WWI, the United States already hosted a vibrant Armenian community. In various 
cities and towns, where Armenian immigrants had settled in considerable numbers, they had 
established Armenian churches, chapters of political parties and other organizations, and started 
Armenian language periodicals.  
 
The genocide and deportations of Armenians during WWI brought massive waves of Armenian 
refugees and orphans to various countries in the Middle East and Europe. The deportations and 
physical annihilation of a significant part of the Armenian population had another important, yet 
mostly unaddressed, effect on the Armenian people. They disrupted the collective effort of the 
nineteenth century Armenian clergy, intellectuals and political activists directed towards 
redefining and modernizing the Armenian identity through spreading education and literacy in 
their envisioned Armenian homeland. The genocide survivor Armenian refugees, reaching 
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different countries, therefore, represented groups of diverse dialects and often languages, habits 
and traditions, subcultures and confessional affiliations. Their collectivity as Armenians was 
defined by their affiliation with a Christian church and by certain shared cultural traits as 
Apostolic, Catholic or Protestant Armenians, and, to a lesser extent, by language - their local 
Armenian dialect or Western Armenian.  
 
While the Armenian political parties negotiated the possibility of regaining the Armenian 
homeland in the early 1920s, as the previous chapter discussed, the dispersed Armenian refugees 
settled in camps, struggled to recover from physical and mental exhaustion, and formed informal 
self-help organizations and community structures. This chapter analyzes the particularities of the 
Armenians’ social adjustment and political integration in the United States, France and Lebanon, 
to argue that the host-country contexts essentially influenced the possibilities of the retention, 
construction and transmission of Armenian identities, and defined the prospects of the formation 
of Armenian communities. The first three sections in the chapter focus on local social-political 
contexts and conditions in the United States, France and Lebanon, on the patterns of the 
dispersion of Armenians in each of these countries, and on the particularities of political 
inclusion and social adjustment of the Armenian immigrants and refugees into these societies. 
These sections particularly stress the initial dialectal, cultural and confessional diversity of 
Armenian immigrant (in the case of the United States) and refugee groups (in the case of France 
and Lebanon), to argue that compatriotic and confessional identities and belongings became one 
of the important factors in the dispersion and settlement of Armenians in the host-countries. In a 
comparative light, these sections also demonstrate how conditions in Lebanon were conducive 
for the integration of Armenians as a distinct community in contrast to the assimilationist 
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contexts of American and French societies, in which integration for the majority of Armenians 
meant assimilation into host-society. The last part of the chapter addresses the activism of 
Armenian compatriotic organizations, which, among other Armenian institutions, grew as 
transnational and truly diasporic initiatives and made an important contribution in the formative 
stage of the post-genocide Armenian diaspora.  
 
This chapter seeks to feel the gap in the secondary literature on Armenian diasporic 
communities, which in most cases understate the diversity and heterogeneity of the Armenian 
refugee and immigrant communities and downplay the role of compatriotic identities, settlements 
and societies. It does so by examining personal accounts of some second generation diaspora 
Armenians, expressed in their published memoirs and interviews with author; by drawing on 
articles published in Armenian language periodical press in the United States, France and 
Lebanon, as well as on the histories of compatriotic societies compiled by their members. In 
addition to these primary accounts, the chapter also relies on many important secondary sources 
on Armenian communities in the United States, France and Lebanon. While individual studies 
about the dispersion, settlement and social-political integration of Armenians in these countries 
are available, a comparative study of these processes and their consequences, which will be 




Armenians in the United States: From foreign workers to Full-Fledged Americans  
 
 
The Armenian presence in the United States dates back to the early seventeenth century. The first 
Armenian, whose name was found in the records of the Virginia Company of London, a certain 
“Martin the Armenian,” also referred to as “John Martin the Persian,” arrived to the United 
States sometime in 1618 or 1619 (Malcom c1919, 51-7; Tashjian ([1947] 1970, 1-2; 
Abrahamyan 1967, 343). Prior to the nineteenth century the number of Armenians in the United 
States was so insignificant that Robert Mirak refused to recognize the Armenians of the British 
colonial period as the “true pioneers.” “They did not start an exodus of Armenians to America;” 
Mirak argued, “they were strays, removed from the main currents of the migration” (Mirak 1983, 
36). The influx of Armenians in the US increased slowly from the 1830s to the 1880s through the 
channels of Armenian missionaries established in the Ottoman Empire. Migration intensified 
significantly after the Hamidian massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1895-96 (cf. 
Malcom [c1919], 57-61; 66; Dekmejian 1997, 434; Mirak 1983, 36-44; Waldstreicher 1989, 35). 
As Malcom ([c1919], 60-61) observed, the Armenians arriving in the US during 1834-94 
represented the higher classes and their purpose was “to go to school to learn trades, to engage in 
commerce, and [for some] to escape political persecution, but with the intention of returning to 
their country within a short time.” The Treaties of Commerce and Navigation concluded between 
the United States and the Ottoman Empire in 1830 and 1862 certainly facilitated immigration to 
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the United States.39 According to Malcom’s estimates, around 2000 Armenians, who came 
mostly through the assistance of American missionaries, settled in New York, Worcester, 
Boston, Providence, Hartford, Philadelphia, Hoboken, Troy, Chicago and Fresno, California 
(Malcom [c1919], 61) (Map 2.1). Since, prior to 1899, the US immigration records were based 
on the countries of origin and not on ethnic affiliations, the figures of Armenians arriving in the 
US remains unknown (Malcom c1919, 63; cf. Jendian 2008, 45; Phillips 1989, 103).  
 
 
Map 2-1. The Armenian Diaspora in the United States (and Canada)  
(Source: Hewsen 2001, 276, Map 270) 
 
                                                
39 The texts of the treaties are available in Treaties (1873, 643-52) 
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Robert Mirak (1983, 36-59) suggests three phases of Armenian arrival in the US prior to WWI: 
“The Pioneers,” in 1834 – 1890; “Flight,” 1890-1899 and “Mass Migration,” 1900-1914. 
According to the estimates provided by Malcom (c1919, 62-7), Mirak (1983, 59), Tashjian 
[1947] 1970, 18) and Jendian (2008, 46), the number of Armenians who settled in the US prior to 
WWI was between sixty and seventy thousand. The number of Armenians arriving in the US 
during 1915-1931, according to Jendian’s (2008, 46) estimates, was less than thirty thousand (cf. 
Federal Writers 1937, 33; Tashjian [1947] 1970, 18). Part of the reason of this relatively small 
number of Armenians arriving in the US, compared to France or the Middle East,40 was the 
remoteness of the United States from the Ottoman Empire. Due to the immediate geographical 
proximity to the Armenian provinces in the Ottoman Empire, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and 
Egypt in the Middle East became the primary destinations of a large influx of Armenian 
genocide survivors in the immediate aftermath of WWI. Another factor, which impacted the 
lower number of Armenian immigration to the United States in the 1920s, was the Immigration 
Act of 1924. The quota system introduced by the Act, among others, significantly reduced the 
rates of Armenian immigration to the United States (cf. Jendian 2008, 51; Tashjian [1947] 19; 
Waldstreicher 1989, 39-40). 
 
In order to accommodate the masses of physically and emotionally exhausted refugees, the local 
officials in Greece, France, Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere had to settle Armenians in temporary 
refugee camps, usually near one of the major harbors. In contrast, Armenians did not have any 
refugee camps in the US. Most of the survivors arrived in the US to join their family members, 
                                                
40 For the number of Armenians arriving in France or Lebanon in the 1920s, see the next sections. 
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who had migrated to America earlier.41 According to the US Census of 1920, Massachusetts 
(25%), California (19.1%) and New York (13.3%) hosted the largest numbers of Armenians (cf. 
Jendian 2008, 52). Within these states, Worcester, MA, Fresno, CA and New York City hosted 
the largest numbers of Armenians by the early 1920s. These cities were followed by Boston, 
Philadelphia, Chicago, West Hoboken, Jersey City, Detroit, Los Angeles, Troy, Cleveland and 
some other minor settlements (Malcom c1919, 73; Deranian 1987, 28; Tashjian [1947] 1970, 
18).   
 
 
Map 2-2. The Armenians in Northeast Atlantic States  
(Source: Hewsen 2001, 277, Map 271) 
                                                
41 Robert Mirak’s parents, for example, John and Artemis Mirak (Zaven Mirakian and Artemis Emerian), both were 
genocide survivor orphans, who were eventually brought to the United States through their family network. In the 
case of Zaven Mirakian, the husband of his aunt had immigrated to the United States in 1912 and he was able to 
bring his wife and her nephews, Zaven and Vartges, to the United States in 1921. In a similar pattern, the husband of 
Artemis Eremian’s cousin also lived in the United States and he brought his genocide survivor wife and her cousins 
to the United States in 1923 (Mirak 2014, 20-34). Most of the genocide survivors arrived in the New World through 




Map 2-3. The Armenians in Northern California 
 (Source: Hewsen 2001, 277, Map 273) 
 
Map 2-4. The Armenians in Southern California 
 (Source: Hewsen 2001, 277, Map 272) 
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The	  American	  Context:	  Immigration Policies, Naturalization and Social-Political Conditions in 
the Untied States  
 
The intensification of the Armenian immigration to the United States in the final decades of the 
nineteenth century was part of one of the massive immigration phases in the history of the United 
States. The growing industrial regions in New England, New York, and the Midwest, massive 
construction projects of especially railroad systems, as well as vast unsettled agricultural areas 
had all created a huge demand for manpower and labor in many regions of the United States. 
Immigration was seen as a solution to the growing needs of the country, which determined one 
of the heaviest immigration flows into the United States beginning in the 1880s. According to the 
data of the two US censuses in 1890 and 1920, more than 18 million immigrants entered the 
United States, the overwhelming majority originating from Europe (Batalova and Terrazas 2013, 
25; cf. Jaret 2002, 21).  
 
The massive flow of immigrants helped advance the economy and industry, but it also entailed 
many problems. The growing number of immigrants posed a certain danger to nation building 
and to then established American identity. Until WWI, tensions between economic advancement 
and national identity, the former encouraging immigration and the latter perceived to be diluted 
by immigration, were resolved in favor of economic advancement. Yet, under the impact of 
prevailing theories of Social-Darwinism, race and physical anthropology in Europe, the new 
science of eugenics, anti-immigration nativist movements manifested themselves in various 
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regions of the United States, first, in the form of anti-Catholic campaigns, and, later, growing 
into Anglo-Saxon nationalism (Jones 1992, 212-238).42   
 
Over several decades, immigration was seen as a problem due to its effects on the American 
identity, generally perceived to be weakening its “social health and integrity” (The Immigration 
Problem 1923, 47). Discrimination and prejudice against immigrants augmented with the 
increasing number of immigrants to the United States. The immigrants were excluded from labor 
unions, while riots and violence against them continued. Batalova and Terrazas (2013, 25) 
describe the situation as follows:  
Citing a host of reasons ranging from immigrants’ poor intellectual capacity and lack of hygiene, racial 
incompatibility, labor competition, and fears over loyalty to the country and its democratic principles, the 
opponents of immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe and Asia were pushing Congress for 
restrictions on further immigration and the curtailing of immigrants’ rights to land and property ownership. 
 
In many states and regions of the country, beatings and murders of immigrant workers, attacks 
against immigrant settlements and the burning of their properties became widespread expressions 
of discrimination against immigrants (Jaret 2002, 29). Concerns for American  “racial purity” 
were so prevalent, that in 1882 the US Congress voted for the expulsion of Chinese refugees. 
The Chinese Expulsion Act was the first law in the United States to severely restrict the entry of 
a certain racial group into the United States (Batalova and Terrazas 2013, 23; Jones 1992, 226-
27; Schneider 2011, 20). 
 
The exclusionist nativist movement at the end of the nineteenth century generated many 
proponents of the inclusion and assimilation of immigrants. In the process, nativism gradually 
                                                
42 As Jeremiah Jenks, a members of the former United States Immigration Commission (1907-1910), and his 
colleague reported, in 1912, “[i]mmigration of foreigners into the United States has been long recognized as one of 
[the] important social and political problems” (Jenks and Lauck 1912, 2). 
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turned into a new, more coercive movement of Americanization. The proponents of the 
Americanization movement were concerned of the immigrants’ ignorance of the language, 
American values and culture, and their inability or unwillingness to connect with American 
culture, to learn the American ways of life. At the turn of the century, Americanization became 
an official campaign with many supporters in the Federal Government and the Congress. The 
purpose of Americanization was assimilating the immigrants into American society, making 
“Americans out of immigrants” in order to “unite the nation”  (Schneider 2002, 171; 2011, 156-
58). Americanization in this context meant not only teaching the immigrants the English 
language and American values, but also making them forget their habits, cultural traits and 
everything deemed “un-American” (Schneider 2011, 158).  
 
The naturalization acts of 1802 and 1870 could not satisfy the fiercest proponents of 
Americanization, as both did not make any reference to the importance of the English language, 
Protestantism, American values or culture.43  Under their pressure, the US Congress passed a 
new naturalization act in 1906, which defined the knowledge of English and the US Constitution 
as legal requirements for acquiring US Citizenship, in addition to the requirements of race and 
age (An Act 1907, 35). Although the level of English proficiency was not clarified in the 
document, Americanization, at least formally, became part of acquiring US citizenship 
(Schneider 2011, 153).  
 
                                                
43 The acts of 1802 and 1870 made only two formal requirements for the foreign born immigrants: they had to be of 
white or of African descent (1870 Act) and over 21 years of age. The laws required five years of residency, a 
“declaration of intention” that the prospective citizens had to file several years prior to naturalization and thereby 
express willingness to renounce all their former allegiances and titles (Schneider 2002, 163; 2011, 196). 
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Americanization, as argued by Dorothee Schneider (2011, 151-52), occurred on formal or public 
and on private levels. Formal or public Americanization was expressed in offering classes of 
English, American history and culture to the immigrants, which would lead them to cultural 
assimilation. Private Americanization was part of the immigrants’ adaptation to the new 
environment. Public Americanization was enforced through many institutions, but primarily 
through education. Public schools became widely recognized as the most important agencies of 
formal Americanization for first- and second-generation immigrant children. Although the 
church was officially separated from the state,44 Protestantism had come to constitute a key 
marker of American identity and was even enforced on Catholics, Mormons and other non-
protestants.45 As Jenks and Lauck, former members of the U.S. Immigration Commission, 
reported in 1912, with the exception of the “Orientals,”46 the assimilation of immigrants, 
especially those of the second-generation, was quite successful under the influence of “public 
schools and the social circumstances” (198-200). As Schneider’s (2011, 171) study also 
confirms, by the 1920s Americanization had become a “widespread part of the identity of public 
schools.” Teaching and requiring the immigrants to speak English had become one of the focal 
points of assimilating the immigrants (Jaret 2002, 28; Schneider 2002, 171-73). Simultaneously, 
many states officially banned instruction in foreign languages and instituted mandatory evening 
citizenship classes for immigrants47 (Schneider 2011, 171-173).   
                                                
44 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution of the Bill of Rights adopted on December 15, 1791, 
guarantees religious liberty, freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom of council. 
45 Up until the 1920s, even “the practice of reading the King James Bible in public schools was judged 
constitutional, despite the appeal of Catholics and others to be exempted on conscientious grounds” (Little 2007, 
40). 
46 By “oriental races” the authors meant the Chinese, the Japanese and the Hindus (Jenks and Lauck 1912, 200-201) 
47 Big industries of the time, such as the Ford Motor Company, would often establish their Americanization 
programs in order to teach immigrant workers the English language, American values and culture, and “elevate” 
their families “to a proper “American” standard of living” (Meyer 1992, 70). As Jones (1992, 243) observed, “From 
1915 onward, the Americanization of the immigrant became a patriotic duty, absorbing the energies of thousands of 





The pre-WWI Americanization policies, apparently, did not prove to be successful vis-à-vis the 
continuing influx of large numbers of immigrants. In the post WWI era, when France and the 
European countries also began welcoming immigration and relatively eased naturalization due to 
the need for manpower both in the armed forces and in the labor economy, the concerns for 
increasing numbers of immigrants resulted in the adoption a restrictive immigration Act of 1917.  
The Act of 1917 (also known as the Asiatic Barred Zone Act) banned immigration from most 
Asia. It also barred immigrants with any physical illness (mostly tuberculosis) or mental 
disorder; prostitutes and anarchists were also banned, and a literacy test for all arriving adults 
over the age of sixteen was introduced (Jaret 2002, 32-34; Jones 1992, 231; The Immigration 
Problem 1923, 61-3). As reported by the National Industrial Conference Board in 1923, this Act, 
did “nothing to solve the problem of adjustment to the English speaking community,” because 
the literacy test implied demonstrating reading skills in any language. At the same time, the 
Board reported that 84% of the foreign-born “white children,” from seven to thirteen years of 
age, and 94% of “native white children of foreign or mixed parentage” were attending schools. 
The report concluded that the high percentage of native-born children of immigrant or mixed 
parentage in American schools was indicative of the eagerness of immigrant parents to give their 
children American education (The Immigration Problem 1923, 45). The success in the 
Americanization of the second generation explains why the Fourteenth Amendment of the US 
                                                                                                                                                       
in the promotion of American culture, values and the nation were also common. One of the oft-quoted reenactments 
of the WWI era Americanization was the performance Melting Pot by the graduating workers of the Ford English 
School in Dearborn. The act symbolically demonstrated the passage from an immigrant to an American. As the 
director of the school described: “…a pageant in the form of a melting pot, where all men descend from a boat scene 
representing the vessel on which they came over; down the gangway . . . into a pot 15 feet in diameter and 7-1/2 feet 
high, which represents the Ford English School. Six teachers, three on either side, stir the pot with ten-foot ladles 
representing nine months of teaching in the school. Into the pot 52 nationalities with their foreign clothes and 
baggage go and out of the pot after vigorous stirring by the teachers comes one nationality, viz, American” (quoted 
in Meyer 1980, 77). 
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Constitution, ratified in 1868, did not become a matter for heated debates and revisions. 
According to the Amendment, all people born in the United States automatically became eligible 
for US Citizenship  (Schneider 2002, 164; Schain 2008, 188). While the children of the 
immigrants did not seem to pose many problems for Americanization or assimilation into 
American society, the immigration problem still persisted, because large numbers of immigrants 
were not assimilating or Americanizing as the proponents of Americanization had envisioned. In 
the concluding part of the 1923 report, regarding the assimilation of immigrants the Board 
proposed:  
we find it stressed that immigrants should be selected as to character, occupations, and numbers, with a 
view to their distribution from the standpoint of assimilation, Americanization, steady employment and the 
maintenance of life at a normal American standard of living; that laws be enacted strictly regulating 
immigrant banks and employment agencies; that aliens be excluded who come to this country with no 
intention of becoming American citizens, and that aliens who attempt to persuade immigrants not become 
American citizens should be made subject to deportation (The Immigration Problem 1923, 118). 
 
 
The proponents of Americanization thought that the intention to acquire naturalization and 
citizenship would take the immigrants to the path of assimilation. Yet by the mid-1920s, 
Americanization had proven inefficient as the increasing number of immigrants began changing 
the balance of American-born and unassimilated immigrant populations in many small and large 
cities. To deal with the immigration problem, public and political discourses eventually shifted 
the focus from the policies of assimilation to simply restricting immigration. The Immigration 
Act, passed by the U.S Congress in 1924 (also known as the Johnson-Reed Act), established 
certain quotas for each country, significantly reducing immigration to the United States. 
According to the act, only 2% of the nationals distributed in the US Census of 1890 could enter 
the country per year (Batalova and Terrazas 2013, 26; Jaret 2002, 32-4; Jones 1992, 237-38; 
Schain 2008, 184, 195-96). The quota system significantly lowered the rates of immigration. 
Section 13(c) declared, “No alien ineligible to citizenship shall be admitted to the United 
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States…” (The Immigration Act of 1924). This section was implicitly referring to the 
naturalization laws of 1870 and 1906 and reconfirming that the Chinese, Japanese and those 
belonging to the Asian “oriental race” could not enter the United States (cf. Schneider 2011, 20-
30, 57-9).  
 
From the early 1920s, the opponents of Americanization became more vocal about the negative 
effects of the policy. To counter the proponents, many social scientists and policy makers 
described coercive Americanization as anti-American and in contradiction with the American 
values. In 1919, the head of the California Commission on Immigration and Housing, himself an 
immigrant, wrote: 
The spectacle of the rapid and ignorant Americanization efforts was disheartening. It did not represent 
America as the foreigner had pictured it in his dreams before landing upon these shores. It flavored more of 
Hungary where the magyarization of several millions of people was attempted … of Russia of the Tsarish  
[sic] days with the persecution of the Jew and the denaturalization of Poles (quoted in Schneider 2011, 164) 
 
Subsequently, many works produced by sociologists, anthropologists and other social scientists 
were published and promoted by the opponents of Americanization. Most of these studies 
demonstrated how Americanization during WWI and in the post-war years had been a failure, 
that there was no need for such a policy as immigrants mostly voluntarily chose to become 
Americans (Schneider 2011, 164-67). By the 1930s the policy of coercive Americanization had 
significantly declined.  
 
As an expression of fading Americanization policies, during the years of the Depression in the 
1930s, the government even began sponsoring projects for collecting American folklife. As part 
of the New Deal policy, the government funded the unemployed intellectuals - lawyers, teachers, 
librarians, and scholars, to continue writing, which became known as the Federal Writers 
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Project. The Project was aimed at collecting oral histories of various American lifestyles, in 
which the immigrants would also self-reflexively present their personal stories of 
Americanization. The Project reconfirmed the inefficiency of coercive Americanization and the 
efficiency of self-initiated Americanization of the immigrants (cf. Schneider 2011, 167-68). The 
Federal Writers Project, as well as many other works produced by social scientists, demonstrated 
how various institutions and organizations, such as churches and other voluntary organizations 
created by various ethnic communities, had become important agencies of Americanization (cf. 
Schneider 2011, 168).  
 
Discourses challenging Americanization policies in the late 1920s and early 1930s reshaped 
official policies towards the immigrants and naturalized citizens. Instead of being suppressed, 
ethnic churches, organizations and cultures were even encouraged as providing effective 
agencies for Americanization. After becoming naturalized citizens, the former immigrants could 
proudly wear their “old world” clothes in various American-style parades to celebrate the true 
spirit of American freedom (Schneider 2011, 169). Structural discrimination against the Asians 
and formal and informal discrimination against Blacks certainly continued, but the white races, 
those eligible for naturalization, benefitted from the decline of coercive Americanization and 
certain toleration of ethnic identities and peculiarities. Even if prejudice and discrimination 
against the immigrants continued through World War II, coercive Americanization significantly 






Dispersion of Armenians in the United States and the Compatriotic Settlements 
 
The immigration of Armenians to the Untied States in the nineteenth century commenced with 
the support and efforts of American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. Various missionary 
reports of the time testified, with some disappointment, that most Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire, who achieved a certain level of literacy in missionary schools, left their native lands for 
America (cf. Malcom c1919, 76-7; Deranian 1987, 15; 20; Tashjian [1947] 1970, 12-3). As 
suggested by Mirak, despite their small numbers in the Ottoman Empire, about twenty percent of 
the early Armenian immigrants to the United States were Protestants.48 After establishing in the 
United States, Armenians who had arrived through the missionaries or who had fled the 
massacres of 1895-1896 also brought their families and encouraged their relatives and friends to 
immigrate to the US.   
 
By the 1880s and 1890s, Worcester in New England and Fresno in California became quite 
notable destinations for Armenian immigration (Maps 2.2, 2.3). Worcester attracted Armenians 
for several reasons: first of all, it was one of the heavily industrialized centers in the US and 
could provide jobs to unskilled workers. Secondly, some of the Protestant missionaries, who 
worked in Kharberd in the mid-nineteenth century, originated from Worcester (Deranian 1987, 
16, cf. Avagyan 2000, 53). Some of them taught at the Armenian College (later renamed to 
Euphrates College) and naturally, as concluded by Deranian (1987, 28), they “spoke of 
                                                
48 “All in all,” Mirak argues, “the movement to America owed much of its character to the Protestant missionaries, 
and the Armenian Protestants were a large factor in the exodus” (Mirak quoted in Deranian 1987, 26). Protestant 
Armenians were very active in the founding and operation of the Armenian Colonial Association, established in 
New York in 1900. The Association helped many Armenian immigrants to find jobs and settle in various cities of 
the Untied States. It also provided some assistance to the needy Armenian immigrants or orphans (Mirak 1983, 70-
71; Tootikian 2005, 14). 
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Worcester and aroused interest in the city.” Finally, the first Armenians, who arrived in 
Worcester and found employment at the Washburn and Moen Manufacturing Corporation or the 
commonly known “the wire mill,” gradually brought their families, friends and relatives from 
Kharberd, making the Armenian community in Worcester about 80% Kharberdts‘i (people 
originating from Kharberd). The president of the “wire mill,” Philip Moen, was himself an active 
missionary and he encouraged the immigration of Protestant Armenians to America. In the 
1880s, the number of Armenians became so noticeable in Worcester that the area they inhabited 
became known as “little Armenia” (Deranian 1987, 17; Phillips 1989, 106).49  
 
In contrast to Worcester, Fresno was not a major industrial center in California. Because of its 
fertile land and favorable climate it was growing into an agricultural center in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century. The first Armenian settlers of Fresno were the Seropian brothers, 
members of the Protestant Congregational Church. They arrived from Worcester in 1881 in 
search of a warmer, drier climate for their sick brother (Bulbulian 2000, 13-20).50 Originating 
from the small town of Marsovan in the Sivas (Sebastia) vilayet in the Ottoman Empire, these 
Protestant brothers soon pulled many Marsovan Armenians from New England and from the old 
country  (Kooshian 2002, 32-5). By the end of the 1880s, the Fresno Armenian community had 
people originating from Yozgat, Bitlis, Kharberd and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire. Most of 
these people had moved to Fresno from New England (Bulbulian 2000, 31-9; Waldstreicher 
1989, 59-60). Similar to Worcester, in the course of a few decades, the Armenian presence 
                                                
49 In order to emphasize the importance of Worcester for Armenians in the 1880s and 1890s, Deranian (1987, 19) in 
his article with a quite intriguing title “Worcester is America,” insists that it had become known as “the Armenian 
metropolis of the country.” Similarly, David Waldstreicher (1989: 46) calls Worcester  “the first center of Armenian 
life in the United States.” 
50 The first Armenian to arrive in Fresno was Martiros Yanikian in 1874. He did not settle there at his first arrival 
and returned to Philadelphia, but eventually he settled in Fresno later. Feeling like a nor mart (new man) in that area 
he adopted the name Frank Normart (Bulbulian 2000, 16-7; Hagopian 1984). 
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became so notable that the area where the Armenians concentrated became eventually known as 
the “Armenian Town” or “Little Armenia” (Bulbulian 2000, 37; Hagopian 1984; 1997). 
Compared to the Worcester Armenian community, the Fresno community was more 
heterogeneous in terms of the origins of the incoming Armenians. Yet, by confessional 
affiliations, most of the early immigrants were all Protestants, just as in Worcester (Bulbulian 
2000, 86-7). 
 
Among the factors influencing the settlement of Armenians, jobs and family/compatriotic ties 
played a crucial role. Most of the Armenian “pioneers” arriving in the US in the course of the 
nineteenth century were unmarried men, ready to travel anywhere for education or employment 
(Waldstreicher 1989, 45). They were followed by their families and compatriot/coreligionists. 
Because of chain migration, many areas became concentrations of Armenians originating from a 
particular village, town or region in the Ottoman Empire. One of the largest groups arriving in 
the Untied States from the “Old World” were the Kharberdts‘is (Kharberd Armenians), who 
settled in Boston, Worcester, Lynn, Providence, and Whitinsville (Mirak 1983, 124). Because a 
smaller number of Armenians from Malatia and Arabkir settled in Philadelphia, it soon became 
the largest aggregation of Armenians from Arabkir and Malatia. Similarly, Armenians from Van 
were mostly drawn to Pawtucket and Niagara Falls, while the Turkophone Armenians from 
Adana and Kayseri concentrated in Watertown and New York respectively51 (Alboyajian 1937, 
1963-4; Eghiayan 1970, 895-96; Mirak 1983, 124; Kaprielian-Churchill 2004, 18). Compatriotic 
identities often prevailed over national/confessional identifications as Armenians. If the number 
                                                
51 Similarly, the Armenians of Tigranakert (Diyarbakir) clustered in Providence or West Hoboken. They became so 
prominent in West Hoboken that an article in an Armenian newspaper of the time wrote: “a visitor to West Hoboken 
who hadn’t visited Dikranagert [Tigranakert] wouldn’t need to” (quoted in Mirak 1983, 124). Robert Mirak recalls a 
story that when the West Hoboken Armenians were asked if there were any Armenians in that community, they said: 
“no, they are all Tigranakerts‘is” (Interview with Robert Mirak. May 12, 2014). 
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of Armenians from a certain village was smaller, they would identify themselves with the nearby 
town and blend into regional compatriotic settlements of, say, Kharberdts‘is or Arabkirts‘is. 
Establishing compatriotic communities was a quite common pattern among the first-generation 
Armenians.52  
 
In industrial or agricultural centers like Worcester and Fresno, where Armenians originating 
from different Ottoman Armenian villages and towns regrouped, the Kharberdts‘is, Bitlists‘is, 
Yozgats‘is, and Mushets‘is concentrated in certain areas within the Armenian quarter and they 
often developed separate community centers and businesses. As Walter Karabian,53 the son of a 
Bitlists‘i, recalled in the documentary From Bitlis to Fresno (Hagopian 1997), “We … knew 
which ones were Mushets‘is, which ones were Kharberdts‘is. We knew of course all the 
Bitlists‘is….” He also recalled an anecdote about his great-uncle, Krikor Karabian, whose 
Kharberdts‘i friend used to tell him, “Krikor, you are a good man, too bad you are not a 
Kharberdts‘i.”54  There were two Armenian markets in Fresno. The Kharberdts‘is went for 
shopping at the Hanoian’s market and the Bitlists‘is to Kersam’s store (Fresno’s Arax market). 
                                                
52 Abrahamyan (1967, 354-355) quotes the records of the proceeding of the February 22, 1910 meeting of the 
Armenian-American delegation, which has the following information about the Armenian settlements in the US: 1. 
California - 2000 Armenians, mostly from Kharberd and Bitlis; 2. West Hoboken region -1000 Armenians mostly 
from Tigranakert; 3. New York with the suburbs - 5000 Armenians from different places; 4. Philadelphia - 650 
Armenians, mostly from Arabkir and Malatia; 5.Troy-NewYork - 600 Armenians from different places; 6. Chicago 
area - 1000 Armenians from different places; 7. Canada - 600 Armenians mostly from Geghi; 8. Saint-Louis region - 
800, mostly from Geghi; 9. Detroit - 400 Armenians from different places; 10. Lawrence region - 900 Armenians 
mostly from Kharberd and Ch‘mshkatsak; 11. Providence - 2500 Armenians mostly from Kharberd, Palu and Mush; 
12. Worcester region - 2500 Armenians, mostly from Kharberd and Malatia; 13. Boston region - 2500 Armenians, 
mostly from Kharberd. The author notes that these do not seem to represent the actual numbers of Armenians, but 
this record is another piece of evidence for the tendency of Armenians to congregate in compatriotic settlements. 
53 Walter Karabian is a second-generation Armenian-American, born in Fresno, CA in 1938. He is a former 
California State Assembly Majority Leader and a well-known attorney. 
54 Karabian recalled another version of the same story during the interview with the author. In this story Krikor 
Karabian’s friend said “Oh, that Krikor Gharibian [the original last name of Karabians - V.S.], what a wonderful 
man, what a great friend, too bad he is a Bitlists‘i.” 
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Intermarriage between the groups in the early years was also rare if not absent at all.55 The 
compatriots knew each other personally and most often all other Armenians in their town 
originating from other Ottoman Armenian villages and regions. Armenian churches, informal 
schooling and political organizations, having been initiated by Armenian activists within 
compatriotic settlements from the 1890s, had the potential to bring together Armenians 
originating from various towns and villages in the Ottoman Empire. 
 
 
The Founding of Armenian Churches in the United States  
 
The majority of Armenian immigrants in the United States were the adherents of the Armenian 
Apostolic and Protestant faiths.56 Before the founding of Armenian churches, first Armenian 
immigrants attended local Protestant churches to pray with the Americans. Sometimes such 
prayer meetings were held at private homes or rented facilities by Protestant missionaries and 
Armenian preachers (Mirak 1983, 182; Avagyan 2000, 122; Kooshian 2002, 87; 92; Minassian 
2010, 66; Shemmassian 2011, 215). Witnessing such conditions upon his arrival to Worcester in 
1888, Mkrtich‘ P‘ortugalian, the editor of Armenia, wrote:  
 
 No matter how much Armenians are persecuted in Muslim countries, they can keep their nationality and 
their own Church, but in Christian countries, especially in America, there are many more difficulties in 
preserving our national and religious identity. Wherever the Armenians have gone, they have also brought 
with them their Armenian churches, the Armenian press, the Armenian schools; and that National Trinity 
has graced them with prosperity and has saved their national existence from all alienating forces and 
unfavorable circumstances (quoted in Deranian 1987, 22) 
 
                                                
55 Interview with Walter Karabian. March 6, 2014. 
56 The number of Catholic Armenian immigrants in the United States was very small. A few Catholic Armenian 
parishes were established in the early 1920s, but the Apostolic Exarchate for Armenian Catholics was established 
only in 1981 (cf. Avagyan 2000, 121, 129; The Eparchy of United States and Canada o the Patriarchal Armenian 
Catholic Church, http://www.armeniancatholic.org/inside.php?lang=en&page_id=304. Accessed August 15, 2014). 
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The concern for the “alienating forces” targeting Armenians was expressed first of all against the 
Armenian Protestants. Tensions and conflict between the Protestant and Apostolic Armenians 
facilitated the need to establish an Armenian Apostolic church in Worcester.  
 
Inspired by P‘ortugalian’s speeches, the Apostolic Armenians in Worcester formed an Armenian 
Academy ⁠ (Kachaṙ haykakan),57 which soon reached a membership of about 250. In their first 
few meetings the newly formed organization voted unanimously to exclude the Protestant 
Armenians (Avagian 2000, 123, Kooshian 2002, 128-29; Minassian 2010, 67). The Academy 
addressed a letter-appeal to the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople with the request to send an 
Apostolic Armenian vardapet (celibate priest) to serve in Worcester. In response to the plea, 
Patriarch Khoren Ashegian sent Bishop Hovsep (Joseph) Sarajian to Worcester in 1889 who 
became the first Armenian Apostolic priest of America (Ashjian 1948, 18; Deranian 1987, 22-4; 
Minassian 2010, 69; Mirak 1983, 182-83). In the course of two years, the board of trustees raised 
enough funds to erect the Armenian Apostolic church of St. Savior (Surb P‘rkich‘) in Worcester 
in 1891. Inspired by Bp. Sarajian’s appointment, many Armenian Apostolic communities 
followed the example of the Worcester church. Apostolic churches were founded in Cambridge 
(Massachusetts), Providence (Rhode Island), Hartford (Connecticut), and elsewhere (Ashjian 
1948, 19; Deranian 1987, 24-5; Mirak 1983, 182-83; 1997, 400; Avagian 2000, 124). In 1898 
with the special decree of Catholicos Khrimian, the Diocese of Armenian Church of America 
was established with its Prelacy seat in Worcester.58 Bp. Sarajian was appointed as the first 
                                                
57 Some authors translate the expression Haykakan Kachaṙ as the Armenian Academy. Others, like Oshagan 
Minassian (2010, 67), translate it as the Armenian Club. The Armenian word ‘kachaṙ’ has many different 
connotations, but Academy seems to be a closer translation. 
58 For political reasons in the Ottoman Empire, churches in the United States were transferred under the jurisdiction 
of the Catholicosate of Ējmiatsin. Maghak‘ia Ormanian, the Patriarch of the Armenian Church in the Ottoman 
Empire at the time, in his three-volume history of the Armenian Church, writes that the Sublime Porte demanded the 
Patriarch of Armenians to eliminate the Armenian revolutionary circles in Europe and the United States. In his own 
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Primate of the Armenian Church. With the active involvement of Bishop Sarajian, parish 
councils were created in New York, Chicago and Troy, Manchester and Lynn, West Hoboken 
and New Britain, Philadelphia and elsewhere (Ormanian [1912] 2001, 5103-105; Mirak 1983, 
186).  
 
In Fresno, the pioneer Armenian immigrants attended the First Congregational Church with the 
Americans, where they were often ostracized and faced discrimination. By 1895 tensions 
between the Americans and Armenians had escalated to such an extent that the American 
members of the church congregation voted to expel the “garlic” Armenians from the church. 
With the help of the Presbyterians, only three years later, a group of Evangelical Armenians was 
able to organize the Armenian First Presbyterian Church in Fresno in 1897. Another group of 
Protestant Armenians founded the Fresno Armenian Evangelical Pilgrim Congregational Church 
in 1901. The first Armenian Apostolic church in Fresno, Holy Trinity, was founded in 1900 with 
local efforts and with the support of Bishop Sarajian (Bulbulian 2000, 86-92; Kooshian 2002, 
104).59 
 
Compared to Armenian Apostolic churches, the Armenian protestant churches benefitted from 
the prevailing Protestantism in America and had better chances of adapting to the New World. 
                                                                                                                                                       
words, in order to escape the responsibility “once and forever,” Ormanian replied that he did not have jurisdiction 
over the churches outside the Ottoman domains. Consequently, he made the necessary arrangements with Catholicos 
Khrimian to transfer the churches in Europe and America under the jurisdiction of the Holy See of Ējmiatsin 
(Ormanian [1912] 2001, 5103-104). 
59 In less than 30 years the number of Armenian apostolic churches increased dramatically with the augmenting 
numbers of Armenians in California. Due to the remoteness of California from Worcester, the need to have a 
separate church diocese grew. From 1918, California churches began making appeals to the Diocese in Worcester 
and to the Catholicos in Ējmiatsin for creating a separate California diocese. Their pleas were finally answered by 
the Catholicos in 1927; with the endorsement of the Holy See of Ējmiatsin, California Armenian churches elected a 
Primate and organized the Diocese of Armenian Church of California (cf. Wertsman 1978, 10; Kooshian 2002, 401-
409; Minassian 2010, 221-25) 
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Having no formal affiliation with any mother church overseas, as Kooshian (2002, 90) argues, 
“they could claim an Armenian heritage, if they had a mind to:” 
 Their church organization was as American as any other. Their doctrine, renouncing all authority but Holy 
Writ and Conscience, emanated from the Protestant Reformation. Their style of worship was identical with 
that of their American brethren. Their songs had been translated for them from the songbooks of the 
missionaries. Their sermons, whether in Turkish or Armenian, could be just as easily delivered in English 
when the need arose. And they could follow the fine old American tradition of spinning off new sects, of 
multiplying, of evangelizing. For them, being Armenian was a matter of nationality and identity, not 
religion or ideology. 
 
Providing service in Turkish was as natural in some Armenian protestant churches, as services in 
Armenian. Services in Turkish were often provided for Turkophone Armenians coming from 
Adana or Kayseri (Malcom c1919, 101). Following the model of various Evangelical Unions in 
the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Protestant churches spreading in New England and 
California organized into two unions. The Armenian Evangelical Association of America was 
founded in Worcester in 1901 for churches in the East and the Armenian Congregationalist 
Association of California was founded in 1908 for churches in California (Kooshian 2002, 103; 
Tootikian 1996, 194).  
 
For number of reasons, compared to the early Armenian Apostolic churches, Armenian 
Protestant churches were “better attended” by Armenian immigrants (cf. Malcom c1919, 102). In 
August 1911 a letter addressed to the Armenian Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Diocese 
of Armenian Church in America noted that on Sundays “only twenty or thirty people out of two 
thousand attended services” (Minassian 2010, 135). Similarly, in 1912, Vahan Kurkjian, the 
founder of the first AGBU chapter in America, wrote in Gotchnag:60 
 
                                                
60 Gotchnag was an Armenian language weekly, published in Boston from 1900. It was founded by Armenian 
Evangelical ministers and was affiliated with the Protestant Armenian community (Mirak 1983, 249; Tootikian 
2005, 15-6). The weekly was renamed to Gotchnag Hayastani in 1919, and Hayastani Gotchnag in 1921, and 
ceased publication in 1968 (Babloyan 1986, 54) 
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The Armenian Church … our chief representative and trustee … is a feeble, breathless creature. …. The 
great majority of the Armenians in America are not in communication with its influence. … In Eastern 
states, the churches in Worcester and Hoboken, in California, Fresno, Fowler and Yettem …lack regularity 
and discipline. … [This is] … the Armenian Church, the first flower of Christianity, whose apostleship, 
devotion and martyrdom we vaunt. … I know of many who scoff, for whom religion means ignorance, 
retrogression and melancholy. … But where are the believers? … In Boston of 2500 Gregorian [Apostolic] 
Armenians barely 25 have paid their $2 annual dues. … Our pews remain empty, except for Easter and 
Christmas, and [many are nominal Christians]. The church is leaderless. (quoted in Mirak 1983, 189-190) 
 
 
Contrary to the expectations of the founders, Armenian churches did not attract large masses of 
Armenian immigrants in the United States.61 Some historians believe this was because of the 
lack of well-prepared Armenian clergy, able to understand and address the spiritual needs of the 
Armenian immigrants in the United States (Mirak 1983, 190-91). While this seems to be a 
crucial factor, another important factor that has not been much addressed, was the overall 
discriminatory American social-political environment, which had a direct impact on the social-
political integration of Armenians into American society. 
 
 
Social Adjustment and Political Inclusion of Armenians in the US 
 
Regardless of regional, linguistic-cultural and confessional diversity, Armenians faced more or 
less similar discriminatory attitudes as immigrants wherever they established visible 
communities. If in Worcester Armenians were prevented from joining labor movements or trade 
unions, in Fresno local American farmers and businesses refused them employment (Bulbulian 
                                                
61 Despite the prevailing apathy among the first generation Armenian immigrants towards the church, elections of 
local parish councils were usually tense. The church had been the most authoritative Armenian institution in the 
Ottoman Empire and in the minds of many immigrants the church had the same importance in the New World. 
Consequently, those affiliated with the Armenian political parties, often sought to control the parish council in order 
to exert certain political influence on the church congregation. Prior to the 1920s, the struggle was between the 
clergy, who in most cases were against the idea of revolution, and the Armenian revolutionary party activists, who 
wanted to use the church and its network for disseminating their revolutionary propaganda and fundraising purposes. 
These conflicts will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
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2000, 55, 114-115; Deranian 1987; 18). If in Worcester Armenians were often denied police 
protection (Deranian 1987, 18; Mirak 1983, 142), in Fresno companies refused selling insurance 
to Armenian businesses against fire (Bulbulian 2000, 111). In many places, for many years 
Armenians could not join any social, service or country clubs, fraternities and sororities, or local 
high-school football teams (Bulbulian 2000, 108; Hagopian 1984; Zenian 1996, 12). Prejudice 
and discrimination did not exclusively target Armenians, yet in places where Armenians lived in 
larger concentrations, discrimination acquired specifically anti-Armenian character. As Charles 
Mahakian notes in his dissertation, 
…Disagreeable traits, which some of the Armenians of the first generation had, would have been the cause 
of their being disliked as individuals, but would not have given rise for a prevalent race prejudice if the 
Armenians were not concentrated in such large numbers, relative to the native population. In large cities or 
small towns, wherever the Armenians are few in number, no such strong antagonism has been developed 
against them as there has in Fresno Country.  (Mahakian quoted in Bulbulian 2008, 107).  
 
In Fresno, discrimination against Armenians was at its highest. The notorious land covenant 
restricted their rights to purchase property in certain areas. As a result, Armenians in Fresno were 
barred from residing in certain areas and were forced to cluster in a ghetto-like Armenian 
neighborhood (Bulbulian 2000, 109, 115; Mirak 1983, 144-45);62 Armenian businessmen were 
not allowed to rent offices at certain buildings  (Hagopian 1983; 1997); some buildings and shop 
windows had signs with discriminatory notes, “no dogs or Armenians allowed”63 or “Farm For 
Sale, Armenians Need Not Apply” (Bulbulian 2000, 119; Zenian 1996, 12).  
 
                                                
62 The standard form of a buy and sell agreement act read: “Neither said premises, nor any part thereof shall be used 
in any manner whatsoever or occupied by any Negro, Chinese, Japanese, Hindu, Armenian, Asiatic or native of the 
Turkish Empire, or descendant of the above named persons, or anyone not of the white or Caucasian race” (quoted 
in Mirak 1983, 144-45). 
63 Similar expressions were quite common against other immigrants as well. Many similar infamous signs of 
discrimination existed against the Irish, Blacks, Chinese and others. “No Dogs and Chinese Allowed,” “No Irish, 
Blacks and Dogs,” and other similar signs were quite prevalent at the time. 
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Prejudice and discrimination was especially hard for the children of immigrants. The children of 
school age had to attend local public schools, interact with the non-Armenian locals and confront 
their American schoolmates’ derogatory comments almost every day. Regardless of which 
background they were coming from, whether they were Kharberdts‘is, Arabkirts‘is, or Bitlists‘is, 
or from Protestants or Apostolic families, expressions like “dirty black Armenians” or “starving 
Armenians” targeted them all equally - in schools, workplaces and streets in Fresno, and 
elsewhere as well (Bulbulian 2000, 108; Deranian 1987, 18; Jendian 2008, 69). In the 
documentary produced by the Armenian Film Foundation Strangers in a Promised Land (1984) 
Walter Karabian recalls: 
Discrimination was one of the major factors in shaping Armenian mentality in Fresno. Parents of the first 
and second generation went out of their way to have us assimilate into the American mainstream of life. 
We were given names like Walter, Rodney, Eugene, Kenneth, Richard and not the traditional Armenian 
names (Hagopian 1984). 
 
Adopting or giving American names seemed to be one way of dealing with the most obvious 
differences between the Armenians and Americans. All across the United States, adopting 
American names or the Americanization of names among the first and second generation 
Armenians seemed to have become a commonly acknowledged mechanism of successful 
integration into American society (Americanization by choice).64 Name changes became so 
popular among Armenians that Shemmassian (2011) even observed some patterns: “Serop 
                                                
64 Examples are plenty, but to name a few, upon his arrival to the United States, the father of Robert Mirak, Zaven 
Mirakian changed his name to John Mirak. Another successful entrepreneur and philanthropist Stephen 
Mugardichian changed his name to Stephen Mugar  (Mirak 2014, 5-37). Similarly, many Fresno Armenians 
willingly changed their names to make them sound more American. Petros Petrosian became Peter Peters, some 
others adopted American last names, such as Taylor, Lyons, Sweat (Bulbulian 2000, 27; Hagopian 1997). Karnig 
Elvasian became Carl Sivas; George Elmasian became George Mason, Mardiros Fereshtian became Mark Frensh 
(Waldstreicher 1989, 97). Among the Musa Dagh Armenians, Yeprem Franklian changed his name to John E. 
Franklin; Hrant Yeghiarian/Egarian/Igarian applied for citizenship under a new name Henry Vance Garian; 
Sherbetjian become Shrin (Shemmassian 2011, 210). In some cases last names were simplified in order to make the 
pronunciation easier. This was the case with Khachigians, who dropped the first letter “K” to sound as Hachigian. 




became Sam, Hovsep became Joseph, Boghos became Paul, Manase became Mac, Elmas 
became Pearl, Azniv became Agnes” (210).    
 
Name changes, although very prevalent,65 were hotly debated among Armenians. While the 
representatives of the Armenian political parties placed much emphasis on the preservation of 
national identity and were against name changing, the more pro-assimilationist factions in the 
community, usually the Protestant affiliated circles and their periodicals (like Gotchnag), 
encouraged the changing and modification of Armenian names to make them easier for 
American pronunciation. Name changing, therefore, was not a universal practice among 
Armenians. Some Armenians still preserved their Armenian names, some just Americanized 
their first names and some changed their entire names to make no obvious connection to their 
previous Armenian names (Mirak 1983, 179). Some of the brothers of the above mentioned 
Seropians in Fresno, for example, Americanized only their first names – John (Hovhannes), 
George (Kevork) Jacob (Hagop). They were able to develop into very successful businessmen 
through discrimination and prejudice which often pushed them downhill and made them climb 
the hill over and over66 (cf. Bulbulian 2000, 22-26; Mirak 1983, 105-22). To rephrase Robert 
Mirak (2014, 37), it seems the Americanized names helped in climbing “a fewer hills.”67 In line 
with the same argument, Bulbulian (2000, 18) also recorded that the first Armenians who were 
                                                
65 Anglicizing or Americanizing names was not a particular characteristic of the Armenian immigrant group in the 
United States. Among other early immigrants to the United States, many adopted American names, and some of 
them even became quite famous Americans. In her article on “Assimilation or Transnationalism? Conceptual 
Models of the Immigrant Experience in America” the author, Silvia Pedraza (2006, 42-43) brings number of 
examples of Hollywood stars, who had changed their names. 
66 In one of the sections of his book on Fresno Armenians Bulbulian (2000, 22-26) describes how discrimination and 
prejudice against Armenians often caused major inconveniences and losses to the Seropians’ businesses. But despite 
the hardships, the brothers were able to become quite successful and prominent in Fresno Country. 
67 In rare instances, some first generation Armenians could succeed without having to change their names. Varaztad 
Kazanjian, an immigrant from the Ottoman Empire, who started from the Worcester “wire mill,” as many of 
Armenians, managed to graduate from Harvard Dental School, joined Harvard Medical Unit in World War I as a 
surgeon, and became “a world famous plastic surgeon” in the 1930s (Federal Writers 1937, 38). 
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able to join American social or country clubs or service organizations had non-Armenian names. 
Yet even after changing names, the school age children of immigrants often felt the prejudice for 
their unpopular last names. In the autobiographical history of his family, Mirak (2014, 100-101) 
recalls how he would often say his last name was “Smith,” and how he felt uncomfortable when 
his mother Artemis spoke Armenian in front of his “Anglo friends.” 
 
In significant ways, the everyday confrontation with discrimination and prejudice had impacted 
not only the regional/compatriotic identities, but also the second generation’s attitude towards 
their Armenian background. Dwelling between two worlds – an Armenian (whether 
Kharberdts‘i, Mushets‘i, Bitlists‘i) at home and an American at school, and in their attempts to 
overcome the inferiority complex in a larger discriminatory context, the second-generation 
Armenians found different ways of dealing with the problem. Some tried to forget their 
Armenian names completely; some rejected anything related to Armenians, even food and 
clothing; some avoided mentioning any relations to Armenians. Yet there were others, who just 
did not know what to do and suffered in retrospect: “The children, the poor children! We were 
torn in half by the conflicting demands of our Armenian homes and our American environment” 
(John Hagopian’s recollection quoted in Mirak 1983, 161; cf. Hagopian 1984; Waldstreicher 
1989, 80-1). Embarrassment for demonstrating their ethnic traits, embarrassment for their 
parents’ not speaking and understanding English, embarrassment for being made interpreters of 
their parents for bargaining goods in markets,68 which created a negative attitude towards 
                                                
68 In one of the chapters of his book, Mirak (1983, 162) discusses several examples of Armenian children, who felt 
embarrassed for their parents, because they often would take them to markets as interpreters and would ask them to 
bargain prices. The non-Armenian shopkeepers perceived the bargaining as cheating and “a desire to rob the 




Armenians, all these made the second generation more prone to assimilation and 
Americanization.  
 
Peer pressure, in addition to the official curriculum in American public schools, made a huge 
impact on the Americanization of the children of immigrants. Despite the pressing atmosphere, 
sometimes for the lack of alternative, but quite often due to the desire to help their children 
integrate and advance in American society, most Armenian immigrant parents voluntarily chose 
to send their children to American public schools.69 Public schooling with its Americanizing 
mission and instruction exclusively in English made the schools important agencies of melting 
the Armenian children into the American pot. As Mirak’s (1983, 161) observation confirms, 
“public schools and their teachers taught impressionable youngsters that the preservation of 
Armenian names and Old World customs and ideas was both totally wrong and un-American.” 
Both formal education (public Americanization) and informal social and peer pressure in public 
schools made the school-age Armenian children not only question their Armenian identities, but 
also in their efforts of becoming an American to often actively reject their Armenian background 
(private Americanization). William Saroyan provided a vivid account of how immigrant children 
felt in American public schools: 
The kids of immigrants … are quickly made aware of a number of attitudes held by others about them, 
mainly that they are not the equals of Americans… First there was a nickname for each of group that 
amounted to an insult, not so much because of the nickname itself, but for the contempt with which it was 
frequently flung at a member of the group not only by angered members of other groups, but also by adults 
and teachers themselves. It was so bad that simply to refer to a boy by his nationality, as an Armenian, for 
instance, became the equivalent of an expression of contempt and, of course, an insult. … It was soon so 
undesirable to be what you were that many boys and girls wished to God they were something else, and 
even tried to pretend that they were actually not Armenian, for instance, but Persian. Or they couldn’t wait 
                                                
69 Jenny Phillips (1989, 109) provides the recollection of an Armenian immigrant worker, which demonstrates how 
ordinary people working at factories were not happy with their status and wanted their children to be more 
successful. According to this account, after the woman was praised by her boss for being a good worker and the boss 
expressed hope that someday her children would work at the factory, she replied: “I hope I never see the day when 
my children have to do this kind of work.” 
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to get out of school, and out of town, so that they could forget what an unfortunate thing it was to be who 
they were (Saroyan quoted in Mirak 1983, 273).70 
 
The negative experience of childhood often made the second-generation not teach their children 
about their Armenian heritage at all.  
 
Armenian families, churches and other formal and informal Armenian communal institutions, 
thus, mostly lost their role in the New World as agencies of identity formation to the American 
public schools. In close-knit Armenian neighborhoods, as in Worcester or Fresno, the presence 
of those institutions significantly prolonged the process of assimilation. The Armenian 
neighborhoods, churches (both Protestant and Apostolic), coffeehouses, political party clubs, and 
informal Armenian schooling71 certainly provided places for intermingling and socialization for 
Armenians arriving from various regions of the Ottoman Empire. In such places, different and 
sometimes mutually unintelligible dialects came together, even though many literature 
Armenians could communicate in Western Armenian.72 Church attendance or community 
participation, however, were secondary compared to the primary concern of all immigrants to 
integrate in the New World. Number of other factors made church or Armenian school 
attendance even repelling for the children of immigrants. Even if some children attended 
Armenian evening or one-day schools “because of parental insistence,” the classes in the 
                                                
70 Some Armenian children lacking working knowledge of English were even placed in schools for individuals with 
mental disorders (Hagopian 1997). 
71 Instruction of the Armenian language, geography, culture and religion was usually held in Armenian evening 
schools adjacent to an Armenian church. There were no full-time Armenian day schools in the Untied States until 
the 1960s. Some communities organized after school Armenian classes. With the lack of trained professionals, 
usually local priests and some learned women volunteered as teachers  (cf. Mirak 1983, 275-76; Shemmassian 2011, 
214). 
72 Armenians coming from different Ottoman provinces spoke different dialects, which in some cases were mutually 
unintelligible. Armenians of Musa Dagh, for example, spoke a dialect called Kistilig, (the language of Christians), 
and many of them were ignorant of the standard Western Armenian, which was based on the Armenian dialect of 




afternoon or during the weekends, taught by non-professional teachers and priests, were not 
enough for learning or transmitting the language (cf. Malcom c1919, 101-2; Mirak 1983, 376). 
Learning Armenian, on the other hand, was not of the utmost priority for the children of 
immigrants, compared to what they had to accomplish in American public schools. Under peer 
pressure, rather than learning the common mutually intelligible standard of Western or any 
Armenian, the Armenian kids preferred learning and communicating in English. This was even 
encouraged by some Armenian institutions. Some Armenian language periodicals urged the 
Armenian immigrants to learn English as a “key to success.” Articles appearing in various 
periodicals suggested to socialize with Americans and to attend evening classes in order to learn 
and improve their command of the English language (Mirak 1983, 273). Evening classes for 
immigrants, provided in most of the communities with significant immigrant population, were 
not mandatory either, but the perspective of integration and success made them more appealing. 
In the long run, therefore, the effects of living in concentrations or scattered in big cities were 
paradoxically the same. While living dispersed and scattered was not conducive for the retention 
of an Armenian language, identity or a particular lifestyle, living in large concentrations also 
eventually led to the assimilation of the second and third generation Armenians. 
 
Acquiring naturalization was seen as an important step towards the full and final inclusion into 
American life. Compared to other immigrants in the United States, the naturalization of the first-
generation Armenians and their children was relatively easier. In contrast to the Chinese or 
Japanese, the Armenians were spared any federal level structural discrimination and could avoid 
significant problems for naturalization in the United States. Generally being considered as 
whites, sometimes through litigation and other measures, Armenians were able to secure their 
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rights for naturalization (cf. Mirak 1983, 282-83; Shneider 2011, 224). Since 1909 if the 
Armenians could meet the requirement of basic proficiency in English, receiving naturalization 
and citizenship would not be a major challenge.73	  As long as they could channel their efforts in 
the directions, which were not much affected by discriminatory policies, as long as they could 
negotiate their professional aspirations, they could quite successfully establish and develop in 
their places of settlement after receiving citizenship.  
 
Acquiring American citizenship, however, often meant more than a mere change of nationality. 
Mirak (1983, 280) quotes George Mardigian saying:  
 I wish I could make you understand what it is like not to be an American - not to have been an American  
 all your life - and then suddenly, with the words of a man in flowing robes, to be one, for that moment, and 
forever after. Think of it … One moment, you belong with your fathers to a million dead yesterdays. The 
next, you belong with America to a million unborn tomorrows. 
 
The American citizenship meant not only becoming formally affiliated with the American state, 
but also signified the passage from an immigrant to an American. It was a certain junction point 
between the Armenian past, “a million dead yesterdays,” and American future - “a million 
unborn tomorrows.” Acquiring citizenship also meant being able to participate in the political 
and public life. During various campaigns, even Armenian language newspapers provided 
extensive coverage of American events, encouraged Armenians to actively follow local politics 
and to vote for a certain candidate (Mirak 1983, 283-86). Acquiring naturalization, thus, was not 
only formally, but also in essence turning the Armenians into full-fledged Americans. 
 
                                                
73 In a brief episode in 1909 Armenians were declared as belonging to the “Asian race” by the United States Bureau 
of Naturalization and therefore not eligible for naturalization. The governmental action, however, was ruled out by 
the United States Circuit Court of Massachusetts, which established that the Armenians belonged to the “white or 
Caucasian race” and were eligible for naturalization (Mirak 1983, 282; cf. Waldstreicher 1989, 62-3) 
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After the destruction of their hometowns and villages in the Ottoman Empire during WWI and 
the loss of hope for return to their ancestral lands, the diverse group of Armenian immigrants 
sought ways to build a future, where they and their children could succeed in the New World. 
The new immigrants arriving in America following WWI, who mostly joined their families and 
relatives, adjusted to the lifestyles and patters of life in America. Despite the proliferation of 
Armenian ethnic organizations in the context of waning Americanization in the 1920s and 1930s, 
most Armenians engaged in voluntary Americanization. As the Federal Writers concluded their 
study on Armenians in Massachusetts in the mid-1930s, in all respects the “American-born 
Armenians” looked and behaved like Americans. Unlike their “foreign-born” parents, they 
hardly used native language, were fluent in English and there was “nothing foreign in their 
customs and habits” (Federal Writers 1937, 144-5) Interviews conducted by Federal Writers 
revealed that the “old generation” Armenian editors, priests, writers, professional men were 
concerned about the fact that it was impossible to keep the second generation Armenian. The 
attempts of the elders to organize the American-born Armenians into Armenian societies 
“conceived by and similar to those of the immigrant generation,” remained unrealized (ibid., 
145). Apart from arguing for the success of Americanization by choice, Federal Writer’s report 
of 1937 was very important in terms of its tolerance towards Armenian ethnic organizations. 
Interviews and research conducted by the Writers, all of them of American origin, made them 
aware of the Armenian political and other organizations operating in the Untied States. Yet by 
completing the work, the authors did not have any intention to call for any coercive action 
against ethnic Armenian organizations. Involvement in ethnic Armenian organizations and 
institutions, especially churches, was no longer seen as detrimental to the success of 
Americanization by choice. 
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Armenians in France: From Apatride Refugees to Frenchmen  
 
Unlike the Untied States, where the number of Armenians was already growing in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century, the largest flow of Armenians to France was directly caused 
by the genocide and deportations in the Ottoman Empire. Prior to WWI, Paris hosted just a small 
Armenian community,74 some Armenians had settled in Marseille as well, but the Armenian 
presence in France became visible after 1920s with the arrival of sizable numbers of refugees 
from various parts of the Ottoman Empire. The actual figure of the Armenian refugees in the 
1920s is hard to estimate, but various accounts put it between forty and seventy thousand.75  
Large numbers of Armenians arriving in France were genocide survivors and were placed in 
refugee camps by the French authorities. Marseille, the largest port city in southern France, was 
the first to accept the Armenian refugees between 1922 and 1928. Four hundred survivors 
                                                
74 The Armenian community in Paris consisted mostly of wealthy, merchant class, political activists, and visiting 
students from Constantinople, most of whom usually returned home after completing their university studies 
(Abrahamyan 1967, 155-71; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 22-47; Ter-Minassian 1997, 50-6; 61-4). 
75 Haratch (1925-2009), the most renowned Armenian newspaper in France, for example, estimated that there were 
about 4,000 Armenians in 1921, which by 1925-26 had increased tenfold, becoming around 40-45 thousand. 20,000 
lived in Marseille (Haratch October 16, 1925; April 4, 7, 1926). Based on some Armenian sources, Abrahamyan 
(1967, 167) suggests that in 1925 the number of Armenians was about 50,000, which by 1936 had become 70,000. 
The estimates provided by the French Office of the Protection of Refugees and Apatrides in the article published 
recently in Le Monde on Dec. 22, 2011, suggest yet another number: “Entre les années 1920 et 1950, la France a 
accueilli 350 000 réfugiés et 12 % d'entre eux étaient des Arméniens [about 42,000 – V.S.], indique l'Office français 
de protection des réfugiés et apatrides (OFPRA). La diaspora arménienne est principalement concentrée à Marseille, 
qui fut la grande de ville de débarquement des Arméniens à partir des années 1920, ainsi que dans les régions 
Rhône-Alpes et Ile-de-France.” Despite some possible exaggerations, the inconsistency between the figures 
provided in Armenian sources for the 1920s and 1930s and the OFPRA figures of the 1920s and1950s suggests that 
the OFPRA did not count all Armenians arriving in France, but only the refugees (who lived in camps). Various 
accounts suggest that France hosted large number of Armenian orphans, as well as Armenian workers, who arrived 
to France with employment contracts and moved to their places of employment immediately after disembarking at 
Marseille (cf. Ch‘ormisian 1975, 67; Belmont 2004, 31-41; Boghossian 2005, 64; Mouradian and Ter-Minassian 
2003, 624; Ter Minassian 1997, 61-69). 
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escaping the Smyrna catastrophe76 disembarked at Marseille in November 1922. Shortly 
afterwards, thousands of survivors arrived in Marseille from temporary camps in the Middle East 
and Greece  (Le Tallec 2001, 43; Hovanessian 1992, 68; Belmonte 2004, 33-5). A small number 
of Armenians came with work contracts and, rather than staying in Marseille, they were 
transported to their places of employment in the industrial centers of Rhône Alpes (Lyon, 
Valence, Saint-Étienne, Saint-Chamond, Grenoble) and the Paris region, along the Marseille-
Paris railroad. Many others passed through France on their way to North and South Americas 
(Boghossian 2009, 59; Dallak‘yan 2004, 220, Hovanessian 2003, 355-56; Ritter 2007, 18). After 
the introduction of immigration quotas in the United States in 1924, the outflow of Armenians 
from France to the United States came to an end.  
 
Most Armenian refugees, arriving in France without prearranged appointments, stayed in 
Marseille, in the barracks of the colonial military and the French workforce during the war 
(Belmonte 2004, 34). Camps Oddo, Mirabeau and Victor Hugo hosted the largest number of 
Armenian refugees (cf. Ter-Minassian 1997, 62). Compared to what the Armenians had 
experienced in the Ottoman Empire, for most even the miserable camp conditions were 
incomparably better. Life in the camps was secure and therefore more preferable. Clustered 
together in camps many refugees were reluctant to move. They preferred to stay enclosed in their 
communities, as they were ignorant of French, local customs and laws. Many Armenians turned 
down temporary employment at distant places, away from family, friends and their camp 
                                                
76 Following WWI, under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the revived Turkish army attacked Smyrna in 1922, 
which had been under Greek occupation since May 1919. The campaign exterminated the Christian population in 
Smyrna (predominantly Greeks and Armenians) and set the town on fire. Thousands of Greeks and Armenians fell 




community life (Belmont 2004, 40). In view of shortages in the workforce, the French 
authorities, however, had different plans for the Armenians.  
 
 
The French Context: Immigration Policies, Naturalization and Social-Political Conditions in 
France 
 
In most theories and histories of nations and nationalism, the French Revolution of 1789 
represents a significant point of reference, which provided a “rupture between the Old and New 
times” (Anderson 2006, 192). France has become the exemplary model of a nation for the 
dynastic and imperial states in the nineteenth century for the promotion of “popular sovereignty 
and constitutional rule” and claims on a “single national language and ethnically homogeneous 
population” (Eley and Suny 1996, 19-20). The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the 
Citizen in 1789, the First French Constitution of 1791 and the National Convention of 1792 
inaugurated the state-imposed nation-building in France. In the course of the following century, 
the government’s nation-building efforts produced, in David Bell’s words, the “cult of the nation 
in France” (Bell 2001, 7, 143-73). As early as in the 1790s, in their centralization attempts, the 
Jacobins began the campaign of eradicating local patois (dialects) and making the French 
language uniform throughout the republic. Largely unsuccessful because of the lack of funds and 
organizational resources, the cultural-linguistic uniformity of France remained to be achieved in 
the times of the Third Republic at the end of the nineteenth century (cf. Bell 2001, 175-77; 
Agulhon 2001, 61). As Eugene Weber (1976, xii, cf. 67-94) also demonstrated with much 
supporting evidence in his seminal work Peasants into Frenchmen, “very significant portions of 
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rural France continued to live in a world of their own until near the end of the nineteenth 
century.” By the twentieth century, loyalty to the French nation had come to dominate over and 
replace regional loyalties and identities; French language had become dominant and the usage of 
regional patois had significantly declined, largely thanks to the effectiveness of the two coercive 
institutions – schools and the army77 (cf. ibid., 84-85, 302). In the course of a century after the 
First French Revolution, thus, French republicanism had developed strong traditions of nation-
building and overcoming differences through coercive assimilation.  
 
In parallel, debates on whether a French person should be defined by descent (jus sanguinis) or 
by birth on the French soil (jus soli)78 went on in the course of the nineteenth century.79 These 
debates continued until the law of 1889 established the principle of jus soli in France (Weil 2008, 
30-53; Brubaker 1992, 85-106; Lewis 2011, 233). The French Nationality Law of 1889 provided 
naturalization to the third-generation descendants of immigrants through jus soli: children born 
to parents, who were born in France, were automatically attributed French citizenship upon their 
birth (Brubaker 1992, 85; Weil 2008, 194). In order to grant French citizenship, the French 
authorities thereby made sure, first of all, that immigrants would be assimilated and transformed 
into Frenchmen in their hearts and souls. If in the US, the desire to acquire citizenship was 
                                                
77 Weber (1976, 295-97) argues that until the 1890s, the army was not operating as a massive instrument of 
assimilation, although systematic conscription was in force. The war against Prussia in 1870-71 gradually changed 
the attitude towards the army and it became “an agency for emigration, acculturation, and in the final analysis, 
civilization, an agency as potent in its way as the schools” (ibid. 302) 
78 As Rogers Brubaker (1992, 123) states, “Jus soli defines the citizenry as a territorial community and jus sanguinis 
as a community of descent.” 
79 The First Constitution contained a definition of a French person, according to which the French were “those who 
were born in France to a French father; those who, born in France to a foreign father, have established their domicile 
in the kingdom; those who, born in a foreign country to a French father, have returned to establish residency in 
France and have sworn the civic oath” (quoted in Weil 2008, 14). The provisions of the First Constitution were 
subjected to certain modifications in the subsequent Constitutions of 1793, 1795, 1799, and in the Civil Code in 
1803, which established jus sanguinis as the “exclusive criterion for attributing the quality of being French at birth” 
(Weil 2008, 14-29). 
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perceived as an incentive for voluntary Americanization, naturalization in France was perceived 
to be the ultimate outcome of the process of Frenchification (francisation).  
 
The French authorities made sure that immigrants could acquire French citizenship and, thus, 
become equal to French citizens only after they had fully assimilated into French society. The 
parallel processes of nation-building through the assimilation of foreigners (étrangers) and 
defining the French based on jus soli, tried to make certain that the immigrant generations would 
have completely assimilated before becoming French nationals. The French policy of 
assimilation, which Baumann (2010, 46) calls “de-ethnicization, re-ethnicization of citizenship,” 
implied that in order to be successfully integrated, immigrants were expected to abandon their 
ethnic or other communitarian identities, “to learn a self-standardizing national language and the 
corresponding hegemonic values, and then to compete with all others admitted as fellow neo-
nationals” (Baumann 2010, 45-9).   
 
The abandonment of ethnic or communitarian identities in the French context concerned religion 
as well. In contrast to the United States, where Protestantism was officially endorsed in coercive 
Americanization policies, the French did not privilege any of the religions. The principle of 
laïcité strongly pushed religious activism to the private sphere and separated French identity 
from all forms of religious affiliation. The law of 1905 on the separation of church and state, 
embodying the principle of laïcité, stipulated that the French Republic did not “recognize, pay or 
subsidize any religion.” Churches and other religious institutions, if they wanted to own and 
 
 104 
maintain buildings, develop networks and conduct worship, had to be registered with the state as 
cultural associations (association culturelles) under the 1901 law80 (cf. Schwartz 2007, 15-6). 
 
In the immediate aftermath of WWI, France became one of the principal countries of 
immigration in the world and even surpassed the United States (Mauco 1933, 765; Lewish 2011, 
232). The shortage of workforce necessitated the recruiting of foreign workers, which made 
France a very attractive destination for large numbers of war refugees and other immigrants. In 
1933, a report prepared by Georges Mauco, one of the leading experts on immigration and 
population in the 1930s,81 sheds an important light on the issues of the control of immigration 
and the problems France faced vis-à-vis the large influx of immigrants. The number of 
immigrants, as reported by Mauco (1933, 767), doubled from 1921 until 1930, increasing from 
about 1.5 million to about 3 million (7% of the entire population of France).82 In desperate need 
of workforce, the French authorities could not stop immigration, but assimilating the immigrants 
was becoming a pressing issue. Given the diversity of the countries of origin,83 the assimilation 
of immigrants was harder “owing to their even wider difference in customs, culture and 
language” (ibid., 776).84  
                                                
80 Article 18 of the 1905 law clarified on religious institutions: “Associations formed to meet expenses, maintenance 
and public exercise of worship shall be established in accordance with Article 5 and following of Title I of the Act 
of July 1, 1901…”  (“Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat.” 
http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006070169anddateTexte=20080306. 
Accessed September 26, 2014) 
81 Reportedly, Mauco had a significant role in shaping the debates on immigration issues in France (Burges 2011, 
167-68) 
82 Because France accepted scores of unskilled workers and because most new immigrants were employed in the 
“roughest, dirtiest and most dangerous trades,” the country had been often accused of using its immigrants as “white 
niggers”(Mauco 1933, 766). 
83 Immigrants were arriving to France mostly from Central European countries, Africa and the former Ottoman 
domains (ibid., 774) 
84 As recorded by Mauco, in some parts of the Mediterranean region, where the immigrants constituted large 
numbers, there was a tendency to replace the native French by their ethnic languages. “It was hardly an 
exaggeration,” wrote Mauco in his report, “for the Italian consul to say to the mayor of Marseilles: “There are two 




The need for quicker absorption of the growing numbers of post-WWI immigrants forced the 
French authorities to liberalize some of the requirements of the 1889 Law and relax the 
conditions of naturalization for the immigrants in 1927. After the revision of the 1889 law, the 
number of naturalized foreigners significantly increased (Weil 2008, 68). Compared to other 
immigrants, Armenians, however, did not benefit from the relaxation of the naturalization laws 
because of their uncertain status as stateless refugees.  
 
 
Political Inclusion of Armenians in France 
 
Armenian refugees and immigrants constituted no exception for the French assimilationist 
policies. They were seen as foreigners, similar to other immigrants, who would have to pass 
through the process of acculturation in order to integrate into French society (cf. Mandel 2003, 
13; 21-22). But Armenians, along with some other categories of political refugees – mostly 
Russians and Jews, had attracted the attention of the French policy makers by the end of the 
1930s as cases to be treated in a special way. Armenians were not just immigrants, but refugees 
without proper documentation. The Ottoman Empire, the country of their origin and the country, 
which could provide some documentation, no longer existed. Along with other political refugees, 
Armenians were generalized in a category “…whose adaptation and assimilation was particularly 
difficult.”85  
 
                                                
85 As Mauco reported, forced migration producing refugees was different form voluntary immigration of workers. 
Refugees tended to regroup in overcrowded cities, where they “presented certain problem for competition and the 
neural centers of the country” (quoted in Weil 1994, 21). 
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The uncertain status of Armenians in France made them even more vulnerable. Compared to 
other immigrants, Armenians often received more discriminatory treatment. Even if some found 
employment or had arrived with work contracts, they were still often treated unequally at work. 
Predominantly with peasant backgrounds, these unskilled workers were put under the same 
rough conditions, as the other immigrants, but were often paid significantly less than their 
coworkers (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 67-9; Abrahamyan 1967, 168-69; Ter-Minassian 1997, 63). The 
growing number of Armenian refugees in miserable conditions, on the other hand, led to 
stereotyping, discrimination and hostility against them. In 1923, the mayor of Marseille, Siméon 
Flaissières specifically targeted Armenians among “des peuples d’Orient,” warning that 40,000 
Armenians were en route to France, who were alien to local customs, ignorant of rules of 
hygiene and brought diseases. The mayor called on the French government to strictly prohibit the 
entry of these “lamentables troupeaux humains” to France, because they were a big threat to the 
country (quoted in Belmont 2004, 38).   
 
Regardless of their refugee status, similar to other immigrants, Armenians were required to 
acquire identification cards from the respective consulates of their countries. These special IDs 
had to “very obviously” mention the nationality of the holder, his civil status, photographic 
description, profession and contain his signature (cf. Noiriel 1996, 61). If the immigrants of other 
nationalities settling in France could acquire identity cards through the consulates of their 
respective countries of origin, the Armenian refugees did not have any consulate to represent 
their interests in France. The matter was complicated further when the French authorizes refused 
to recognize “Nationalité arménienne.” In an interview to Haratch, an officer representing the 
Police Bureau of Paris clarified the point that after the Sovietization of Armenia and the 
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foundation of the Republic of Turkey, given that Armenia had become divided between “Russia 
and Turkey,” the Armenians born in Turkey were seen as Turkish nationals, and those born in 
Russia were seen as Russian nationals (Haratch, August 2, 1925). The officer suggested the 
Armenians to apply to the Soviet or Turkish consulates for identity cards. As the editor of 
Haratch commented in the footnote, neither option would work for the Armenians. Turkey no 
longer recognized those who left the country without acquiring the passports of the Republic, 
and the Soviet Union granted passports only to the former residents of Russia. And even if some 
Armenians could acquire the Soviet passports, they would not be able to cross borders to other 
countries, which had not recognized the Soviet Union86 (Haratch, August 2, 1925). Because of 
the unfeasibility of receiving identity cards either from the Soviet or Turkish consulates, both 
due to personal87 and structural constraints, the Armenians were left “under no particular state’s 
jurisdiction” (Mandel 2003, 21). The alternative for the stateless (apatride) Armenians was the 
acquisition of Nansen passports. 
 
The Nansen passports, named after Fridtjof Nansen, the High Commissioner of the Refugees 
(1921-1930) in the League of Nations, were initially designed in 1922 as identity cards for the 
Russian refugees after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, whose return to their former country of 
residence was impossible. Following the appeal made by the chairman of the Armenian National 
Delegation, Gabriel Noradungian (Gabriel Noratunkian), the League of Nations extended the 
jurisdiction of Nansen passports to include the apatride Armenian refugees as well (Le Tallec 
2001, 38-9; Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 144). Under the nationality line the Nansen documents stated in 
French and in the language of the issuer country: “personnes d’origine russe ou arménienne 
                                                
86 France recognized the Soviet Union in 1924. 
87 Some editorials of Haratch in 1925 suggest that there was a great resentment at least on the part of the Armenian 
elites at being identified as Turks. 
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n’ayant acquis aucune autre nationalité.” During the economic crisis in the early 1930s, while 
many immigrants were forced out of the country, Nansen passports helped their holders to avoid 
persecution for they had no place to return (cf. Hovanessian 1992, 67-8; Ter Minassian 1997, 
69). Nansen passports, however, were of no help for acquiring naturalization. The naturalization 
laws in France did not have any provisions for refugees. Often reluctant to approve naturalization 
requests filed by Armenians, the French authorities were concerned first of all for their slower 
rates of assimilation. The 1927 liberalization of naturalization policies, as reported by Mauco 
(1933, 77), contributed to the assimilation of some naturalized foreigners. Yet, the French 
authorities were reluctant to grant French citizenship to immigrants, who could barely articulate 
anything intelligible in French. Rather than providing naturalization to immigrants in the 1930s, 
the French integrationist and assimilationist policies gradually expanded to incorporate political 
refugees, including the apatride Armenians, in the education system and the army.  
 
The reforms of the education system, introduced by the Jules Ferry88 administration back in the 
1880s, created a nationwide primary school system accessible to all citizens of France at no cost. 
Yet these “free, compulsory, secular and intensely nationalistic … engines of assimilation,” as 
Brubaker (1992, 15) described them, were not enforced on foreigners and refugees. Similarly, 
the introduction of universal conscription in 1889 left foreigners out of “the school of the nation” 
(Nord 2011, 48). Without having thoroughly worked out strategies for the integration of 
foreigners and immigrants, the French authorities often had to improvise on the level of public 
policies, revising policies towards the political refugees, such as the Russians, Armenians or the 
Jews in the 1930s only gradually and sometimes spontaneously (cf. Weil 1994, 16-9; Lewis 
2011, 232-33). After their accession to power in 1936, the Front Populaire and the Léon Blum 
                                                
88 Jules Ferry was the minister of public instruction and later the prime minister of France (Nord 2011, 48). 
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administration initiated a series of social reforms, which significantly increased the number of 
immigrants’ children in French école communale – i.e. primary schools - and made secondary 
education free and accessible for the poor and the children of immigrants. By 1937, most 
Armenian day schools, which had operated first within camps, then in the proximity of Armenian 
concentrations in Greater Marseille and the Paris region, were shut down; some, for not having a 
government issued license, others through various regulations passed by the government, which 
encouraged enrollment in école communale (cf. Boghossian 2009, 251).  
 
Compulsory military service was also enforced on the holders of Nansen passports by the end of 
the 1930s. As reported by Arshag Chobanian (Arshak Ch‘obanian) in December 1937, the 
French law on military service, voted several years ago, was finally implemented to include the 
holders of Nansen passports between the ages of 20 and 21.89 A few years later, on the eve of 
WWII, Armenians with Nansen passports between ages 20 to 48 were massively mobilized to 
the French army (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 177-78; Le Tallec 2001, 156-57; Belmonte 2004, 99).  
While according to the provisions of the Treaty of Geneva of 1928 recruits with Nansen 
passports could wear the uniforms of the host-countries, the military records of the Armenian 
recruits during WWII contained the following line in red ink: “Soldat n’ayant pas la nationalité 
française” (Le Tallec 2001, 156). The discrimination of the apatrides in the army raised the 
discontent of Armenians in many regions - Lyon, Angoulême, Issy-les-Moulineaux and 
elsewhere. Some Armenian organizations, such as the Central Committee for Armenian 
Refugees,90 filed petitions to various agencies demanding French citizenship for the Armenian 
                                                
89 Holders of Nansen passports who refused to serve in the army were required to leave the country within a year 
(Chobanian 1937, 5-6, 93) 
90 After the treaty of Lausanne, the Armenian National Delegation reorganized itself into the Central Committee for 
Armenian Refugees (see next chapter). 
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recruits in the French army (cf. Ch‘ormisian 1975, 178; Chobanian 1937, 94; Le Tallec 2001, 
157). Yet, it was not until the aftermath of WWII that the apatride Armenians were finally 
granted naturalization, after the Armenian recruits in the French army had demonstrated their 
loyalty to France. 
 
 
Dispersion of Armenians in France and the Compatriotic Settlements  
 
Two factors determined the dispersion and settlement of Armenians in France. The first factor 
was the “brutal proletarization,” as some scholars describe the process of involuntary transition 
of Armenians from peasants into hard-laborers. It dispersed the Armenians throughout the sites 
of their future workplaces across the country (cf. Ananian 1999, 36; Boudjikanian-Keuroghlian 
1978, 27-34; Lauras 2006, 76-7; Ter Minassian 1997, 32). Chain migration through family 
networks and compatriotic ties was the second factor, which determined the concentration of 
Armenians originating from the same village in the Ottoman Empire in certain areas. Former 
refugees, who by the end of the 1920s had become mostly employed in big industrial and 
agricultural regions of France, tended to take their families to their new places of residence and 
helped their compatriots to find employment in the same industries or branches of agriculture 
and settle in those regions as well91 (cf. Boudjikanian-Keuroghlian 1978, 35, 163; Le Tallec 
2001, 75; Hovanessian 2003, 366). Similar to the dispersion pattern in the United States, 
Armenians originating from the same town or village in the Ottoman Empire tended to regroup 
                                                
91 These middlemen, who arranged employment for their family members or compatriots, were often called simsars 
(broker in Turkish) (Le Tallec 2001, 75) 
 
 111 
in various cities, towns, quarters or neighborhoods.92 Family and compatriotic ties provided with 
invaluable trust and fraternity relations, very productive for developing self-help communities in 
a foreign country.93  
 
Compatriotic ties were quite predominant, but in rare cases religious affiliation also played some 
role in the distribution and resettlement of Armenians. As observed by Lauras (2006, 112), 
Armenians arriving in Saint-Étienne or Saint-Chamond were predominantly the adherents of the 
Catholic rite. Quite often, though, compatriotic and confessional affiliations were intertwined. 
Armenian refugees from Amassia, Afyonkarahisar and Ankara settling in Arnouville-lès-
Gonesse were predominantly Catholic, making this suburb of Paris a concentration of Catholic 
Armenians. Those from Yozgat, Adapazar, Izmit, Seleuz, Tokat, Stanoz moving to Issy-les-
Moulineaux were predominantly Evangelical Armenians, and they eventually made Issy-les-
Moulineaux an important hub of the Evangelical Armenian community in the Paris region (Map 
2.5) (Ananyan 1999, 132; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 277; Ter-Minassian 1997, 66). 
                                                
92 In the case of Marseille, Armenians originating from Sebastia (Sivas), Tomarza, and Aslanbek settled in 
Campagne Perrier (Saint Antoine), those from Yozgat and Kharberd - in Campagne Frèze; Saint Jerome attracted 
Armenians from Afion, Izmir and Sivri Hissar; Armenians from Cilicia and Tigranakert regrouped in Saint Loup; 
and those originating from Ankara settled in Campagne Ripert. Other suburbs in Marseille followed a similar pattern 
of resettlement, yet in some cases the suburbs did not have just one particular compatriotic coloring. Beaumont, for 
example, which was much closer to the town, attracted Armenians originating from many different parts of the 
Ottoman Empire - Urfa, Van, Constantinople, Cilicia, Butania and elsewhere (Boghossian 2009, 73-4; Ch‘ormisian 
1975, 325). However, as Ch‘ormisian (1975, 323) observes, even when Armenians originating from different 
villages and towns moved to the same suburb of Marseille, they created their small compatriotic quarters. Armenian 
dispersion outside Marseille mostly followed the same pattern. In the Rhône Alpes and Paris regions, Armenians 
from Malatia tended to concentrate in Saint-Chamond; those originating from the Tchenkiler region regrouped in 
Alfortville; those from Yozgat, Adapazar, Izmit, Seleuz, Tokat, Stanoz villages settled in Issy-les-Moulineaux 
(Ananian 1999, 37; Artin and Morel-Deladalle 2007, 126; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 80, 268; Lauras 2006, 44-6; 
Hovanessian 1992, 60; Ter Minassian 1997, 66). 
93 Ch‘ormisian’s (1975, 322) account provides a clear image of how compatriotic ties were indispensable for the 
resettlement of Armenians from the camps: “Several families residing in Camp Oddo learn that 8-10 kilometers 
away from the town, in a village called Saint Antoine, a landowner by name Perrier sold part of his lands for a very 
cheap price. One Sunday they go there, see the lands lying on the slope of a woody hill, hanging on a canyon near 
the village, where one could get only by climbing. Could they build a house on that hill? After a minute of 
hesitation, dissatisfied with the living conditions in the camp and yearning for leaving the camp as soon as possible, 
they introduce themselves to the landowner and purchase a large piece of land in order to divide among themselves 




Map 2-5. The Armenians in Western Europe  
(Source: Hewsen 2001, 273, Map 272) 
Compatriotic settlements often represented concentrations of quite different, yet still Armenian, 
linguistic-cultural settings. Local differences in dialect, habits, customs, and traditions created 
natural symbolic boundaries between Armenians originating from different parts of the Ottoman 
Empire. Some Armenian refugee groups were Turkophone, such as those coming from Ankara, 
Adana, Ayntab, Kayseri, in most cases adherents of the Catholic94 and Protestant faiths (cf. 
Ch‘ormisian 1975, 277; Ter-Minassian 1997, 74-5). Quite often local Armenian dialects were 
                                                
94 In an interview with Haratch on August 30, 1925, Father Bedros Kedijian (Petros Ketichian), a Catholic 
Armenian bishop, reported: “Despite the fact, that the significant part of our community are Turkophone, the 
sermons in our churches are in Armenian.” 
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different from one another to such an extent that the speakers of one dialect could hardly 
understand the others.95 Similar to the United States, within some compatriotic communities, 
intermarriage with “odars” (foreigner) originating from other towns or villages was strongly 
discouraged (cf. Boghossian 2009, 131). Symbolic group boundary making between “us” and 
“them” defined by differences in regional dialects, customs, habits, was very common among the 
first-generation Armenians in France, as well, although it was challenged by the centripetal 
tendencies of Armenian Church and other communal organizations.  
 
The Founding of Armenian Churches in France  
 
Contrary to the United States, the founding of the first Armenian Apostolic church in Paris 
predated the large influx of Armenian refugees for about two decades. The small Apostolic 
Armenian community residing in Paris at the turn of the century used to hold services in a local 
Protestant church, which they rented for services in Armenian. The founding of an Armenian 
church in Paris was initiated and commissioned by Alexander Mantashev (Mant‘ashiants‘), an 
Eastern Armenian oil magnate, who used to visit Paris quite often and participated in Armenian 
religious services at the rented Protestant church building. The construction of the Cathedrale 
apostolique Saint-Jean-Baptiste began in 1902 and finished in 1904 on rue Jean Goujon in 
downtown Paris (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 85-86; Mouradian and Ter-Minassian 2003, 635). In 1927, 
the leaders of the church registered the Association culturelle de l'Église Apostolique 
Arménienne de Paris et de la région parisienne according to the French law of 1901, authorizing 
                                                
95 One of the interviewees of Martine Hovanessian in Issy-les-Moulineaux recalled that she could not understand 
any word in the dialect of Armenians originating from Stanoz (Yenikent). She thought that “their Armenian,” 
meaning her dialect of Partizak was purer, more authentic and closer to the literary Armenian language 
(Hovanessian 1992, 60). 
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the creation of associations, and the law of 1905 on the separation of church and state. The 
Association aimed at meeting the spiritual needs of the Armenians in Paris and its regions by 
constructing more churches. The French government approved the “Religious Association” in 
1927, and the church building became the property of the Association. The Association was 
based on membership and non-members could not participate in the church administration. 
Therefore, as Ch‘ormisian noted, the church in Paris became “the property of several dozens of 
Parisian Armenians, generally of the wealthier people, who had settled in Paris before [WWI]” 
(Ch‘ormisian 1975, 248-49).  
 
The Armenian Church in Paris was nominally recognized as the seat of the Diocese of the 
Armenian Church in Europe since the 1900s under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of 
Ējmiatsin. Because of the absence of an established Armenian community in Paris before WWI 
this church acted as solely a religious institution, without having any other social functions 
(Ch‘ormisian 1975, 85-8, 247). In the mid-1920s the Catholicos of the Armenian Church 
appointed Archbishop Grigoris Balakian (Grigoris Palak‘ian) as his nuncio in Paris. Unable to 
come to terms with the Armenian notables in Paris, who controlled the church affairs, Balakian 
chose Marseille as the locus of his activities. He moved there in 1927 and actively embarked on 
Armenian church construction projects in the various suburbs of Marseille (Boghossian 2009, 
84; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 248-49, 314-15). 
 
First churches were constructed in Marseille following the influx of Armenian refugees in the 
1920s. While still at Camp Oddo, Armenians managed to develop their own camp 
administration, establish a small chapel and organize a school (Boghossian 2005, 74; Belmont 
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2004, 35-7). Similarly, a few other chapels appeared in the quarters of Marseille where 
Armenians constituted significant numbers (Boghossian 2005, 95-96). Shortly after the closing 
of Camp Oddo in 1927, Abp. Balakian initiated the construction of Armenian churches in all 
Armenian populated neighborhoods in Marseille and other Armenian settlements (Boghossian 
2005, 102; 2009, 88-9; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 314-5). Between 1926 and 1933, many Armenian 
apostolic and Evangelical churches were established in Marseille.96  
 
For various reasons, most of the Armenian Apostolic chapels and churches did not register as 
Associations culturelles based on 1901 and 1905 laws (Boghossian 2005, 120). As in the past, 
the chapel-church acted not only as a place of worship, but also as a community center (“maison 
du people”), meeting the social, cultural and educational needs of the community. Adjacent to 
the chapels and churches, Armenians organized informal schooling to provide lessons in 
Armenian language and history, as well as the French language (cf. Belmont 2004, 62-76). 
According to Boghossian (2005, 216) there were about seven or eight Armenian Apostolic 
chapels and churches and ten Armenian day schools in Marseille in the 1930s. Although there 
were no legislative restrictions against running private schools “exclusively for foreign children 
residing in France,” the law of 188697 and some special decrees issued by the Minister of 
Education established certain eligibility criteria for school instructors and defined daily hours of 
instruction in languages other than French. These measures significantly limited the possibilities 
                                                
96 Marseille currently hosts the largest number of Armenian churches in France. It has eight Armenian Apostolic, 
four Armenian Evangelical and one Armenian Catholic churches. The number of Apostolic, Evangelical or Catholic 
Armenian churches is significantly lower in other Armenian settlements in France. Paris (without the suburbs) and 
Lyon, for example, where the Armenian Apostolic population constitutes the majority compared to the Catholic and 
Protestant Armenians, have only one Armenian Apostolic Church. 
97 Full text of the law was published in Journal Officiel de la Républic Française, October 31, 1886. 
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of foreign language instruction in public and, to a lesser degree, in private schools.98 Under such 
conditions, Armenians often disregarded state regulations and set up their own schools without 
obtaining a license, even if the school enrollment was numbered in the hundreds (cf. Boghossian 
2005, 217).  
 
The proliferation of Armenian churches, chapels, schools and other organizations was thanks to 
the efforts of the Armenian elites and activists; most Armenian refugees were not actively 
involved in community affairs. Sending children to Armenian schools was not a matter of 
primary concern for most Armenian parents as well. According to Boghossian’s estimates (2005, 
216), only one-third of the Armenian children attended Armenian schools and the other two-
thirds attended French public schools. Similarly, as Belmonte’s (2004, 78-9) study illustrates, the 
majority of Armenian school-age kids (6-8 years), who lived within an Armenian community in 
Saint-Loup, Marseille, attended French public schools, despite the fact that there were two 
Armenian schools in the proximity. There were many factors influencing this tendency, but most 
importantly it was due to the Armenian parents’ desire to help their children integrate into 






                                                
98 Haratch discuses the decree of the Minister of Education of December 12, 1925, according to which foreign 
language instruction in public schools was allowed only as an extracurricular activity, after regular classes. In 
private schools, foreign language instruction could not exceed half of the regular school day hours (Haratch, 
January 24, 1926). 
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Social Adjustment of Armenians in France 
 
In many ways similar to the United States, two processes went hand in hand in the newly 
emerging Armenian communities in France. Compatriotic settlements were producing Armenian 
communities, which provided conditions for the preservation and transmission of local/regional 
Armenian identities, customs and traditions. Yet, at the same time, Armenians sought ways of 
integrating into French society. Without a native village or town to return, they had to build their 
future in France. Despite the compatriotic boundaries, the common status of the Armenians in 
France as refugees and étrangers, the frequent stigmatization at work, schools and elsewhere, 
created another, more cohesive level of social boundaries between “us” – the Armenians - and 
“them” - the French. Armenians and their children, regardless of places of origin, often became 
victims of verbal abuse, racism and discrimination. During the years of the Depression in the 
1930s, the French often called names to immigrants, including Armenians, offending the latter 
by expressions like “Sale étranger! Retourne dans ton pays.”99 The French schoolmates of the 
Armenian children often made fun of their names, mocked their accents, and laughed at them 
with sarcastic comments, like “Arménien, tête de chien, mange ta soupe et ne dis rien”100 
(Belmonte 2004, 81; cf. Ter Minassian 1997, 70). The increasing unemployment in the 1930s 
exacerbated xenophobia and discrimination against the foreigners, who were now seen as 
depriving Frenchmen of their livelihood (Terzian 1974, 274). The daily social pressure and 
discrimination at work, at school or in other public domains, socially excluded the Armenians, 
making them realize that if they wanted to succeed in France, they had to assimilate.  
 
                                                
99 Dirty foreigners, return to your countries. 
100 [You] Armenian, head of dog, eat your soup and shut your mouth. 
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Facing everyday discrimination, experiencing the disadvantages of being a foreigner in France, 
the stateless Armenians sought to be naturalized and acquire French citizenship as quickly as 
possible. The key to success in French society was, first of all, learning the language and 
acculturation. Therefore, despite the availability of Armenian schools, most Armenian families 
preferred sending their children to the French écoles communales in order to facilitate their 
integration. In rare instances, some relatively well-off Armenian families sent their children to 
private French schools, which promised better chances of succeeding in France after graduation 
(Belmonte 2004, 81; cf. Boghossian 2005, 216; Boudjikanian-Keurooghlian 1978, 177-78; 
Mandel 2003, 102).   
 
The problem of assimilation was even more pressing in Paris. Armenians in Paris assimilated at 
higher rates and a faster pace, than those in Marseille and elsewhere, where they could afford 
living in communities. As Ch‘ormisian (1975, 236-40) observed, in 1926, when some officials 
from Valence were reporting that Armenian women were still dressed in their national costumes, 
the situation in Paris was quite different, where women coming from more affluent cities, like 
Constantinople, Smyrna or Bursa, had already adopted the Parisian ways of dress, hairdo and 
makeup (cf. Ter Minassian 1997, 71). The openness of the Parisian society accelerated the pace 
of assimilation and the erasing of the traditional Armenian customs. Several articles published in 
1925 in Haratch, shared the concerns for assimilation. “The danger of denationalization,” as the 
author of one of the articles referred to the process of assimilation, was a persistent “threat.” He 
urged the community notables to find solutions, arguing that the founding of schools and 
churches would not solve the problem, because the Armenian youth mostly spent their days at 
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work and nights in their hotel rooms in Paris. Young people, who gathered in significant 
numbers at church on Sundays, did not have anywhere else to go (Haratch, October 2, 1925).  
 
The problem of assimilation, which was attracting the attention of many Armenian intellectuals 
of the time, was sharply expressed by Shahan Shanur, himself an Armenian immigrant from 
Istanbul, in his novel, Retreat Without Song (1929).101 Shahnur portrayed the life of some young 
Armenians in Paris and described how they all, regardless of their initial firm beliefs and 
convictions, gradually assimilated into French society. Armenian intellectuals of the time, 
expressing concern for the decline in the usage of Armenian-language newspapers and literature, 
did not see how Armenian organizations, with their limited capabilities, could reverse the 
ongoing process of assimilation. They often saw endogamy as the most efficient way to stop or 
at least slow down the pace of assimilation.102  Shahnur also thought that the biggest threat in 
France was the demise of the Armenian family, the “basic pillar,” which had preserved the 
Armenians for centuries (Shahnur 1994, 128). The author realized that the French, Italian, 
German, Greek and Russian women were perhaps more attractive, compared to the more 
traditional Armenian women, yet the Armenian women were essential for the continuation of the 
“Armenian blood” (Shahnur 1982, 88).  
 
Despite the persistence of concerns regarding assimilation in the Armenian public discourse of 
the time, on the individual level, ordinary Armenians were more concerned with establishing 
themselves, integrating and advancing in the new country. The passage from an apatride 
                                                
101 The work appeared in installments in Haratch before 1929. 
102 Some suggested creating conditions, where orphaned Armenian men could meet orphaned Armenian women, 
because they believed that only marriage with an Armenian could save a person from “denationalization” (Haratch, 
October 2, 1925). 
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étranger to an integrated French citizen implied a process of identity transformation and 
acquisition of a new, French, identity. Through a mixture of isolation and ghettoization, through 
voluntary and involuntary involvement, through learning French and the customs, through the 
clash of first- and second-generations, through eventual expressions of ultimate loyalty to France 





Armenians in Lebanon: From Millets to Confessions  
 
Many historians trace the Armenian presence in the Arab word back to the Middle Ages and the 
Early Modern period.103 Until the nineteenth century, Armenians settling in Lebanon were 
predominantly Armenian converts to Catholicism. In 1749, an Armenian Catholic congregation 
established the monastery in Bzommar, which served as the seat of the Catholic Catholicos until 
the seat moved to Constantinople in 1866 (Sanjian 2003, 299). Prior to the founding of the 
Catholic millet in 1830, the Armenian converts to Catholicism were often persecuted in the 
Ottoman Empire. In order to escape persecutions, many sought refuge in the remote regions of 
the Empire, like the mountains of Lebanon, where most Christians were Catholic (Ormanian 
[1912] 2001, 3543-546, 3551; Sanjian 1965, 60-1). Apart from this institutional presence, there 
were a number of other Armenian settlements in various towns and villages of Syria and 
Lebanon.104   
 
The massacres of 1895-96 prompted a new wave of Armenians to Syria and Lebanon, but the 
most massive influx of Armenians occurred during WWI and in its immediate aftermath 
(Hovannissian 1974, 19; Sanjian 2001, 149-50; Sanjian 2008a, 1; Schahgaldian 1983, 47). If the 
                                                
103 Seta Dadoyan recently published three volumes, entitled Armenians in the Medieval Islamic World (2011-13), 
where she argues that the history of Armenians from the seventh century was part of the histories of the locations 
and peoples in the Mediterranean, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Egypt. These were locations, 
where “Armenians lived as integral elements and their world was governed by more or less the same laws that 
governed the region.” (Dadoyan 2011, 1) 
104 Such settlements existed in Aleppo, Antioch, Latakia, Damascus, Alexandretta (Iskenderun), Kessab and 
elsewhere in Syria, and in Beirut, Ghazir, Junieh, Zgharta and elsewhere in Lebanon (Sanjian 1965, 46-70; 
Abrahamyan 1967, 13-8). The estimated number of Armenians in Beirut, for example, prior to WWI was about 
1,500 (Varzhabedian 1981a, 34; Sanjian 2003, 291). 
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small community of Armenians, settled in the Beirut Vilayet prior to 1915, was spared major 
deportations and any massacre, the Armenian settlements in the Aleppo Vilayet in Ayntab, 
Marash, Zeytun, Urfa, Kilis, Beilan, Chork‘marzpan (Dörtyol), were not. In the first stage of the 
Armenian deportations in 1915, most of the northern Syrian towns served as locations of transit 
for the deportees from the Ottoman Armenian provinces. In the subsequent stage, the Armenian 
survivor refugees were subjected to massacre in many towns and villages of Syria, especially in 
the desert of Deir ez-Zore (cf. Kévorkian 2011, 289ff, 625-41; Mik‘ayelyan and Top‘uzyan 
2003, 337-38; Sanjian 2003, 291-92). The Ottoman blockade of Mount Lebanon, however, and 
the ensuing famine in 1915-1918, had claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese 
Christians and prevented the flow of Armenian genocide survivors to Lebanon (Fisk 2001, 58; 
Traboulsi 2007, 82).  
 
The armistice concluded in Mudros in October 1918 between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire 
provided certain conditions for the return of Armenians to some of their native towns and 
villages. Indeed, many Armenian survivors returned to their homes hoping that it was safe to 
return (cf. Hovannisian 1997c, 308; Mik‘ayelyan and Top‘uzyan 2003, 338). The retreat of the 
Ottoman armies from Cilicia was hailed by a number of Armenians. It prompted the return of 
significant numbers of Armenian survivor refugees to their native villages and towns in Cilicia. 
Initial French backing seemed to be quite promising for Armenians, yet the French followed 
their own policies and had their own calculations. Three years after the Mudros armistice, after 
negotiations with the Turkish Nationalist Forces under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal, the 
French troops retreated from Cilicia in late 1921. The French retreat resulted in a massive 




The major influx of Armenians into Lebanon, thus, occurred from late 1921. Following the 
French retreat from Cilicia, about 80,000 Armenian refugees and orphans arrived in Syria and 
Lebanon (Kitur 1962, 616; Migliorino 2008, 31). By 1925, according to various estimates, the 
number of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon swelled reaching between 150,000 and 
200,000, of which about 100,000-150,000 settled in Syria, between 35,000 and 40,0000 in 
Greater Lebanon, and the rest in Egypt and elsewhere in the Middle East (Abrahamyan 1967, 21-
2; Hovannisian 1974, 20; Sanjian 2003, 292, Top‘uzyan 1986, 169-70). An estimated 10,000 of 
these refugees were orphaned children, most of whom had settled in the seven orphanages 
founded by the American Near East Relief Society in the region (Schahgaldian 1979, 57; 
Top‘uzyan 1986, 171). To host the Armenian genocide survivors in Lebanon, about six or seven 
camps or shantytowns were established in Beirut. According to different estimates, in 1923 
camps in Beirut accommodated somewhere around 12,000 to 19,000 Armenian refugees, of 
which Le Grand Camp and Quarantina had the largest number of Armenians (cf. Boudjikanian 
2009, 299; Tachjian 2007, 121; 2009, 64; Top‘uzyan 1986, 172; Varzhabedian 1981a, 37). Camp 
conditions were miserable. Armenians lived in temporary tents, later turned into tin huts or rarely 
to wooden shacks, which could get extremely warm and humid in summers and quite cold in 
winters. Essential conditions for maintaining personal hygiene were absent; poverty, malnutrition 
and various epidemics claimed the lives of many.105  
 
A few more waves of Armenians from Syria and Turkey augmented the number of the 
Armenians in Lebanon on the eve of WWII. After Aleppo and Beirut, the coastal region of 
                                                
105 On a number of occasions in his second volume, Varzhabedian (1981: 39-43; 60-4) provides many eyewitness 
accounts and quotes correspondence from various Armenian newspapers of the time, which describe the dire 
conditions, widespread diseases and poverty in the Beirut camps in the 1920s. 
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Alexandretta (Iskenderun) in northern Syria106 had hosted the third largest Armenian refugee 
concentration Syria and Lebanon in the 1920s107 (Map 2.6). In 1939 some 12,000 to 15,000 
Armenians fled the Sanjak of Alexandretta as a result of the French ceding of the region to 
Turkey (Fig. 2.2). An estimated 12,000 to 15,000 Armenians found refuge mostly in Lebanon, 
forming a new camp near Beirut, known as the Sanjak camp  (Sanjian 1956, 218; Karadjian 
1986, 21; Paboudjian 2007b, 268-84). Armenians from the Musa Dagh villages constituted the 
most notable group among the Sanjak Armenians. Upon their arrival in Lebanon in 1939, they 
were settled on a land in the Bekaa valley, which later became the Armenian village of Anjar 
(Schahgaldian 1979, 78).  
 
Map 2-6. The Armenians in the Middle East  
(Source: Hewsen 2001, 269) 
                                                
106 The status of the Sanjak of Alexandretta was defined in the Franco-Turkish agreement of October 20, 1921 
(known as the Franklin-Bouillon Agreement or the Ankara Agreement), which concluded the fighting between the 
Kemalists and the French in Cilicia. Article 7 stipulated that a special administrative regime would be established in 
Alexandretta, which would guarantee the rights of the Turkish inhabitants in the region and the usage of Turkish 
language (cf. Sanjian 1956, 19-22, 171-86; Paboudjian 2007a, 174-83). 
107 According to the diagrams presented by Greenshields (1981, 234), in 1928 Aleppo hosted the largest numbers of 




Figure 2-1. Distribution of Refugees in Syria and Lebanon  
(1928) (Source: Greenshields 1981, 234) 
 
Figure 2-2. The Sanjak of Alexandretta (Iskenderun) and the Evacuation of Armenians in 1939  
(Source: Paboudjian 2007, 148) 
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The Lebanese context: Naturalization and Social-Political Conditions in Lebanon 
 
Following the Ottoman defeat in WWI and the Mudros armistice Syria and Lebanon came under 
French occupation.108 Even though the peace treaty of Sèvres (August 10, 1920) between the 
Allied powers and Ottoman Turkey did not explicitly define a French mandate in the region, the 
Article 94 assumed the presence of a Mandatory in independent Syria and Mesopotamia “until 
such time as they are able to stand alone.” In September 1920, the French administration 
implemented certain territorial and administrative restructuring in Syria by separating Greater 
Lebanon as an administrative unit (Maktabi 2000; 158; Julian 2009, 193). A few years later, in 
August 1922, the League of Nations officially granted France the mandate to administer the 
region (Migliorino 2008, 46). Despite some opposition both from Syria and from different 
Christian and Muslim sects in Greater Lebanon, the drawing of the Lebanese borders was 
completed by 1923 (Maktabi 2000, 159-61; Traboulsi 2007, 75-8; 80-7; Habib 2009, 48-9). 
 
Lebanon is a country with a social-political system, which has been described by many scholars 
as “consociational democracy.” The essence of “consociationalism” is the sharing of power 
among various confessional or ethno-religious and sectarian communities (Avsharian 2009, 387; 
Migliorino 2009, 480; Habib 2009, 21-43). The roots of Lebanese consociationalism go back to 
the late Ottoman period. The Mandate document of 1922 officially recognized the existence of 
different religious communities in Lebanon and guaranteed their interests, their rights to retain 
and control their properties (Article 6), their “freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all 
                                                
108 In 1916, the British and the French concluded a secret agreement, which became known as the Sykes-Picot 
agreement. According to it, in case of an Ottoman defeat in WWI they would respectively take control of the 
Ottoman Arab provinces. As a realization of this agreement, after the Mudros armistice, the coastal region from 
Cilicia to Lebanon fell under the control of the French (cf. Hovannisian 1997b, 282; Migliorino 2008, 46). 
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forms of worship” without discrimination on grounds of race, religion or language (Article 8). 
Article 8 went on to recognize the rights of each community “to maintain its own schools for the 
instruction and education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such 
educational requirements of a general nature as the administration may impose…” (“French 
Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon” 1923, 178-79).  
 
The Treaty of Lausanne between the Allied Powers and Kemalist Turkey, which recognized the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923, reconfirmed the end of the Ottoman presence in the Arab world. For 
the former Ottoman subjects, the Treaty of Lausanne provisioned that they could acquire either 
Turkish nationality or the nationality of the state, in which “the majority of the population is of 
the same race.” This article of the treaty was put in effect in Lebanon on August 30, 1924, 
through the decree issued by the French High Commissioner. According to the decree “[a]ny 
person who was a Turkish subject … and resided in the territories of Greater Lebanon on August 
30, 1924, is confirmed as a Lebanese and is regarded from now on as having lost the Turkish 
citizenship” (Article 1 of the Resolution 2825, quoted in Maktabi 2000, 157). In practice, the 
decree translated the corresponding article of the Treaty of Lausanne into a simple eligibility 
criterion: all who had settled in the country by August 30, 1924 were eligible	   for	   Lebanese	  
nationality109 (cf. El-Khoury and Jaulin 2012, 3; Hashimoto 1992, 75; Maktabi 2000, 157; 
Vernant 1953, 417).  
 
At the beginning of the French Mandate in Lebanon, the French had to deal with roughly two 
major factions. Some favored the maintenance of a separate Lebanon; others advocated for 
                                                
109 Maktabi (2000, 147) argues that citizenship policies “were applied to reinforce the size of the Christian citizen 
population through the naturalization of Christian immigrants and refugees.” 
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unification with Syria. Those supporting the maintenance of Greater Lebanon (Lebanonism) 
were associated largely with the Christians (predominantly Maronites). The supporters of 
unification with Syria (Unionism) were associated primarily with the Sunni Muslims (Trabousi 
2007, 99; cf. El-Khoury and Jaulin, 2012, 2-3). The numbers of Christians and Muslims, 
therefore, were important in the making of Lebanon. The interests of the French mandatory 
power and the Maronite leaders coincided in the creation of Greater Lebanon.  
 
The census of 1921, which was seen as an important political tool, was carried out without much 
participation by the Muslims, who refused to recognize the Lebanese state (cf. Jaulin 2009, 196; 
Maktabi 1999, 230-32; 2000, 162). The Census of 1921 registered only four Christian 
communities with the following numbers: the Maronites (175,702), the Greek Orthodox 
(64,416), the Greek Catholic (38,559) and the Protestants (3,730) (Jaulin 2009, 195). Six 
communities were large enough to have pre-allocated seats in the Administrative Commission 
appointed by the French High Commissioner in 1921. The Commission comprised 6 Maronites, 
3 Greek Orthodox, 1 Greek Catholic, 1 Druze, 4 Sunnis and 2 Shiites, total of 17 representatives 
(Traboulsi 2007, 88). Apostolic Armenians did not constitute much numbers in 1921 prior to the 
influx from Cilicia.  
 
The Lebanese constitution, promulgated a few years later in 1926, basically incorporated many 
of the articles of the Mandate document. The Constitution declared French and Arabic as the 
official languages of Lebanon, recognized the existence and interests of religious communities 
without privileging any of them. Article 9 of the Constitution declared absolute “freedom of 
conscience,” and left matters of personal status, such as marriage, divorce, custody of children, 
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adoption, inheritance, under the jurisdiction of the religious communities (The Lebanese 
Constitution 1960, 6-7; cf. Migliorino 2007, 97; 2008, 47; Sanjian 2001, 155; Traboulsi 2007, 
90). Article 10 of the constitution was basically the reformulation of the Article 8 of the Mandate 
document: “There shall be no violation of the right of religious communities … to have their 
own schools provided they follow the general rules issued by the state regulating public 
instruction” (The Lebanese Constitution, 1960, 6). The Mandate document and the Lebanese 
Constitution of 1926 endowed Lebanon’s religious communities with certain rights to manage 
their internal matters, as well as establish and run their own schools and organizations. 
Moreover, the Constitution of 1926 guaranteed that all the religious communities were to be 
represented at the legislative power of the country and in the “public employment and in the 
composition of the Ministry” (The Lebanese Constitution, 1960, 12-3; 33; cf. Migliorino 2008, 
48). The representation of various religious communities and the distribution of various offices 
among these communities had to be established according to their numbers. 
 
The Constitution, however, did not put an end to tensions between the Christians and Muslims. 
Both in Syria and Lebanon, Sunni Muslim opposition to the French Mandatory administration 
continued in the 1930s. These conflicts eventually made the French conclude new agreements 
with Syria and Lebanon. Treaties of Friendship and Alliance were signed with Syria (September 
9, 1936) and Lebanon (November 13, 1936), which promised independence to both states within 
a period of three years. The treaties basically preserved the territorial restructuring, significantly 
reduced the French administrative presence in the region, but the French would still maintain 
their military presence in Syria and Lebanon (Traboulsi 2007, 100-101). The growing 
aggressiveness of the Nazi regime in Germany in the second half of the 1930s and the 
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deteriorating political conditions in Europe, however, prevented the French ratification of these 
treaties. After the Nazi occupation of France in 1940, the French authorities were no longer able 
to keep a strong military presence in the Middle East and both Lebanon and Syria acquired 
independence toward the end of WWII. 
 
 
Political inclusion of Armenians in Lebanon 
 
The experience of political inclusion of the Armenian genocide survivors in Lebanon was in 
sharp contrast to the same process of Armenian immigrants in the United States or France. If 
Armenian immigrants and refugees had been arriving in states with long established traditions in 
the West, the Armenian refugees in Lebanon became part of the newly emerging state under a 
French Mandate. As former Ottoman subjects, like the other residents of Lebanon, Armenians, 
who had just arrived in the country as refugees, were granted Lebanese citizenship in compliance 
with the degree of August 30, 1924. In June 1925, Armenians voted in the elections of the 
Lebanese Representative Council. The favorable provisions for Armenians generated heated 
debates in the country between the Christians and the Muslims.110 While the Christians, 
especially the Maronite leaders, supported and probably hoped to benefit from the political 
inclusion of Christian Armenians in the country, the Muslims were against the settlement of 
Armenians in Lebanon and granting them citizenship111 (cf. Messerlian 1963, 60-1; 
                                                
110 Top‘uzyan (1986, 168) quotes a letter addressed to King Hussein of Hejaz (Saudi Arabia) in 1924, in which the 
Syrian Muslims complained that the Armenian influx to Syria, Egypt and other Arab countries could eventually 
make Lebanon and Syria Armenia in a short span of time. 
111 By 1939, the disagreements of granting citizenship to Armenians had mostly faded out. Armenian refugees from 
the Sanjak of Alexandretta, who wanted to receive Lebanese citizenship, were granted without any difficulty 
(Messerlian 1963, 14). 
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Schahgaldian 1979, 58). The French Mandatory administration was also interested in the 
political inclusion of Armenians (El-Khoury and Jaulin 2012, 6; Maktabi 1999, 227).   
 
Several months before the Lebanese census of 1932 the Maronite President of Lebanon had 
issued a decree (No. 8837) to make sure that “refugees from Turkish territories such as 
Armenians, Syriacs, Chaldeans and [members of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox churches] or 
other persons who are of Turkish origin, shall be counted [in the forthcoming census] as 
Lebanese provided they were found on Lebanese territories on 30 August 1924 according to 
Regulation 2825” (Article 13 of the Decree 8837, quoted in Maktabi 1999, 227). The census, 
which became the second and the last in the history of the country, registered Armenian 
Orthodox112 and Armenian Catholic as two separate religious communities. According to the 
census data, the number of Armenians in Lebanon was 31,992 of which the Orthodox Armenians 
constituted 26,102 and the Catholic Armenians were 5,890. The number of Evangelical 
Armenians was not mentioned in the Census, because the Evangelical Armenians were not 
recognized as a separate religious community and were counted with the other Protestants113 
(Tableau 3 in Jaulin 2009, 200; Table 1 and Table 3, Maktabi 1999, 222, 235; Sanjian 2003, 291-
292).  
 
In contrast to France and the United States, where separation of the church and state constituted 
one of the founding principles of the making of both nations, the formation of the Lebanese 
                                                
112 Within Armenian circles, the term “Orthodox” is not applied to the church. The Armenian Church calls itself 
Apostolic and the community is referred to as the Armenian Apostolic community. In official documents and 
correspondence in Lebanon, however, this community is defined as the Armenian Orthodox community. 
113 Armenian Evangelical community is still not recognized as a separate religious community in Lebanon. The 
Evangelical Armenians are formally part of the Protestant community, but the Armenian Evangelical community 
developed separate institutions and, except being formally represented in the Lebanese political structures, otherwise 
enjoys all the rights for confessional communities. 
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nation was based on the mix of religion and politics. The confessional system in Lebanon, 
inherited from the Ottoman millet system, implied that the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and, 
indirectly, Armenian Protestant communities, enjoyed the same rights as other confessional 
communities in Lebanon, including the right to maintain their own religious and educational 
institutions, and the right to enjoy certain autonomy in the management of the community 
matters. Because of this major difference, if during the interwar years in France and United 
States communitarian segregation was not encouraged and both countries sought ways to deal 
with their refugee or immigrant populations either by excluding or assimilating them, in the case 
of Lebanon the overall political make-up supported the existing religious communities and 
thereby encouraged communitarianism. The Lebanese political structure, an outgrowth of the 
Ottoman millet system, had one important difference from the latter: while the millet system had 
favored the Muslims over non-Muslims in the Ottoman empire, confessionalism in Lebanon did 
not make any of the religious communities more privileged. It, therefore, provided quite 
favorable conditions for the adjustment and establishment of Armenians in the region. The 
absence of assimilatory policies and structural discrimination, the recognition and occasional 
encouragement of especially Christian community rights, and the official acknowledgment of the 
Armenian Orthodox and Catholic communities, and indirectly the Armenian Evangelical 
community, made the building of exclusively Armenian communities possible in Lebanon. 
Regardless of one’s personal choice, in sharp contrast to France and the United States, 
Armenians in Lebanon were expected and supposed to continue their communitarian and 
confessional affiliations, rather than assimilate into other confessional communities. Armenians 
were integrated into the Lebanese political system as Armenians, without having to abandon 
their ethnic-religious traits. The important condition of Armenian involvement in the Lebanese 
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political system was that they were expected to remain Armenian, retain their Armenian 
identities and their affiliation with their church(es) in order to be represented in various branches 
of government and the administration.  
 
 
The Establishment of Armenian Churches in Lebanon  
 
The peculiarities of the Lebanese social and political system pre-determined to a certain extent 
the establishment of Armenian Church hierarchy in Lebanon. If in the United States and France 
Armenian churches had been established predominantly thanks to some individual or community 
initiatives, the highest clergymen of Armenian churches were very active in the establishment of 
churches and church hierarchies in Lebanon.   
 
The Armenian Catholic church had been established in the region since the eighteenth century. 
In the early 1930s, the Seat of the Armenian Catholic Patriarch moved from Istanbul to Lebanon 
and was reestablished in Achrafieh quarter in 1934 (Sanjian 2003, 299). Other Catholic 
Armenian orders - Armenian Sisters of Immaculate Conception and the Mekhitarists, established 
their congregations in Lebanon in 1927 and 1937 respectively (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 228-29; 
Messerlian 1963, 21-3; Migliorino 2007, 100-101; Varzhabedian 1982, 272-73).  
 
The Armenian Apostolic church did not have long established roots in Lebanon. The only 
Apostolic church before WWI, Surb Nshan (Holy Sign) was constructed in Beirut in 1851 and 
mostly accommodated the Armenian pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem (Sanjian 1965, 62; 2003, 
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295). In the 1920s, when the number of Apostolic Armenians increased in Beirut and elsewhere, 
the leaders of the Armenian Church became concerned about the growing influence of the 
Catholic Church on Armenians. Surb Nshan could not represent the Apostolic Armenians 
arriving from Cilicia, because it was under the jurisdiction of the Armenian Patriarchate of 
Jerusalem, while the Apostolic Armenians arriving from former Ottoman provinces were 
formally affiliated with the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul or the Catholicosate of Cilicia.114   
 
The cession of Cilicia to Turkey in 1921 forced out Catholicos Sahak II from his residence in 
Sis. From his exile in Damascus and Aleppo, following his flock, the Catholicos remained active 
in his support of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon.115 With his encouragement and 
support, the Armenian refugees in the Beirut Camp founded the small wooden chapel of Surb 
Khach‘ (Holy Cross), organized a camp administration, representation and started an Armenian 
school in 1925-26 (cf. Messerlian 1963, 10-2; Varzhabedian 1981a, 110-31, 182-85). The 
tension between Surb Nshan and Surb Khach‘ for representing Armenians was resolved in 1929, 
when the Patriarchate of Jerusalem ceded churches under its jurisdiction in Lebanon and Syria to 
the Catholicosate of Cilicia thanks to the intervention and approval of the Catholicos of 
Ējmiatsin (Sanjian 2001, 156). The following year, the Catholicos of Cilicia was finally able to 
find a permanent place to reestablish the Catholicosate of Cilicia. In response to his appeals, the 
                                                
114 The history of Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia goes back to the Middle Ages. According to tradition, the 
Armenian Church had been established in early fourth century in Ējmiatsin (ancient Vagharshapat). With the change 
of political situation in Armenia the seat of the Catholicos had been relocated to other places, usually following the 
Armenian kings and the nobility. The fall of the last Armenian kingdom on Armenian highland in the 11th century 
prompted an exodus of Armenians from their ancestral lands. After the establishment of an Armenian Kingdom in 
Cilicia in 1098, the Catholicosate moved to Cilicia and in 1293 it was finally established in Sis, the capital of the 
Kingdom. Despite the fall of the Cilician Armenian kingdom in 1375, the Catholicosate remained in Cilicia until 
1441. In 1441, a church assembly gathered in Ējmiatsin, which decided to move the Catholicosate from Sis back to 
Ējmiatsin after nearly a millennium. The Assembly elected a new Catholicos in Ējmiatsin, but the Catholicosate of 
Sis continued with limited jurisdiction over churches in Cilicia (cf. Ormanian 1912, col. 2107-121, 2139-141) 
115 Iskandar (1999, 99-100) quotes the entire text of a circular of Catholicos Sahak II, issued in 1922, in which the 




French High Commissioner granted permission to establish the seat of the Cilician Catholicosate 
in Lebanon in 1930.116 Since the establishment of the Catholicosate of Cilicia in Antelias, 
Lebanon, the Armenian Apostolic community began forming its representative bodies in 
accordance with the Armenian Constitution of 1863. The relocation of the Catholicosate of 
Cilicia to Lebanon, as noted by Sanjian (2001, 156), “deemed important to strengthen the 
Armenian Apostolic Church against Catholic and Protestant proselytizing activity in the French-
mandated territories.” 
  
Alongside the Armenian Apostolic and Catholic churches, Armenian Protestant churches also 
began appearing in Lebanon shortly after the influx of the refugees. Some historians trace the 
presence of Armenian Protestants in Lebanon to the early nineteenth century. Varzhabedian 
(1982, 51-57) and Atigian (1985, 62) argue that the Protestant Christian community in Lebanon 
was founded by two Armenian monks, former members of the congregation of the Armenian 
Patriarchate in Jerusalem, who broke up with the Patriarchate in 1823-1825, converted to 
Protestantism and became the founders of Arab Protestant community in Syria and Lebanon. 
Until the 1920s, however, the Armenian Evangelical Protestants were indistinguishable from the 
local Arab or European Protestants. Initially, upon their arrival to Lebanon, the Evangelical 
Armenian refugees used to gather for services in local Arab or European Protestant churches and 
halls. The first Armenian Evangelical church in Beirut was established in 1921 and in 1924 the 
Evangelical Armenians formed the Union of Evangelical Armenian churches of Syria and 
Lebanon (of the Middle East since 1930) (Sanjian 2003, 300; Tootikian 1996, 195). The 
evangelical Armenians were quite active in schools and education since Ottoman times. Under 
new conditions in Lebanon, despite their small numbers in comparison to the Catholic and 
                                                
116 On the establishment of the Cilician Catholicosate in Lebanon see Eghiayan 1975, 209-21. 
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Apostolic Armenians, they continued to have active involvement within the Armenian 
community especially in the matters of education (cf. Messerlian 1963, 26).  
 
 
Social Adjustment of Armenians in Lebanon  
 
As elsewhere, Armenians arriving in Lebanon constituted diverse dialectal and subcultural 
groups. Church affiliation constituted one of the most important signifiers of Armenian identity. 
The majority of the Armenian refugees were adherents of the Armenian Apostolic faith and in 
that sense did not blend easily in the existing Armenian Catholic community in Lebanon 
(Schahgaldian 1983, 47). While the Armenian Apostolic, Catholic and Evangelical faiths 
connected Armenians originating from various provinces in the Ottoman Empire and these 
church affiliations predominantly defined their Armenianness, in other respects, such as 
language, customs and habits, Armenians originating from different parts of the Ottoman Empire 
represented diverse cohorts.  
 
 
Shahgaldian (1979, 69; 1983, 48-49) argues that the “underlying divisions” eventually caused a 
split in the community into two basic factions between “Diaspora Armenians,” who were drawn 
to Lebanon from non-Armenian Ottoman provinces, and the “native Armenians,” or “…those 
born and raised in either Western or Eastern Armenia.” According to him, about 80-85% of 
Armenians belonged to “Diaspora Armenians,” who were in turn divided into several factions -  
“Cilician Armenians” (about 25,000 in 1926), who originated mostly from the former Ottoman 
vilayets of Adana and Aleppo; “Anatolian Armenians” (about 8,000), who arrived in Lebanon 
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from “various Armenian communities in central and western Anatolia in the 1920s;” and “local 
Armenians” (about 2,000), who had settled in Lebanon prior to the 1920s (Schahgaldian 1979, 
69-70). He goes on to characterize these sub-groups, arguing that, for example, the “so-called 
Cilician and Anatolian subgroups of diaspora Armenians” were Turkophone, in most cases 
Catholic and Protestant (Schahgaldian 1979, 78). While the fragmented evidence provided by 
various histories of the compatriotic unions also seems to confirm Schahgaldian's 
observations,117 such generalizations of “Diaspora Armenians” and “Native Armenians” or 
“Cilician Armenians” and “Anatolian Armenians” seems to be less helpful in understanding and 
explaining the primary identifications of the Armenian refugees in various Lebanese camps. As 
Schahgaldian (1979: 78) also noticed and as the evidence in the histories of compatriotic unions 
suggests, there were number of exceptions to the general pattern suggested by Schahgaldian. The 
Musa Dagh Armenians, who arrived in Lebanon in the late 1930s, were Armenophone and 
overwhelmingly Orthodox Armenians (Schahgaldian 1979, 78). Similarly, as Alboyajian (1937, 
1618) noted, despite Kayseri Armenians were Turkophone, many villages in the region were 
Armenophone. In this regard, Schahgaldian (1979, 69) correctly notes: “Understandably enough, 
the existence of such [Diaspora Armenians, Cilician Armenians, Anatolian Armenians - V.S.] 
divisions has seldom been explicitly acknowledged by Lebanon's Armenians, and has remained 
unknown both to non-Armenians and even to Armenians residing outside Syria and Lebanon.” 
He goes on to argue that “[d]espite many common denominations the overwhelming majority of 
diaspora Armenians in Syria and Lebanon were divided into more than two dozen traditionally-
bound solidarities” (ibid., 70). These “traditionally-bound” localized solidarities were exactly 
what people identified with and which made the Armenians refugee groups so diverse in 
                                                
117 Biwzant Eghiayan’s (1970, 783-797) account on Adana Armenians, Alboyajian’s (1937, 1607; 1618) work on 
Armenians in Kayseri, Ter-Minassian’s (1997, 74-75) study of Armenian refugees in France, and many other similar 
works have demonstrated that Armenians in certain Ottoman villages were predominantly Turkophone. 
 
 138 
Lebanon (and elsewhere). Camps provided the confined geographical space, in which all these 
diversities came to clash in Lebanon. Armenian identities at the time of their arrival to Lebanon, 
as in the United States or France, were highly regional, rather than confessional or even more so 
national (cf. Krikorian 2007, 34-5). While Schahgaldian’s work significantly challenges the 
monolithic perceptions of Armenians as a coherent group with common markers of identity, the 
generalizations prevent him from arguing that even the “Cilician Armenians” from Sis, Adana or 
Marash, despite being Turkophone in many cases, would find each other quite different. 
Accordingly, the Armenians from Sis, Adana, Marash, or Hachn gathered in separate small camp 
neighborhoods, and Armenians originating from other villages or gowns grouped in other 
camps.118 In a more comprehensive manner, Vahe Tachjian (2007, 121-2) suggests that 
Armenians originating from various small regions in Cilicia or elsewhere tended to regroup in 
the following small compatriotic settlements in le Grand Camp: Adana (which would include 
Armenians from Adana, Mersin, Tarsus, Djihan, Osmanie and Selefke), Sis (Sis, Kars Bazar, 
Feke, Tapan, Chokak); Hachn (Hachn, Dörtyol, Amanus, Karaköy); Marash (Marash, Ayntab, 
Fernouz, Zeytun, Findijak); Kayseri (Kayseri, Everek, Chomaklu, Tomarz, Yozgat); Sivas 
(Sivas, Chepni, Burhan, Karagöl, Zara, Severk, Tokat, Amassia, Gürün, Gemerek, Shabin-
Karahisar); Kharberd (Kharberd, Malatia, Behensi, Adiyaman, Arabkir, Palu, Erzrum, Yerznka, 
Geghi, Taron, Diarbekir, Arzni, Urfa). Some smaller camps in Beirut were better known by the 
name of the village or the town in the Ottoman Empire, from where the Armenian survivors 
originated, such as, for example, camps Adana, Amanos or Yozgat (Fig. 2.3) 
 
                                                
118 Alboyajian’s extensive work on Kayseri Armenians suggests, for example, that by 1931 the Armenians from 
Everek (a small village near Kayseri in the Ottoman Empire) had their own neighborhood in a camp in Beirut 
(Alboyajian 1937,1981). To emphasize the diversity of Armenians at Le Grand Camp in Beirut, Varzhabedian 
(1981a, 61) even compared it with the Babylonian tower: “The so-called Armenian shantytown (vranak‘aghak‘) was 





Figure 2-3. Armenian Camps (in light brown) and Armenian Quarters (in red) in Beirut  
(Source: Tachjian 2007, 120) 
 
Compatriotic affiliations and identities played crucial role in community building in Beirut and 
elsewhere in Lebanon. As Greenshields rightfully pointed out, “in clustering together” besides 
the attempts to preserve their unique customs, traditions and community structure, the Armenians 
were “genuinely concerned about their own security” (Greenshields 1981, 235). Having survived 
deportations and genocide, clustering together was the natural response of people arriving in 
foreign lands, who would rather rely on their family members, friends and compatriots for 
mutual aid and security, than the Maronites, the French and the external powers (cf. Tachjian 




The failed attempt of the French High Commission to disperse the Armenians in the interior of 
Syria and Lebanon eventually made the High Commissioner consider constructing Armenian 
quarters for the resettlement of the Armenian refugees. In the beginning of 1926, the French 
High Commission submitted a proposal to the League of Nations for the construction of special 
permanent housing for the Armenian refugees. The proposition caused surprise in France. The 
Minister of Foreign affairs expressed a concern that the project of constructing “little Armenia” 
may entail dissatisfaction and new waves of opposition in Lebanon to the French mandate. But 
the High Commissioner successfully pushed the project forward. The construction of an 
Armenian town with its own municipality would help resolve several issues. First of all, the 
Mandatory authorities would deal with the problem of camps. Secondly, this new Christian 
settlement in the immediate proximity to Beirut could make another electoral district for 
Christians. Finally, it could satisfy the passionate desire of Armenians to maintain their 
subgroups rather than disperse throughout the country119 (Greenshields 1981, 235; Tachjian 
2007, 127-28; 2009, 65-7, 71). The joint efforts of the League of Nations Nansen Office 
(International Office for Refugees), the French High Commission, the AGBU120 and other 
Armenian charitable organizations started to bear some fruit. By the 1930s several quarters had 
already been constructed for Armenians in the northeastern part of Beirut and Achrafieh.  
 
Along with the AGBU and the League of Nations Nansen Office, it turned out that various 
compatriotic unions in the relatively long established communities in the United States were the 
                                                
119 Greenshields (1981, 239) argues that the principal effect of both economic and ethnic constraints was 
maintaining “a self-perpetuating process of concentration and segregation” for Armenians. 
120 Vahé Tachjian provides important details on how the AGBU became partners with the French High Commission 
in implementing the projects of Armenians’ establishment in Syria and Lebanon. After Calouste Gulbenkian (Galust 
Gyulbenkian) became the president of the AGBU in 1930, “ce magnat de petrol,” as Tachjian characterized him, 
whose residence was in Paris, developed close personal relations with the French High Commissar in Lebanon and 
Syria, Henri Ponsot. It was largely thanks to this friendship that the negotiations in 1931 made the AGBU a partner 
and a participant in the project initiated by the French High Commission (Tachjian 2009, 68). 
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major sponsors of the construction projects of their respective compatriotic organizations in 
Lebanon. To honor the sponsors, some of the quarters, such as Nor Hachn, Nor Marash, Nor Sis, 
Nor Adana, were officially named after the sponsor compatriotic organizations.121 By the 1930s, 
compatriotic unions had emerged as truly diasporic transnational organizations capable of 
mobilizing resources for certain activities for their compatriots residing elsewhere.   
 
 
Figure 2-4. Street Sign to an Armenian Quarter of “Nor Sis"  
(Personal Photograph by Author. 2 June, 2012) 
                                                
121 In present days most of these quarters have lost the compatriotic coloring of neighborhoods, but some street signs 
in Bourj Hammoud are still salient reminders of the time, when Armenians used to concentrate in compatriotic 
settlements (Fig. 2.4). There were also some exceptions from this general pattern. Quarters like Gullabashen, 
Pareshen or Haykashen were not named after any compatriotic unions. Gullabashen, in particular, was constructed 
through the funding and active efforts of the AGBU by the initiative of Calouste Gulbenkian (cf. Tachjian 2009, 70, 
73; Varzhabedian 1981b, 63). 
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From Adjustment to Transnational Activism:  
Compatriotic Societies and Projects from Afar  
 
Conditions in the United States, France and Lebanon provided different possibilities for the 
political integration and adaptation of Armenian immigrants and refugees. Irrespective of the 
actual conditions in these countries, wherever the Armenians clustered together, they attempted 
to recreate their communal lifestyle and community structures, according to the old ways in their 
native towns and villages. A comparative glance at the concentration of Armenians in Marseille 
(France), in Worcester and Fresno (the United States), and in Beirut, (Lebanon) reveals some 
patterns of how Armenians sought to adjust to host societies. Regardless of the enormous 
differences in the social-political make-up of these countries, the first stage of the adjustment of 
Armenians usually involved the establishment of predominantly compatriotic communities or 
sub-communities within larger Armenian settlements. The geographical dispersion in the United 
States and France, as argued in previous sections, were defined by two major factors: 
employment and affordability of life, and family, compatriotic or, sometimes, confessional ties.  
In Lebanon, the small size of the country did not really provide many options for geographical 
mobility. The Armenian community stayed mostly grouped in the Beirut area first in the camps 
then in the newly established Armenian quarters. But even in Beirut, within the same camps, the 
Armenians originating from different villages and towns in the Ottoman Empire preferred to 




Contrary to the United States and France, however, the clustering of Armenians together in 
compatriotic settings was not hindered or challenged in the Lebanese social and political context. 
If in the United States and France the Armenian concentrations attracted much attention and 
made the Armenians a special target for discrimination and social exclusion, the concentrations 
and community building in Lebanon were relatively tolerated in the confessional political 
structure of the country. Finally, if the Armenians were expected to give up their ethnic 
peculiarities, assimilate in American or French societies and only thereby become politically 
included, in Lebanon, Armenians were granted Lebanese citizenship without putting much effort, 
the Apostolic, Catholic and, indirectly, Evangelical Armenian communities were recognized by 
the state, and the social adjustment of Armenians did not entail assimilation.  
 
After initial clustering in compatriotic settlements, efforts to establish churches, informal 
Armenian language instruction and schooling usually followed. While Lebanese 
confessionalism, again, was conducive to such efforts, the official separation of church and state 
in France and the United States did not officially impede the setting up of churches either. The 
overall intolerant social and political context in the Untied States and France, however, 
significantly confined the scope of ethnic activism. Under such conditions, compatriotic 
settlements emerging in the United States and France eventually became more oriented towards 







Compatriotic Societies in the United States 
 
First Armenian compatriotic societies were formed in the Untied States, where Armenians had 
settled in significant numbers prior to the 1920s. Most of these societies had been initially 
established as philanthropic or educational associations. Prior to WWI, the purpose of these 
societies was to send financial aid to their home communities in their native towns and villages 
in the Ottoman Empire in support of the local church or school related affairs, or the needy 
compatriots and orphans (cf. Bakalian 1993, 184; Ter-Minassian 2002, 73). One of the earliest 
compatriotic associations was the Educational Society of Husenik formed in 1888 in Worcester. 
The purpose of this society was to raise funds to support the church and the school in the village 
of Husenik122 (Deranian 1987, 20; Malcom 1919, 113). Another association, Kharberd Union 
Educational Society, was founded in Boston, in 1893. Its goal was to promote education in their 
native village by supporting the existing Armenian parochial schools. The union annually 
contributed certain funds to the maintenance of schools and for fellowships to students in 
Kharberd. The Kiwrin (Gürün) Educational Union was founded in 1899 in Providence and 
remained quite active until 1915. Many other similar compatriotic associations emerged at the 
turn of the century.123 The income of compatriotic societies was mostly generated from monthly 
membership dues and from occasional donations.  
 
The founding of compatriotic societies comprising neighboring villages in the Ottoman Empire 
was quite common in the US at the time due also to mutual influences. The Everek Educational 
                                                
122 Husenik was one of the villages of Kharberd/Harput in the Ottoman Empire. 
123 The Kayseri Armenians founded the Kesaria Union in 1905. Armenians originating from Everek founded the 
Everek Mesropian Educational Society in 1906 in New York. Adana Educational Society and Tzak Village 
Educational Society emerged in Watertown in 1906 and 1910 respectively (Alboyajian 1937, 1965; Eghiayan 1970, 
895; Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 110; Minasian 1974, 764-65; Mirak 1983, 174). 
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Society, for example, influenced the emergence of Fenesse Rubinian Educational Society (1908) 
and Tomarza Sahakian School Society (1909) (Alboyajian 1937, 1965-967). Quite often, 
Armenians originating from the same village or town started two compatriotic associations, 
usually independent from each other. One of them would aim to help the poor and the needy in 
the homeland; the other would focus on supporting churches and schools. In time, such smaller 
associations gradually merged into larger units to form a single compatriotic union (cf. 
Alboyajian 1937, 1965-981; Minasian 1970, 765-66). Separate compatriotic associations merged 
into village unions (such as the Everek Compatriotic Union or the Tomarza Compatriotic Union), 
and village unions quite often merged with greater regional compatriotic unions (such as, for 
example, the Greater Sivas Compatriotic Union, or the Kayseri Compatriotic Union). By 1906, 
according to Mirak (1983, 174), there were some 27 compatriotic unions in the Untied States. In 
most cases these greater compatriotic unions created chapters in various towns across the US and 
encouraged their compatriots to create similar societies in other countries (cf. Alboyajian 1937, 
1977-981; Dallak‘yan 2004, 228; Minasian 1974, 766).  
 
Expanding compatriotic unions eventually became agencies connecting compatriots scattered in 
various corners of the host-countries and beyond their borders. In the case of the United States, 
as Mirak (1983, 174) observes, “in addition to their stated educational and charitable purposes, 
the compatriotic societies in America took on the new social function of enabling widely 
scattered immigrants from the same Old World town or village to reconvene, at least annually, to 




The genocide and massive deportations of Armenians from their native hometowns and villages 
in the Ottoman Empire prompted the compatriotic societies to radically reconsider their former 
activities and programs. The initial program of the Educational Society of Kiwrin [Gürün] 
(founded in 1899 in Boston) declared that the goal of the society was to “establish a school of 
higher learning” and “support the needy schools in Kiwrin” (Minasian 1974, 743). The 1922 
program of the Compatriotic Union of Kiwrin, which had been formed through the merger of the 
Educational Society and the Reconstruction Union of Kiwrin (founded in 1918), declared that the 
goal of the Union was to aid its compatriots both “materially and morally,” and especially 
support the orphans (Minasian 1974, 750). Therefore, with no Armenians left in old Kiwrin 
because of the genocide, there was no longer a point in establishing a school of higher learning. 
The program and goals of the Compatriotic Union of Kiwrin underwent another significant 
revision in 1936: “The major goal of the union is to construct Nor Kiwrin in Soviet Armenia and 
to gather the Kiwrints‘is residing abroad” in Nor Kiwrin. The second purpose of the Union was 
sending aid to the needy compatriots whether in Soviet Armenia or elsewhere (Minasian 1974, 
793).  
 
After WWI, schools, churches, and neighborhoods in the ancestral villages, now completely 
devoid of Armenians, could no longer serve as objects of care and support for the compatriotic 
unions. Having lost their homelands, under the new conditions, the compatriotic unions 
refocused their attention on sending aid to their compatriots in the refugee camps and orphanages 
in the Middle East. Alongside these activities, these organizations also became important 
contributors to the reconstruction projects both in Soviet Armenia and in the Middle East. By the 
1930s, the search for new places for the (re)construction of new hometowns had become a 
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general trend among the compatriotic unions. Due to the influence of Armenian political parties, 
as well as the organizational challenges often posed by Soviet Armenia, not all compatriotic 
unions chose Soviet Armenia for constructing new quarters.124 Many had to shift their attention 
from Soviet Armenia to the countries of the Middle East or Europe, where many Armenian 
refugees continued living in wooden or tin shacks.  
 
 
Compatriotic Societies in France and Lebanon 
 
New compatriotic societies or branches of existing ones also emerged in Lebanon and France 
from the mid-1920s and into the 1930s. In France such societies came about first of all as self-
help organizations, aiming at providing aid and relief to their poor compatriots, supporting the 
elderly, orphans, the disabled and the sick, as well as “restoring relations with compatriots 
scattered in France and … abroad” (Temime 2007, 139). Various compatriotic unions, such as 
Marash, Sis, Van, Malatia, Kharberd, Trebizond, Kayseri and others, appeared one after another 
in France in the late 1920s and 1930s125 (cf. Boudjikanian-Keuroghlian 1978, 163; Le Tallec 
2001, 75-6). Boghossian lists about twenty compatriotic societies and unions operating in 
Marseille in the 1920s: a list, which according to him, was far from being exhaustive 
(Boghossian 2005, 230-32) A report published in Haratch on February 2, 1928, listed 32 
compatriotic unions in Marseille and a total of 54 in France. The compatriotic societies in most 
cases operated informally, without formal state registration. Frequently, the address listed in their 
                                                
124 See next chapter. 
125 Old world hostilities among family clans often found expression in the new settlements as well. In Marseille, for 
example, two compatriotic organizations of Palu were founded in 1928 in the same neighborhood within three 
months (Le Tallec 2001, 76). 
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correspondence was a residential address, usually that of the president of the union or society, or, 
in some cases, that of a church (Boghossian 2009, 131).  
 
In Lebanon, according to Varzhabedian, the number of compatriotic unions was about 33 in 1927 
(Varzhabedian 1981b, 104; cf. Sanjian 2003, 307). Similar to the United States and France, 
compatriotic unions of Adana, Zeytun, Kharberd, Erzrum, Malatia, Ayntab, Mush, Van, Arabkir, 
Hachn, Marash and other places, emerged one after another in the 1920s and 1930s (Minasian 
1974, 762; Eghiayan 1975, 230; Dallak‘yan 2004, 228). In most cases these were self-help 
organizations, but more often they were created directly for the purpose of community building 
and constructing compatriotic neighborhoods. 
 
The loss of hometowns and villages in the Ottoman Empire, as well as the dissipation of all hope 
for return, inspired many of the compatriotic societies to turn to constructing quarters or towns in 
the host-countries and Soviet Armenia. If social-political conditions in the United States and 
France in the 1920s were not favorable for the construction of ethnic quarters and for naming 
them after the lost ones, conditions both in Lebanon and Soviet Armenia were quite conducive to 
such undertakings (cf. Le Tallec 2001, 76-7). In Lebanon, the League of Nations and the French 
High Commission became eventually quite interested in the construction of Armenian quarters. 
From the mid-1920s, the Communist party leadership in Yerevan also began encouraging 
investments from Armenian compatriotic societies and other diaspora organizations in order to 
construct quarters or villages for the repatriating Armenians. The trend of supporting 
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reconstruction projects became quite prominent among the compatriotic associations in the 
1930s. Some compatriotic unions even formally reorganized into reconstruction unions.126  
 
 
Sponsoring Construction Projects in Soviet Armenia and Lebanon 
 
Between 1922 and 1936, compatriotic unions became actively involved in the construction of 
new quarters for refugees in Soviet Armenia through the branches of the Soviet Armenian 
Committee for Aid to Armenia (Hayastani Ognut‘yan Komite - HOK) operating in the 
diaspora.127 The union of Arabkir Armenians in the US was the first to make an appeal to the 
Soviet government in 1924 for approval to establish New Arabkir in Soviet Armenia. The next 
year, on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Sovietization of Armenia on November 29, 
1925, the government of Soviet Armenia announced the founding of the New Arabkir quarter in 
Yerevan (Pakhtigian 1934, 37; Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 111-12). The Verashinats‘ (reconstruction) 
Union of Kayseri, in turn, sponsored the founding of Nor Kesaria in Soviet Armenia (Alboyajian 
1937, 1996, 1998-2004). The cooperation of the compatriotic unions with the chapters of HOK 
continued in the late 1920s and 1930s, resulting in the construction of the quarters of Nor 
Malatia (1927), Nor Sebastia (1928) in Yerevan, and the emergence of some new villages and 
towns, such as the village of Nor Kharberd (cf. Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 156-57; Minasian 1974, 
768-72; Ter-Minassian 2002, 73, 76).  
                                                
126 Boghossian (2009, 131) mentions several such unions in France: the Verachinatz (reconstruction) de Palou, 
Verachinatz de Bythania, Verachinatz de Gamarak, and so on. There is some fragmented evidence that some 
compatriotic unions changed into reconstruction unions in the US as well. The Kayseri Compatriotic Union of New 
York, for example, was renamed to Kayseri Verashinats Union in 1929 (Alboyajian 1937: 1979-983). 
127 The Committee for Aid to Armenia was created by the Soviet Armenian government in 1921. The organization 
established many branches in many countries to solicit aid for the homeland (Soviet Armenia). In the same period, 
the Soviet authorities launched a repatriation campaign to return some Armenian refugees to the homeland. The 




Besides contributing to projects in Soviet Armenia, compatriotic unions pursued significant 
projects in places with large concentrations of their respective compatriots. Following the 
permission of the French High Commission in 1926, compatriotic unions began mobilizing 
resources and expanding their chapters in Lebanon in order to establish quarters for their 
compatriots. The Beirut chapter of the Compatriotic Union of Marash, for example, was 
established in 1924.  By 1929, the members of this union were able to raise enough funds for 
purchasing a plot of land and launched the construction of the Nor Marash quarter in Bourj 
Hammoud in 1931 (Tachjian 2009, 72; Varzhabedian 1981b, 109-110). Similarly, compatriots 
from the United States funded the local chapter of the Compatriotic Union of Hachn in Lebanon 
for the construction of the Nor Hachn quarter. Others followed the same pattern (Tashjian 2009, 
72-3; Varzhabedian 1981b, 522-23).  
 
In the 1920s and 1930s, compatriotic societies were instrumental in the organization of the 
Armenian refugee communities in the diaspora. Although fragmented along certain 
communitarian, compatriotic affiliations and identities, compatriotic unions played an important 
role in bringing together scattered compatriots in their new host-countries, in supporting needy 
compatriots, in memorializing the ancestral village or town by constructing and naming certain 
quarters, and finally in transmitting orally or in the form of various publications the peculiarities 
of local Armenian culture, customs, habits and dialects to posterity.   
 
Several factors influenced the gradual decline of compatriotic societies and their transnational 
networks in the diaspora. First of all, the compatriotic societies and unions were staffed and run 
 
 151 
by first generation compatriot immigrants, who in most cases personally knew most of the 
compatriots and all extended families in their village or town. For the second and third 
generations compatriotic affiliations were of less or no importance at all. The second and third 
generations did not have any memories of the birthplace of their parents and grandparents, 
extended families, relatives, neighbors. Secondly, in the West, the American and French milieu, 
in which the second and third generations grew up, erased the linguistic and cultural 
particularities of compatriotic neighborhoods. If the first generations spoke their dialects in the 
United States, retained local customs and traditions, often in close-knit communities, the second 
and third generations, in most cases, lost most of these distinctions. Lastly, the establishment of 
Armenian political parties and churches in the host-countries and the resumption of the 
interrupted by the genocide nation-building efforts by them accelerated the decline of 
compatriotic loyalties and identities, especially in the Middle East. The fragmented compatriotic 
affiliations certainly presented a challenge to the extending network of Armenian political 
parties, who sought to create a more homogeneous Armenian national identity since their 
founding in the Ottoman Empire. If in the United States and France compatriotic identities faded 
mostly because of the social and political milieu of these countries, in the Middle East they 
gradually yielded to the homogenizing projects of Armenian institutions. Political parties 
reorganizing in the diaspora, as the following chapter will discuss, found fragmented 
compatriotic affiliations quite challenging for gaining followers. The educational, cultural, 
athletic and other organizations established by them, therefore, had the intention to produce 
linguistically and culturally more homogeneous generations in the Middle East, for whom 
compatriotic identities and affiliations of the first generations would become less relevant and 





Social and political conditions in various host-countries made a significant impact on the 
formation of Armenian communities in two important ways. First of all, they determined the 
ways in which Armenians had to adjust and integrate in those countries. In the United States, 
Armenians, as all other immigrants, were expected to assimilate and thereby integrate into 
American society. In France, Armenians, along with white Russians and other expatriate groups 
of the former Russian empire, posed an unprecedented problem: people who did not have a state 
- the apatrides. The special status of Armenians, however, did not prevent the French authorities 
from treating them differently from the other immigrants. If the Armenians had to stay in France, 
they had to become French by assimilating into French society.  Both in American and French 
societies, in addition to formal state policies, informal discrimination, social exclusion and 
marginalization of Armenians at work, at schools and elsewhere, all these made the Armenians 
even more anxious about integration through assimilation. In contrast to these countries, in 
Lebanon Armenians were formally integrated at the political level almost at their arrival by 
receiving Lebanese citizenship. After formally receiving equal rights with all other Lebanese, 
they were expected to create their own communal institutions and representations according to 
the Lebanese political system. The Lebanese system, therefore, was quite conducive for the 
Armenian collective efforts of founding churches, schools and other community organizations. It 




Secondly, country contexts made a significant impact on the role of the Armenian Apostolic 
church in the host-countries. While the separation of church and state was the norm both in the 
United States and France, American and French societies had developed different perceptions of 
religion and religiosity. In the United States, church affiliation and attendance had been part of 
the American culture and the American way of life. Assimilation into American society or 
becoming an American implied, therefore, affiliation with and regular attendance of church 
services. Armenians, who were eager to be socially included, to be fully integrated and 
assimilated, often through sacrifices like name changes, would still remain affiliated with a 
Protestant church or with the Armenian church. In French society, the French identity had been 
separated from any religion. Church affiliation and attendance was not part of the French laïcité. 
Armenians seeking to integrate into French society, therefore, did not see church attendance as 
one of the important attributes of being French. In Lebanon, finally, church affiliation was not 
even a choice. As Lebanese citizens, Armenians had to be affiliated with one of the confessional 
communities - Apostolic, Catholic or Evangelical. These particularities of contexts, thus, 
determined the absolute importance of the Armenian Apostolic and other Armenian churches in 
Lebanon, the centrality of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the United States, and the 
somewhat insignificant role of the Armenian Church in France in the shaping of Armenian 
communities. For this and some other reasons, as the following chapter will discuss in detail, in 
struggling to define their attitudes towards Soviet Armenia and to gain followers to their cause, 
the political parties made the Armenian church a battleground in the United States and Lebanon, 





Chapter 3  
 
In Search of Armenia Between the Two World Wars 
Introduction 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia and the loss of hope for achieving any larger Armenia after the 
Treaty of Lausanne posed serious questions for the Armenian political parties, now all operating 
in the diaspora. As the first chapter concluded, they had to redefine their respective attitudes 
towards the small portion of the homeland that survived under the guise of a Soviet republic, in 
the government of which none of them were permitted to participate. The first part of this 
chapter analyzes the dynamic interrelations between Soviet Armenia and the Armenian political 
parties in the diaspora, which eventually shaped the conflicting orientations towards Soviet 
Armenia among the Armenian political parties. The second and third parts examine the 
implications of the pro- and anti-Soviet orientations taken by the top decision making bodies and 
leaderships of these parties in their respective host-countries, and the struggle among the 
Armenian political parties for gaining influence among the diverse Armenian immigrant and 
refugee masses. This chapter argues that the Armenian parties developed different and often 
conflicting perceptions of Armenian homeland and Soviet Armenia and actively contributed to 
the production of mutually exclusive identities, ideologies and discourses in the diaspora. 
Compatriotic identifications and narrow perceptions of homeland associated with ancestral 
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villages or towns in the Ottoman Empire, outlined in the previous chapter, were challenged and 
mostly replaced with idealized and conflicting images of the Armenian homeland, promoted by 
the political parties. Those Armenian parties which assumed a more pro-Soviet orientation, 
began propagating Soviet Armenia as the homeland of Armenians and actively supported 
projects initiated by the Soviet Armenian government. The Dashnaktsutyun, which assumed a 
more anti-Soviet orientation, envisioned itself as the government in exile, sought to dominate the 
Armenian community affairs abroad, retained the symbolism of the short-lived Republic of 
Armenia (1918-1920), and propagated a more abstract homeland, an Armenia to be achieved in 
future. The struggle among the Armenian political parties resulted in tensions, conflicts and 
violence in many communities and led to a schism in the Armenian Apostolic community in the 
United States. In their attempts to gain followers, the parties, in the meantime, significantly 
contributed to the forging of a more homogeneous Armenian identity, especially under more 
favorable social-political conditions for community building in Lebanon.  
 
Because the archives of the Armenian political parties are not available, editorials, articles and 
correspondence authored by the eyewitnesses, immediate participants and agents of these events 
published in political party periodicals or often as separate pamphlets, are treated in this chapter 
as primary sources. Relying on a large body of such works128 by former and active Dashnak 
leaders,129 the leaders of Soviet Armenia,130 the Hnchakyan131 or Ramkavar activists,132 as well 
                                                
128 Full list of these sources is provided in Bibliography. 
129 Such as Hovhannes K‘ajaznuni (1923), Simon Vrats‘yan (1923a, 1923b, 1923c, 1924, 1928), Shavarsh 
Missakian or Ruben Ter-Minasian (in Haratch), Shahan Natali and others (in Husaber, Mardgotz and other 
Dashnak-leaning newspapers). 
130 Such as Alexander Martuni (Miasnikyan) (1925) and Ashot Hovhannisyan (1925). 
131 Such as Mihran Aghazarian (1926). 
132 Such as Arshag Ch‘obanian and his Anahit. 
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as on published documents of other Armenian organizations133 and secondary studies, rather than 
treating the Armenian organizations as monolithic structures, this chapter presents the debates 
and tensions within and among the Armenian political parties in detail and more accurately, than 
previously provided in secondary sources. The discussion here and in the following chapter is 
meant to demonstrate how in the process of defining attitudes towards Soviet Armenia and in 
their rivalry for power in Armenian communities, the Armenian political parties became 
instrumental in the shaping of Armenian diasporic identities and in the transformation of the 











                                                
133 Such as the Documents on the Schism in the Armenian Church of America (1993) published by the Diocese of the 
Armenian Church, or the founding documents of the Committee for Aid to Armenia (Sargsyan 2003). 
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Homeland Reconsidered: The Sovietization of Armenia and  
the Formation of the Pro and Anti-Soviet Attitudes in the Diaspora 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia in 1920, the politics of Soviet Armenian government towards the 
Armenian refugees and diasporic organizations in the 1920s and 1930s and the Treaty of 
Lausanne, which sealed the Armenian question and recognized the Republic of Turkey, all these 
in many ways determined the policies of reorganizing Armenian political parties in the diaspora. 
The agreement signed by Boris Legran, the Bolshevik diplomat, and Dro (Drastamat) Kanayan, 
the Defense Minister and the representative of the Republic of Armenia, on December 2, 1920 
transferred power in Armenia to the Bolsheviks. The Bolshevik-Dashnak agreement promised 
not to persecute the Dashnaks and members of other socialist parties, and the leaders of the 
outgoing Republic, such as Simon Vrats‘ian, Dro, Alexander Khatisian, did not leave thereafter 
Armenia immediately. The promise was broken after the Military Revolutionary Committee 
(Revkom) assumed power in Armenia. Many Dashnak leaders were soon harassed and 
imprisoned. Some were exiled, and property expropriations became the norm. This was in part 
due to the new economic policies of War Communism134 (Vrats‘ian 1923a, 73-4; 1923b, 66-75; 
Hovannisian 1997c, 343; Suny 1997b, 348-50). Tension between the Bolsheviks and the 
Dashnaks led to a massive uprising against the Revkom and the Bolsheviks on February 18, 
1921, which temporarily restored Dashnak power in Erevan and adjacent provinces of Armenia. 
The Committee of Salvation of the Homeland (Hayrenik‘I p‘rkut‘yan komite), founded and 
                                                
134 Economic policies of the Bolsheviks during the Russian civil war of 1918-1921 later came to be known as War 
Communism. This policy included coercive nationalization of industry and banks, restrictions on the market and 
increasing control over the food production and distribution (for more details on War Communism, see Raleigh 
2006, 157-63; cf. Suny 1997b, 348). 
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headed by Simon Vrats‘ian as a temporary government, had to cede the power to the Bolsheviks 
a second time, now by force, as the revolt was suppressed by the advancing Red Army in April 
1921. The uprising left no chance of reconciliation between the Bolsheviks and Dashnaks. 
Intolerance and mutual enmity escalated and most Dashnak leaders and supporters of the revolt 
had to flee to Iran. The February uprising was one of the reasons, which forced the Bolshevik 
leadership in Moscow to reconsider its policies in Armenia and Transcaucasia. The Revkom was 
replaced by a new government under the leadership of Alexander Miasnikyan, who had proved 
to be a loyal Bolshevik at positions he held in western Russia (Suny 1997b, 351). The Treaty of 
Kars concluded with Turkey in October 1921 established peace in the region and conditions for 
the rebuilding of Armenia as a Soviet Socialist Republic. The Armenian homeland, as it had 
been imagined in the nineteenth century, reimagined following WWI as the United and 
Independent Armenia and partially actualized on paper in the Treaty of Sèvres and the Wilsonian 
award, was now reduced to an actualized tiny Soviet Republic (Map 3.1). The Armenian political 
parties, now reorganizing in the diaspora, had to define their orientations towards Soviet 
Armenia, towards its Soviet-Bolshevik regime. These new orientations would depend on Soviet 
policies in Armenia and policies towards Armenians in the dispersion. While the twin Armenian 
Delegations in Paris were still negotiating with the Allied Powers the possibility of creating the 
Wilsonian Armenia in the summer of 1921 (see Chapter 1), the Soviets from Armenia initiated a 
series of policy programs towards the Armenian refugees and orphans135 dispersed in Europe and 
the Middle East.  
                                                
135 The Armenian Genocide produced tens of thousands of orphans, who became a matter of concern not only for 
Armenian organizations and Soviet Armenia, but also many international humanitarian organizations. Among these 
international organizations, the American Near East Relief was the most active in the opening and maintenance of 
Armenian orphanages across the Middle East, in Asia Minor, in the Republic of Armenia (later Soviet Armenia). 
Armenian organizations, such as the AGBU, were also actively involved in the projects for Armenian women and 




Map 3-1. Armenia in the Soviet Period (1921-1991)  
(Source: Hewsen 2001, 243) 
 
Soon after the Bolshevik takeover of the country, the new leaders announced a repatriation of 
Armenians to the homeland (Step‘anyan 2010, 36). On September 13, 1921, the government of 
Soviet Armenia created the Committee for Aid to Armenia (Hayastani Ognut‘yan Komite, 
hereafter HOK) with the purpose of raising funds from Armenians in the diaspora in order to 
ease the plight of the economically devastated country and support the large number of starving 
refugees and orphans (cf. Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 152-53). The inaugural appeal of HOK to the 
Armenian people in the diaspora, read, in part, as follows: 
To the Armenian People dispersed in four corners of the world [emphasis in original] 
Listen! The Committee for Aid to Armenia is calling on you! The council of Armenian activists of all 
currents convened and literary scholars in the capital of Armenia is appealing to you. You have perhaps 
never heard their voices in such unison and unanimity…. The free and independent Armenia is finally 
rising … [t]oday the Committee for Aid to Armenia [HOK] hereby announces to all the Armenians 
everywhere that peace has already been established in our homeland and [she is] in peaceful and 
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harmonious relations with its old neighboring peoples. She is now attending to healing her wounds and 
recovery. The government has mobilized all its resources to help people survive the prevailing and the 
anticipated famine in particular and to rebuild the destroyed country. …  
 
… At a time, when the neighboring proletarian peoples are extending their hand of brotherly assistance to 
the Armenian workers today…, when the American people are continuing their aid with greater effort, is it 
possible for you to remain indifferent to her sufferings and efforts of construction – you, her migrant exiled 
brother; you, who are far from the homeland, with all your thoughts harking back to the homeland? It is 
impossible! 
 
Yes, the HOK realizes full well that you too are divided along various political party lines, just as any 
people in a political and civil society. The HOK itself is made up of people with different political 
viewpoints, but it is fully aware that saving the Armenians from starvation and the rebuilding of the 
destroyed Armenia are above all political disagreements. And [it is with such] reasoning [that] they have all 
rallied around this noble cause, have formed an independent and a non-partisan public body and invite 
everybody, one and all to action. Of like mind is the government of Armenia’s Soviet republic, which not 
only grants full rights for activities, but also supports everybody and every organization, all those who want 
to help – to come in person, witness and supervise their assistance. Now, listen Armenians, wherever you 
are – from Europe to America, Egypt to India and everywhere else. Hear the call of the homeland and 
hasten to help in anyway you can, so that you may achieve what you have dreamed of for centuries – a free 
and prosperous homeland (quoted in Sargsyan 2003, 184-5). 
 
 
The appeal of the government of Soviet Armenia and HOK was quickly disseminated to all 
diaspora communities. In two respects the appeal and the activities of HOK made an important 
impact on Armenian political parties and other Armenian organizations in the diaspora. First of 
all, the appeal explicitly promoted Soviet Armenia as the homeland, bringing the debates on 
Armenian homeland to a completely new level: the homeland was not only defined in strictly 
territorial area, Soviet Armenia, but also by its Soviet leadership. Secondly, because of this 
amalgam of the country with its leadership, the appeal to cooperate with the homeland basically 
meant cooperation with the Soviet Armenian Bolshevik leadership and their representatives. The 
Armenian parties, now in the exile, were expected to define their attitudes not only towards 
accepting or rejecting Soviet Armenia as the homeland, but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
towards the Bolshevik regime established after the Sovietization.  
 
The new conditions posed serious challenges especially for the Armenian National Delegation, 
dominated by members of the AGBU and the Ramkavar party, and the Delegation of the 
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Republic of Armenia, represented solely by the members of the Dashnak party. Armenian 
political parties and delegations were reluctant to immediately convene World Congresses and 
respond to the appeal of the government of Soviet Armenia. The delay in the implementation of 
the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, the unstable situation in Turkey, the resumed negotiations 
between the Allied Powers and Turkey in 1922-23 in Lausanne and the opposition of the Allied 
Powers to the expansion of the Russian Soviet regime instilled some hope that the state of affairs 
could change in favor of Armenians and for the rise of a larger Armenia, than the Soviet 
Republic. 
 
The Treaty of Lausanne, concluded in July 1923 between the Allied Powers and Turkey, made 
no reference to Armenians or Armenia and recognized the Republic of Turkey. Without directly 
referring to the treaties concluded with the Bolsheviks in Moscow and Kars, the Treaty of 
Lausanne, however, also indirectly recognized Turkey’s borders with Soviet Union (Soviet 
Armenia) as final. At Lausanne, all hopes for an independent or large Armenian homeland 
vanished into thin air. Following the treaty of Lausanne, Armenian political parties convened 
their world congresses to (re)define their goals, future objectives, and their orientation towards 
Soviet Armenia and the Bolshevik leadership under these new conditions.  
 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia and the Hnchakyan Party 
 
Among the three Armenian political parties, the Hnchakyans enthusiastically hailed the creation 
of Soviet Armenia. The pro-Bolshevik orientation of the Hnchakyans had taken shape since the 
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formation of the Comintern (Communist International) in 1919, and on May 1, 1920, the 
Hnchakyans participated in the rally in Yerevan, organized by the Bolsheviks against the 
Dashnak government (Djeredjian 2002, 174). A few months after the Sovietization of Armenia, 
on February 23, 1921, Eritasard Hayastan, the official organ of the Hnchakyan party in the 
Untied States, wrote: 
The absolute safety of the Armenians is guaranteed thanks to the Sovietization of Armenia. The Armenian 
Workers [upper case in original] should no longer think that they do not have a homeland, that they do not 
have a future. They have it all. Soviet Armenia is the homeland, the home, the future (K‘arasnameak 1944, 
41-42). 
 
The Hnchakyan newspaper declared Soviet Armenia as the homeland, the future of Armenian-
American workers, while the same party a few years ago was reluctant to recognize the Republic 
of Armenia and anticipated that the Russian revolution would reach not only Transcaucasia, but 
also Ottoman Armenia as well (ibid.). In this context, the Hnchakyans had to reconsider their 
relations with the Comintern. In February 1923, The Comintern leadership expressed for the 
dissolution of the Hnchakyans party in all countries and called on the Hnchakyans to join local 
Communist or Workers’ parties abroad (Djeredjian 2002, 189). In response to this, between 1923 
and 1926, the Hnchakyan chapters in Russia and Transcaucasia mostly dissolved, while chapters 
in the diaspora were torn by internal disagreements. Many Hnchakyans individually left the party 
and joined the local Communist or Workers’ parties in Lebanon, Greece or the United States, but 
the proponents of the independent existence of the party continued running the chapters and the 
Hnchakyan organs, like Eritasard Hayastan136 (cf. Djeredjian 2002, 183-89, 193-209).  
 
                                                
136 Yeghig Djeredjian’s (Yeghik Cherechian) (2002) article, “SDHK-Komintern Haraberut‘iwnnerě” [Relations 
between the Hnchakyan Party and the Comintern], sheds an important light on the internal discord and 
disagreements among the Hnchakyans on the party’s relations with the Comintern. 
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The official stand of the proponents of the independent Hnchakyan party towards Soviet 
Armenia was defined in the Eighth World Congress, convened in October 1924 in Athens. 
Despite the strained relations with the Comintern, the Congress determined that Soviet Armenia 
was the realization of the goals pursued by the Hnchakyans for thirty-eight years, ever since the 
foundation of the party in 1887 (Kitur 1962, 516; cf. Libaridian 2007, 38; Walker 1990, 354). 
However, it was not the end for the Hnchakyan party. The party envisioned itself as the advocate 
and defender of Soviet Armenia in the diaspora against other “nationalist” parties (Djeredjian 
2002, 205). In realization of this goal, the party apparatus, current and former rank and file in 
various countries significantly contributed to the formation and development of HOK branches 
in France, the Untied States and elsewhere (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 111, 115; Kitur 1962, 495, 499-
500). Despite the internal controversy around the Comintern, most of the active Hnchakyans 
remained pro-Comintern and continued favoring the Bolshevik regime in Soviet Armenia (cf. 
Djeredjian 2002, 208-9).  
 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia and the Dashnaktsutyun 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia had a near devastating effect on the Dashnaktsutyun. The ceding 
of power to the Bolsheviks in Armenia led to one of the most critical periods for the party. 
Internal disputes, mutual criticisms, accusations, accompanied by self-reflexive critique and 
evaluations of the immediate past of the Dashnak party, often resulted in open confrontations and 
intra-party violence. The Conference of Bucharest, convened in April 1921, in view of the failed 
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February uprising and in the absence of some Bureau137 members, strongly criticized the recent 
activities of the Dashnak Bureau because “it had not risen up to the historic moment, had not 
worked to forge a strong Party organization, [had instead] entered the government, abandoning 
the organizational ranks” (Dasnabedian 1990, 150). Two years later, in April-May 1923, in 
another Dashnak conference in Vienna, Hovhannes K‘ajaznuni, the first prime minister of the 
Republic of Armenia, presented a lengthy and controversial report on the recent activities of the 
party. In his retrospective analysis of the Dashnak activities since 1914 K‘ajaznuni believed 
whatever the party had planned and executed turned out to be detrimental to the Armenian 
people. Therefore, he concluded that the continuation of the Dashnaktsutyun could bring further 
harm to Armenians: 
Turkish Armenia no longer exists. The Great European powers have abandoned our cause. Half of the 
Armenian people has been massacred or dispersed in four corners of the world; the other half is homeless 
and bleeding and is in need of long period of rest. The Republic of Armenia is attached to Soviet Russia as 
an autonomous province; we cannot separate our State from Russia, even if we wished to, and we must not 
wish it, even if we could. The Party is beaten and has lost its authority, has been expelled from our country, 
and cannot return home, while it has no business to pursue in the communities abroad (K‘ajaznuni 1923, 
70). 
 
K‘ajaznuni could no longer see any reason for the existence of the party and suggested a political 
“suicide.” For K‘ajaznuni, the Armenian Bolsheviks were the legitimate successors of the 
Dashnak party, because they had been able to end wars and to secure the borders of Armenia – 
two existential ends that the Dashnaks had failed to meet (ibid., 64-5; 74). The title of his 
presentation expressed the essence of his proposal: “Dashnaktsutyun Has Nothing to do 
Anymore” [H.H. Dashnaktsutiwně anelik‘ ch‘uni ayl ews]. The speech and the book, which 
came out the same year, entailed much recrimination and controversy, but at the same time 
significantly contributed to the reevaluation and redefinition of the goals of the Dashnaktsutyun. 
 
                                                
137 The Bureau is the highest executive organ of the Dashnaktsutyun. The Bureau members are elected at the 
Dashnak World Congresses, which convene usually every 4 years (cf. Dasnabedian 1974).  
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The majority of leaders within the party did not share K‘ajaznuni’s extreme criticism and 
especially disagreed with his verdict. While some could agree with some of his comments, many 
rejected his call for self-abolition. A number of responses appeared to K‘ajaznuni’s speech. 
Simon Vrats‘ian, a prominent Bureau member and the last prime minister of the Republic of 
Armenia, delivered one of the most comprehensive responses to K‘ajaznuni. In a book entitled 
Kharkhap‘umner, H. Kajaznunu “H.H. Dashnakts‘ut‘iwně anelik‘ ch‘uni aylews” girk‘I aṙt‘iv 
[Gropings. On K‘ajaznuni’s “Dashnaktsutyun has nothing to do anymore”], published in 1924, 
Vrats‘ian addressed K‘ajaznuni’s criticisms in detail and justified the policies of the Dashnak 
party since 1914. Justifications provided by Vrats‘ian relieved the Dashnak leaders for being 
held responsible in the misfortunes of Armenians. More importantly, however, the book defined 
the reasons why the party should continue to exist in the diaspora. The reasons, as suggested by 
Vrats‘ian, can be summarized in three major points. First of all, Vrats‘ian insisted that 
Bolshevism was alien to Armenians. It was anti-Armenian and dictatorial; therefore the 
Dashnaktsutyun must oppose the Bolsheviks abroad (Vrats‘ian 1924, 168; 172; 172-74). 
Secondly, as Vrats‘ian assumed, dictatorships usually did not last long, and the Dashnaktsutyun 
must keep the masses in the Armenian communities ready for their return to Armenia when 
Bolshevism eventually fell (ibid., 177-178). Finally, Vrats‘ian believed that the Armenian 
workers in the diaspora did not sympathize with the Ramkavar party, and the Hnchakyans were 
no longer influential. The Dashnaktsutyun, therefore, remained as the only political party to 
represent the interests of Armenian masses in the dispersed communities (ibid., 183-85). 
Vrats‘ian did not rule out the possibility of an alliance with Turkey against the Bolsheviks. He 
declared that the Independent Republic of Armenia and the Armenian people “had no bigger 




Vrats‘ian’s account was the reflection of his personal experience with the Bolsheviks and the 
Kemalists. Between the two foes, he would rather rely on the Turks than on the Bolsheviks. In 
1921, as the leader of the Committee of Salvation of the Homeland during the February revolt in 
Soviet Armenia, Vrats‘ian and his administration were even ready to solicit Turkish military 
assistance to fight against the Bolsheviks in Armenia. In his series of publications in the Hairenik 
monthly titled Republic of Armenia, Vrats‘ian wrote in retrospect:  
We even made an appeal to the Turks138 asking for military assistance against the Bolsheviks. And we sent 
one of our officers to the Turkish command in Igdir for this purpose. Of course we were aware that the 
Turks would not help us against their ally [i.e. the Russians – V.S.], but with our appeal we wanted to stress 
our friendly attitude and to inspire confidence in us. … When in the middle of March the situation on the 
frontline worsened, I inquired from many of our officers, our commander in chief, the members of the 
Salvation Committee of the Homeland and the representatives of political parties as to what they thought of 
Turkish assistance; and they all, one and all, asked me to appeal to the Turks for assistance. One can 
imagine how hated the Bolshevik rule was, that even the Turkish Armenians preferred the Turks! 
(Vrats‘ian 1923c, 43-4) 
 
Vrats‘ian, who persecuted and was persecuted by the Bolsheviks, who led a rebellion against 
them and had to flee the country, had a pro-Turkish bias. He had no problem cooperating with 
the anti-Bolshevik forces and the Turks. Some sources suggest that Vrats‘ian and his former 
colleagues in the government, who knew the exiled leaders of the Georgian Mensheviks and 
Azerbaijani Musavatists, occasionally met with them in the early 1920s allegedly in search of 
ways to join their efforts in the anti-Bolshevik struggle (Nat‘ali [1928] 1992, 143-45; Dallak‘yan 
2004, 82). K‘ajaznuni was certainly aware of the Dashnak leadership’s attempts to regain power 
in Armenia at all costs, and, if needed, by allying with the Turks. In fact, K‘ajaznuni himself was 
the proponent of the pro-Turkish orientation during the Dashnak revolt in February 1921.139 In 
his speech at the Vienna conference in 1923, however, K‘ajaznuni occasionally discussed the 
                                                
138 Tajik in the original. 
139 Vrats‘ian quotes an extensive excerpt from K‘ajaznuni’s letter to the Committee of Salvation of the Homeland, 




possibilities of the Russian or Turkish orientations, now calling for a pro-Russian/Bolshevik 
orientation:  
Today, there are two real powers that we must recon with, Russia and Turkey. It so happens that our 
country today is in the Russian orbit and is largely secured from Turkey. If Russian hegemony is 
eliminated, Turkish-Tatar hegemony will inevitably replace it. It is Russia or Turkey, the Bolsheviks or the 
Milli Turks [Kemalist Nationalists – V.S.] – we do not have any [other] choice. When we are faced with 
such alternatives, it seems to me that there should not be hesitations: of course Russia and not Turkey, of 
course the Bolsheviks and not the Milli Turks (K‘ajaznuni 1923, 65). 
 
K‘ajaznuni’s calls for a pro-Bolshevik orientation, however, were overshadowed under the heavy 
criticisms of his verdict by Vrats‘ian and others. Vrats‘ian’s book expressed the viewpoints of 
most of the Bureau140 members and other leaders of the party, who had held various 
governmental positions in the Republic of Armenia, while K‘ajaznuni’s viewpoints did not have 
many supporters among the highest leadership of the party.  
 
The Tenth World Congress convened in Paris in November 1924, shortly after the publication of 
Vrats‘ian’s response to K‘ajaznuni. It established the anti-Soviet orientation of the 
Dashnaktsutyun and reelected most of the previous Bureau members. The majority of the newly 
elected Bureau, three out of five – Simon Vrats‘ian, Ruben Ter-Minasian, Arshak Jamalian, had 
been ministers in the former Republic of Armenia141 (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 96-8; Dasnabedian 
1974, 146; 1990, 160-61). The 1924-1925 World Congress, thus, bestowed legitimacy on the 
previous leaders, and the top echelon of the Dashnaktsutyun bypassed the question of holding 
them accountable for the party’s failures. In a sense, the “same leaders” declared themselves 
“innocent.” Yet, the anti-Bolshevik orientation adopted by the Vienna Conference and the Tenth 
World Congress was not widely shared even among the leaders of the Dashnaktsutyun.  
                                                
140 The incumbent Bureau members were elected in 1919, at the Dashnak World Congress in Erevan.  
141 Vrats‘ian was the last prime minister, Ter-Minasian was the former Minister of Defense and Jamalian was the 
former Minister of Communications in the Republic of Armenia. The other two were Shahan Nat‘ali and Shavarsh 




Shahan Nat‘ali (1884-1983), one of the Bureau members elected in the Tenth World Congress, 
later strongly criticized the attempts of some leaders of the party to cooperate with the Georgian 
Mensheviks and the Azerbaijani Musavatists against the Bolsheviks and voted against joining the 
pro-Turkish and anti-Bolshevik Union of Caucasian Peoples (also known as “Prometey”142) 
(Ch‘ormisian 1975, 101, Dallak‘yan 2004, 83; Nat‘ali [1928] 1997, 16, 143-47; Walker 1990, 
353). Probably for his radical views, but formally accused of embezzling funds, Nat‘ali was 
suspended and eventually expelled from the party prior to the Eleventh World Congress of 1929.  
The intra-party tensions between the anti-Bolshevik and anti-Turkish factions, however, did not 
end.  
 
The discord of views erupted in September 1932, when several known Dashnak figures in Paris 
began issuing a new Armenian-language newspaper called Mardgotz (Bastion). The founders 
announced Mardgotz to be the official organ of the Dashnak Western European Central 
Committee. In the first issue of Mardgotz (September 11, 1932), the title of the centered front 
page announcement read in bold: “OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT of the Armenian 
Revolutionary Federation [Dashnaktsutyun] (1890) Western Europe Central Committee.” 
Right below the title a small text-box quoted from Haratch:143  
                                                
142 Nat‘ali accused Simon Vrats‘ian and Ruben Ter-Minasian for their involvement with the pro-Turkish 
organization called “Prometey,” the Union of Caucasian People, which aimed at liberating Caucasus from the 
Bolsheviks. In his booklet Turkism from Ankara to Baku and Turkish Orientation, Shahan Nat‘ali brings evidence 
from various publications by Vrats‘ian and Ter-Minassian to prove their pro-Turkish orientation (Nat‘ali [1928] 
1992, 147-58). The internal tensions and conflicts spilled over into the public sphere, when Shahan Nat‘ali founded 
the newspaper “Azatamart” and openly criticized the policies of his colleagues. He was supported by the local 
Dashnak Central Committee and many rank and file members in Paris (Nat‘ali [1928] 1992, 14-6) 
143 Haratch was the semi-official organ of the Dashnaktsutyun in Paris, established in 1925. Formally, it was 
independent from the Dashnaktsutyun, but the founder, Shavarsh Missakian, was a member of the Dashnak party, 
was elected to the Dashnak Bureau at the Tenth World Congress in 1924-25 and reelected at the Eleventh World 





Due to grave anti-disciplinary violations the following comrades 
of the European Region are hereby expelled from the ranks of the 
A. R. Federation [Dashnaktsutyun]: A[bo] Aboyan, L[evon] 
Mozian, V[azgen] Shushanian, M[krtich‘] Yerits‘ants‘, and 
M[esrop] K‘uyumjian.  
ARF Bureau  
Haratch 4. Sept. 1932, #1974.  
 
The text of the Official Announcement introduced the expelled comrades as members of the 
Dashnak Western European Central Committee.144 They had been reelected in the party’s 
European Regional Congress, the highest local decision making body on August 18, 1932. 
Therefore, the editors of Mardgotz argued that the Bureau’s decision could not go into effect. 
Except from revealing the escalating conflict between the Bureau and the Western European 
Central Committee, the first issue of Mardgotz did not elaborate much on specific problems 
causing the rift. However, the subsequent issues did. On October 13, 1932, Mesrop K‘uyumjian 
published a “Fourth Letter,” which accused some of the Bureau members for ceding Kars to the 
Turks, for abandoning Western Armenia by signing the Treaty of Alexandropol and for 
abandoning Russian Armenia by the agreement concluded with Boris Legran.145 Reflecting on 
K‘ajaznuni’s work, the article concluded: “…the party Bureau-state not only has nothing left to 
do, but also stands accused before the public court of Turkish Armenians.” The article reminded 
its readers that the mission of the Dashnaktsutyun had always been secondary in the Caucasus 
and had ended after the Sovietization of Armenia. However, the Western Armenian Cause still 
preserved its urgency.  
                                                
144 Lewon Ch‘ormisian, a member of the Dashnak party at the time, wrote that besides this five, there were four 
others in the Central Committee - Levon Kevonian, Sahak Ter-T‘ovmasian, Serenekian and Meldonian (does not 
mention the first names).  According to him, these four toned down the criticism of the Bureau, were forgiven and 
not expelled from the party. They later became strong advocates of the Bureau (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 101-102). 
145 The article did not explicitly name Simon Vrats‘ian or Ruben Ter-Minasian, but they were the only members of 
the Dashnak Bureau reelected at the 1929 World Congress, who occupied high posts during the last months of the 




Shahan Nat‘ali joined the Mardgotz movement and accused the same Bureau members of their 
perverse expulsions of many, as Nat‘ali thought, worthy Dashnaks.146 In his front-page column 
“Who Ousts Whom!” on October 20, 1932, he wondered why and by what authority the Bureau, 
whom he referred to as the Vrats‘ians, expelled so many influential Dashnak comrades from the 
party. Similar to K‘uyumjian and his other comrades in Mardgotz, Nat‘ali believed this was 
because the Caucasian Armenians could not relate to the problems of the Ottoman Armenians, 
but who had been running the Bureau since 1919. Nat‘ali thought some Ottoman Armenians, 
who cooperated with the Vrats‘ians, were serving the interests of the Caucasian Armenian 
leadership: “Long life to Shavarsh Missakians, Karo Sasunis and Vahan P‘ap‘azians; there had 
always been Ottoman Armenians, who in the pursuit of personal interests … served as tools for 
the Turkophilia of the Vrats‘ians’ ” (Mardgotz, October 20, 1932).   
 
Accountability, which had been avoided by Vrats‘ian and the critics of K‘ajaznuni, and the anti-
Bolshevik orientation taken at the 1924-1925 World Congress, became eventually the major 
reason behind the rift between the faction representing the Caucasian Armenia (Simon Vrats‘ian, 
Ruben Ter-Minasian, Hamo Ohanjanian), and the others, representing the diaspora (Dasnabedian 
1990, 159). The Mardgotzakans147 wanted a change in the Bureau leadership and in its policies. 
They believed that the anti-Bolshevism pursued by the Bureau cast a dark shadow on the real 
mission of the Dashnaktsutyun – the Ottoman Armenian Cause. The Mardgotzakans expressed a 
concern for the almost decade-long “indolence” of the party in pursuit of the Ottoman Armenian 
                                                
146 After Nat‘ali was expelled from the Dashnaktsutyun in 1929 he made a trip to the United States. Apparently, he 
could not solicit many supporters among the local Dashnaks for the anti-Turkish orientation. A few years later, he 
had to return to France and join the expelled members of the Mardgotz Central Committee (cf. Walker 1990, 445). 
147 The Bureau and the pro-Bureau faction referred to the anti-Bureau faction gathered around Mardgotz as the 
Mardgotzakans [literally - the Mardgotz affiliates]. 
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Cause. They demanded action and the revival of the revolutionary traditions of the first 
generation party leaders. In order to reach these goals, they believed some of the Bureau 
members should be removed and should be held accountable before the Dashnak World 
Congress, in the anticipation of which they continued acting as the Western European Central 
Committee.  
 
To the greatest disappointment of the Mardgotzakans, the Twelfth World Congress, convened in 
February-March 1933 in Paris, in the absence of the Mardgotz leaders approved all the 
accusations and claims against them and reconfirmed the Bureau’s decision to expel them. If 
before the World Congress the Mardgotzakans argued that the Bureau did not have the authority 
to expel the members of the Western European Central Committee, they could no longer claim 
legitimacy after the Congress. The decision of the 1933 World Congress marginalized the 
Mardgotzakan movement and, by January 1934, it had come to an end.148 In January 1934, the 
former Mardgotzakans founded the Western Armenian Liberation Pact [Arevmtahay 
azatagrakan ukht] in Paris and began publishing the weekly Amrotz (Fortress). But the 
movement became less and less influential, as it continued to be heavily persecuted by the 
Dashnaktsutyun (cf. Lalayan 2001, 9-12).   
 
The Bureau leadership of the Dashnaktsutyun, despite internal conflicts in the party, forged a 
solid anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet orientation through severe disciplinary actions, like 
suspensions and expulsions, against the most disloyal elements. In parallel to the internal 
“cleansing,” they claimed of being a government in exile. Following the course suggested by 
                                                
148 One of the Mardgotzakans, Mesrob K‘uyumjian, was exposed as a collaborator of Soviet secret services, which 
created an internal conflict among the followers of Mardgotz and accelerated its decline. 
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Simon Vrats‘ian, the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia continued to represent “Armenia.” 
The Delegation continued issuing Armenian passports to Armenians from their office at 71 
avenue Kléber in Paris. After the recognition of the USSR by France in 1924, the French 
government ceased to recognize such Armenian passports, although the party continued to 
project itself unofficially as the government-in-exile until 1965149 (cf. Tölölyan 1991a, 181-82; 
Ter-Minassian 2010).   
 
The institutionalization of strong anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet attitude in between the wars 
refocused the efforts of the leaders of the Dashnaktsutyun from Soviet Armenia and homeland to 
internal matters of self-discipline and to matters of community building effort in the diaspora 
(Panossian 2006, 294 cf. Atamian 1955, 330; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 55; Le Tallec 2001, 34-5; Ter 
Minassian 1997, 75). Rejecting the Bolshevik-Communist leadership of Armenia, the 
Dashnaktsutyun occasionally entertained the idea of anhayrenik‘ petut‘yun, literally “a 
homeland-less state” in an attempt to rally the Armenian refugees around a pan-diasporic 
organization. In public addresses, speeches and newspaper articles, the Dashnak leaders often 
redefined the idea of homeland and state to bypass Soviet Armenia. In a public speech given in 
Cairo, Egypt, on January 20, 1924, for example, Nikol Aghbalian, the former Minister of 
Education and Culture in the Republic of Armenia, declared: 
It is necessary, that the Armenians colonies abroad create a supreme organization with appropriate 
branches, and organize regional, communal bodies, to be united through a special and relevant constitution 
of a central council; a sort of moral state, a homeland-less state [anhayrenik‘ petut‘yun] with all state 
attributes, and national and international legal systems. That will be the supreme body for the Armenians 
abroad, it should rally the Armenians scattered everywhere, as well as their national, cultural and economic 
                                                
149 The delegation created the Office Céntral des Refugies Arméniens in 1926, which by the decree of January 11, 
1930, provided special certificates to Armenian refugees for administrative purposes (cf. Le Tallec 2001, 185). 
Alexander Khatisian, the last president of the Republic of Armenia, succeeded Avetis Aharonian as the head of the 
Delegation, and Hrant Samuelian succeeded Khatisian in 1945. In 1965, the delegation was reorganized into the 
Comité de Défense de la Cause Arménienne [Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause] - CDCA (see 
chapter 5, cf. Mouradian and Kunth 2010, 40; Ter-Minassian 2010) 
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activities through state and civic interrelations. On the other hand, each community should isolate itself, 
should not become citizens of [their] country of residence, to join through such separation its national 
organization, an organization which corresponds to its nationality, which should be recognized by the 
League of Nations (Husaber150 (January 22, 1924). Quoted in Top‘uzyan 1986, 206). 
 
Nikol Aghbalian’s “homeland-less state” surfaced with slight variations in public speeches of the 
Dashnak leaders elsewhere. In his interview to Haratch on May 7, 1926, Avetis Aharonian 
remembered a recent speech of his in Lyon: “The Armenians … should not perceive themselves 
as expatriates, but must connect with the homeland by heart; because the homeland is not only 
the land, but the person with all his feelings, ideals, traditions and aspirations.” In another article 
in Haratch (October 20, 1926), reflecting on the role of compatriotic unions in Armenia, Ruben 
Ter-Minasian, stated: “The word “Armenia” means very little to the exiled masses, because Lake 
Van is not next to Lake Sevan, and Surb Karapet of Mush has not been saved with Ējmiatsin.” 
Even if formally the Dashnaktsutyun came out in favor of reconstruction and repatriation 
programs in Soviet Armenia,151 in the attempt to rebuild the party and gain influence in the 
diaspora, many of its leaders preached an abstract homeland, especially for the Middle Eastern 
Armenians, focusing on the rallying the dispersed and diverse Armenian refugee masses around 






                                                
150 Husaber was the organ of the Dashnak party in Cairo, Egypt. 
151 Shahgaldian (1979, 104-6) quotes some excerpts from the decisions taken at the Tenth (1924-1925) and Eleventh 
World Congresses (1929)  to argue that the party was “decidedly in favor of the emigration of all Armenian refugees 
to their homeland.” According to him, the policy of supporting repatriation and reconstruction was revised only at 
the Thirteenth World Congress in 1938, at the time of the Great Purges, in which the party just stated its non-
opposition to “repatriation drives and reconstruction efforts.” 
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 The Sovietization of Armenia and the Ramkavar Party 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia made an impact on the Sahmandir Ramkavars and Reformed 
Hnchakyans as well, who merged into a single political party in October 1921, in Constantinople 
(Dallak‘yan 1999, 12-3). The founding congress of the Democratic Liberal Party (Ramkavar-
Azatakan Kusaktsut‘yun or Ramkavar) determined the party’s attitude toward Soviet Armenia 
and defined relations with the Dashnaktsutyun. Acknowledging that the Bolshevik government 
ensured the security of Armenians in Soviet Armenia, the Ramkavar congress pledged to assist 
the government of Armenia in economic development at the same time, as it would pursue the 
Western Armenian Cause in Europe. The Ramkavars remained relatively open to the possibilities 
of cooperation with the Dashnaks in assisting Soviet Armenia (Dallak‘yan 1999, 31-2).  
 
After the Treaty of Lausanne two issues became paramount for the Ramkavar party: the 
preservation of Armenian identity in the dispersion, and assistance to Soviet Armenia as the only 
surviving Armenian land. In response to the anti-Soviet orientation of the Dashnak party at the 
Vienna Conference in 1923, the Second World Congress of the Ramkavar Party, convened in 
Paris in 1924, repudiated the Dashnak stand and refused to recognize the Dashnak led Delegation 
of the Republic of Armenia. The congress referred to it as the “Delegation of the Former 
Government of Armenia” thereby denying its legitimacy (Dallak‘yan 1999, 84, 2004, 91-2). The 
ideological differences of the liberal-democratic Ramkavar and the Soviet regime in Armenia did 
not prevent them from accepting the Bolsheviks’ legitimacy in Armenia as long as it provided 
for the safety and security of the Armenian people. Compared to past disagreements, tensions 
and conflicts with the Dashnaks, the incompatibility of the Liberal-Democrat (Ramkavar) and 
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Communist (Bolshevik) ideologies was less relevant in the Ramkavar attitudes towards Soviet 
Armenia. If in 1918-1920, the Ramkavars participating in the Boghos Nubar National Delegation 
would often refuse to recognize the Dashnak governed Republic of Armenia as the homeland 
(see the previous chapter), after the Sovietization and Lausanne, Arshag Chobanian, one of the 
leaders of the party, could write in the party organ Apaga in 1923: 
The Armenians abroad have now turned their eyes to the Republic of Erevan, which is their national center, 
their free homeland; and consider assisting it as their chief ideal, their greatest duty and solace… (quoted in 
Dallak‘yan 1987, 368) 
 
In this excerpt Chobanian continually refers to Soviet Armenia as the “Republic of Erevan” but 
he defines it as the homeland to which the Armenians in dispersion should feel affinity and 
belonging. During the 1920s and 1930s, Chobanian’s designations for Soviet Armenia gradually 
transitioned from “Republic of Erevan” to “our little Armenia” and finally to “Hayastan” – 
Armenia  (cf. Dallak‘yan 1987, 364-72).  
 
Since most of the leaders of the Sahmanadir Ramkavar party had been members of the Boghos 
Nubar National Delegation in Paris, the close cooperation with the Delegation continued after the 
founding of the Ramkavar Azatakan Party (cf. Dallak‘yan 1999, 84). At the thick of political 
adversities in Paris, the National Delegation was quick to realize that after the Treaty of 
Lausanne the Armenian passports provided by the Dashnak government in exile could not get 
international recognition. Following the appeal of the Delegation made in the summer of 1924, 
the League of Nations International Office for Refugees made Nansen Passports available for 
the Armenians as well (cf. Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 144). After the French Recognition of Soviet 
Union in October 1924, the Armenian National Delegation dissolved on November 30 and 
proclaimed itself the Central Committee for Armenian Refugees [Hay gaght‘akanats‘ 
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kedronakan handznazhoghov] to deal with the problems of refugees and orphans  (Ch‘ormisian 
1975, 55, 95).  
 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia and other Armenian Organizations in the Diaspora 
 
The establishment of Soviet Armenia posed a number challenges not only to the Armenian 
political parties, but also to various other organizations. Many compatriotic unions operating in 
the Untied States from the end of the nineteenth century, as the previous chapter demonstrated, 
had to redefine their goals and forge relations with Soviet Armenia in order to either perpetuate 
means of their compatriots, to help them settle in Soviet Armenia or to construct quarters or 
small villages/towns. The Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) also responded 
positively to the calls of repatriation and cooperation with the government of Soviet Armenia. 
From the summer of 1923, Boghos Nubar began negotiating with the government of Soviet 
Armenia about the possibilities of transferring Armenian orphans to Armenia. In October 1923, 
the AGBU was officially permitted to extend its activities to Soviet Armenia, which was 
unprecedented in the relations of other diasporic organizations with the government of Soviet 
Armenia (Melk‘onyan 2005, 171-72; 176-79). In his address in the AGBU World Congress in 
December 1924, Boghos Nubar spoke of the future of the orphans, stating that the orphans over 
17 years old could not stay in the orphanages anymore, but they could be transferred to 
“Armenia, where it is hoped that they can find employment in land cultivation or small 
industries…” He went on to comment: “thereby, their dispersion in foreign countries would be 
partly prevented and the number of Armenians residing in our homeland [italic added] would 
 
 177 
correspondingly increase…” (quoted in Melk‘onyan 2005, 173-74). The chairman of the 
Armenian National Delegation, who in 1919 and 1920 would refer to the Republic of Armenia as 
the “Araratian republic,” in his 1923 address not only referred to Soviet Armenia as Armenia, 
but also called it “our homeland.” The Treaty of Lausanne and the dissipation of hope that 
Armenia would become any larger than Soviet Armenia had certainly influenced the choice of 
words and expressions by such an established diplomat as Boghos Nubar. Accepting Soviet 
Armenia as the homeland determined the course of the AGBU charitable activities in Armenia. 
The organization sponsored the construction of villages, hospitals and schools, donated to 
various educational and scientific programs in Soviet Armenia, as well as sent relief to the needy 
families and refugees (Melk‘onyan 2005, 180-201). Although often criticized by the Soviet 
Armenian authorities for not focusing all their activities on Soviet Armenia, it contributed most 
significantly to the rebuilding of Soviet Armenia. 
 
For the Ottoman Armenians, the homeland – the Ottoman Armenia, “no longer existed.” Boghos 
Nubar, Chobanian and some other Ottoman Armenians, who accepted Soviet Armenia as the 
homeland, did it with certain reluctance. They were not born in Eastern Armenia; they actively 
refused to recognize the former Republic of Armenia as Armenia, which was on the same 
geographical location as Soviet Armenia. Boghos Nubar expressed a concern even for Soviet 
Armenia, that the Armenian orphans would eventually become Bolsheviks in Armenia and 
feared that the Bolsheviks may not allow the orphans to learn their language, history and 
religion.152 Yet because of the realization that Soviet Armenia had become the only Armenian 
state after the Treaty of Lausanne, Boghos Nubar and many other Ottoman Armenians perceived 
                                                
152 Boghos Nubar expressed this concern in 1923 in a private conversation with one of the Ramkavar leaders, 




its Bolshevik regime as the lesser evil compared to the prospect of the dispersion and 
assimilation of Armenians in foreign countries (cf. Melk‘onyan 2005, 170).  
 
 
Soviet Nationality Policies, HOK and the Political Polarization of Armenian Factions in the 
Diaspora 
 
The Sovietization of Armenia and the appeal of the Soviet Armenian government for cooperation 
through the channels of HOK, thus, became important factors determining the pro- and anti-
Soviet orientations of the Armenian elites and institutions in the diaspora. The orientations of the 
higher decision making bodies of the Armenian political parties and organizations were 
expressed in the actual task of cooperating or competing with the Soviet sponsored HOK 
branches, which began appearing in various countries after 1924.   
 
Prior to 1923, HOK was not very active in establishing branches abroad, but after 1924 many 
HOK branches appeared in various countries with significant Armenian population. According to 
Melik‘set‘yan by the mid-1930s, HOK had been able to organize more than 200 branches outside 
the Soviet Union with more than 10,000 members (Melik‘set‘yan 1959, 35). In many countries 
HOKs acquired legal recognition by local governments, such as in the United States and France, 
and this provided extra impetus to their activities (cf. Abrahamyan 1967, 385; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 
117). To better understand the role of HOK in organizing Armenian communities and its 
influence on the formation and institutionalization of various Armenian factions, it should be 
analyzed in the context of Soviet nationality policies. After all, HOK chapters could not operate 
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independently of the Soviet policies, and, on the whole, HOK became the instrument of the 
Soviet nationalities policies extending beyond the physical borders of the Soviet Union. 
 
The solution of the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union, contrary to expectations, became 
conducive to the nation building especially of “small” nations, as many scholars have rightfully 
noticed. Vladimir Lenin, the ideologist and leader of the Soviet Union, and Joseph Stalin, the 
first Commissar of Nationalities, shared similar views on this issue. They believed that the best 
way to deal with nationalisms was to grant them what they aspired for and grant them “forms” of 
nationhood.153 The Resolution on Nationalities Policy, adopted at the Twelfth Congress of the 
Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in April 1923, affirmed the support for the national 
“forms.” Among other recommendations, the resolution specifically suggested to staff the organs 
of national republics by locals, who spoke the language, knew local customs and traditions; to 
adopt special laws which would ensure the usage of national languages in local governments and 
all institutions of the constituent republics; and encouraged the development of Marxist and other 
ideological literature in national languages (Dvenadtsatyĭ s”ezd 1968, 696-7). These policies 
were directed towards the “suppressed” nations and minorities, and were implemented 
nationwide. The reforms became known as korenizatsiia (179eneration179ion) – the 
                                                
153 The Soviet “affirmative action empire,” as Terri Martin (2001, 3, 18) defines the “positive support of the forms 
of nationhood” in the Soviet Union, was the strategy aimed at disarming nationalism by granting what were called 
the “forms” of nationhood. Lenin distinguished between the “oppressor” and the “oppressed” nations, arguing that 
the nationalism of the oppressed nations was not dangerous, while the nationalism of oppressor nations should be 
avoided. Lenin, thus, could tolerate nationalisms and the right to “national self-determination” of the “oppressed” 
nations, but fight what he called the Great Russian Chauvinism (cf. Martin 2001, 3, 6). Lenin’s ideology on 
nationalities was shared and supported by Stalin, the author of the text Marxism and the Nationalities Question 
(1913-1914. In their attempts to spark a global revolution, Lenin and Stalin envisioned using the nationalisms of 
small nations as a way of projecting influence beyond the borders of the Soviet Union. Such a policy was attempted 
at the Western borderland and proved successful in Ukraine, about which a leading Soviet Ukrainian newspaper 
wrote in April 1924: “There was a time when Galicia served as the “Piedmont” for Ukrainian culture. Now, when 
Ukrainian culture is suffocating in “cultured,” “European” Poland, its center has naturally shifted to the Ukrainian 
SSR” (quoted in Martin 2001, 9). 
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establishment of national territories based on national languages and cultures (Marin 2001, 11; 
Hirsch 2005, 145-46).  
 
Armenia also benefitted from the Soviet Nationalities policies and korenizatsiia. It was 
designated as an Armenian territorial unit and Armenians living elsewhere in the Soviet Union 
were encouraged to settle there permanently. Armenians were declared a “titular nationality” in 
Soviet Armenia, which implied that Armenian nationals were privileged to run various 
administrative positions in their republic. The Armenian language was to be used in all public 
institutions as the official language of the Republic. Armenian was officially endorsed as the 
language of instruction, as well154 (Suny 1993, 154-56). Shortly after the Twelfth Congress, the 
leader of Soviet Armenia, Alexander Miasnikyan (Martuni) (1885-1925) in his speech published 
in Bakinskiĭ Rabochiĭ [Baku worker] in 1924 noted: 
We know that form and framework are one thing, in which the cultures of different nations develop, and 
it’s altogether another, when these national cultures develop and not only do not hinder, but also 
complement one another. The best Turkish [means Azerbaijani – V.S.] cultural elements complement the 
Armenian cultural elements; the best experienced, educated Georgian professors promote Armenian and 
Azerbaijani culture. We [the Transcaucasian people] are striving to become equals, not to lag behind one 
another, but we are at the same time creating our culture, [and] our socialist, proletarian culture (Martuni 
1925, xxxv).  
 
Miasnikyan was expressing the essence of the Twelfth Congress, which, within less than a year, 
would be formulated by Joseph Stalin as “proletarian in content, national in form”155 (Stalin 
[1925] 1952, 138). The proletarian or socialist content promoted by Miasnikyan (“…we create 
our culture, our socialist, proletarian culture”) and other leaders of Soviet Armenia were 
applicable not only to the internal matters in Armenia, but also in their relations with Armenians 
                                                
154 By the end of the 1930s, Armenia had experienced a cultural renaissance: many cultural, educational, and artistic 
centers and organizations had emerged; many artists, writers and scholars had been able to produce Armenian 
literature and art works; the country had achieved full literacy of the population by mandatory schooling (Suny 
1997b, 356-57). 
155 In 1930, Stalin reformulated this doctrine as “socialist in content, national in form” (cf. Martin 2001, 12) 
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abroad. Several months later, Miasnikyan’s speech was reproduced in the introduction to his 
book on the Armenian political parties in the diaspora, entitled Kusaktsut‘iunnerě 
gaghut‘ahayut‘yan mej [Political Parties in Armenian Diaspora]. Miasnikyan’s analysis of the 
Armenian political parties was first of all intended for a diasporan Armenian audience. The 
leader of Soviet Armenia provided the guidelines of the policies towards the Armenian political 
parties in the diaspora. His speech in the introduction served as a general point of departure: 
relations with diasporic political parties could in no case hinder the creation of “socialist, 
proletarian culture” in Soviet Armenia. 
 
The creation of “socialist, proletarian culture,” however, as Miasnikyan envisioned, was not 
detrimental for Armenia or Armenianness. In response to the Dashnak criticism that Armenia 
had lost her independence and was suppressed under Bolshevik rule, Miasnikyan quoted many 
articles from the Ramkavar or AGBU affiliated newspapers to demonstrate that other factions in 
the diaspora had different perspectives. To illustrate this, Miasnikyan quoted an article from 
Gotchnag:  
You know that you are in Armenia, which despite being linked to Russia through political federation, 
oversees its internal culture in accordance with its wishes, completely independently, without being 
accountable to anyone. In reality, Armenia, as a national Soviet state [emphasis added], is a sovereign 
[ink‘nuruyn] state with its Armenian language and its Armenian culture. Pure, literary Armenian prevails in 
all institutions, from the people’s commissariats to military barracks. There is a special decree, announcing 
Armenian as a state language (quoted in Martuni 1925, 49).  
 
For the supporters of Soviet Armenia, Armenia was seen as not just a Soviet state, but as a 
national Soviet state [azgayin khorhrdayin petut‘yun]. Such important national signifiers, as 
language and Armenian autonomy, in the eyes of many other diasporan organizations mattered 
more than the Soviet regime. The fact that Miasnikyan quoted the passage without omitting the 
word “national” (in italic) or the expression “Armenian culture” implied his agreement with the 
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author of the article in Gotchnag, which dragged him into a long distance argument with the 
Dashnaks over the issue of independence. He contrasted the prosperity, security, economic and 
cultural advancements of Soviet Armenia during its first few years of existence to the short-lived 
independent Armenia of the Dashnaks, to argue that she now enjoyed a better independence than 
Dashnaks could imagine (Martuni 1925, 50-2). Drawing extensively on Armenian-language 
newspapers published in the diaspora (usually those not affiliated with the Dashnaktsutyun), 
Miasnikyan concluded: 
…There are two [opposing] social poles in Armenian life – communism and nationalism, or Bolshevism 
and Dashnakism. The former is the new Armenia; the latter is the old Armenia. The former is our 
revolution, our present and, moreover, our future; the latter is the regressive life of Armenians, the bad past, 
which is breathing its last (Martuni 1925, 83). 
 
As paradoxical as it may sound, Miasnikyan defined both Communism and Nationalism as two 
opposing poles in the “Armenian life.” However, whether willingly or unwillingly, the Soviets’ 
commitment to national forms, especially to language, was actually forging a kind of Armenian 
culture in Soviet Armenia, even if “proletarian” or “socialist” in content. It was for this reason 
that such apolitical unions and organizations, as the various compatriotic unions or the AGBU, 
and political parties, as the Ramkavars, could develop a pro-Soviet Armenian orientation. Their 
interest was not promoting socialist ideology or a global communist revolution, but to contribute 
to the Armenian national projects, which they could find plenty in Soviet Armenia, of which 
they wrote in their newspapers, and to which Miasnikyan referred in his book.  
 
The frequent references to Ramkavar newspapers and authors, however, did not refrain 
Miasnikyan from criticizing the Ramkavars as well. The strong proponent of socialism defined 
the Democratic Liberal Ramkavars as the more “peaceful” “bourgeois party of the diaspora,” but 
as another opposite pole to the Bolshevism: “Ramkavars and Bolsheviks are opposite poles. 
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Regardless of the extent of one of the poles’ temporary sympathy towards the other, the 
confrontation will always continue” (Martuni 61-2). The Hnchakyans were not spared either. 
Miasnikyan did not even consider the Hnchakyans as a political party, arguing that they had been 
strong until 1897 and had declined afterwards yielding their place to the Dashnaks (Martuni 
1925, 66). In response to Hnchakyan claims that the Bolsheviks were born out of the Hnchakyan 
party, Miasnikyan wrote: 
The Hnchak is the same Dashnak but more shrouded and from the outset wrapped up in a false socialist 
veil. There have been Armenian socialists before the Hnchak, fitting their own times. There are socialist 
elements in Nalbandian’s thought. We have comrades, who have gone through the Dashnak way of 
thinking. Such were those times. We have comrades who, before communism, were in the Hnchakyan 
ranks, which does not give us any right to consider the Hnchak as our precursor (Martuni 1925, 76). 
 
The principles and orientation towards the Armenian diasporic parties projected by the leaders of 
Soviet Armenia naturally became guiding principles for the HOK leadership from the mid-1920s 
through the 1930s. In 1925, Ashot Hovhannisyan, the secretary of the Communist party of 
Armenia at the time, specifically defined the future perspectives of HOK: 
HOK should stop serving as an arena for the consolidation of the national “living forces,” national classes 
and political parties. It should turn into an organ for organizing the masses of proletariat, which by putting 
an end to the empty mentality of the convergence of incompatible classes, should contribute to the class 
stratification of the nation (Hovhannisyan 1925, 23).156  
 
In the light of processes in Soviet Armenia, HOK was gradually transformed into what 
Dallak‘yan (2004, 34) refers to as a “non-partisan political party.” While created for 
philanthropic purposes as a Committee for Aid to Armenia (Hayastani Ognut‘yan Komite), HOK 
branches formed in the Armenian diaspora became active political agents of class segregation 
and proponents of the “socialist, proletarian” content. HOK cultural unions, libraries, clubs, 
theatrical and dance groups appeared one after another in diasporic settlements; HOK produced 
propaganda material, including literature, films and exhibitions, various albums and postcards 
                                                
156 I want to thank Ara Sanjian, who directed me to this source. 
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about Soviet Armenia. It founded newspapers, through which it reached the Armenian 
population in the diaspora (cf. Abrahamyan 1967, 385; Melk‘onyan 2005, 220; Melik‘set‘yan 
1959, 35-6; 1985, 165).  
 
The policies of HOK were first of all directed against the Dashnaktsutyun, whose name became 
widely used as the synonym of “anti-revolutionary elements.” The first step towards the 
implementation of the new policies was defining the criteria for HOK membership. According to 
the new guidelines, the membership was open to all those who had “friendly attitude towards 
Soviet regime in Armenia,” and who accepted it as “the native government of our country.” Such 
politicization of HOK actively excluded the Dashnaktsutyun and its sympathizers from Soviet 
Armenia related activities. While the Dashnak leadership was confronting significant tensions 
and internal conflicts on matters of party’s orientation towards Soviet Armenia in the 1930s, the 
discriminating policies of HOK significantly contributed to the strengthening of the anti-
Bolshevik and anti-Soviet orientations among the Dashnak rank and file and sympathizers.  
 
Gradually the new policies of HOK marginalized the Ramkavars and Hnchakyans as well. HOK 
began distancing itself from what they called “the masked friends” [dimakavor barekam] who 
were thought to be “as dangerous as the non-disguised enemies.” By “masked friends” they 
basically referred to the Ramkavars, the Hnchakyans and the AGBU (Dallak‘yan 2004, 36). By 
1929, many Ramkavar members of HOK quit the organization. The Hnchakyans also began 
rejecting the exclusivist political orientation of HOK (Dallak‘yan 1999, 104, 138; Kitur 1963, 
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178). In practice, it seems, in the 1930s, HOK became almost identical with local Armenian 
Communists.157  
 
When an organization, representing the homeland, calling on the diaspora to put aside all 
political disagreements and come to the assistance of the homeland suddenly began 
discriminating and defining who could and who could not help the homeland or repatriate, it 
naturally alienated and provoked counter actions of rejecting the representatives of the 
homeland, the regime in the homeland, and even the homeland itself. As Ch‘ormisian ([1965] 
1995, 121-22) concluded, the creation of HOK branches abroad formed three types of 
allegiances among Armenians:  
• Pro-Soviet – who perceived Soviet Armenia and Soviet regime as the best of all possible 
options for the Armenian people [HOK, Communists and a substantial group among the 
Hnchakyans]; 
• Pro-Soviet Armenia – who did not have any particular preference for the Soviet regime in 
Armenia, but who also did not see any benefit for the Armenian people in being against it 
[the Ramkavars and the AGBU]; 
• Anti-Soviet – who considered the Soviet regime as fatal and dangerous for the 
preservation of the Armenian people and believed it could be replaced by some other 
regime through constant anti-Soviet struggle [the Dashnaktsutyun]. 
 
In practice these options, however, boiled down to anti-Soviet and pro-Soviet orientations, 
especially during the years of Cold War. The Ramkavars, who were ideologically incompatible 
                                                
157 HOK chapters, generally, encouraged Armenian workers to join local Communist or Workers parties in France 
and the United States (cf. Dallak‘yan 2004, 35-8; Djeredjian 2002, 192). The relations between HOK and Armenian 
Communists, however, need further scholarly attention.  
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with the Soviets and in theory were in the opposition to the Soviet regime, as it will be argued in 
the following sections, did practically nothing to oppose to the Soviet regime in Armenia. 
Instead, they celebrated the Sovietization of Armenia and joined efforts with the ideologically 
pro-Soviet groups against the Dashnaktsutyun, thereby indirectly supporting the perpetuation of 
the Soviet regime in Armenia. Therefore, the pro-Soviet Armenia faction, which the Ramkavars 







Political Rivalries and the Institutionalization of the Armenian Pro-Soviet and Anti-Soviet 
Factions in the Untied States and France 
 
Since the establishment of Armenian institutions in the diaspora, especially the churches and 
political parties, tensions and conflicts had become inseparable part of the dynamic processes 
within Armenian communities abroad. Differences in the social-economic and political contexts 
in the United States, France and Lebanon, events happening in the homeland or concerning the 
homeland, as well as the varying conditions under which the Armenian refugees arrived in large 
numbers to these countries, determined, in many ways, the peculiarities, nature and intensity of 
these conflicts in each of these host countries. Conflicts, usually between the Armenian Church 
and Armenian revolutionary political parties and/or among the political parties themselves, had 
different manifestations, intensity and repercussions in the United States, France and Lebanon.  
 
If in France and Lebanon Armenians formed significant communities only in the 1920s and 
1930s, in the United States the formation of Armenian communities had begun several decades 
earlier. Political competition, rivalries, disagreements and conflicts defined allegiances, 
affiliations and attitudes in the nascent Armenian communities in the United States long before 
the Sovietization of Armenia, the emergence of HOK branches in Armenian communities abroad 
and the Soviets’ anti-Dashnak propaganda. Relations between Armenian institutions in the 
United States in the interwar period, therefore, developed not only in response to events 
happening thousands of miles away in the homeland, France, or the Middle East, but also as 
reflections of unique continuities shaped within the Armenian-American context. This section 
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will start by addressing the Armenian-American institutional context and its continuities prior to 
WWI. It will then proceed to the examination of events, which led to the formation of mutually 
exclusive orientations both in the United States and France.  
 
 
Armenian Political Factions in the Untied States (1880s to 1910s) 
 
By WWI, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation or the Dashnaktsutyun had become the largest 
Armenian political party in the United States. Between 1903 and 1914, as Mirak (1983, 241-2) 
observes, the number of local chapters of the Dashnaktsutyun increased from 36 to 77 and the 
number of members increased from 1,005 to 1,728. The other parties, like the Reformed 
Hnchakyans or the Sahmanadir Ramkavars, hardly equaled the numbers of the Dashnak party in 
the United States.158 The coordination of activities between the local branches, regional central 
committees and the global central executive bodies of the Armenian political parties were made 
through the field workers (gortsich‘) and through various circulating party organs (cf. Mirak 
1983, 243). The first Dashnak and Reformed Hnchakyan chapters in the United States appeared 
in the mid-1890s, and aimed at raising money in support of party activities in the Ottoman 
Empire.  
 
In order to propagate the Armenian cause, to organize fund raising, and to have access to larger 
audiences, the revolutionary parties founded periodicals, and took a close interest in being 
represented on parish and communal councils. The first party papers were Tzayn Haireniats 
                                                
158 According to the statistics provided by Mirak (1983, 242), the Hnchakyans had about 400-500 members, while 
the Reformed Hnchakyans, many of whom joined the Sahmanadir Ramkavar party in 1908, were estimated to have 
around 1,000 followers. 
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(Voice of the Homeland) and Hairenik (Homeland/Fatherland), founded by the Reformed 
Hnchakyans and the Dashnaks respectively.  Both were founded in New York in 1899, but soon 
moved to the Boston region. Tzayn Hayreniats lasted only until 1907. It ceased publication 
following the schism within the ranks of the party. The two branches, after the schism, 
established their own newspapers – Azk (in Boston) and Bahag (in Providence) (Mirak 1983, 
251). Hairenik, on the other hand, continued and soon became the most prominent Armenian 
language periodical in New England. The third newspaper was Gotchnag (Church Bell), founded 
in 1900 in Boston. It was sponsored by Evangelical Armenian ministers with no political 
affiliation (Tootikian 2005, 15). Gotchnag served as a neutral alternative to the nationalist 
propaganda of Tzayn Haireniats and Hairenik. It encouraged the Americanization of Armenians, 
educated the readers about “American citizenship obligations, American history and the virtues 
of republicanism”  (Mirak 1983, 249-50). In 1903, the Social Democrat Hnchakyans also 
founded their newspaper Eritasard Hayastan (cf. Hisnameak 1953, 5; Federal Writers 1937, 81). 
In Fresno, California, which also hosted a significant Armenian community, the Dashnaktsutyun 
was the first to establish its paper Asbarez (Arena) in 1908.159 The Ramkavars did not have any 
official organ in California until the mid-1920s, but Nor Kyank was considered to express their 
views. Nor Kyank was founded by Haigag Eginian (Haykak Ekinian) in 1915, the Reformed 
Hnchakyan sympathizer in 1914, and after his death Nor Kyank was taken over by the 
Ramkavars (Kooshian 2002, 138-39, Babloyan 1986, 106).  
 
To rally the crowds around them, the political parties also founded clubs and societies, which 
served as places of socialization, discussion and lectures, as well as informal instruction in 
                                                
159 Asbarez was preceded by another periodical, Kaghakatsi (Citizen) (1902-1909), founded and published by 
Haigag Eghinian, who was sympathetic to the Reformed Hnchakyans, but the paper remained independent 
(Kooshian 2002, 137-38; Babloyan 1986, 56). 
 
 190 
Armenian history, language and culture. An eyewitness left the following account of one such 
Hnchakyan clubs in Boston in 1914: 
 By 1914 Hunchags maintained clubs in Watertown, Chelsea, Cambridge and elsewhere. Boston was the 
center. At the Tremont Street club, the rooms were open day and night, receiving members from outlying 
towns as well as Boston. The tables were crowded with comrades reading papers, books, disputing…. It 
was a kind of school. One evening each week there were lecture groups, at which the educated comrades 
spoke on scientific, political and social questions; college and university students were invited to speak on 
their specialties. … Later the group turned into an educational hearth, which assisted the illiterate to be 
educated; we promoted the zeal for self improvement (quoted in Mirak 1983, 253). 
 
 
The diversity of Armenian settlements in New England, California and elsewhere made the 
mobilization of large number of Armenians around a political cause a difficult task for the 
political parties. First of all, most of the Armenian immigrants, in the majority of cases former 
peasants, were illiterate and unable to read an Armenian language newspaper. Secondly, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, for some, Armenian was not their mother language: Western 
Armenian, the language of the newspapers, was not used by a significant number of Turkophone 
Armenian immigrants.   
 
The parties realized that the church had larger followers and in order to reach out to broader 
audiences, they had to penetrate the church and her flock. Back in the old country, the 
revolutionary parties had frequently taken the church as a platform to disseminate their 
revolutionary propaganda (cf. Ormanian [1912] 2001, 5323-326; Papazian 1934, 33-6). Some 
supporters and members of Armenian revolutionary parties carried the tension of hostilities that 




Soon after the establishment of an Armenian church in Worcester in 1891, the Hnchakyans160 
began disseminating revolutionary literature in the Untied States. The copies of P‘ortugalian’s 
Armenia from Marseille, the Hnchakyan organ, Hnchak, Raffi’s works and other revolutionary 
literature became widely available at the National Library housed in the church, despite the 
opposition of the Bp. Sarajian. His attempt to ban this literature raised tensions between his 
supporters and the Hnchakyans during a meeting on March 26, 1893 to such an extent, that the 
next day the Worcester Daily Telegram reported in bold headlines: “PRIEST WAS IN FIGHT,” 
“ARMENIANS SMASH EACH OTHER WITH TABLES AND CHAIRS” (Mirak 1983, 184; 
cf. Deranian 1987, 24-5; Kooshian 2002, 91-2; Minassian 2010, 73-4). The violent event led to 
the dissolution of the Armenian Academy161 and resignation of Bp. Sarajian in 1893. In order to 
avoid similar incidents, the board agreed to ban any political discussions at the church (Mirak 
1983, 184-85). The incident was the reflection of the strained relations between the Armenian 
Church and the Hnchakyans162. While the church and its leadership were opposed to the violence 
and the revolutionary tactics of the parties, the Hnchakyans and later the Dashnaks sought to use 
the church and its leaders to attain certain political ends. 
 
If the first stage of conflicts was marked by antagonism among the Armenian church leadership, 
their conservative supporters and the Armenian revolutionary parties in general, the conflicts 
following the foundation of the Armenian Diocese in 1898 gradually developed into antagonisms 
among political parties. After establishing the Diocese of Armenian Church in the United States 
                                                
160 The Hnchakyans were the first to organize branches in the United States. The first Hnchakyan convention in the 
US was in 1894 in Worcester. The Dashnak branches were forming at the same time, but their influence grew in 
parallel with the decline of the Hnchakyans after the split in 1896 (cf. Kooshian 2002, 130-32) 
161 The Academy was the organization, which initiated the founding of the first Armenian Apostolic church in 
Worcester (see the previous chapter). 
162 In 1890, the Hnchakyans organized a demonstration in Constantinople and forced the Armenian Patriarch to hand 
a petition to the Ottoman Sultan. They remained opposed to the patriarchate thereafter (Hovannisian 1997a, 218). 
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in 1898, Catholicos Khrimian appointed Bishop Sarajian as the first primate of the diocese. The 
Diocesan constitution was adopted in 1902, which regulated the relations of the diocese with 
parishes, church congregation and membership, as well as the election of the primate, the 
Diocesan delegates, and parish councils (cf. Mirak 1983, 186-87; Phillips 1986, 118). The 
primate’s appointment, rather than selection by the Diocesan Assembly from a list presented by 
the Catholicos, local assembly or both, and a number of other issues aroused the opposition of 
the political parties. Coming under intense pressure, Bp. Sarajian had to resign a second time in 
1906, now from the position of the Primate of the Armenian Diocese (Ashjian 1948, 23; 
Minassian 2010, 112-13; Mirak 1983, 187). The right to select a primate, vested in the Diocesan 
Assembly in the by-laws of the Diocese, made the parish councils very attractive to the 
Armenian political parties. Obviously, through the parish councils the political parties could 
exert their influence on the church and its leadership and through the church network on the 
community. 
 
The founding of the Armenian Constitutional Liberal party (Hay Sahmanadrakan Ramkavar, 
hereafter Ramkavar or the Ramkavar party) in the Ottoman Empire in 1908 found many 
supporters among the conservative Armenians established in the United States. In contrast to the 
Dashnaks or Hnchaks, the Ramkavar party was a non-revolutionary party. One of the wings of 
the Reformed Hnchakyans and their newspaper Azk joined the Ramkavars upon their 
establishment in the United States. Because of its liberal-democratic ideology, church affiliated 
conservative circles, as well as some well-off Armenian business circles associated with the 
AGBU, favored the Ramkavars over the revolutionary Hnchakyans and Dashnaks, and many 
even joined the party (cf. Ghazarian 1988, 21-2; Mirak 1983, 240, 256-57). The Dashnaks 
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wielded a good deal of influence by the 1910s, as did the Ramkavar party, as its supporters 
acquired influence by being elected to parish councils.  
 
Following the resignation of Bishop Sarajian, the seat of the primate remained vacant until 1910, 
when the bishop of Adana, Mushegh Seropian, came to America and was considered as a 
candidate for the position. Lacking the support of Ējmiatsin, because Adana was affiliated with 
the Catholicosate of Cilicia, Seropian hoped he could get the office of the Primate by allying 
with one of local Armenian factions in the elections to the Diocesan Assembly. Among the three 
Armenian political parties, the non-revolutionary Ramkavars presented a more preferable option 
for a conservative priest. As Seropian confessed in Azk in November 1910,  “If I were not a 
priest, I would join the [Ramkavar] party, I encourage them, I praise their direction, I speak at all 
their pulpits where I am invited” (quoted in Mirak 1983, 188). Seropian was elected primate in 
1911, which sparked another wave of tensions and conflicts between the pro-bishop Ramkavars 
and anti-bishop factions, including the Dashnaks. With the intervention of Ējmiatsin, Bishop 
Seropian had to resign several months later and order was restored at the Prelacy in 1913 with 
the election of Arsen Vehuni, the candidate supported by Ējmiatsin (Ashjian 1948, 25; Minassian 
2010, 155-57; Mirak 1983, 189).  
 
The outbreak of WWI provided new grounds for disagreement and tensions among the political 
parties and the church in the United States. At first, however, the common goal of supporting the 
Armenian cause in the Ottoman Empire brought all Armenian factions together. On November 
12, 1914, the four major Armenian political parties in America – The Hnchakyans (Social 
Democrat Hnchakyan Party), the Dashnaks (Armenian Revolutionary Federation), the Reformed 
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Hnchakyan Party and the Ramkavars (Armenian Constitutional Democratic Party) formed a 
coalition in Boston with the purpose of assisting the Armenians in organizing self-defense 
groups in the Ottoman Empire (Documents 1993, 4). The AGBU, which by then had developed a 
large network of chapters in the United States, was involved in humanitarian aid and charitable 
activities in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere163 (Mirak 1983, 177; Melk‘onyan 2005, 147-
150).   
 
Seeking to unite all these efforts, the Diocesan Assembly of November 26-27, 1914 entrusted the 
Primate of the Armenian church to “officially take upon himself the task of providing moral and 
financial assistance to Armenia” and with the help of the Plenipotentiary Committee “secure the 
cooperation of the Inter-party Committee of Boston” and the AGBU (Documents 1993, 6). After 
meeting with the representatives of the parties, the Diocesan Plenipotentiary committee was able 
to form the American Union for the Defense of [Armenian – V.S.] National Interests [Azgayin 
shaheru pashtpanut‘yan Amerikayi handznakhumb] in 1914. The AGBU and the Armenian 
Evangelical Church also joined the National Defense Union, and Primate Arsen Vehuni became 
the President of the Union (Documents 1993, 7).  
 
The Union did not last long and was dissolved in 1917 due to internal tensions and 
disagreements. The Dashnaks insisted that 50% of the raised funds should go to Tiflis in 
Transcaucasia for the organization of the Armenian volunteer corps in the Russian Empire. The 
Dashnak proposal was rejected and the party withdrew from the Union. The rivalry and 
opposition of Armenian political parties, stemming from different policies pursued toward the 
                                                
163 The first AGBU chapter was established in Boston in 1908. In the course of next five years, by 1913, the 
organization had already established 54 chapters in the United States with the support of the Protestant Armenian 
clergy. The total members of the AGBU in 1913 were about 2,400 (Melk‘onyan 2005, 147-50). 
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Ottoman Empire, were actively acquiring new dimensions in the United States. The AGBU was 
not spared from criticism either. The Dashnak papers of the time accused all members of the 
AGBU for being affiliated with the Ramkavar party (Documents 1947, 9-10). Hairenik even 
charged the AGBU as “parasites … negligent in their calling … inefficient … the pawn of 
bureaucrats … a juggler of figures” (quoted in Mirak 1983, 178). Because of their antagonism to 
the AGBU in the Untied States, the Dashnaks had formed their own charitable organization, the 
Armenian Red Cross (Hay Karmir Khach‘) in 1910 in New York. The organization was entirely 
represented by women and aimed at providing aid and relief to needy families in wartime, and 
supporting various Armenian initiatives, events, projects in peacetime (Mirak 1983, 178; 
Sonentz-Papazian 2010, xi, 3-4).  
 
Before the Sovietizaiton of Armenia in 1921 and the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, antagonisms 
and alliances of the parties with the Diocese of Armenian Church in the Untied States, thus, 
fluctuated, reflecting events taking place thousands of miles away. In 1917, at the initiative of the 
Armenian National Delegation led by Boghos Nubar, the Armenian political parties formed the 
Armenian National Union of Egypt. Nubar had been able to negotiate with the European powers 
in Paris the creation of an Armenian legion as part of the Eastern Legion to fight against the 
Turks in Palestine. The Armenian National Union of Egypt sent three representatives to the 
United States – Step‘an Sabah-Gulian (Hnchak), Artavazd Hanemian (Dashnak) and Mihran 
Damadian (Mihran Tamatian) (Ramkavar) in order to restore unity among the Armenian-
Americans, as well as to solicit their support for the initiative of the Armenian National 
Delegation  (Djizmedjian 1930, 344-46). The efforts of the representatives proved fruitful, as 
once again all four political parties, the Diocese of the Armenian Church, the Armenian 
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Evangelical Church and the AGBU came together to form the Armenian National Union of 
America in March 1917. The Union recruited 1172 volunteers for the Armenian Legion in 1917 
(Djizmedjian 1930, 353). Yet the rapidly changing wartime political conditions in the Old 
Country, the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917 and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 
1918 once again sparked disagreements and frictions that led to the eventual dissolution of the 
Union. Armenian factions in the United States, thus, entered the interwar period with the 
experience of some cooperation but most often of tensions and conflicts, which intensified in the 
following decades.  
 
 
The Republic of Armenia and Armenian Political Factions in the United States 
 
Having consolidated its hold over the independent Republic of Armenia by the late 1918, the 
Dashnaktsutyun gradually developed a self-perception as the only legitimate power to represent 
the Armenians. In the declaration of May 28, 1919, the de facto Dashnak dominated government 
of the Republic of Armenia declared itself as the government of the aspired “United Armenia.” 
In addition, in the eyes of the European powers, the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, 
headed by Avetis Aharonian, became a more legitimate representative of the Armenians, than the 
Armenian National Delegation, appointed by the Catholicos of Armenians in 1912 and led by 
Boghos Nubar. The National Delegation could not tolerate another Armenian delegation headed 
by some “unknown people from Erevan” and was reluctant even to recognize the Republic as 
that of “Armenia.” In Boghos Nubar’s imagination Armenia was much larger and also 
encompassed the lands of the Ottoman Armenia and Cilicia (see chapter 1). The declaration by 
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the Dashnaktsutyun in Armenia made on May 28, 1919, and the disagreements between the two 
delegations in Paris translated into renewed disagreements and conflicts between the Ramkavars 
and the Dashnaks in the United States. The Dashnaktsutyun demanded that the Armenian-
American National Union recognize the government in Yerevan as the legitimate government of 
United Armenia. The Union, created at the initiative of the Armenian National Delegation and 
dominated by the Ramkavars, could not agree to such demands. Unable to achieve their goals, 
the Dashnak representatives withdrew from the Union. The Hnchakyans had withdrawn earlier, 
after they had realized that their small representation could not affect the decisions of the 
Armenian National Union (Djizmedjian 1930, 363; 390-1).  
 
After quitting the Union, the Dashnaktsutyun attempted to regain control over it by controlling 
the Diocese and its representatives on the Armenian National Union of America (cf. ibid., 364). 
Following the deposition of Fr. Vehuni in 1917 by the Diocesan Assembly, Bp. Shahe Kasbarian 
(Shahe Gasparian), with the approval of the Catholicos of Ējmiatsin became the Locum Tenens. 
Fr. Vehuni, the incumbent, refused to resign, and was supported by the Dashnaktsutyun. On 
October 20, 1918, in a separate Assembly in Providence, Vehuni was elected Primate of the 
Armenian Diocese, causing a split from the Diocese in Worcester. After having gained control 
over the Diocese based in Providence, the Dashnaktsutyun elected three representatives to the 
Armenian National Union, hoping thus to break the Ramkavar majority therein. The Dashnak 
representatives, however, were rejected by the Union as illegitimate (Ashjian 1948, 31; 




In Los Angeles, where the Dashnaktsutyun was stronger, the incipient Armenian community 
experienced a similar rift in the elections to the Holy Cross Church board in 1919. As a result of 
fraudulent elections, the previously Ramkavar-dominated board came under the domination of 
the Dashnaks, who attempted to separate this church from Worcester Diocese and join the 
Dashnak-controlled Diocese in Providence (cf. Kooshian 1987, 93; 2002, 117-18; 138-39). In a 
letter addressed to Bp. Shahe Kasbarian, the Dashnak board of the church accused the Primate of 
turning “into an agent of a political faction” and of favoring the Union. Hence, the Dashnaks 
refused to recognize him as “the religious leader of [Armenians in] America” (quoted Kooshian 
2002, 117).  
 
The church schism was resolved only in 1920 with the intervention of Catholicos Gevorg V 
Surenyants (1847-1930). His Plenipotentiary, Archbishop Khoren Muradbekian, arrived from 
Ējmiatsin to reconcile the factions and restore the unity of the Armenian Church in America. The 
election of Archbishop Tirayr Ter Hovhannesian as the new Primate and the withdrawal of the 
Church from Armenian National Union brought the factions together and put an end to the 
schism in the church (Achjian 1948, 31; Documents 1993, 12-8; Djizmedjian 1930, 364-65; 
Minassian 2010, 205). The unity of the church did not last long, as once again, the rapidly 
changing conditions in Armenia and Europe thousands of miles away made the Armenian 






The Sovietization of Armenia, Formation of HOKs and the Crystallization of the pro- and anti-
Soviet attitudes in the United States and France 
 
Accusations and recriminations between the Dashnak and the Ramkavar sponsored newspapers 
flamed up anew as the news of the 11th Red Army marching into Armenia reached the shores of 
the United States (Kooshian 2002, 306-309). The response of the Dashnak California chapter to 
the Sovietization of Armenia was calm. On December 10, 1920, Asbarez wrote: 
Yesterday we stood at the side of the Armenian state. Today we are at the side of the Armenian 
government. It doesn’t matter if that government is Soviet or non-Soviet. And with the appearance of 
Soviet Armenia we have the hope that our nation’s desires will be attained more than we were able to 
achieve attached to European imperialism (quoted in Kooshian 2002, 305). 
 
As elsewhere, anti-Soviet attitudes among the Dashnaks in the United States crystallized 
gradually, through internal discords in the 1920s. Similar to France, many American Dashnaks, 
as Kooshian (2002, 313-15) argued, were critical of the leadership and their anti-Bolshevik 
stand. The anti-Bolshevik (Soviet) attitudes of the Armenian-American Dashnaks took shape 
under the influence of the party’s official anti-Soviet course adopted by the Tenth World 
Congress (November 1924 – January 1925) and the leadership who sought to implement the 
decision, but very significantly also in the relations with HOK branches in the United States. 
 
The first HOK branches in the United States appeared in 1922. The Hnchakyans greatly 
contributed to the founding of HOK branches in the United States following the visit of the 
representatives of Soviet Armenia, Grigor Vardanyan and Artashes Karinyan. Grigor Vardanyan 
was a former Hnchakyan, who encouraged the local Hnchakyans to support the creation of HOK 
branches (Kitur 1962: 499). Despite the decree of the Hnchakyan Executive Committee of 
America, which instructed the Hnchakyan branches to “cooperate with the Committee for Aid to 
 
 200 
the Homeland [sic]” (Kitur 1962, 499), Vardanyan personally met with the Hnchakyan branches 
in New England and New York to ensure cooperation with Soviet Armenia. Meanwhile, he 
urged the Hnchakyans to join the Communist party in the United States (Djeredjian 2002, 192). 
“Now that the short and long term goals of the Hnchakyan party have been realized by [the 
establishment of] Soviet Armenia,” Vardanyan argued, “there is no longer a need for the Social-
Democrat Hnchakyan Party” (quoted in Kitur 1962, 500).  
 
In 1925, after the momentous HOK plenum, which redefined its mission abroad,164 the 
government of Soviet Armenia sent a new delegation abroad to promote the activities and 
facilitate the formation of new branches of HOK and the (Soviet) Armenian Red Cross.165 The 
three members of the delegation, Karen Mik‘ayelyan, Grigor Vardanyan and Dr. Spandarat 
Kamsarakan, the Red Cross representative, left Armenia on November 1925 and returned in 
December 1926 (Melik‘set‘yan 1958, 39). One of the first destinations on their itinerary was 
Paris, where the fate of the Armenian people had been discussed at the Paris Peace Conference 
six years earlier, where the headquarters of the twin Armenian delegations were located, and 
where some of the most prominent leaders of the Armenian organizations had clustered from the 
early 1920s. The HOK delegation spent a few weeks in France (Vardanyan 1984, 85-6). The 
mission was quite effective, as during the visit the delegation was able to establish three HOK 
branches in Paris and other branches in Lyon, Vienne, Sent-Étienne, Valence, Marseille, Nice, 
                                                
164 As the previous section discussed, HOK thereafter became an agency of spreading Soviet propaganda abroad. 
165 For a while, there were two Armenian Red Cross organizations: one was founded by the Dashnaks in 1910 and 
the other by the representatives of Soviet Armenia in the mid-1920s. The Dashnak sponsored Armenian Red Cross 
was soon renamed to Armenian Relief Society [Hay ognut‘yan miut‘yun]. Similarly, in France, where the chapters 
of Soviet Armenian Red Cross began operating in the 1920s, the Dashnaktsutyun had to rename their Red Cross 
organization Croix Bleue des Arméniens de France (CBAF) in 1928. Quite often, however, Haratch referred to the 
Croix Bleue as the Fransahay karmir khach‘ [Armenian Red Cross of France] (see for example Simon Vrats‘ian’s 
article on the Armenian Red Cross in Haratch, December 23, 1933). 
 
 201 
and elsewhere. Among the Armenian working class in France, HOK branches quickly became 
very popular (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 112-14).  
 
The founding of HOKs created tensions and conflicts within the French-Armenian community, 
especially between the proponents and supporters of HOK and the anti-Bolshevik Dashnaks. 
Since its founding in August 1925, Haratch published a number of articles, revealing these 
tensions, disagreements and often violent conflicts between the pro-communist HOK 
sympathizers and the Dashnak rank and file. Initially, Shavarsh Missakian, the Dashnak Bureau 
member and the editor of Haratch, occasionally published open-minded articles about HOK. In 
November 22 and December 6, 1925, Haratch even published an extensive interview with Karen 
Mik‘ayelyan, and included another extensive coverage of the report of the HOK representatives, 
elaborating in detail the activities of HOK in Soviet Armenia. Gradually, however, Haratch took 
an intensely anti-HOK stand, after Missakian realized that HOK was not a politically neutral 
organization and it pursued Soviet policies abroad. Article 4 of the HOK program, quoted by 
Missakian in his December 6, 1925, editorial, read: “…All those, who do not have a negative 
attitude against Armenia can become HOK members.” It was interpreted as an explicit invitation 
for struggle against HOK. In effect, HOK actively discriminated against the sympathizers and 
affiliates of the Dashnaktsutyun, fearing their alleged “anti-revolutionary” and “anti-Bolshevik” 
connections. The antagonism between HOK and the Dashnaks intensified after 1926 and 
escalated into occasional fistfights, violence and even bloodshed. Haratch reported about an 
incident on May 5, 1926 in Lyon, where a clash broke out between the “red bastards” (pro-
Soviets) and those who attended the talk of Avetis Aharonian, the president of the Delegation of 
the Republic of Armenia. The pro-Soviet propagandists accused Aharonian of describing the 
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“patriotic calls of HOK representatives as howls” and wanted to disrupt his public address. The 
conflict ended with one of the demonstrators shot to death. Similar incidents happened later in 
Valance, Grenoble, Paris and elsewhere (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 126). Both factions effectively 
utilized the social-political conditions of France and Europe, where international workers’ 
movements and exploitation at workplaces encouraged workers to join socialist and communist 
organizations, all the while the capitalist and national-socialist regimes resisted and repudiated 
the workers’ movements and the spread of communism.  
 
In 1926, the HOK delegation arrived in the United States. As in France, the delegation began 
disseminating pro-Soviet Armenia propaganda in various Armenian communities in the United 
States. The propaganda materials included a documentary entitled Soviet Armenia and other 
materials, which promoted the image of Armenia as a “Worker’s Paradise” (Kooshian 2002, 
331). The Delegation arrived in Fresno in July and met with the community at the Fresno Civic 
Auditorium on July 23, 1926.  The HOK chapter in Fresno had been formed several months ago 
and hosted these events. While the “enemies of Soviet Armenia,” i.e. the Dashnaks, were not 
expected to attend the meeting, the local clergy, both Apostolic and Protestant, were invited to 
share the platform with the delegates from Soviet Armenia. HOK leaders perfectly realized that 
the community in the diaspora would be interested not in Socialism, but in the rebuilding of 
Armenia, as well as the preservation of the Armenian language and churches. Therefore, they 
much emphasized and elaborated on those topics through their propaganda materials. When the 
documentary Soviet Armenia began with the first Armenian letters appearing on the screen, the 
public clapped and shouted in excitement. Karen Mik‘ayelian narrated the film for the audience: 
“Here is Erevan, here are the streets of the city, the university, the library, the statues of Freedom 
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and Gamar Katipa;166 and the President of Armenia, Mr. [Sargis] Hambardzumyan. Happy 
people, smiling, working!” Then the documentary moved from Yerevan to Leninakan, 
Vagharshapat (Ējmiatsin), to the ruins of the medieval cathedral of Zvart‘snots‘. Mik‘ayelyan 
continued narrating: “…see Khach‘ik Vardapet [Dadian], see the pitiable former conditions of 
our orphans, see the opening of the Shirak Canal, see the happy dances!” (quoted in Kooshian 
2002, 334-35). The narration was national, both in form and content: the emphasis on Yerevan, 
Leninakan, Vagharshapat (Ējmiatsin),	  Zvart‘nots‘, the mentioning of Khach‘ik Vardapet, Gamar 
Katipa, was all about Armenia and Armenian content. Socialist content was only implied – all 
this was achieved under the Bolshevik rule. The Bolsheviks were reconstructing Yerevan and 
Leninakan and brought happiness to the people. As Mik‘ayelyan reported to the HOK Central 
Board on their missions, the documentary created much excitement among the Armenian 
audiences wherever it was screened (Vardanyan 1984, 81; 85). Some local Armenian newspapers 
considered the Bolsheviks just “as patriotic… and just as cultivated as the Armenians of 
California” (quoted in Kooshian 2002, 336). Even the radically critical Dashnak organ Asbarez 
reported that the documentary made a good impression on “homesick” Armenians (Kooshian 
2002, 342). As in Fresno, so throughout the US, the mission of the HOK delegation was 
successful. Upon their return from the States, Karen Mik‘ayelyan’s final report detailed that 
HOK had established 45 branches and the Armenian Red Cross had founded 61 branches in 
various cities of the United States. The next country to host a large number of HOK branches at 
that stage, was France with 32 chapters (Vardanyan 1984, 86). 
 
                                                




The exclusion of Dashnak sympathizers and party members from the HOK and Soviet Armenia-
related activities created much resentment among the followers of the party. On various 
occasions, the party condemned the Bolsheviks and “their fellow-traveling bourgeois foreign 
elements” for using HOK to neutralize and isolate the Dashnaktsutyun (cf. Kooshian 2002, 332). 
Following the earthquake in Leninakan in October 1926, Asbarez condemned the Bolsheviks on 
December 31 for accepting aid from their class enemy, the bourgeois AGBU and liberal 
Ramkavars, but rejecting it from the Dashnaks. Asbarez commented that the enmity towards the 
Bolsheviks was by no means directed against the Armenian people in Soviet Armenia. The 
Dashnak criticism expressed in their press had certain objective grounds. As Karen 
Mik‘ayelyan’s reports also confirm, during their global tour, the HOK delegation did not have 
any intention to damage relations with such wealthy Armenians, as Boghos Nubar or other 
members of the AGBU. By establishing friendly relations with the AGBU notables, the HOK 
leaders anticipated to secure all their wealth and funds for Soviet Armenia.167  
 
In parallel to the Dashnak exclusion from HOK, the Dashnak press in New England began 
actively propagating an anti-Soviet orientation among its readership. To reinforce the revised 
ideological and policy course of the party in the United States, Reuben Darbinian, the former 
                                                
167 Friendly relations with the AGBU, however, did not last long. Upon the return of the HOK delegation, when the 
collected donations and pledges seemed to be much less than they had anticipated, Karen Mik‘ayelyan published a 
book, entitled Hay zhoghovrdakan harstut‘yunnerě artasahmanum [Armenian National Wealth Abroad] in 1928. 
The book targeted first of all the AGBU, accusing it of unwillingness to invest all its resources in Soviet Armenia 
and for “hiding” the national wealth of the Armenians (Melik‘set‘yan 1959, 40). The alienation of the AGBU 
continued in the following years and culminated after a speech given by Aghasi Khanjian, the First Secretary of the 
Communist Party in Armenia (from 1930 to 1936). Khanjian accused the AGBU and its new president, Calouste 
Gulbenkian, for sponsoring the Dashnaks in their attempts to create an “Armenian home” in Syria, for the “anti-
Soviet imperialist intervention” (Melk‘onyan 2005, 223). Gulbenkian had assumed the AGBU leadership in 1930, 
after the death of Boghos Nubar. Following this incident, he resigned in 1932 (Melk‘onyan 2005, 225). While the 
AGBU continued contributing to various projects in Soviet Armenia and to the repatriation of Armenian refugees, 
the volume of aid significantly declined and the organization began sponsoring projects in the Middle East. The 
tightening of social and political space in Soviet Union during the Stalinist socialist offensive and the subsequent 
dissolution of the AGBU in Armenia in 1935 also contributed to the refocusing of the AGBU efforts entirely to 
diaspora until WWII. 
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Minister of Justice of the Republic of Armenia, moved to the United States after being expelled 
from Soviet Armenia in 1921. Darbinian had experienced persecution and imprisonment at the 
hands of the Bolsheviks and was a fierce anti-Bolshevik.  Almost immediately upon his arrival in 
the United States, Darbinian assumed the editorship of Hairenik Daily168 in 1921 (Federal 
Writers 1937: 76). In 1922, the Dashnaktsutyun chapter in the United States began publication of 
the literary-political journal Harenik Monthly with Darbinian as the editor in chief. In the 
inaugural editorial of Hairenik Monthly, Darbinian wrote that national independence and 
“political freedom had become … an existential issue” for the Armenians. He declared that the 
creation of an independent Armenian State was the ultimate purpose of the current generation 
and that Hairenik Monthly was to be devoted to this purpose. Following the mission declared by 
Darbinian, the monthly began actively publishing political essays by Darbinian and his 
colleagues Simon Vrats‘ian and Ruben Ter-Minasian. Darbinian’s Hay k‘aghak‘akan mtki 
degerumnerě [Wonderings of the Armenian Political Thought], Simon Vrats‘ian’s Hayastani 
Hanrapetut‘iwn [Republic of Armenia], Ejer motik ants‘yalits‘ [Pages from the Near Past], 
Ruben Ter-Minasian’s Hay heghapokhakani mě hishatakaraně [The Memoirs of an Armenian 
Revolutionary], as well as various other essays by such well known Dashnak figures as Armen 
Garo (Garegin Pastrmachian), the first ambassador of the Republic of Armenia to the United 
States; Avetis Aharonian and others. These essays served the purpose of justifying and forging 
the anti-Bolshevik stance of the Dashnaktsutyun and defining its future mission of liberating 
Armenia from the Bolshevik-Communist dictatorship. The articles in Hairenik Monthly were 
instilling anti-Bolshevism as an inseparable part of the Dashnak identity.  
 
                                                
168 Hairenik weekly was founded in 1899, became a daily in December 1915 and continued to be the official organ 




Two processes, thus, institutionalized the anti-Bolshevik attitude of the Dashnaktsutyun and 
solidified its ranks vis-à-vis the pro-Bolshevik faction in the United States and France: the top-
down implementation of the anti-Soviet course adopted at the Vienna Conference in 1923 and 
the Tenth World Congress (1924-1925), which often included coercion and expulsions,169 and 
the exclusion of party members and sympathizers from HOK activities. The parallel processes 
eventually were channeling the Dashnak leadership, the rank and file and sympathizers toward 
the same direction of forming a solid anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet stand in the course of the 
1920s and 1930s. Compared to France, the internal crisis of the Dashnaktsutyun in the United 
States, following the expulsion of the Dashnak leaders from Soviet Armenia, was apparently 
resolved relatively easier. By 1920, the Dashnaktsutyun was an established party in the United 
States with a considerable number of followers. The longer established the Dashnaktsutyun with 
stronger roots as an Armenian-American community organization in the United States, was quite 
different from the emerging Dashnak chapters throughout France and elsewhere. The 
independence of Armenia reinforced the self-perception of the Dashnaktsutyun in the Untied 
States as the only legitimate power to represent the Armenians. The Sovietization of Armenia 
and the expulsion of the Dashnak leaders from Soviet Armenia generated some dissatisfaction 
among the party ranks and even some dissenters, but the party ranks in the US remained coherent 
compared to the internal conflicts in France (cf. Djizmedjian 1930, 512-13). The internal 
coherence of the Dashnaktsutyun in the US was provided by already institutionalized tensions 
and conflicts with their opponents (particularly the Ramkavars), which also had a specifically 
American context. In the past decade, since 1914, whatever had happened elsewhere, for the 
                                                
169 The adoption of anti-Soviet stand was, however, not a rejection of Soviet Armenia. Initially, the Dashnaktsutyun, 
as argued above, was even supportive of the programs, repatriation and rebuilding of neighborhoods for Armenian 
refugees in Soviet Armenia as reported in the decisions of the Tenth and Elevenths World Congresses (cf. 
Shahgaldian 1979, 104-106). 
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Dashnaks on the American soil it had boiled down to a struggle against the Ramkavars and 
church leaders so as to gain full control over the Armenian Diocese and Armenian churchgoers.  
 
 
Political Polarization, Church Conflict and the Schism of the Armenian Community in the United 
States 
 
The reluctance of the United States to recognize the Soviet Union until 1933 enhanced the 
Dashnaks’ self-perception as the only legitimate political party to represent the Armenians. The 
party retained the symbolism of the 1918-1920 Republic of Armenia and continued celebrating 
the anniversary of the Independence of the Republic of Armenia on May 28 annually. The 
immigrant Armenians, who were still hesitant about accepting Soviet Armenia as ‘the 
homeland,’ were more inclined to sympathize with the Dashnaktsutyun (cf. Tölölyan 1991a, 
181-82). The supporters of Soviet Armenia, allied with the HOK branches, on the other hand, 
celebrated November 29, the day of the Sovietization of Armenia, as the date of the “real” rebirth 
of Armenia. The differentiation of national celebrations, symbolism, partisan and organizational 
affiliations further polarized the community. One of the major symbols distinguishing the 
Dashnaks from their opponents in their public events was the Tricolor flag of the Republic of 
Armenia. All the events organized by the Dashnaks had the Armenian Tricolor, while their more 
fragmented pro-Soviet opponents did not use the old flag of the Republic. For the Dashnaks, the 
use of the Tricolor became a symbolic act expressing their protest and rejection of the Soviet 
government in Armenia. For the Dashnak opponents the flag of the Republic belonged to the 
past; it was increasingly losing its initial meaning and becoming solely the symbol of the 
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Dashnaktsutyun.170 As long as events were scheduled and organized on different days or at 
different times, disagreements and conflicts did not produce any clashes and violence. But during 
the commonly celebrated events, church holidays, or during parish council elections, clashes 
often were unavoidable. Armenian churches and the Diocese in the United States provided a 
common space where confrontations between representatives of different factions would 
occasionally occur.   
 
Many Armenian church councils in the US were dominated by Ramkavar/AGBU or Dashnak 
members and sympathizers.171 The fact that the ecclesiastical head of the Armenian diocese was 
under the Soviet rule in Ējmiatsin was a matter of concern first of all for the anti-Soviet 
Dashnaks. The party leadership, however, did not take any action against the incumbent Primate, 
Archbishop Tirayr Ter Hovhannesian. The Primate was elected several months before the 
Sovietization of Armenia, in July 1920, and remained an explicit Dashnak sympathizer. The 
Dashnak opponents condemned the Primate for permitting the celebrations of May 28 inside 
church premises (Documents 1993, 18; Minassian 2010, 203). The presence of many Dashnak 
members in church councils and the political activity of the Armenian churches in the United 
States were brought to the attention of the Catholicos in Ējmiatsin as well. Under pressure from 
Ējmiatsin and local community, Archbishop Ter-Hovhannesian resigned in 1928. On June 26, 
1929, in the name of the Catholicos, the Supreme Spiritual Council of the Holy See of Ējmiatsin 
sent the following circular to all Armenian Church Primates: 
                                                
170 Some fierce critics of the Dashnaktsutyun went as far as to call the Tricolor “a piece of rag not deserving any 
honor” (cf. Dallak‘yan 1999, 276; Varzhabedian 1981a, 77). 
171 The Soviet policies officially separated the church from the state in 1922, and although not officially, 
significantly discouraged and suppressed the influence of Ējmiatsin both within Soviet Armenia and in the parishes 
abroad (Matossian 1962, 90-95; Minassian 2010, 200-203). Following this policy, HOK branches in the diaspora, in 
general, refrained from involving in parish board, councils and church affairs. 
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From the day of its establishment until now, Holy Etchmiadzin, and the Armenian Church, has throughout 
its history kept away from factional and political strife, realizing that the Church is the spiritual parent of 
all Armenian faithful and, at times of political difficulties, it has a moral obligation to be the loyal guardian 
of their interests. 
Etchmiadzin still maintains the same policy today and conducts itself according to the same principle, but, 
 Considering that there are partisans, particularly Tashnags, who are trying to turn the Church and 
Church assemblies into forums for political propaganda and making anti-Soviet speeches there – for 
example, according to information that has reached us, such incidents have taken place in certain places in 
the diaspora – and that our representatives, the clergy, have not prohibited the delivery of such speeches; 
 Also considering that there are individuals and groups who have intentionally spread, and are 
spreading, wicked slanders about Etchmiadzin for the sake of their personal or organizational monetary 
interests;  
 The Holy See hereby declares that [the Church] is far from adhering to any party nor will it protect 
the interest of any faction but … she states her loyalty and friendship towards the Soviet regime and 
advises all the Diocesan Primates as well as the religious jurisdictions and the clergy subject to them to be 
likewise loyal and friendly towards the Soviet regime. Having as a guide the principle of division of church 
and state, they are asked not to allow speeches against the state or to permit the exploitation of Church 
functions and institutions for anti-Soviet propaganda. The Armenian faithful must be advised to follow the 
same course. It should be made known that the opposite course is and will hereafter be disapproved and 
subject to censure (Documents 1993, 20-21). 
 
Gotchnag published this circular on August 31, 1929. The circular explicitly instructed the 
Primates not to favor especially the Dashnaks, who were “trying to turn the Church and Church 
assemblies into forums for political propaganda and making anti-Soviet speeches;”172 called 
them to be loyal to the Soviet government in Armenia and implicitly rebuked the former Primate, 
Tirayr Ter Hovhannesian, for having permitted “the exploitation of Church functions and 
institutions.”  The next Primate, Archbishop Ghevond Tourian (Ghevond Durian),173 elected at 
the Diocesan Assembly in May, 1931, immediately embarked on implementing the requirements 
of the Supreme Spiritual Council of Ējmiatsin. Church reforms initiated by Abp. Tourian marked 
a certain retreat from his predecessor’s stand. In April 1932, he banned all clergy under his 
jurisdiction from participating in any commemoration events on April 24 outside of the church. 
The note was very brief, but very strict: 
                                                
172 The circular prompted criticism from the Dashnaks targeting the Holy See of Ējmiatsin. They labeled the clergy 
and their adherents as “Communist agents.” After Catholicos Gevorg V passed away in 1930, the Dashnak circles 
reportedly entertained the possibility of transferring the Holy See from Ējmiatsin out of Soviet Armenia (cf. 
Minassian 2010, 248-49). 
173 Abp. Tourian was the former pastor of the Armenian Church in Manchester (Documents 1993, 18-19; Minassian 
2010, 255, 267). 
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According to latest Prelacy order, no clergy is allowed to preside or participate at any mourning ceremonies 
outside of the Church. 
Bishop Tourian (Documents 1993, 23) 
 
The telegram was publicized by the former Primate, Tirayr Ter Hovhannesian, and became a 
matter of heated discussions at the Diocesan Assembly in January 1933 (Achjian 1948, 39-40). 
The restrictive policies of Tourian were first of all directed against the Dashnaktsutyun. The 
party however, did not have much resource to respond. After losing control over the diocese, 
with the resignation of Ter Hovhannesian in 1928, the Dashnaktsutyun also lost majority support 
within the Diocesan Assembly. During the January Assembly, the Dashnaktsutyun even 
attempted to achieve a vote of non-confidence and remove the Primate from office with no 
success (Documents 1993, 24).  
 
Tensions escalated further in the summer of the same year, during Chicago’s Century of 
Progress International Exposition World’s Fair.174 Along with other American citizens of 
different ethnic origins, Armenians were also invited to participate at the celebrations and the 
fair. Primate Tourian was invited to preside over the Armenian Day festivities on July 1, 1933. 
The organizing committee of the Armenian Day had a hard time deciding whether or not the 
Tricolor flag of Armenia should be used during the celebrations. Eventually, in order to avoid 
any potential conflict, the committee decided that no Armenian flag would be displayed. When 
the day arrived, it turned out that the stage on which Archbishop Tourian was invited to give his 
opening address, was decorated with an Armenian tricolor flag. Shortly before the address, 
several women and children lined up at each side of the stage with Armenian tricolors flags in 
their hands. The Primate refused to take the stage until the flags were removed. As the 
                                                
174 The World’s Fair was organized to celebrate the centennial of the founding of Chicago. 
 
 211 
announcement of the organizing committee reported later, the attempt to remove the Armenian 
flag aroused much discontent, which turned into fistfights, and was brought under control only 
after police intervened. The police gathered the flags and arrested some of the trouble makers 
(ibid., 28-29). Following the incident, the Dashnak condemnation of the Primate became more 
and more aggressive and fierce. Hairenik called the Primate “imposer, fraud and traitor” and 
urged the people to “teach him a lesson” (ibid., 33; Minassian 2010, 279). On July 12, 1933, an 
editorial in Hairenik, entitled “An Undeserving Primate” demanded his impeachment: 
By his undesirable conduct in Chicago, Archbishop Tourian sentenced himself to moral death. The 
Armenians of America have no recourse but to banish him from his exalted office. The Armenian 
communities must consider it their national responsibility to morally censure this unworthy clergyman and 
must mobilize all legal avenues to impeach him (quoted in Minassian 2010, 279). 
 
The anti-Primate Dashnak faction saw the Diocesan Assembly that was to convene in New York 
in September 1933 as a perfect occasion to settle scores with the Primate.  
 
The Assembly scheduled to convene in the Saint Illuminator Church in New York had to be 
reconsidered because of the heated atmosphere between the pro- and anti-Primate factions and 
the presence of a large crowd in the church hall. In response to appeals made by some delegates, 
Archbishop Tourian had to instruct the delegates to change the site of the Assembly to Hotel 
Martinique in New York. The Dashnak affiliated delegates remained at the St. Illuminator 
Church and most anti-Dashnak delegates moved to Hotel Martinique. Archbishop Tourian was 
not participating in either of the Assemblies because of sickness. The results of the rival 
Diocesan Assemblies were quite predictable. While the assembly convened at Hotel Martinique 
“expressed its confidence in the Primate,” the other Assembly at the church, voted to depose the 
Primate. Both Assemblies sent their minutes to Ējmiatsin for approval (Documents 1993, 39-43). 
Ējmiatsin recognized the decision of the Assembly convened at Hotel Martinique, and 
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considered the Assembly convened at the church as illegitimate and unconstitutional. 
Furthermore, the Catholicos asked Archbishop Tourian to “summon a new Assembly at the 
proper time to meet under his presidency, and give the opportunity to the delegates to gather and 
come to an accord” (Documents 1933, 44). The Primate, however, did not have a chance to invite 
another Diocesan Assembly. On December 24, 1933, as Archbishop Tourian was processing to 
the altar through the single central aisle of the Holy Cross Church in uptown Manhattan, six men 
surrounded him between the fifth and sixth pews and stabbed him to death with a butcher’s knife 
(New York Times, December 25, 1933). Although the Dashank party denied any involvement in 
the assassination at the time, the arrested perpetrators were all members of the Dashnak party. 
Nine Dashnaks were convicted with two of them being sentenced to life imprisonment (Atamian 
1955, 369). The event was widely covered by the American press of the time. In most, the 
Dashnaktsutyun was attacked for being a “small terrorist clique endangering the American way 
of life” (Atamian 1955, 367).   
 
The murder deepened the implacable enmity between the pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet factions, 
which was now acquiring anti-Dashnak and pro-Dashnak coloring. HOK and its supporters even 
initiated the creation of a “United Front of Anti-Dashnaks.” Anti-Dashnak propaganda was 
spreading everywhere. The Dashnak opponents boycotted businesses owned by Dashnaks; 
business owners were called on to fire their Dashnak employees; several assassination attempts 
were made on some prominent Dashnaks, as well as on clergy supporting them (Atamian 1955, 
367-68; Minassian 2010, 308-309; 322). The church schism, which initially seemed to be 
reconcilable, had become irreconcilable after the assassination of Archbishop Tourian because of 
the intensifying enmity and mutual hatred among the factions. The excommunication of the 
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Dashnak-sympathizing clergy and the defrocking of two of them by Ējmiatsin exacerbated these 
disagreements and tensions. Attempts at reconciliation initiated by the Catholicos of Ējmiatsin 
and his Plenipotentiary Archbishop Karekin Hovsepian (Garegin Hovsep‘ian) in 1936 proved 
futile. Archbishop Hovsepian’s endeavors were challenged not only by the distrust of the 
Ramkavar and the Dashnak controlled church councils, but also by the pro-Communist groups.  
Armenian Communist Panvor accused Archbishop Hovsepian of attempting “under the auspices 
of the Armenian church … to make the two segments of the Armenian bourgeoisie – the 
Ramgavars and the Tashnags – sit at the round table and reconcile their differences by forming a 
united front against Soviet Armenia” (quoted in Minassian 2010, 335).  
 
Meanwhile, the separated clergy, supported by the Dashnak-controlled church councils, 
remained loyal to the Central Executive Committee formed at the Diocesan Assembly in 
September, 1933, and refused to recognize the Primate’s authority and Ējmiatsin as the 
administrative head of the Armenian church (Minassian 2010, 321-22). Even after the election of 
Karekin Hovsepian as the Primate of the Armenian Diocese in America in 1938 the dissident 
Dashnak-controlled Central Executive Committee refused to recognize his authority. Churches, 
where Dashnaks could secure majority in the parish councils, joined the dissident Central 








Repercussions of the Schism in France  
 
The murder of 1933 and the split of the Armenian Church in the United States had major 
repercussions not only for the Armenian-American community, but also for many other 
Armenian communities outside the United States. While reluctant to accept Dashnak complicity 
in the assassination, Shavarsh Missakian in his Haratch editorial on December 30 responded: 
“…even if Dashnak individuals had planned and implemented the assassination, as it is 
suspected by the police, the party cannot be held accountable for such a barbarity.” In the next 
day’s editorial (December 31, 1933) he continued accusing the Ramkavar opponents in 
committing what he labeled as “the crime of crimes:” “Archbishop Ghevond is first of all the 
victim of the stubborn blockheadedness and vile mobocracy of the Ramkavar party and other 
[parties] masked in different colors.” He went on to explain that Tourian became the enemy of 
the Dashnaktsutyun because the Ramkavars and his other supporters turned him into a “symbol 
of patriotism;” this clergyman, who insisted on bringing down the Armenian Tricolor [during the 
Chicago fair].  
 
While Missakian targeted the Ramkavars, HOK and the pro-Communist Armenians in France 
called on their followers to mobilize against Dashnak terror. In January 1934, the official organ 
of HOK connected the assassination of Archbishop Tourian with the earlier killings of HOK 
activists by the Dashanks and stressed the urgency of a “broad united struggle against Dashnak 
terrorism” (HOK monthly, January 1934, 5). Several months earlier, in September 1933, HOK 
had published a call to the diasporan Armenians, in which it had referred to a number of 
assassinations instigated by the Dashnaks from Beirut in the Middle East, to Athens in Greece, 
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Lyon and Grenoble in France, and the United States, declared of the formation of a Committee 
for the Defense of the Victims of Dashnak Terror and called on Armenians to join:  
Only under the huge wave of united popular anger will the Vrats‘ians and Jamalians hide in their dens and 
not disturb the peace and future of the diaspora Armenians by their adventurous political games (HOK 
monthly, Sept. 1933, p. 58-9). 
 
Violence by some individual Dashnaks, implicitly encouraged by the party leadership, generated 
significant opposition to the party and its leadership. If the Dashnaktsutyun could resist and even 
attain a greater degree of coherence from such confrontations in the Untied States, the party was 
not as successful in France. In the United States the Dashnaktsutyun had laid strong roots before 
WWI and had developed a certain degree of flexibility to respond to changing situations. In 
France, most of the Dashnak chapters were in the formative stage in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
evidence scattered in Haratch and Mardgotz suggests that the internal discord on the matter of 
Russian or Turkish orientation had found expression in various regions of France – Marseille, 
Lyon, Décines, Valence, and elsewhere.  
 
The French recognition of the Soviet Union in 1924 and the subsequent refusal by the French 
government to recognize nationalité 215eneration was another factor, which contributed to the 
relative weakening of the Dashnak position in France. If until the US recognition of the Soviet 
Union in November 1933, the Dashnaktsutyun could legitimately claim to represent the interests 
of the Armenian people as a government in exile in America, the decisions of the French 
government erased such grounds for Dashnak claims. Finally, the strength of the French 
Communist party in the 1930s also significantly challenged the authority of the Dashnaks. Some 
studies suggest that there was a strong relationship between immigration, the rising number of 
workers in France and the strengthening of the French Communist party before WWII (cf. 
Schain 2008, 45-46). If Armenian members of the French Communist party encouraged the 
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participation of Armenian workers in the strikes and demonstrations, the Dashnaktsutyun tried to 
keep them away from participating in local politics. Benefitting from the overall pro-communist 
atmosphere, the Armenian Communists organized public meetings for Armenian workers in 
Paris and elsewhere to explain the need to participate in local movements. In one of such putlic 
meetings, Missak Manoushian, a young Armenian Communist condemned the Dashnaks for 
“isolating Armenian workers from local working people” and thereby preventing them “to 
receive such an enormous civilizational education, which they could and they must acquire [by 
interacting with] local progressive people” (quoted in Drambyan 1979, 42). For large masses of 
Armenians, who had been employed in the French industries and factories, who had been facing 
everyday discrimination, exploitation and marginalization at workplaces, and who sought to 
integrate into French society and finally become eligible for the French citizenship, the message 
of the Armenian communists was much more appealing.  
 
The hardening economic crisis in France and the massive strikes in various regions augmented 
the ranks of the worker’s movements and leftist parties. After HOK was dissolved in Soviet 
Armenia at the height of the Stalinist purges in 1937, many previous HOK branches merged to 
form the Union populaire franco-arménienne (cf. Drambyan 1979; 43; Le Tallec 2001, 143). 
The name of the newly established association resembled the name of the French Front 
Populaire, the coalition of leftist parties, which had come to power in May 1936. The anti-Nazi 
French-Soviet pact of 1935 provided an added confidence to the Communists. Now working 
under more favorable conditions, the Communists often charged the Dashnaks as Fascists and 
provoked persecution of the party members by the French authorities. Despite the crisis, the 
Dashnaktsutyun preserved its chapters in Paris and in the suburbs. In Marseille Dashnaks 
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members even constituted the majority in some church councils and enjoyed the sympathy of 
Archbishop Balakian. The crisis, however, caused the Dashnak Bureau to move to Egypt in the 
late 1930s. Compared to France, social-political conditions and the strength of the 
Dashnaktsutyun in Cairo made Egypt more preferable and safe for the activities of the party  
(Ch‘ormisian 1975, 104).  
 
 
Beyond Political Factions and Schisms 
 
Dynamic processes and conflicts, which happened in the course of the 1920s and 30s in the 
United States and France, may create an impression that Armenians, regardless of the diversity 
of origins, dialects, customs and habits, were vigorously involved in the pro- and anti-Soviet 
factions. Yet, many Armenians, as described in the previous chapter, remained uninvolved in the 
partisan or even church activities. The emergence of the first English language Armenian 
newspapers in the United States – The Armenian Mirror in 1932 founded by the Ramkavars, and 
the Hairenik Weekly in 1934, founded by the Dashnaks, indicated that the second generation 
coming of age was not able to read Armenian and was hardly interested in Armenian matters. In 
order to recruit the youth in the 1930s both the Ramkavars and the Dashnaks founded their youth 
organizations – A.D.L. Juniors and Tseghakron175 respectively (cf. Federal Writers 1937, 60; 
Walker 1990, 355). The parties sought ways to integrate younger generations through their 
respective youth organizations, but in the assimilating contexts of the American and French 
societies the second generation had more incentives to disengage and distance themselves from 
                                                
175 Tseghakron movement was started by Garegin Nzhdeh in 1933 in Boston, who then travelled to many other 
communities in the US to rally the Armenian youth around the new movement (Panossian 2006, 301) 
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their Armenian roots. The inability of the Armenian Church to adjust to the needs of the 
Armenian flock in the United States on the other hand, made American churches more preferable 
for the second generation. In 1937, for example, in the project accomplished by Federal Writers, 
the authors concluded:  
In the matter of religion the American-born generation seems to have a preference for American 
institutions. Of recent years special efforts have been made to interest them in the Armenian Church but 
these efforts have met with only partial success. Even in such large centers as Boston, Watertown, and 
Worcester the percentage of the new generation in church congregations is very small (Federal Writers 
1937, 122). 
 
If amid internal conflicts, the Armenian institutions in the Unite States and France had to also 
struggle for reaching the diaspora-born generations, in more compact territories and under 
different social-political conditions, such as in Lebanon, they became instrumental in the shaping 









Political Rivalries and the Forging of a “Diasporic Nation” in Lebanon 
 
The institutionalization of Armenian political parties in Lebanon in the 1920s was accompanied 
by parallel efforts to be represented at local parish and community councils and to recruit 
followers from among the diverse groups of Armenians originating from different villages and 
towns of Western and Central Anatolia and Cilicia. Compared to France and the United States, 
with the absences of HOKs, until the 1930s, the pro- and anti-Soviet orientations were less 
defining in everyday relations of Armenian political parties in Lebanon. As a measure of 
precaution against the potential spread of anti-imperialist and pro-communist propaganda, the 
French mandatory administration prevented the formation of HOK chapters in the Middle East. 
In some cases HOK operated semi-legally or illegally, but could not exert as much influence 
over Armenian matters in Lebanon as in France and the United States176 (cf. Melik‘set‘yan 1959: 
45; Abrahamyan 1967: 385-86).  
 
The Armenian refugee settlements and camps in Lebanon represented a mosaic of compatriotic 
identities and affiliations, defined by linguistic and cultural, often mutually unintelligible 
particularities. Catholic, Evangelical and Armenian Apostolic churches were the only formal 
institutions connecting the diverse groups of Armenians through their networks. The French 
mandatory authorities recognized Dr. Baghdasar Melkonian, who was appointed by Boghos 
                                                
176 The Soviets still exerted some influence in Lebanon through the Lebanese Communist party, which was formed 
in 1924. Some Armenians were also very active in the Communist Party in Syria and Lebanon. The party, however, 
did not have much success under the French Mandate and was banned in 1939. After the Lebanese independence in 
1943, the ban was lifted and the Communists began participating in the Lebanese elections (cf. Colelo 2003, 147). 
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Nubar as the representative of the Central Committee for Armenian Refugees (former Armenian 
National Delegation) in Lebanon and the representative of Armenians. Melkonian was a 
respected professor at the Université Saint Joseph, and headed the Armenian National Union in 
Lebanon, then formally comprising the representatives of the Armenian denominations and 
political parties. The Union soon dissolved because of the rivalry of the Armenian political party 
chapters (Top‘uzyan 1986, 208). As elsewhere, upon its establishment in Lebanon, the 
Dashnaktsutyun sought ways to establish itself as the legitimate government of Armenians in 
Lebanon, and as elsewhere, conflicts between the nascent Armenian political party organizations 
began shaping the formation of the Lebanese Armenian community. 
 
While the Catholic Armenians did not allow the participation of laymen in the church affairs and 
the Protestant Armenians were cautious of political activists in churches, the 1863 Constitution 
of the Armenian millet, which regulated church and community affairs in the Ottoman Empire, 
established the involvement of laymen in the administrative matters of the Armenian Church and 
community. After settling in Lebanon, the political parties, especially the Dashnaktsutyun sought 
ways to be involved in the Armenian Apostolic church affairs and bring the communal structures 
under their control. Conditions in Lebanon, however, were not as favorable for the party initially. 
In one of the letters in June 1924, the Central Committee of the Dashnaktsutyun in Syria and 
Lebanon reported to the higher Dashnak leadership structures abroad:  
The [Armenian] masses are confused and pessimistic. … Our party suffers from the fact that for the first 
time in recent history, the ARF has lost its influence among the masses. … Party members are split 
ideologically and otherwise; they do not know whence to proceed and what to do. … The religious heads, 
exploiting the mentality of the refugees, continually try to disrupt and neutralize secular bodies and extend 





The report complained that the Catholicos of Sis disregarded the party and provided a significant 
competition by meddling in politics: 
He is not only satisfied with his religious prominence, but actually meddles in politicos with local and 
foreign elements. … He does not even consult us in his political activities. … Although we know very little 
about what is going on in the Catholicosate, we are dead sure of one thing: the leadership of this 
community cannot be entrusted to the Catholicos and the people around him (quoted in Schahgaldian 1979, 
155). 
 
As the above quotes suggest, the Dashnak Central Committee aimed at establishing its authority 
and dominance in Syria and Lebanon, but the internal split around the future course of the party, 
and the general apathy of masses towards the Armenian political parties impeded the party’s 
progress.177   
 
After a lot of Dashnak agitation, in 1925 the Catholicos Sahak II Khabayan of Sis invited the 
political parties to organize a Diocesan (gavarakan) Council. According to the electoral decree 
adopted in June 1926, all Armenians above 25 years of age could vote in the elections if they 
were members of the Armenian Apostolic community. The Surb Nshan church in Beirut and the 
Surb Khach‘ church at the Camp were designed to serve as polling stations in Beirut and its 
suburbs (Varzhabedian 1981a, 88-91; 189). The chance to finally get involved in communal 
matters was provided. The major contestants, as expected, were the representatives of the 
Armenian political parties – the Hnchakyans, Ramkavars and Dashnaks. The Hnchakyans and 
Ramkavars, sharing more identical interests after the Sovietization of Armenia, joined into single 
coalition against the Dashnaks. In the elections of the Diocesan Council in 1926 the 
Dashnaktsutyun received the majority of votes. The opponents, however, refused to recognize 
                                                
177 The Dashnaktsutyun was able to take the control of the Surb Nshan (Holy Sign) church in downtown Beirut, but 
the Armenian refugees were largely concentrated in camps, in which the party was not able to gain much success. 
The Surb Khach‘ (Holy Cross) church in Le Grand Camp, founded in 1923, was composed of a very diverse 
congregation of Armenians originating mostly from various places in Cilicia, and initially remained out of the 
control of the Dashnak party (cf. Varzhabedian 1981a, 184-87). 
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the elections as fair and accused the Dashnaks of the manipulations of votes. Disregarding the 
concerns of the Hnchakyans and others, the Catholicos approved the results of the elections. 
Rather than boycotting the elections, the elected Hnchakyan representatives decided to continue 
the struggle against the Dashnaktsutyun within the Council.  
 
The first sessions of the Council in September 1926 produced heated discussions and conflicts 
between the adversaries. On September 28, 1926, Vahan Vartabedian (Vahan Vardapetian), one 
of the Dashnak delegates, was found dead when some unknown young men disrupted the session 
and opened fire after the lights had gone out. Mihran Aghazarian, one of the fiercest Hnchakyan 
opponents of the Dashnaks, was arrested and charged for the death (Varzhabedian 1981a, 194-6). 
Aghazarian left the session just before the incident, but because of previous confrontation with 
Vartabedian, the Dashnaks and the police assumed he planned the assassination. Aghazarian 
wrote down his impressions on the Diocesan Council elections in prison, which was published 
the same year, in 1926 (Varzhabedian 1981a, 132-33). The 147 page long essay entitled Sisi 
verjin at‘orakalě ew ir meghapart gavarakaně: Libananahay gavarakan ěntrut‘eants‘ aṙt‘iv  
[The Incumbent of Sis and His Culpable Provincial Council: On the Elections of the Lebanese-
Armenian Diocesan Council] doubted the legitimacy and legality of the Diocesan Council 
elections because, as the author argued, the Catholicos of Sis did not have jurisdiction over 
Lebanon and could not invite Diocesan Council elections.178 Aghazarian condemned the 
Catholicos for his submission to the Dashnaktsutyun (Aghazarian 1926, 7-14).  
 
Aghazarian’s essay was published under the headline Depi anhayrenik‘ petut‘iwn [Towards 
Homeland-less State] and the second chapter of the book was entirely devoted to the idea of 
                                                
178 Churches in Lebanon came under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Sis in 1929 (see the previous chapter). 
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“homeland-less state” pursued by the Dashnaktsutyun. Aghazarian speculated that the creation 
of the Lebanese-Armenian Prelacy through the Diocesan Council served the interests of the 
Dashnaks in the realization of the “homeland-less state.” According to the Constitution of the 
Armenian Church of 1863, the “National Council” (or the Diocesan Council) formed Civic and 
Religious Boards to run the national-secular [azgayin] and religious affairs of the Armenian 
Apostolic Community. By approving the results of the elections and by legitimizing the Dashnak 
dominated Diocesan Council, Aghazarian thought that the Catholicos endorsed the Dashnak 
pursuit of the “homeland-less state” (ibid., 16-18). Defining Soviet Armenia as the center, 
Aghazarian (1926, 19-25) juxtaposed the “centrifugal” and “destructive” activity of the 
Dashnaktsutyun in Armenian diasporic communities to the “centripetal” and “constructive” 
projects of the Hnchakyan, Ramkavar and other “patriotic factions:” 
A HOMELAND-LESS-STATE for the Armenians abroad, relying on Western diplomacy, against the 
rising Armenia [upper case and emphasis in original] 
This is the centrifugal political program of the Dashnaktsutyun, which is so telling in Dashnak speech and 
pen, although wrapped in tattered rags.   
 
Forward towards statehood, unity and ties with Armenia, and away from deceptive Western diplomacies 
[emphasis original] 
This is the centripetal direction of the Hnchakyan, Ramkavar and other patriotic groups towards Armenia, 
which will of course clash with unscrupulous Dashnak enmity everywhere… (ibid., 22-23).  
 
Aghazarian’s call to clash “with the Dashnak dishonest enmity” had been going on for several 
years in Lebanon.  
 
Aghazarian’s detention was a significant loss to the Hnchakyan-Ramkavar bloc in the Diocesan 
Council. With the most active of their only two delegates detained,179 the Diocesan Council came 
under the complete control of the Dashnaktsutyun. The incidents led to the political distancing of 
the congregations of Surb Khach‘ and Surb Nshan. Surb Nshan remained under Dashnak 
                                                
179 The	  other	  delegate	  was	  Antranig	  Gendjian (Andranik Kenchian) (Varzhabedian 1981a, 96). 
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influence, while the clashes of the Dashnaks with the anti-Dashnaks at the Camp gradually 
established the dominance of Hnchakyan, Ramkavar and AGBU faction at Le Grand Camp over 
Surb Khach‘ church and Sahakian school.180  
 
As a possible act of revenge, three years after the assassination of Vahan Vartabedian, some 
Dashnaks killed Sarkis Dkhruni (Sargis Tkhruni) in January 1929. Dkhruni was a prominent 
Hnchakyan intellectual and the vice-principal of Sahakian school at the time. He was a strong 
proponent of Soviet Armenia and a fierce anti-Dashnak, but he had not been involved in the 
murder of Vartabedian. The assassination of Dkhruni provoked massive discontent among 
Armenians in Le Grand camp (Varzhabedian 1979, 216). Another political assassination 
followed a few years later. Mihran Aghazarian, who had spent several years in prison for the 
alleged complicity in Vartabedian’s killing, was shot dead in October 1933 (Messerlian 1963, 
66; Varzhabedian 1981a, 197; 216-18). The assassinations of Sarkis Dkhruni and Mihran 
Aghazarian naturally accelerated the polarization of the Armenian community in Lebanon.  
 
The violent events often leading to clashes among the rank and file and the sympathizers had a 
dual effect on the Armenian refugee masses at large. On the one hand, occasional fights and 
assassinations made the matters more personal, mobilizing the networks of relatives, friends, 
family clans, and compatriots against each other. On the other hand, political struggles were 
repelling for many Armenian refugee groups. Most compatriotic societies developed internal 
agreements to remain uninvolved in the struggles among the Armenian political parties. 
Compatriotic societies, moreover, often were targeted as challenges to the expansion of party 
                                                
180 Sahakian school was established by the efforts of Armenians settled at the Camp. The school was named after 
Catholicos Sahak Khanabian of Sis (Varzhabedian 1981a, 184-85) 
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influences. The problem was especially acute for the Dashnaktsutyun, who sought to achieve a 
dominant position among Armenians in the diaspora. The leaders of the Dashnaktsutyun became 
especially vocal about the need to deal with compatriotic societies and affiliations. Reluctantly 
and gradually from the 1930s through the 1960s, compatriotic societies came under the control 




Struggle Against Compatriotic Societies 
 
The prominence of diverse compatriotic affiliations and societies in all Armenian communities 
from the United States to the Middle East drew the attention of the highest leadership of some 
Armenian political factions and organizations. The chapters of HOK, founded in the Untied 
States and France, cooperated with the apolitical compatriotic societies and unions channeling 
their resources to social and economic projects in Soviet Armenia. The Hnchakyans and 
Ramkavars also largely developed cooperative relations with compatriotic unions. However, the  
policy of the Dashnaktsutyun towards the compatriotic societies developed within the framework 
of its attempts to act as the government-in-exile of the dispersed Armenians.  
 
The Tenth World Congress of the party in November 1924 – January 1925, declared the 
beginning of ‘une 225enera d’action pour la restructuration des nouvelles colonies 225eneratio 
et la 225eneration des orphelins devenus adults’ [a period of action for the restructuring of the 
new dispersed colonies and for the generation of orphans who became adults] (quoted in 
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Panossian 2006: 294). The orientation towards the dispersed colonies meant developing certain 
strategies of the recruitment of followers from among the diverse refugee and immigrant 
Armenian masses, which were then actively organizing into compatriotic societies.  
 
In August 1926, Haratch in France published a series of articles by Ruben Ter-Minasian on 
compatriotic unions. The first part of Ter-Minasian’s analysis appeared on August 8, 1926. The 
author praised the Compatriotic Unions as organizations preventing the assimilation of 
Armenians in countries with strong assimilationist policies. The second part of the article 
appeared a week later on August 15, 1926, entitled “Compatriotic Unions: Good in Colonies, 
Evil in Armenia.” In the opening paragraph Ter-Minasian stated: 
But there is no good without evil. There are places, where the Armenian people are free from the danger of 
assimilation, where [they] live their national life and [preserve their national] culture, and [they] constitute 
a majority, or represent the local government, or are on their way [to such an end]. In such places not only 
does the existence of Compatriotic Unions become meaningless, but [it is] even detrimental to the 
formation of a full union and a unified will… 
 
Taken out of context, this message could well be interpreted in Lebanon as an invitation to fight 
against compatriotic unions. Having been granted Lebanese citizenship in 1925, Armenians in 
Lebanon were not subjected to certain assimilationist policies, and Lebanese confessionalism 
provided certain grounds for Armenians to become a majority in certain areas and form a 
“government” of their own. Yet Ter-Minasian continued, further clarifying his point: 
Regardless of [the type] of the government ruling in Armenia, whether independent or not, whether 
Dashnak or Bolshevik, in Armenia the damage caused by compatriotic unions is greater than the good they 
make. Promoting local patriotism to its extreme, the idea of a common homeland and the basic interests of 
Armenia will pale in comparison to local interests, which may lead to … factionalism. The promotion of 
local patriotism will become an obstacle to physical, moral, mental and economic integrity; and the strong 
organization of compatriotic unions may create a compatriotic state within a state, a new church inside a 
church, a local political party within a political party and so on. This will render it impossible to establish 
one language, one integral power and authority. For this reason, the existence of compatriotic unions both 
in the present and future United Armenia will become a negative phenomenon, which needs to be uprooted, 
replacing it with the patriotism of the entire Armenians, and that of Armenia as a whole…. In short, for the 
sake of the Armenian people and the supreme interests of Armenia, we should oppose the formation 




In the final part of this lengthy analysis, published on August 20, 1926 in Haratch, Ter-Minasian 
analyzed the reasons of why Armenians formed compatriotic unions in “colonies” and in the 
conclusion he stated: 
…As abroad, so in Soviet countries the compatriotic unions are the result of the disorganized political and 
internal conditions of our communities… Those unions fill the gaps we pointed to and fix the defects that 
our spiritual, lay, political and other parties and leaders have. And therefore, the existence of compatriotic 
unions in the [diasporic] communities should be considered a desirable and useful phenomenon. 
Participation in their [activities], strengthening and organizing them is required of every true Armenian. 
 
The reasons of why Compatriotic Unions should not be encouraged and promoted in Armenia, as 
explained by Ruben Ter-Minasian in 1926, were becoming increasingly relevant in Lebanon and 
to a lesser extent elsewhere in the following years.   
 
The “duty of every true Armenian” to strengthen and organize the compatriotic unions in 
Armenian communities abroad proved detrimental to the dissemination of the political ideals of 
the Dashnaktsutyun, to the recruitment of new followers and members in Lebanon and 
elsewhere. The emerging compatriotic neighborhoods in Lebanon, which tended to build their 
own churches, their own schools, organize separate and exclusive educational initiatives, were 
certainly detrimental to the establishment of “one language, an integral power and authority” in 
these communities as well. Under such conditions in Lebanon, the question of whether the 
Dashnaktsutyun should be concerned for creating one language, an integral power and authority 
in the diaspora, became paramount. If the answer of the Dashnak leadership was yes, according 
to Ter-Minasian’s advice, it should entail certain actions towards “uprooting” compatriotic 




In response to these new challenges, Shavarsh Missakian, the Bureau colleague of Ruben Ter-
Minasian, came to realize that even in the diaspora, compatriotic unions did not render much 
service to Armenianness. In his editorial on September 3, 1928 entitled “‘Compatriotic’ Wastes”, 
Missakian argued that the “narrow patriotism” of compatriotic unions wasted the moral and 
material resources of the Armenians. Missakian concluded the passage with a call to abandon 
narrow compatriotic identities and to think more broadly: 
If the Kharberdts‘is, Malatiats‘is or Tigranakertts‘is, being very numerous in America, have wealthy 
unions, it does not mean they should not be benevolent, for example, towards the Chenkilerts‘is or 
Karnets‘is, who are fewer in America, who were prosperous yesterday, but today are in need of brotherly 
support.  
Broader, much broader horizons, compatriots!  
We have arrived at a point, where, instead of turning our backs to each other, we should look for each 
other… 
 
Instead of developing a common sense of Armenianness, compatriotic unions had contributed to 
the developing of “narrow patriotism,” the Dashnak leadership argued. Armenian refugees and 
immigrants were still bound to their local, traditional, compatriotic affiliations. As Schahgaldian 
(1979, 81) noted: “Armenian national consciousness … was the least likely area in which 
diaspora locality groups found their identity or sense of belonging.”  
 
The local leaderships of the Dashnaktsutyun, operating in Marseille and Beirut, came to the 
realization that in order to gain followers they first of all had to “uproot” compatriotic 
identifications, to get rid of these “useless weeds”181 and turn the heterogeneous masses into a 
homogeneous Armenophone community. Local and regional party leaderships realized that 
newspapers, public meetings, lectures and “oral propaganda” were not as effective tools among 
the linguistically diverse groups of refugees with low literacy rates. Contrary to what Ter-
                                                
181 In the 1920s, the around 30 compatriotic unions in Beirut were branded by the Dashnaktsutyun as “useless weeds 
which divided the Armenians in themselves” (Schahgaldian 1979, 79). 
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Minassian envisioned as the policy towards compatriotic unions in colonies, the mid-level party 
leadership and the agents operating on the ground had to adopt different policies against 
compatriotic societies in order to overcome local differences and make the Dashnak envisioned 
pan-Armenian causes appealing to larger masses of Armenian refugees. Through the control of 
church councils, through the establishment of various party affiliated cultural associations, 
through youth oriented programs, through mass media and propaganda, and most importantly 
through taking control of schools and establishing new schools the Dashnaktsutyun and other 




“Diaspora-Style” Nation-Building in Lebanon 
 
The political distancing of the Dashnak and anti-Dashnak factions and the establishment of party 
sponsored educational, cultural, youth and other institutions and organizations determined the 
particularities of the “diaspora-style nation-building” in Lebanon. The social-political conditions 
in Lebanon (and the Middle East in general) proved more favorable for Armenians’ organizing 
like a nation-state. Yet in the absence of a centralized national Armenian government in 
Lebanon (and in the dispersion) the design and implementation of the educational programs 
remained highly factional, confessional and partisan. By 1926, the Apostolic Armenians 
community in Lebanon had established 15, Catholic Armenians 8 and Evangelical Armenians 6 
kindergartens and primary schools for the orphans and the children of refugees (Varzhabedian 
1981a, 391). In some cases, the initiators of kindergarten and schools were the reorganized 
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compatriotic neighborhoods and societies, but gradually schools affiliated with the Apostolic 
Armenian community fell under the control of political party chapters. 
 
In Le Grand Camp, for example, the political polarization in the 1920s increased the influence of 
the non-Dashnak faction. The activities of the Sahakian school were supported by various 
compatriotic unions operating at the camp, including those of Adana, Everek, Hachn, Malatia, 
Ayntab, Karin, Marash, Mush and others (Varzhabedian 1981a, 200), but the curriculum was 
mostly influenced by the pro-Soviet orientation of the Hnchakyans. Various Hnchakyan and 
AGBU/Ramkavar affiliated youth, athletic and cultural organizations and projects provided 
certain coloring to the extra-curricular activities. For example, the Hnchakyan-affiliated sports 
organization, Homenmen (Armenian Athletic Union), was founded in Damascus in 1921, and by 
1923 it had established athletic clubs at Le Grand Camp (cf. Sarafian 2007, 19-22; Varzhabedian 
1981a, 200; 1981b, 95). The premises of the Sahakian school at the Camp were made available 
not only to Homenmen, but also to other organizations, including the AGBU chapters, to various 
theatrical performances, youth and student organizations (Varzhabedian 1981a, 200-201). The 
school and various organizations on the one hand bridged the differences between Armenians 
originating from diverse linguistic-cultural backgrounds and developed a strong leaning and 
affinity towards the homeland – Soviet Armenia. 
 
The orientation of the Dashnaktsutyun towards the dispersion put a greater emphasis on the 
schooling and ideological preparation of the younger generations in the party’s programs.  In 
1929, Karo Sasuni, a former MP and governor in the Republic of Armenia and the long-term 
chairman of the Dashnak Central Committee in Lebanon wrote in Droshak (June-July 1929): 
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… The essential feature of the previous generation [in Armenia] was its ideological preparedness and its 
excellent comprehension of the revolutionary faith and chastity, whereas today, almost all purity has been 
wiped out of the hearts of Armenian youth. … Our responsible bodies must realize that it is their urgent 
duty to inflame the youth with revolutionary fire, to inject traits of sacrifice, boldness and firmness in them. 
… The revolutionary education of the wandering youth of this wandering people is a most urgent task. 
Therefore, it is necessary to prepare them spiritually and mentally, for they must symbolize that 
revolutionary character which is the party’s heritage, for they must always be ever-ready soldiers of the 
ARF willing to work everywhere and under all circumstances. … Comrades, without this uneasy task, in 
five to ten years, we shall have a mediocre leadership many in numbers, yet different in education, different 
in character, and most of all, different in party psychology, who shall not be the genuine successors to the 
many self-sacrificing generations of the last forty years (quoted in Schahgaldian 1979, 165-166). 
 
Sasuni considered the ideological preparation of the young generation (“revolutionary 
education”) as important as the instruction of the youth in Armenian language, history and 
culture. To prepare future leaders, first the party needed to homogenize the heterogeneous 
Armenian communities, to make them similar in “education,” and in “character,” but secondly 
and in parallel, the party also needed to inflame the youth with “revolutionary faith and chastity,” 
to forge a common “party psychology.” In their literary works in the 1920s two other former 
leaders of the Republic of Armenia, Levon Shant‘182 and Nikol Aghbalian, supported the cause 
of nations and nationalism against internationalism and socialism, thereby contributing to the 
institutionalization of the anti-Bolshevik stand of the party.  
 
Besides producing an alternative discourse to Bolshevism and the pro-Soviet orientation, the 
Dashnak leaders also actively embarked on establishing schools. In 1924 Levon Shant‘, started 
the Armenian National College in Marseille, but because of the lack of support and unfavorable 
conditions in France he left Marseille and settled in Cairo, Egypt.183 In Egypt, Shant‘ founded the 
Hamazkayin Cultural Association in 1928 (cf. Boghossian 2005, 217-18; Dasnabedian 1990, 
                                                
182 Levon Shant‘’s Azgut‘iwně himk‘ mardkayin ěnkerut‘ean [Nationality as a Basis for Human Societies] appeared 
in several volumes of Hairenik monthly in 1922, in which the author attempts to define historically and politically 
the ideas of nation and state, and justify the cause of nationalism vis-à-vis socialism. In the creation of nations, 
Shant‘ emphasizes the role of families, social environment and schools (Shant‘ [1922] 1979, 103-105) 
183 Haratch published a lengthy interview about the College with Levon Shant‘ on September 23, 1925. As the 
correspondent noted, by this time Levon Shant‘ had already left Marseille. 
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206). Hamazkayin aimed at promoting the Armenian language and culture in the diaspora, 
providing Armenian education through schools, vocational classes and various publications, 
preparing future public leaders, teachers, activists ⁠. The first major contribution of the 
Association was the founding of the Armenian Lyceum (Hay Chemaran) in Beirut with the 
efforts of Levon Shant‘ and Nikol Aghbalian in 1930184 (Sanjian 2003, 304). Mostly known by 
its Armenian name as Chemaran [academy, college] the college was meant to prepare future 
leadership for Armenians of the diaspora. Along with the Chemaran, most schools affiliated with 
the Armenian Apostolic community gradually came under the direct control of the 
Dashnaktsutyun as the party secured absolute dominance over the Apostolic Armenian 
communal structures from the 1930s. Quite naturally the ideology and the beliefs of Karo Sasuni, 
those of the founders of the Chemaran, and other Dashnak leaders were reflected in the 
curriculum, in the selection of teaching materials, the appointment of teachers, and overall in the 
strategic course of Dashnak-controlled educational institutions. Rather than focusing on Soviet 
Armenia, the Chemaran and the schools affiliated with the Prelacy of Armenian Church of 
Lebanon (the Apostolic Armenian community), aimed at forging a nation around the idea of 
more abstract Armenia and around the symbolism of the 1918-1920 Republic of Armenia.185 
 
In parallel with establishing schools, the Dashnak educational activities expanded to target 
various categories of Armenian refugees. In order to educate the masses or involve and mobilize 
the elderly, women and the youth around more communal, pan-Armenian goals, the 
                                                
184 Varzhabedian (1981b, 67) suggests winter of 1929 as the year of the foundation of the Chemaran, but 1930 was 
confirmed by Dikran Djinbashian (Tigran Jinbashian), the principal of the Chemaran, in the interview with the 
author on June 27, 2012. 
185 The Dashnaks and the AGBU often clashed over the issues of curriculum and teacher selection, as the Dashnaks 
controlled the Diocesan Council, while the AGBU provided most of the funding for schools (author’s 
correspondence with Ara Sanjian, March 21, 2015). 
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Dashnaktsutyun also established many other local organizations. In the 1930s Hamazkayin 
established semi-professional theatrical groups, published a literary quarterly, organized 
discussions and lectures (Schahgaldian 1979, 168). Along with party chapters, the 
Dashnaktsutyun founded a local chapter of the Armenian Relief Society [the former Armenian 
Red Cross of New York] in Lebanon in 1930 to provide social services to the refugees. The 
organization grew in the 1930s and 40s, eventually becoming a women’s organization and 
focused on charitable activities (Schahgaldian 1979, 168; Varzhabedian 1981b, 48-9). For youth 
oriented programs, the Dashnaktsutyun gradually took under its control the Armenian General 
Athletic Union (Hay marmnakrt‘akan ěndhanur miut‘iwn), better known by the acronym 
Homenetmen.186   
 
The bitter rivalries influenced the ways in which the political parties envisioned and imagined 
the Armenian “nation” in Lebanon and in the diaspora. Conflicting orientations towards Soviet 
Armenia meant not only profound differences in the perceptions of the Armenian homeland, but 
also entailed contrasting sets of values, symbols and loyalties. The varying and often 
incompatible perspectives of the Armenian political factions on patriotism, the homeland, 
priorities of Armenians, national symbolism, national holidays and many other issues were 
reflected in school curricula and the extra-curricular activities at schools, in youth and athletic 
organizations, thereby shaping the mindset of the younger generations.   
 
                                                
186 The Union was founded in Constantinople in 1918 and after the dissolution of its chapters in the early 1920s the 
members of the Union dispersed in Europe, Middle East and reached as far as the Americas, both South and North. 
Several members of Homenetmen ended up in Beirut and established a local chapter of Homenetmen in 1924. 
Although the Union had not been affiliated with the Dashnak party in any formal way, in Lebanon it became widely 
associated with the Dashnaktsutyun (Varzhabedian 1981b, 89-2). The program-constitution adopted in 1921 
declared the mission of Homenetmen “to promote the nation’s moral and cognitive development by providing 
healthy physical training to the adolescents…” (Tsragir 1921, 1). 
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Five factors, according to Varzhabedian (1981a, 74-8), defined the major disagreements of 
political factions: 
• Whether or not May 28 should be celebrated in the community as the independence day; 
• Whether or not the Tricolor should be used at various community events; 
• Whether or not Soviet Armenia should be recognized and the anniversary of the 
Sovietization of Armenian should be celebrated; 
• Who should dominate in national (azgayin) bodies (Parish, Civic, Diocesan Councils); 
• Who should be the representative of the Armenian people at Lebanese government.  
 
Public celebrations of May 28 or November 29, Diocesan Council elections or other intra-
communal events served as occasions for often violent bursts of tensions, adding to the hostilities 
and tearing the factions further apart from each other. The official endorsement of the Armenian 
Apostolic community by the Lebanese government and the integration of Armenians into the 
Lebanese political system added new elements for more aggressive competition for attracting 
sympathizers and potential votes.  
 
 
Political Rivalries and Representation in Lebanese Chamber of Deputies 
 
Daily competition for gaining followers among the diverse group of Armenians, more than the 
pro- and anti-Soviet orientations, defined everyday relations of the Armenian political factions in 
Lebanon. After all, in order to dominate the national (azgayin) bodies or to represent Armenians 
in the Lebanese political system, various political factions needed votes. In France and the 
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Untied States, Armenians not interested or disappointed in Armenian affairs or the Armenian 
political parties could withdraw and live without having to be involved. In Lebanon, regardless 
of personal interests and motivations, Armenians affiliated with the Armenian Apostolic 
(Orthodox Armenian) community, had to remain connected to a church and occasionally get 
involved in Armenian affairs and politics in one way or another.  
 
The census of 1932 confirmed that the Orthodox (Apostolic) Armenians constituted a significant 
number in Lebanon. Following the meeting of Catholicos Sahak II of Cilicia (now established in 
Antelias since 1930) and his coadjutor Catholicos Papken I with the French High Commissioner 
in December 1933, with a special decree issued in January 1934, the Orthodox Armenians were 
finally granted a seat at the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies187 (Messerlian 1963, 61-65). The 
upcoming parliamentary elections of 1934 invited the Armenian political parties to actively 
embark on election campaigns. If in the Untied States and France, the Dashnaktsutyun generally 
discouraged participation in local politics and public affairs in the 1920s and 30s, the formal 
representation of Orthodox Armenians provided by the Lebanese political structure was 
appealing especially to the Dashnaktsutyun who sought to represent the Armenians everywhere. 
In the heated atmosphere, following the recent assassination of Mihran Aghazarian in October 
1933, and Archbishop Tourian in December 1933, the electoral campaign was very tense 
between the Dashnak and anti-Dashnak factions. The election of a neutral Vahram Leilekian was 
received with triumph by the Hnchakyans and Ramkavars, who supported Leilekian. Reflecting 
on the elections, the pro-Hnchakyan Libanan188 published an article titled “the Fascist 
                                                
187 An earlier attempt of the Prelacy to get a seat in the Chamber of Deputies in 1929 remained unaddressed 
(author’s correspondence with Ara Sanjian, March 21, 2015). 
188 Libanan was a weekly, then biweekly, published in 1924-35. Initially it was in Armeno-Turkish. The paper was 
not formally affiliated with any party, but was more pro-Hnchakyan (Sanjian 2003: 323) 
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Tashnagtsutiun crushingly defeated, the glorious victory of the anti-Tashnag current” (quoted in 
Messerlian 1963, 78).  
 
The solidifying identities of anti-Dashnak and pro-Dashnak groupings, the name-callings and 
labeling each other as fascists and communists, were institutionalizing the factions, yet the anti-
Dashnak or even the Dashnak groupings did not always constitute internally coherent political 
entities in the 1930s. If the Hnchakyans and Ramkavars supported Leilikian in 1934, four years 
later, the parties supported different candidates in the parliamentary elections. In 1937 both 
parties established their organs, Ararad (Hnchakyan) and Zartonk (Ramkavar), and launched 
separate propaganda and campaigns in the upcoming elections of 1937. The Dashnaktsutyun, in 
the meantime, experienced an internal discord between the Central Committee and several 
Dashnaks gathered around Aztag daily.189 While the Dashnak Central Committee supported the 
chairman of the Central Committee Khosrov T‘ut‘unjian, Aztag initially was against his 
candidacy and supported Hrach‘ia Shamlian, the non-partisan candidate, supported also by the 
Ramkavars (Messrlian 1963, 83; Schahgaldian 1979, 185). To clarify its standing and position, 
the Central Committee even issued a statement on October 16, 1937, which partly read: “…the 
Lebanon Central Committee of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation [the Dashnaktsutyun] 
declares to Armenians that the newspaper Aztag [underline original], its editor and his opinions 
have no relation whatsoever with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation” (quoted in Messerlian 
1963, 89). The tension, however, was short lived, and changing political alliances made the 
Aztag group eventually switch their support to Khosrov T‘ut‘unjian.  
  
                                                
189 Aztag (Factor) was founded in 1927, privately owned, but served as the unofficial organ of the Dashnaktsutyun. 
It became the official organ of the Dashnaktsutyun in 1965 and continues until present days (cf. Babloyan 1986, 
158, 163; Sanjian 2003, 318). 
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The peculiarities of the Lebanese political system offered certain possibilities for the local 
chapters of Armenian political parties to grow stronger not only by soliciting supporters, but 
also, and more importantly, by making political alliances with the Lebanese political factions and 
parties. The Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of 1936 between the French mandatory and 
Lebanese authorities190 created new grounds for intensifying independence movements in the 
country. As citizens of Lebanon, Armenians and their political factions were also expected to 
participate in the process and position themselves within the changing political spectrum. 
Towards the 1937 parliamentary elections, the Hnchakyans, along with the Armenian 
Communists, had to ally with the United Front, the pro-independent and anti-imperialist Arab 
opposition. The Dashnaks allied with the pro-government bloc (Migliorino 2008, 61; 
Schahgaldian 1979, 183-84). The non-Armenian political parties were interested in forming 
alliances with the Armenian political parties as well for the latter’s votes. The Dashnak Central 
Committee, claiming to possess 3000 votes, eventually was able to replace Hrach‘ia Shamlian191 
by Khosrov T‘ut‘unjian on the governmental coalition list and have him elected in 1937192 
(Messerlian 1963, 92, 96-97). Dashnak representation in the Lebanese Parliament and its 
dominating presence in the Armenian communal structures significantly reinforced the 




                                                
190 See the previous chapter. 
191 Shamlian was a well-known lawyer, had many French colleagues, and his name was included in the government 
list with the intervention of his French colleagues (Messerlian 1963, 88). 
192 By this time, Armenian Orthodox community had been granted the second seat at the Lebanese Parliament as an 
appointed position. Vahram Leilekian was appointed at this position and Khosrov Tutundjian was elected to the 






Dynamic processes in the relations of Soviet Armenian authorities and the Armenian diasporic 
political parties led to the formation of pro- and anti-Soviet orientations outside Armenia, which 
found different expressions in different countries. As argued in the first chapter, since the 
consolidation of power in the Republic of Armenia, especially from 1919 to 1920, the 
Dashnaktsutyun had developed a self-perception of being the only legitimate party to represent 
(the United) Armenia. After the expulsion of the Dashnak leadership from Armenia following 
the Sovietization of the country, the party leadership began promoting the Dashnaktsutyun as the 
Armenian government in exile. With the adoption of a fiercely anti-Soviet orientation, amid 
internal conflicts, the party leadership embarked on a struggle against Soviet Armenia and all 
other Armenian organizations in the diaspora, who supported Soviet Armenia. Meanwhile, the 
Hnchakyans and Ramkavars developed a more pro-Soviet stand. Although the Democratic 
Liberal Ramkavar party’s ideology was incompatible with the Bolsheviks’ socialism, the 
Ramkavar formula of accepting Soviet Armenia but not its regime in practice was not translated 
into any opposition to the Soviet government in Armenia. To the contrary, supporting Soviet 
Armenia in every respect meant supporting the government of Soviet Armenia, even if 
indirectly. Therefore, in practice, they were considered to represent the pro-Soviet faction, and 




The pro-Soviet orientation of the Hnchakyans and Ramkavars and the anti-Soviet stand of the 
Dashnaktsutyun shaped different perceptions of the homeland. The pro-Soviet factions accepted 
Soviet Armenia as the homeland and channeled their organizational, human and financial 
resources to the support of Soviet Armenia and the repatriation campaign in the 1920s. In 
contrast, the Dashnaktsutyun’s anti-Soviet orientation often translated into the rejection of Soviet 
Armenia as the homeland, which was especially expressed by their loyalty to the symbolism of 
the Republic of Armenia. Such an orientation and the ambition to become the government of 
Armenians in exile determined the exclusive focus of the party on reorganizing in the diaspora. 
This also made the Dashnaktsutyun more influential in many communities, despite the party’s 
internal crises. Depending on the specific contexts in the United States, France and Lebanon, the 
Dashnaktsutyun had to accomplish two goals in order to achieve dominance over the Armenian 
communities and truly claim the leadership in the Armenian diaspora. First of all, the party had 
to struggle against fragmented compatriotic affiliations and identities, forge a more 
homogeneous Armenian identity wherever possible, and produce a second generation 
sympathetic to its cause; secondly, the party had to find ways of controlling the Armenian 
(Apostolic) Church, especially in countries, where it was established as an important community 
center (as in the United States) or had become incorporated into the political structure and 
received certain privileges (as in Lebanon).  
  
On the eve of WWII, the leaderships of the Armenian political parties could not find local 
conditions in France favorable for remaining as active; the struggle between the pro- and anti-
Soviet political factions led to a schism in the Armenian Apostolic Church and community in the 
United States; and in Lebanon the Dashnaktsutyun had assumed a dominant position, heavily 
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represented in all Armenian community structures, as well as in the Lebanese chamber of 
deputies. Although all the parties expressed a concern for assimilation, compared to the United 
States and France, the preservation of Armenian identity became possible only under the more 
favorable social-political conditions in Lebanon. Armenian institutions in Lebanon were able to 
forge a more homogeneous Armenophone second generation, with an Armenian national 
consciousness, albeit divided in political orientations, in the perceptions of the homeland and of 
their own diasporic status. WWII and especially the Cold War, as the following chapter will 
discuss, escalated the conflicts between Armenian political parties, which led to a transnational 






Chapter 4  
 
From Exclusions and Violent Schism  
to Joint Commemorations of the Genocide  
Introduction 
 
The institutionalization of tense relations between the reorganizing Armenian diasporic political 
factions in the interwar period found further impetus during WWII and the early years of the 
Cold War. This chapter analyzes how rapidly changing international conditions affected the 
relations among Armenian political factions during WWII and the Cold War, as well as the 
factors which determined the transition from antagonism and violence to tolerance and 
cooperation in the Armenian diaspora in the 1960s. The major argument here is that the radical 
shift in the relations of the Soviet Union and the West from the WWII alliance to the Cold War 
enmity had a direct impact on the escalation of conflicts between the pro- and anti-Soviet 
Armenian political factions in the diaspora, making them transnationally more coherent against 
their “Armenian others.” If in between the wars, as the previous chapter demonstrated, tense 
relations between Armenian political parties did not translate into mutually exclusive identity 
politics transnationally, the years of WWII and the Cold War provided the contexts, in which 
Armenian factions grew transnationally more coherent and began actively forging exclusive 
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diasporic identities. Drawing on primary accounts of the Armenian elites,193 the second part of 
the chapter particularly examines how the conflicting perceptions of Soviet Armenia promoted 
by the pro-Soviet groupings and the anti-Soviet Dashnaktsutyun forged mutually exclusive self-
identifications of the ‘patriots’ and the ‘true Armenians’, respectively, during WWII and the 
Cold War. If the ‘patriots’ defined their patriotism by their unconditional acceptance of Soviet 
Armenia as the homeland, the ‘true Armenians’ constructed their identification on the 
juxtaposition of Armenianness and Communism as two incompatible identities, struggled against 
the Soviet regime in Armenia and refrained from promoting Soviet Armenia as the homeland.  
 
The transnational institutionalization of mutually exclusive identities, in turn, determined further 
escalation of hostilities and eventually led to a transnational schism in the Armenian diaspora.  In 
addition to other primary and secondary sources, the third part of the chapter extensively uses the 
CIA archival documents to examine how the Dashnaktsutyun benefitted from the Cold War 
conditions and how it grew into one of the most dominant transnational Armenian organizations 
by gaining control over the Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia in Lebanon and by helping to 
extend its jurisdiction transnationally. The chapter concludes with the analysis of the factors, 
including the adoption of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (1948), the Soviet relaxation under Khrushchev, the resumption of active politics 
pursued by Soviet Armenia in the diaspora, which made the hostile Armenian factions to rethink 
their priorities, put aside hostilities and join efforts in many countries for the commemoration of 
the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in 1965.  
                                                
193 This chapter also consulted a number of accounts authored by the eyewitnesses and participants of the events. 
These include Carlson (1943; 1949-1950), Vrats‘ian (1943, 1955-56), Reuben Darbinian (1948, 1953, 1956, 1968), 
Kersam Aharonian (Gersam Aharonian) ([1964] 1986), Antranig Dzarugian (Andranik Tsarukian) (1980, 1992) and 
others. This chapter also relies on the diplomatic documents on Soviet-Turkish relations in 1945-46, published by 




 The Call of Homeland: World War II,  
Soviet Armenia and the Revival of the Armenian Question 
 
WWII and the Political Turn in Soviet Union 
 
On June 22, 1941, the Nazi troops invaded the Soviet Union opening an era of significant 
revisions and turns from the previous suppressive policies in the country. The Stalinist purges 
between 1936 and 1939 had significantly repressed any manifestations of national or anti-Soviet 
sentiments in literature, public speeches or activities, causing large scale persecution and 
executions of political, literary and public activists. The exile, arrests and executions of many 
Armenian prominent literary figures, incumbent and former “Old Bolsheviks,” leaders of Soviet 
Armenia, including Aghasi Khanjian, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia in 
1930-1936, spread terror in Armenia and forestalled briefly the production of anything even 
remotely associated with national content. Armenian clergy were not spared persecution either. 
The death of Catholicos Khoren Muradbekian in 1938 was largely believed to be an NKVD194 
operation (Matossian 1962, 160-61; Suny 1997b, 364-65). The Nazi invasion and the beginning 
of the “Great Patriotic War,” as Joseph Stalin described it, forced the autocratic architect of the 
Soviet policies to abandon political extremes, refocus on the war effort and even turn a blind eye 
on some manifestations of national sentiments in literature, arts, and politics (cf. Bardakjian 
2000, 205). Concerns for the possible penetration and expansion of nationalist-bourgeois 
                                                
194 Narodniĭ kommisariat vnutrennykh del (NKVD) [People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs). 
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sentiments in the country paled next to the Nazi threat. The Soviets even made an alliance with 
their “imperialist” rivals, Britain and the Untied States, to fight against the Nazis.  
 
By November 1942, the Nazi Wehrmacht had devastated and absorbed most of the European 
part of the Soviet Union, besieged Leningrad, almost reached Moscow and occupied North 
Caucasus. Under the devastating conditions of war anything that could potentially prevent the 
break up of the Union, inspire and enflame patriotic feelings among the peoples of the Soviet 
Union and support the war effort was encouraged. In 1942 the Russian Orthodox Church was 
revived for the purpose of generating patriotic feelings, as well as soliciting support for the war 
effort. Shortly afterwards, the Catholicosate of Ējmiatsin also became proactive in its support of 
the “Great Patriotic War.” In a petition to Joseph Stalin on January 20, 1943, Archbishop Gevorg 
Ch‘orekch‘yan, then the locum tenens, requested permission to open a special account at the 
State Bank for the establishment of “Sasunts‘i Davit‘”195 tank regiment. In the same letter 
Archbishop Ch‘orekch‘yan notified Stalin that Ējmiatsin donated more than 800,000 Soviet 
rubles worth of jewelry, 1,000 English pounds and 50,000 rubles to the foundation, and that he 
was going to start a pan-Armenian fund raising campaign in support of the cause (Melk‘onyan 
2005, 333-34). Stalin’s approval arrived six days later, and on February 2, 1943, Archbishop 
Ch‘orekch‘yan made a public appeal to all Armenians abroad. The call was especially addressed 
to Armenians in America because they stayed “free of the catastrophes of the dreadful war” 
(Melk‘onyan 2005, 334).  
 
                                                
195 Sasunts‘i Davit‘ (David of Sasun) is the central protagonist in the Armenian national epic poem Daredevils of 
Sasun (Sasna Tsṙer). 
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The call reached the Armenian Americans a month later. In response to it, Bp. Karekin 
Hovsepian, the Primate of the Armenian Church in New York, initiated the “Sasunts‘i Davit‘” 
fund raising campaign. Armenians in the Untied States and the Primate had made earlier efforts 
to collect aid for Soviet Armenia. The project of Armenian War Relief, which lasted for only one 
year, was now replaced by the new project, “Sasunts‘i Davit‘” (Melk‘onyan 2005, 332-34). In 
the summer of 1944, the “Sasunts‘i Davit‘” tank regiment joined the Red Army and some of its 
units even reached Berlin in 1945 (Arzumanian 1997, 198-200; Dallak‘yan 2007, 94-5; cf. Kitur 
1963, 105). The efforts of Archbishop Ch‘orekch‘yan were truly appreciated by Stalin, who 
received him at his Kremlin office on April 19, 1945,196 endorsed the elections of a new 
Catholicos in Ējmiatsin according to the constitution of the Catholicosate, and restored other 
privileges to the Catholicosate.  
 
In 1945, Armenian church parishes throughout the world were permitted to send delegates to 
Ējmiatsin to participate in the election of the Catholicos. On June 22, 1945, the Ecclesiastical 
Assembly convened in Ējmiatsin and elected Archbishop Ch‘orekch‘yan as the Catholicos of all 
Armenians (Arzumanian 1997, 209-13). By meeting with Archbishop Ch‘orekch‘yan and by 
permitting the elections, the Soviet leader made a good will gesture towards Armenians 
worldwide. Besides learning about the Soviet achievements in Armenia, the delegates arriving 
for the elections of the Catholicos were also to learn soon that the Soviet authorities had certain 
intentions to raise the Armenian question internationally and launch a repatriation campaign.  
                                                
196 According to Stalin’s appointments journal, the meeting lasted only 20 minutes form 7.30 to 7.50pm (Na Priëme 
u Stalina…2014). Pravda, the leading daily of the time, printed a brief coverage of the meeting the next day, on 
April 20, 1945: “On April 19th the Secretary of the Council of Peoples Commissars of the USSR, com. I.V. Stalin 
had a conversation with the deputy Catholicos of all Armenians, archbishop Georg Cheorekchyan on the affairs of 
the Armenian Church. Secretary of the Council on Religious Cults under the SovNarKom, Polyanski I.V. was 




By the summer of 1945, as the world rejoiced over the victory against the Nazis, the Soviet 
authorities spoke at the highest diplomatic levels of territorial claims against Turkey. The issue 
was first raised in confidential diplomatic circles and secret communications. In late May and 
early June of 1945, the matter was communicated to the Ambassador of Turkey by the People’s 
Commissar (Minister) of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov197 (Kirakosyan 
2010, 31-2). Several weeks later, at the Seventh Session of the Heads of Governments of the 
victorious Allied Powers at Potsdam, convened on July 23, 1945, Stalin expressed his interest in 
redrawing the Soviet-Turkish border in Transcaucasia so that the regions of Ardahan and Kars 
would be incorporated into Soviet Georgia and Soviet Armenia respectively. In negotiations with 
Winston Churchill and Harry Truman, Joseph Stalin expressed the need for the “reinstatement of 
the borders,” which existed before WWI with Turkey and clarified:  
… I mean the region of Kars, which before the war was part of Armenia, and the region of Ardahan, which 
before the war was part of Georgia. … we think that the border in the regions of Kars and Ardahan is 
incorrect, and we declared to Turkey, that, if she [Turkey] wants to make an alliance with us [Soviet Union 
- V.S.], the border must be corrected; if she [Turkey] does not want to correct the border, then there cannot 
be a question of alliance. (Excerpt from the Seventh Session of the Head of the Governments, Potsdam, 23 
July, 1945. Translated from Kirakosyan 2010, 262). 
 
While the actual motives behind Stalin’s decision of claiming Kars and Ardahan remain 
unknown, the Soviets, it seems, used the aspirations of Armenians to return to the 1914 
boundaries with Turkey. Towards the end of WWII, many Armenian organizations in the 
diaspora actively pursued this possibility. The Soviet consulates and intelligence reported such 
activities among Armenians to the People’s Commissariat (Ministry) for Foreign Affairs of the 
USSR. In a letter addressed to the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Armenian SSR, 
dated on April 17, 1945, the deputy People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, wrote: 
                                                
197 “Zapis’ shestogo zasedaniia glav pravitel’stv [Record of the Sixth Session of the Heads of Governments]. June 
22, 1945” (in Kirakosyan 2010, 259-262). 
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Recently, in a number of countries a movement among Armenians abroad has been gathering momentum 
demanding first of all the unification with Soviet Armenia of the former Armenian territories, lost to 
Turkey, and secondly, providing the possibility to all Armenians, residing abroad, to return to the 
homeland, i.e. Soviet Armenia.  
Here, for example, in October 1944, the American Armenians raised this issue in the periodical press, and 
in March 1945 they formally appealed to Roosevelt, the President of the Untied States of America, with the 
same two demands.  
On April 7, 1945 the American-Armenian National Committee appealed to Comrade Stalin through a 
telegram signed by the president of the committee, Doctor Armenak Alikhanian, requesting to review and 
positively resolve the issues of the incorporation of Turkish Armenia to Armenian SSR and providing the 
possibility to all Armenians, residing abroad, to return to the homeland.  
Following the example of the American-Armenians, the representatives of various Armenian spiritual and 
public (obshchestvennykh) organizations in Iran have been appealing to our consular officers with similar 
requests. Besides, they intend to instruct their delegates to the Ējmiatsin Council to present these questions 
to the republican organs of Soviet Armenia…198 
 
The letter ended with a request for a detailed report on the “ethnographic, historical political and 
other aspects of the issue.” The detailed report of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs 
of Soviet Armenia, submitted on May 3, 1945,199 concluded with three possible options for 
further resolution and action: 
1. The restoration of the Russo-Turkish borders of 1914, which would include the regions of 
Kars, Ardahan and the Surmalu county; 
2. The restoration of the Russo-Turkish borders according to the Treaty of San-Stefano of 
1878, which would return to the Soviet Union the region of Kars, the Alashkert valley 
with the town of Bayazet; 
3. In addition to the region of Kars, the Surmalu county and the Alashkert valley, the USSR 
also demands the return of three of the six Armenian vilayets of the former Ottoman 
                                                
198 “Pis’mo zamestitel’ia Ministra Inostrannykh del SSSR S.I Kavtaradze Ministru Inostrannykh del Armianskoĭ 
SSR S.K. Karapetyanu o predstavlenii obstoyatel’noĭ dokladnoĭ o byvshikh Armianskikh territoriiakh, otoshedshikh 
k Turtsii i o vozmozhnostiakh vozvrashcheniia na rodinu Armian, prozhivaiushchikh za rubezhom.” [Letter of the 
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR S.I. Kavtaradze to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Armenian 
SSR S.K. Karapetyan on the provision of a thorough report on the former Armenian territories, conceded to Turkey, 
and on the possibilities of the return of Armenians residing abroad to the homeland], translated from Kirakosyan 
(2010, 61) 
199 The text of the report is available in Russian in Kirakosyan (2010, 63-90) 
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Empire - Erzrum, Van and Bitlis (or 5 vilayets according to the administrative division in 
1945)200 (Kirakosyan 2010, 75). 
 
The document did not explicitly mention whether the territories would be incorporated into 
Soviet Armenia or Soviet Georgia, but it recorded that “the seizure of Kars and Ardahan in favor 
of Turkey had made a grim impression on the workers of Armenia and Georgia” (quoted in 
Kirakosyan 2010, 71).  
 
The Armenian land issue was made public in an article published in Sovetakan Hayastan (Soviet 
Armenia), the official organ of the Communist Party of Armenia on June 13, 1945. The article 
reproduced the Declaration of the Armenian National Council in America, under the same 
heading. The Declaration announced that the Armenian National Council of America, which 
represented all Armenian factions except the Dashnaktsutyun, petitioned the First Session of the 
UN General Assembly for returning the Armenian lands occupied by Turkey to Soviet Armenia 
(Dallak‘yan 2004, 42). In the extremely centralized political structure, an article published in the 
organ of the Armenian Communist party indicated that the Soviet authorities publicly 
encouraged and fully supported the activism of Armenian organizations and unions abroad. 
Stalin raised the issue of the border adjustment at the Seventh Session of the Heads of 
Governments in Potsdam one month after this article and he was certainly aware of the earlier 
Armenian activism in the diaspora (cf. Melk‘onyan 2009, 26). The Armenian territorial demands 
                                                
200 “Doklodnaia zapiska Ministra Inostrannykh del Armianskoĭ SSR S.K. Karapetyana zamestitel’iu Ministra 
Inostrannykh del SSSR S.I. Kavtaradze “O byvshikh Armianskikh territoriiakh, otoshedshikh k Turtsii i o 
vozmozhnostiakh vozvrashcheniia na rodiny armyan, prozhivaiushchikh za rubezhom” [Report of the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the Armenian SSR to the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR “On former Armenian 
territories, conceded to Turkey and the possibilities of the return of Armenians residing abroad to the homeland], in 
Kirakosyan (2010, 63-90). 
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perfectly fit the interests of Soviet Union against Turkey; since the beginning of the War, rather 
than joining the Allies, Turkey had signed a non-aggression pact with the Nazis in 1941, and the 
Soviets feared Turkey would have opened a second front against Soviet Union were the Germans 
to succeed at Stalingrad in the late 1942. Besides, Turkey declared war on Germany only 
reluctantly in February 1945 after the defeat of the Nazis had become inevitable (cf. Dallak‘yan 
2007, 117; Melk‘onyan 2009, 23).  
 
The matter of border adjustment was not resolved at the Seventh Session in Potsdam. For 
President Truman, it concerned only to Soviet Union and Turkey, and it was left to be dealt 
between the two countries. The leaders of Great Britain and the Untied States avoided 
confronting Stalin openly, but they continued sympathizing with Turkey against possible Soviet 
expansion. The nuclear attack on Japan in August 1945 held Stalin back from military 
intervention in Turkey, but the Soviet authorities continued to pursue the matter through 
diplomatic channels.201   
 
On November 21, 1945, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR issued a decree on the 
repatriation of Armenians to Soviet Armenia (Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 177). Several days later, on 
November 27, 1945, the Catholicos of All Armenians, Gevorg VI Ch‘orekch‘yan, was allowed 
to address an appeal to the three Heads of Governments, Stalin, Churchill and Truman, 
requesting a discussion of the issue of Armenian lands in Turkey (Arzumanian 1997, 226; 
Kirakosyan 2010, 41). Delegates arriving for the election of the Catholicos in June had returned 
                                                
201 Stalin had certain territorial demands against Iran as well. The Soviet troops had occupied northern Iran in 1941. 
The nuclear attack on Japan was a sort of warning sign for Stalin. If the Soviet army continued the occupation of 
Iran and if it invaded Turkey, President Truman might consider using a nuclear bomb against the Soviet Union as 




from Armenia to their respective communities with the news of Soviets supporting the return of 
Armenian territories. This sparked many petitions, letters, discussions, and even demonstrations 
in various communities. In the meantime, the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs of 
Soviet Armenia intensively collected and translated memoranda, letters and petitions by various 
Armenian organizations to the United Nations, to the leaders of the United States and the UK, as 
well as just circulars in order to generate public support among Armenians. One such file 
produced by the Commissariat on May 14, 1946, contained in Russian translation about four 
dozen petitions, letters and memoranda, all relating to the incorporation of Armenian lands in 
Turkey to Soviet Armenia.202 The petitions and letters collected in the file varied from individual 
short letters, telegrams, to more elaborate memoranda and appeals by various Armenian 
organizations. Encouraged by the petitions of Armenian diasporic organizations, the Soviets 
hoped to gain the support of Western powers for their expansion against Turkey. Yet, the gap 
between the Soviet and Western interests was increasing at the time and relations were 
deteriorating.  
 
Concerned with the Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, on March 5, 1946 Winston Churchill 
gave a speech at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri, which became known as the “Iron 
Curtain” speech. The wartime ally of the Soviet Union was warning that “…an iron curtain [had] 
descended across the Continent,” behind which lay “all the capitals of the ancient states of 
Central and Eastern Europe: Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest 
and Sofia…” Under “the Soviet sphere,” behind the curtain, all were subject “in one form or 
                                                
202 “Spravka MID Armianskoĭ SSR “Obrasheniia zarubezhnykh Armianskikh organizatsiĭ k rukovoditel’iam 
velikikh derzhav i konferentsiiam ob”edinënnykh natsiĭ po voprosu prisoedineniia Armianskikh zemel’ v Turtsii k 
Sovetskoĭ Armenii” [Reference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Petitions of Armenian organizations abroad to 
the heads of great powers and conferences of the United Nations on the issue of the incorporation of Armenian lands 
in Turkey into Soviet Armenia] (in Kirakosyan 2010, 174-210). 
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another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in some cases, increasing measure of 
control from Moscow” (quoted in Rahe 1999, 66). In the following year, as the Communist 
expansion in Europe continued, and the British could no longer provide military or material 
assistance to the governments fighting against the expansion of Communism, President Truman 
thought the US should intervene. In his speech on March 12, 1947 at the US Congress, in 
response to the continuing civil war in Greece between the Communists and the Greek 
government, and to the potential Soviet threat against Turkey, the President called on Congress 
to vote for United States military and material assistance to nations fighting “totalitarian regimes 
forced upon them against their will.”203 The Truman Doctrine, as the ensuing policy of the 
United States became known, represented the United State’s aspiration as a growing super-power 
to provide material and military support to countries fighting against Communism. The chilling 
of relations between the wartime allies was growing into antagonism and enmity, thus opening 
the era of Cold War.  
 
The “Iron Curtain,” which descended in Europe after 1945, had a significant effect on the 
revitalized relations between Soviet Armenia and Armenians abroad. The deteriorating relations 
between the former Allies in the course of 1945-48, combined with the inability of the Soviet 
Armenian economy to cope with the growing numbers of Armenian repatriates, had a direct 
impact on the repatriation program. If in 1946, the number of the repatriates was about 50,000, in 
1947 it dropped to about 35,500, and in 1948 only around 3100 Armenians arrived to Soviet 
Armenia. Officially, repatriation was terminated in September 1948, but the last group of 
Armenians, consisting only of 162 individuals, arrived from the United States in January 1949 
                                                
203 “Truman Doctrine. President Harry S. Truman’s Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947,” 
The Avalon Project. Yale Law School: Lilian Goldman Law Library. 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. Accessed August 11, 2014. 
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(Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 241). During the Cold War years, many repatriates ended up in Russian 
exile charged as “Armenian nationalists” and “enemies of the nation” (cf. Kirakosyan 2010, 45). 
The pursuit of territorial claims against Turkey formally remained in the Soviet foreign policy 
agenda until the death of Stalin in 1953 without turning into any policy action. References to it in 
print were gradually abandoned and the Soviet Union officially dropped territorial claims against 
Turkey in May 30, 1953 (Kirakosyan 2010, 46). Armenian hopes to have these territories back 
from Turkey once again remained unfulfilled. The common interests of territorial annexation, 
which had mobilized almost all the Armenian diasporic organizations, was short-lived and was 
soon destroyed by the approaching Cold War. They did not bring any reconciliation between the 
Dashnak and pro-Soviet Armenian factions. Instead, the Cold War and the developing global 
bipolarism tremendously exacerbated the existing antagonisms and conflicts. All these events 
happening during WWII and its immediate aftermath, however, had different impact on 
Armenian communities and institutions in various countries. 
 
 
Armenians in France: From WWII to the Cold War 
 
Having served as the most important hub of the Armenian diasporic political activism in the 
1920s and early 1930s, Armenian organizational activity in France significantly declined during 
the war. In 1939, at the outset of the war, the French government adopted certain laws, severely 
restricting affiliation with foreign associations. During the French preparations for war, the 
general mobilization decree issued in September 1939 targeted among others all étrangers sans 
nationalité of ages between 20 and 48 as well. These were to serve in the French army, along 
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with French citizens (Le Tallec 2001, 156-8, 160). While many Armenians joined the French 
army, the restricting regulations and laws began affecting the activities of Armenian compatriotic 
unions, associations culturelles, as well as other political and charitable organizations. The 
Bureau of the Dashnaktsutyun had already moved from Paris to Egypt prior to the war, and 
following the Nazi occupation of France in May-June 1940, the Dashnaktsutyun chapters 
became practically inactive throughout the country. The Vichy regime204 outlawed all 
Communist-leaning organizations, including the Hnchakyans (Le Tallec 2001, 174; Mandel 
2003, 180). By the outbreak of the war, the AGBU had established its headquarters and many 
chapters in France, had invested in many projects, constructed a dorm for Armenian students at 
Cité universitaire in Paris, and established Bibliotheque Nubar. In 1940, several days after the 
Nazi invasion, the AGBU headquarters were moved to New York (Melk‘onyan 2005, 316-17).  
 
Life in Paris and elsewhere under the Occupation was paralyzed, as was Armenian activism. 
With few exceptions, Armenian-language periodicals ceased publication. Haratch, the most 
prominent Dashnak-leaning newspaper, and Anahit, the celebrated literary-political monthly 
edited by Arshag Chobanian, a Ramkavar, also ceased publication in 1940 (Le Tallec 2001, 148; 
Mouradyan 1991, 46; Ter-Minassian 1994, 216). France could no longer serve as the center from 
where Armenian organizations outside France would expect to receive guidance on future 
strategies, policies and organizational matters.  
 
                                                
204 Following the German occupation in 1940, France was divided into two parts. The Occupied Zone in the north 
and northwest was directly controlled by the Nazis. It contained the most important industrial centers of France, 
including Paris. The Unoccupied Zone, or the Zone Libre, included the rural areas of Central and Southern France 
and nominally remained under French control until 1942. The government in Zone Libre was established in the town 
of Vichy and became known as the Vichy regime. The French Occupation ended the Third Republic, as the 




Armenian communists, some former Hnchakyan and HOK activists joined the French 
Résistance. Most Armenians, however, as apatride foreigners, tried to keep a low profile in order 
to escape the fate that befell the Jews under Nazi Occupation. Under the Vichy regime, the 
Armenians, along with Russians and Jews, were classified as “inassimilable” refugees.205 
Witnessing the persecution of the Jews, the apatride Armenians had every reason to fear for their 
fate. While many Armenians in the French army ended up in German Stalags,206 quite a few 
joined the underground Résistance in Marseille, Paris and elsewhere. But those who did not join 
the Résistance had to negotiate their rights and racial status in order to continue residing in 
France either by cooperating with the Nazis or by staying neutral (cf. Le Tallec 2001, 163, 186-
87; Mandel 2003, 185). Under such circumstances, certain Armenian circles embraced racial 
theories to substantiate Armenians’ belonging to the Aryan race, and certain Armenian 
organizations provided documents to certify this207 (cf. Le Tallec 2001, 186; Mandel 2003, 182).  
 
Following the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941, Germany initiated the 
creation of an Armenian battalion as part of the foreign legions recruited mostly from among the 
POWs. By the summer of 1942, several Armenian battalions had already been put in action, 
commanded by Dro (Drastamat Kanayan), the last Minister of Defense of the Republic of 
Armenia in 1920. The Armenian regiments were distinguished by the shield symbols sewn to 
                                                
205 Georges Mauco, the best expert on immigration since the 1920s, had the following to say with regards to 
refugees in 1941: “While the Russians are far from the French people in many respects, they generally have a 
cultural level that allows contact. With the Armenians, even this contact is difficult … They have been living for 
generations in a situation of enforced inferiority, and they have been chronically terrorized. With the exception of 
some isolated individuals, this has shaped a soul adapted to constraint in which character gives way to shifty 
obsequiousness” (quoted in Weil 2008, 132). Mauco went on to portray the Jews as having “souls shaped by the 
long humiliations of a servile state,” like Armenians, whose “repressed hatred was masked by obsequiousness” 
(quoted in Weil 2008, 132). 
206 Prisoner of War (POW) camps. 
207 The Office des Réfugiés Arméniens, (the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia), continued providing 
certificates to refugees d’origine arménienne to confirm their belonging to the Armenian race (Mouradian and 
Kunth 2010, 40; Le Tallec 2001, 185). 
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their sleeves in the colors of the Armenian tricolor flag (Le Tallec 2001, 177-78; Ch‘ormisian 
1975, 189; Thomassian 2012, 62-3). In the same year the Nazi military administration initiated 
the creation of the Armenischen Nationalen Gremiums (Armenian National Council/Committee) 
in Berlin, headed by Artashes Abeghian, a professor at Berlin University. Abeghian invited 
Garegin Nzhdeh208 and Vahan P‘ap‘azian, two well-known Dashnak leaders, to serve on the 
council. The Council established a weekly named Armenien and broadcast an Armenian 
language program on Radio Berlin.209 In their support of the anti-Soviet mission of the Nazis, 
these Dashnak activists sought, first of all, to establish the racial purity of the Armenians and, 
secondly, hoped to liberate Armenia after the Soviet defeat (cf. Atamian 1955, 398-99; 
Ch‘ormisian 1975, 198; Khurshudyan 1964, 63; Le Tallec 2001, 176; Thomassian 2012, 32; 
Walker 1990, 357-58). One of the effects of the cooperation with the Nazis was the saving of 
Armenian prisoners from concentration and POW camps. These soldiers preferred joining the 
Armenische Legion over suffering and dying at camps (cf. Ch‘ormisian 1975, 203). In order to 
prove the Armenians’ racial purity several “scholarly” works appeared in German and French in 
this period, including R. Kherumian’s Les Arméniens: race, origines ethno-raciales (Paris, 
Vigot, 1941), H.H. Sandel’s Die armenische Nation im Laufe der Jahrtausende (1943) and a 
number of articles published in French- and German-language newspapers of the time (Le Tallec 
2001, 186-87). Apparently, these works were written in response to Alfred Rosenberg’s 
perception of the Armenians as “the people of the wastes,” next to the Jews, and Hitler’s 
insistence on a racial legislation, which would protect “the German blood from contamination, 
not only of the Jewish but also of the Armenian blood” (quoted in Bardakjian 1985, 30).  
                                                
208 Garegin Nzhdeh was expelled from the Dashnaktsutyun at the end of the 1930s. His cooperation with the Nazis 
led to his arrest in 1944 by the Soviet counterintelligence in Bulgaria. Nzhdeh was sentenced to 25 years’ 
imprisonment and died in prison in the Soviet Union in 1955 (Ovsepian 2007, 3-4; 10) 
209 Ch‘ormisian (1975, 189) recalls how an Armenian female voice announced everyday “Ushadrut‘yun, 




Despite the fact that some prominent Dashnaks cooperated with the Nazis, many others did not. 
The decentralized nature of the party allowed the local chapters and committees to be flexible. 
Shavarsh Missakian, the former Bureau member and the editor of Haratch refused to cooperate 
with the Nazis in the Occupied Zone and terminated Haratch in 1940. According to an 
eyewitness account of Lewon Ch‘ormisian210 (1975, 190), there were no Dashnak Armenian 
regiments in France.211 The French Dashnaks felt a certain loyalty to France, which had hosted 
Armenians for decades and had fallen under the occupation of the enemy, but, on the other hand, 
they were hesitant to join their ideological enemies, the Communists and Communist Armenians, 
who joined the Résistance. Consequently, most Dashnaks preserved neutrality and preferred to 
keep low profile in France during the war.  
 
The Armenian Communists, former affiliates of HOK and the Union populaire franco-
arménienne212 decidedly joined the French Résistance against the Nazis. The Résistance was 
organized and led by General Charles De Gaulle, who represented the government of Free 
France in London. In the initial years of the Occupation in 1940-41, the Résistance could not 
achieve much success. But from 1943 onwards the movement gained many followers from 
among the Communists and became increasingly influential, especially in the Occupied Zone (cf. 
Haine 2000, 165; Howarth and Varouxakis 2003, 111). The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union 
mobilized the members of Comintern against Hitler. The anti-Nazi mobilization of the 
                                                
210 Ch‘ormisian was a member of the Dashnak party in the 1930s, but he was later expelled and gradually turned 
into a fierce anti-Dashnak (Ch‘ormisian 1975: 100; 199; 211; 225). 
211 Similarly, the Dashnak chapter in Cairo affirmed its loyalty to the Allies. The Times in London also published an 
article in 1941 denying any Armenian pro-Nazi affiliations in Britain (Walker 1990, 356-7). 
212 The Union was created in 1937, after the dissolution of HOK. It emerged from the merger of several former 
HOK chapters (see Chapter 3.2). 
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Communists became especially efficient in France from 1943, when the Communist Party 
chapters reorganized themselves into underground paramilitary units. Many Armenians and other 
immigrant Communists were affiliated with the French Communist Party through its chapters 
called Main-d’oeuvre Immigrée (MOI).  
 
In 1942, Missak Manouchian, the former leader of the Union populaire franco-arménienne, 
became one of the leaders of Francs-tireurs et partisans de la MOI (FTP-MOI)213 in Paris and 
assumed the leadership of several of its paramilitary guerrilla detachments. One of its 
detachments, called “Stalingrad,” comprised mostly Armenian and Polish immigrants. Under the 
leadership of Manouchian, the regiments of FTP-MOI instigated several attacks on the Nazi 
Occupiers in Paris and assassinated some high-ranking officials. The group was eventually 
arrested in 1944 and all 23 members of the Manouchian Group, as they were referred to, were 
executed in February 1944  (cf. Le Tallec 2001, 167; Mandel 2003, 182). Following the 
execution, the Nazi military administration printed and spread 15,000 copies of a poster, which 
depicted the executed members of the Manouchian Group on a red background and described 
them as criminals. The Affiche Rouge, as the poster became widely known, portrayed pictures of 
five Polish Jews, two Hungarian Jews, an Italian, a Spanish and Missak Manouchian, the 
Armenian chef de bande (Fig. 4.1). The poster was widely disseminated in France with a note 
denouncing the Résistance fighters as having been inspired by “foreigners,” “Jews,” and labeling 
them as “l’armée du crime contre la France.”214 Following the liberation of France in 1944, the 
Affiche Rouge became one of the symbols of the Liberation. The members of the Manouchian 
                                                
213 “Free-shooters” and Partisans of the MOI. 
214 “The army of crime against France.” Quoted from the webpage of the Musée de l’Histoire de l’Immigration of 
France (http://www.histoire-immigration.fr/des-dossiers-thematiques-sur-l-histoire-de-l-immigration/l-affiche-
rouge. Accessed August 7, 2014) 
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Group were honored as martyrs and became symbols of the Résistance and Liberation (cf. Le 
Tallec 2001, 170; Mandel 2003, 188).  
 
Figure 4-1. Affiche Rouge.  
(Source: Musée de l’Histoire de l’Immigration, 
 http://www.histoire-immigration.fr. Accessed September 2, 2014) 
 
The extent of Armenian participation in the French Résistance still needs further research. 
However, based on some secondary evidence, Armenian participation acquired multiple forms, 
ranging from locally oriented individual and small group activities to organizationed efforts (cf. 
Le Tallec 2001, 178-84; Mandel 2003, 184). At the outset of the war, the Armenian members of 
the French Communist party initiated the creation of Front National Arménien (FNA) [Armenian 
National Front] and l’Association des Jeunes Patriots Arméniens [Association of Young 
Armenian Patriots]. Despite functioning informally and mostly underground during the years of 
occupation, the activities of the FNA became more manifest in the final months of the 
 
 259 
Occupation. On August 22, 1944 the FNA issued a call to all Armenians in Paris and the Parisian 
region: 
Armenians, the victorious Allied armies are not far from Paris. The French people continue the fight for 
Liberty. The French combatants are experiencing heroic hours and Paris stands proudly with its barricades 
against the German [soldiers]. Victory is near, but the struggle is not over. You, who during four years, 
have suffered with this people under the German boot, you, who have thousands of prisoners in the German 
concentration camps; you, who even under the most ferocious Hitlerian repressions have been able to give 
a courageous generation like the martyrs MANOUCHIAN, MANOUKIAN and others, who have struggled 
with weapons in hand side by side with the French combatants for our Homeland and for this country, 
which has welcomed us, rise! Put all your strength in the service of French people, who have stood up in 
rebellion, whose liberation is yours and whose victory is that of your homeland! 
Young Armenians, join the ranks of F.F.I215 and fight with the Armenian patriotic militia groups and the 
Armenian National Front, side by side with the French brothers. 
Participate in the construction of barricades. 
Death to the Hitlerians!  
Long live the friendship of the Armenian and French people! 
Long live heroic Paris! Long live Free France! (Quoted and translated from Le Tallec 2001, 170-171) 
  
The statement calling on Armenians to fight side by side with the French people, reveals several 
notable points. First of all, it suggests that by the end of WWII even the most integrated 
Communist Armenians still felt foreigners in France, despite their presence in the country for 
almost two decades. They call on Armenians to fight both for their “Homeland” [Soviet 
Armenia] and for the “country, which welcomed” them, implying that Armenians are still 
foreigners in France. Secondly, the call to fight “side by side with the French brothers” for 
liberation of France, the hailing of the friendship of the Armenians and French, represents a 
certain pledge of loyalty to the French people and France as the country which “welcomed 
Armenians.” The FNA leadership refrained from calling France the Homeland, but it hailed 
Liberated France and affirmed Armenian participation in the liberation struggle. In the context of 
the Allied victories against the common enemy, the Axis powers, presenting Soviet Armenia or 
even Soviet Union as the Homeland216 became completely compatible with the calls to fight for 
                                                
215 Forces françaises de l’intérieur (FFI),was the army of French Résistance under the command of General De 
Gaulle (Le Tallec 2001, 162) 
216 The Armenian communists often referred to Soviet Union as the Homeland. Missak Manouchian also often 
referred to the Soviet Union as the “homeland of the working class” (Ter-Minassian 1997, 40). Along similar lines, 
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France. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the statement manifests a significant change in 
the language of Armenian Communists. Rather than calling for class struggle against the 
imperialists, they were calling on Armenians regardless of class to join the struggle against the 
Germans, side by side with their “brothers,” the French people regardless of class, much in 
accordance with the policies of the USSR during the War. During the same period, between May 
and August 1944, the Association of Young Armenians disseminated secret circulars among the 
Armenians in France, which expressed patriotic feelings towards Soviet Armenia, compared the 
economic, demographic and agricultural developments in Turkey to those in Soviet Armenia to 
demonstrate the advantages of the Soviet regime and called on the Armenians to fight the 
Germans, the WWI allies of Turkey.217 The activation of ethnopolitical organizations in the post-
WWII political context in France, such as the Armenian FNA, Mandel (2003, 191) attributes to 
the Vichy years, which “sparked a more public and vocal ethnopolitical consciousness among 
various local minority groups.” The heavy emphasis the Nazis placed on ethnicity and race 
certainly influenced prevailing ideologies and identifications in the Nazi occupied regions. As a 
reflection of that, the Vichy regime and their collaborators stressed race and ethnicity in their 
publications, radio broadcasts and newspapers,218 which in turn enhanced the racial and ethnic 
identifications of the population groups under their control. The treatment of different population 
groups according to their race and ethnicity under the Occupation and the Vichy regime, and the 
responses generated by these groups, including the Armenians, made a significant impact on the 
reinforcement of ethno-racial consciousness and identities in France.  
                                                                                                                                                       
Levon Ch‘ormisian, who was pro-Soviet, but not Communist, and had chaired the first congress of the FNA in 1945, 
wrote in retrospect: “Soviet Union in its entirety provided the most favorable conditions for the development and 
security of the Armenian people. Therefore, [it] became sort of a homeland not only for the Russians, but also for all 
the nationalities constituting it, [including] … the Armenians” (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 187). 
217 Four circulars ended up in the archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenian SSR and were translated 
from French into Russian in June 1946 (Kirakosyan 2010, 105-122). 
218 For example, L’Ethnie française was a periodical, founded in 1940 by George Montandon, an anti-Jewish and 




In the immediate aftermath of the war, the Communists emerged largely favored by the French 
nation for their participation in the Résistance. The rightists, in contrast, were discredited 
because of their association with the Vichy administration. The post-war euphoria of the 
victorious Communists in France and the persecutions of the extreme right had their parallels 
among the Armenians: condemnations and suppression of the Dashnak party and its rank and file 
continued in the immediate aftermath of the war. Moreover, the Dashnaks were often referred to 
as Fascists. In 1944-1946 the Dashnaktsutyun was practically absent from Armenian communal 
affairs in France, which was dominated by the FNA (Boghossian 2009, 180). The FNA actively 
hailed the Liberation of France and spent much effort to propagate Armenian participation in the 
Résistance (cf. Mandel 2003, 188-89). It sought to bring together all Armenian organizations and 
create an Armenian representation in France demonstrating yet another turn from class to ethnic 
affairs. In January 1945, the FNA initiated the unification of Armenian youth organizations 
under the umbrella organization called Jeunesse Arménienne de France (JAF). The Dashnak 
leadership in France, however, was reluctant of encouraging its youth to join. The same year, the 
party initiated the creation of its youth organization, Nor Seround (La nouvelle génération).219  
 
The first General congress of the FNA, convened in March 1945, brought together 
representatives from all Armenian political factions and various charitable and benevolent 
organizations (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 202, 205). Still hesitant about the future and without clear 
instructions from the Bureau and the leadership, some Dashnak representatives also participated 
                                                
219 Nor Seround youth organization should not be confused with the homonymous Nor Serount Cultural 
Association, founded by the Hnchakyan party in Beirut in 1955 (see Chapter 4.4). 
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in the Congress and were reluctantly involved in the Communist dominated Central Board220 
(Ch‘ormisian 1975, 204). The Armenian National Union, as the new organization became known 
after the Congress, even became interested in the affairs of the Armenian Church. The Board 
could no longer tolerate that the only Armenian Church in Paris was controlled by some 
individuals. They registered 5000 parish members and conducted an election for a new Board of 
Trustees (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 207).   
 
The Armenian National Union in France became actively involved in Armenian territorial 
claims. On August 30, 1945, the Union sent a petition, a memorandum and a resolution to the 
London Conference of Foreign Ministers of the victorious Allied Powers justifying the need to 
consider the return of Armenian territories from Turkey. Based on the signatures, the Armenian 
National Union comprised the following Armenian organizations: FNA, AGBU, National Union 
of Ancient Combatants of France, Armenian Catholic mission in Paris, Armenian Benevolent 
Society in Paris, Armenian Protestant Community in France, the JAF, the Armenian Church in 
Paris and Association of Armenian Women Tebrotzassère (Dprotsaser).221 It seems that officially 
at least, the Dashnaktsutyun was not represented at the National Union, although the Executive 
Board, according to Ch‘ormisian, had a few Dashnak members. But the Dashnak leaders in 
France, as elsewhere, also supported the Armenian land claims by sending various petitions and 
memoranda independently or in cooperation with other Armenian organizations. The petition 
sent on behalf of the “Armenian community” of France to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Soviet Armenia in September 1945 along with the signatures of the member organizations of the 
Armenian National Union, also included the signature of Shavarsh Missakian as the 
                                                
220 The Central Board, elected at the Congress, comprised 21 members, of which 2 were Dashnaks, 2 Ramkavars, 8-
10 Communists and the rest were non-partisan (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 204). 
221 The document is available in Kirakosyan 2010 (122-144). 
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representative of Haratch (Kirakosyan 2010, 55-60). Hrant Samuelian, the president of the 
Office des Réfugiés Arméniens, sent a petition to the Soviet Embassy in Paris and also to the 
representatives of the United States, France and Great Britain with the same request. In a joint 
accord, Hrant Samuelian and Arshag Chobanian sent a petition on behalf of the Office des 
Réfugiés Arméniens (Delegation of the Republic of Armenia)222 and Comité Central des Réfugies 
Arméniens (former Armenian National Delegation)223 to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
USSR, Vyacheslav Molotov. On September 7, 1945, Shavarsh Missakian handed another 
memorandum to Molotov and to the representatives of the United States and Great Britain, on 
behalf of the “Armenian Socialist party” (the Dashnaktsutyun), demanding that the territories 
allocated to Armenia by president Wilson were annexed to Soviet Armenia (Kirakosyan 2010, 
93-4; 205-207).  
 
In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the FNA and the Armenian National Union were also 
involved in local French politics and explicitly advocated for the rights of Armenians (Mandel 
2003, 190-91). One of the first acts of the provisional government of France under General De 
Gaulle was the revision of the Naturalization Act of 1927. Amid the debates on the criteria for 
providing naturalization, De Gaulle insisted that the participants of the Résistance be given 
certain priority (Weil 2008, 135). The Act of 1945 significantly eased the process and 
accelerated the naturalization of foreigners in France (Weil 2008, 146). The new act provided a 
basis for the Armenian National Union to advocate for granting French citizenship to the 
Armenians. For the first time, after twenty years, Armenians along with many other étrangers, 
                                                
222 The Office des Réfugiés Arméniens was on 71 Avenue Kléber in Paris, the same address, from where the 
Delegation of the Republic of Armenia provided identity cards to Armenians in the 1920s and 1930s. The 
Delegation of the Republic of Armenia had not formally ended and in internal correspondence, Hrant Samuelian was 
often referred to as the head of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia (cf. Mouradian and Kunth 2010, 40) 
223 According to Le Tallec (2001: 185) these two organizations merged in 1945. 
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were finally considered eligible for acquiring naturalization in 1947. While many Armenians 
applied for naturalization, some were reluctant to receive French citizenship. The repatriation of 
Armenian refugees, launched by the Soviet authorities immediately following the war in 1945, 
had made the perspective of moving to Soviet Armenia more appealing to many. 
 
The repatriation to Soviet Armenia provided another ground for a brief unification of the 
Armenian efforts in France. The Hnchakyans with the Ramkavars supported and participated in 
organizing the repatriation. The AGBU provided financial assistance, while the Dashnaktsutyun 
also spoke in favor of repatriation and supported the program. But, similar to earlier incidents 
during the interwar period, the process of organization largely alienated and marginalized the 
Dashnak sympathizers and members. With the initiative of the Soviet Embassy in France and the 
active participation of some Armenian organizations, a Committee of Repatriation was formed, 
which excluded the Dashnaks, as elsewhere in the diaspora. The Dashnak rank and file or 
sympathizers were excluded form the list of eligible repatriates as well (Le Tallec 2001, 194-95). 
Two ships with altogether about 5,000 - 7,000 Armenians aboard224 departed from Marseille in 
August and December of 1947 (Arnoux 2007, 145-6). While the Dashnaktsutyun was once again 
excluded from participating both in the Committee and in repatriation, the party leadership in 
France remained active in the pursuit of the territorial claims initiated by the Soviet government 
and advocated for the return of Armenian lands to Soviet Armenia. 
 
Petitions, memoranda and universal support for the repatriation continued until 1947. The 
popular enthusiasm among Armenians was quelled after the Deputy Foreign Minister of the 
                                                
224 According to Melik‘set‘yan (185, 241), the number of Armenians arriving from France was 5260, while 
Ch‘ormisian (1975, 211), Ter Minassian (1997, 78) suggest 7,000 and Le Tallec (2001, 197) puts around 7,300. 
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USSR Andrei Vyshinsky mentioned at the UN session of October 24, 1947 that Kars and 
Ardahan had been Georgian territories. Vyshinsky’s speech was published in Pravda on October 
28, 1947. In his speech, referring to a work recently submitted by two Georgian academics, 
Vyshinsky concluded that “…therefore, the authors of this letter peacefully … express their wish 
based on historical, ethnographic, political and all other grounds for the return of those lands to 
the Georgian republic, [the] Georgian people. This is just, because those lands belong to 
Georgia” (Pravda October 28, 1947). Vyshinsky’s statement sparked heated discussions in 
especially Dashnak affiliated newspapers abroad. The chilling relations between the Soviet 
Union and the West facilitated the Dashnaktsutyun’s regaining of self-confidence and its 
resumption of anti-Soviet policies. On January 9, 1948, Haratch resumed the criticism of the 
opponents of the Dashnak party with an added self-confidence. The paper condemned the 
Bolshevik-Hnchak-Ramkavar “parrots,” who still hoped that the “Father of Nations” (Stalin) 
would realize the Armenian demands. After the defeat of the Nazis and the discrediting of the 
rightist ideologies, Haratch and the Dashnaktsutyun in France began accentuating the party’s 
socialist aspect, moving towards the left, closer to the French Socialist party in the political 
spectrum.225 For the Dashnak leaders in France, the move was justified in the arriving Cold War 
context, because it allowed the party to resume the anti-Soviet propaganda without fear of being 
associated with the Nazis.  
 
France was involved in the Cold War by subscribing to the US Marshall Plan in 1947. The 
Marshall Plan, announced by the US Secretary of State George Marshall in June 1947, 
proclaimed the readiness of the United States to provide grants and loans to the European 
                                                




countries in order to help them rebuild their economies. France benefitted greatly from the 
financial assistance coming from the Untied States. The economic boom of the French society 
was so tremendous that the years of 1945-1975 were later labeled as Les Trente Glorieuses [The 
Glorious Thirty] (cf. Haine 2000, 173; 194). As Haine (2000, 175) notes, “once France accepted 
the Marshall Plan” it became clear “that the country would not declare its neutrality between the 
Soviet and American camps.” As an expression of the Cold War alliances in France, the 
Communist Party was expelled from the government in 1947 for its opposition to the economic 
and social policy proposed by the government (Haine 2000, 175).  
 
The anti-Communist course that the government of the Fourth Republic pursued, eventually led 
to the legal dissolution of all “foreign” organizations affiliated with the Résistance and the 
Communist Party. The Armenian National Front also dissolved in 1948 (Boghossian 2009, 191-
92; Ch‘ormisian 1975, 210; Le Tallec 2001, 200). The dissolution of the FNA scattered the pro-
Soviet faction in the Armenian National Union, although some of the former FNA members 
regrouped and founded l’Union culturelle française des Arméniens de France (UCFAF) (French 
Cultural Union of Armenians of France). The UCFAF was registered according to the 1901 law 
on June 18, 1949. It mostly comprised former Hnchakyans, former members of the FNA and 
some active members of the French Communist Party. The UCFAF aimed at a) reaffirming the 
existing secular ties between the French and Armenian people; b) introducing the cultures of 
both peoples to one another; c) introducing Armenia, its culture, history and progress to both the 
Armenian community in France and the French people. The JAF and the UCFAF became closely 




Having almost identical goals and activities, the JAF and Nor Seround began representing the 
Cold War youth factions among Armenians. The JAF and the UCFAF remained pro-Soviet, 
celebrated November 29, the day of Sovietization of Armenia, while Nor Seround and the 
Dashnaktsutyun, celebrated May 28, the Independence Day of the Republic of Armenia 
(Ch‘ormisian 1975, 217; 226; Le Tallec 2001, 200-201). The strength of the Communist Party 
during the war and until 1948 and the ensuing strength of the Armenian Communists led to the 
actual dissolution of most Hnchakyan chapters226 and the emergence of local organizations, 
congenial to the French social-political context, such as the JAF and the UCFAF. Although 
ostensibly apolitical, through their cultural, artistic programs, camps, and friendly relations with 
Soviet Armenia, these organizations provided an alternative to the Dashnaktsutyun’s reclaimed 
anti-Soviet orientation and growing influence in France.  
 
The Cold War provided the Dashnaktsutyun with a favorable climate. Haratch resumed in 1945 
and from 1947 it returned to its anti-Soviet orientation. The party, often referring to itself as the 
Parti Socialiste Arménien, gradually allied with the French Socialist party (SFIO) and became 
very active and visible. In 1953, the Dashnaktsutyun supported the election of the Socialist 
Gaston Defferre as the Mayor of Marseille, who remained in that position for 33 years. The 
cooperation reinforced the party’s political position in Marseille and affirmed its leading role 
within the Armenian community. In parallel to the founding of the JAF and the UCFAF chapters 
in various Armenian populated regions, the Dashnaktsutyun regrouped the anti-Soviet camp by 
founding chapters of Nor Seround and Croix Bleue in many regions and towns in France. The 
party became so visible that Ch‘ormisian (1975, 220), a former member of the UCFAF, 
reluctantly concluded: “It is a fact that as a political organization in the French Armenian 
                                                
226 Ch‘ormisian (1975, 223) notes that only a handful of Hnchakyans remained faithful to the party. 
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community, the Dashnaktsutyun preserved its existence and continues to exist in contrast to the 
dissolved and lamentable conditions of other political parties.”  
 
 
Armenians in the United States: From WWII to the Cold War 
 
The US entered WWII in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. 
The unprecedented US-Soviet alliance in the war after two decades of nearly non-existent 
political relations had most significant repercussions for the Armenian-American communities. 
In the context of the prevailing anti-Nazi and pro-Soviet atmosphere in the early to the mid-
1940s, the polarization inside the community after the church schism of 1933 intensified and 
divided it into two distinct camps. 
 
By the outbreak of WWII, the Dashnaktsutyun had been largely marginalized in the United 
States due to the events of 1933. In the 1930s, many Dashnak sympathizers and members had 
been left out of the churches loyal to the Diocese of North America. The radicalization and 
growing hostilities had severely altered interactions and interrelations between families and 
relatives, and had even broken many families. In the years following the assassination of Abp. 
Tourian, Dashnaks were labeled as “assassins,” “priest killers” and “people with knives in their 
pockets” (Phillips 1989, 132-33). Regardless of how Dashnak-affiliated people actually 
interpreted the incident, they were no longer welcome to churches affiliated with the Diocese. 
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The congregation in these churches in most cases indirectly, but in some cases directly, made 
them feel unwelcome.227  
 
Wherever Dashnaks constituted majority on the church boards or among parishioners, the 
sympathizers of Ramkavars were similarly excluded from churches. Such incidents were 
recorded in Philadelphia, New York, Fresno and elsewhere (cf. Atamian 1955, 373). In the Holy 
Trinity church in Fresno, for example, where the majority of the parishioners were Dashnak 
sympathizers, the general membership voted in a meeting in December 1934 in favor of 
terminating its affiliation with the Ējmiatsin affiliated Diocese. The non-Dashnaks and their 
sympathizers were left out of the church and had no church to attend until 1939, when they 
founded the St. Paul Armenian Apostolic Church (Bulbulian 2000, 94). The voluntary and forced 
exclusion of the political adversaries and their sympathizers from churches separated the 
Armenian communities everywhere in the Untied States, confining the spaces of interaction only 
to their respective community circles. The polarization of pro- and anti-Dashnak communities 
had been going on for several years, when the United States declared War on the Axis Powers in 
December 1941.  
 
The US-Soviet Alliance against the Nazis was first of all detrimental to the Dashnaktsutyun, 
whose anti-Soviet stand for the past two decades proved untenable during the war. The American 
Central Committee of the Party was quick to respond to the new international balance of power 
following the US alliance with the Soviet Union in WWII. The December 24, 1941 issue of 
                                                
227 One of Jenny Phillips’ respondents from Watertown recalled the following story: “I was married in St. James and 
my child was christened there. I was in the choir there for fifteen years. I always felt St. James was my church. I was 
attending church one day and this guy approached me from behind. I had known him for years. He said, “What are 
you doing here?” I said, “What do you mean? This is my church.” He said, “The Tashnaks have their own church 
now. I figured you’d be over there.” This was it. I never went back to St. James” (Phillips 1989, 133-34). 
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Hairenik Daily published the proclamation of the Dashnaktsutyun, which confirmed the 
unconditional support of the party to the Allies. The anti-Dashnak faction vociferously cast doubt 
on the honesty of Dashnak intentions (cf. Atamian 1955, 387-88). They took full advantage of 
the American-Soviet Alliance to improve their position in the Untied States.  
 
In November 1941, Abp. Karekin Hovsepian, the Primate of the Diocese, initiated the Armenian 
War Relief campaign in support of the Soviet army and Armenian refugees in the Soviet Union 
and the diaspora (Melk‘onyan 2005, 332-3). The Armenian-American community, socially and 
structurally divided into pro- and anti-Dashnak factions, could no longer respond in unison to the 
calls of the Catholicos of Ējmiatsin or the Primate of the Armenian Church in New York for the 
creation of the “Sasunts‘i Davit‘” committee.228 The call was answered only by organizations 
with certain pro-Soviet leanings. The “Sasunts‘i Davit‘” committee was formed of the 
representatives from the Hnchakyan and Ramkavar parties, Armenian Apostolic and Evangelical 
churches, as well as the AGBU. The committee succeeded in raising a substantial amount of 
funds, more than $100,000 for the cause (Kitur 1963, 105; cf. Melk‘onyan 2005, 334-35). The 
opportunity and common cause of openly supporting the Soviet Union and Soviet Armenia 
brought together all the pro-Communist, pro-Soviet and politically neutral Armenian 
organizations in the Armenian National Council in March 1944. The Armenian Apostolic and 
Evangelical churches and the AGBU supported the activities of the Council, which comprised 
the Ramkavars, the Armenian Progressive League (Communists), the Hnchakyans and 
representatives of some compatriotic societies (cf. Aharonian [1964] 1986, 195). The Council 
particularly set four objectives: 
                                                
228 The committee was the initiative of the Primate in order to raise funds for the creation of the previously 
mentioned “Sasunts‘i Davit‘” tank regiment for the Red Army. 
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1. Assisting the war effort of the Allies; 
2. Organizing the means to help the Soviet Union and Soviet Armenia; 
3. Defending the rights of diaspora Armenians by all means and working for their resettlement on 
Armenian lands; 
4. Taking the necessary measures in assisting the emigration movement229 (quoted in Schahgaldian 1979, 
97) 
 
 One of the major acts of the Council was a memorandum addressed to the UN Founding 
Conference in San Francisco on June 8, 1945. The lengthy memorandum provided a brief outline 
of the events in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire, described in much detail the suffering 
and massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, and pled the conference for the return of 
the historical Armenian lands to Soviet Armenia, which would facilitate the return of more than a 
million Armenian refugees to their historical homeland (Kirakosyan 2010, 154-55). The Council 
addressed several other petitions to the leaders of the Great powers and other officials, 
expressing the same concern and request (Kirakosyan 2010, 91; 154; 177).  
 
By this time, the Dashnaktsutyun and its newspapers in the Untied States had significantly toned 
down their anti-Soviet rhetoric and propaganda. During the war and the years of Cold War, the 
Dashnak ideologists spent much effort to revise their previous priorities. One of the first 
expressions of such revision and retreat was the renaming of the Dashnak Tseghakron youth 
movement to the Armenian Youth Federation, an ideologically neutral designation. The founder 
of the Tseghakron movement in America, Garegin Nzhdeh, was in many ways inspired by the 
dominant racial theories and ideologies of the 1930s, and the word Tseghakron was interpreted 
especially by the Dashnak opponents as “race worshippers.”230  
 
                                                
229 The AGBU refrained from joining the Union, but pledged to continue supporting projects for Soviet Armenia. 
The organization found some of the articles in the program politically loaded, which could be detrimental to the tax-
exempt status the organization had been recently granted by the US Government (Melk‘onyan 2005, 336-37). 
230 Many scholars believe that the expulsion of Nzhdeh from the Dashnaktsutyun was because of his “extreme and 
racist views” (Ovsepian 2007, 23; Panossian 2006, 301) 
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In 1943, the Hairenik Association in Boston published a pamphlet by Simon Vrats‘yan in 
English, entitled Armenia and the Armenian Question. Addressing the American audience, the 
author provided some background on the Armenian Question, stressed the scarcity of lands in 
Soviet Armenia and advocated for the need to expand its boundaries: 
Today the Armenian Question is primarily a question of territory, - specifically, the question of expanding 
the boundaries of Armenia to an extent which will meet the demands of the natural growth of population 
and the necessity of providing adequate room for those expatriated who want to return to the fatherland 
(Vrats‘ian 1943, 105) 
 
While the author still remained critical of the Bolshevik regime in Armenia, the anti-Soviet 
rhetoric in the pamphlet was significantly toned down, and Vrats‘ian even referred to Soviet 
Armenia as the “fatherland.” The annual convention of the Dashnaktsutyun in July 1944, in 
Boston, finally, resolved for the reversal of its anti-Soviet orientation.231 In 1945, as everywhere 
else, the Dashnaktsutyun in the Untied States began actively participating in the raising of 
territorial demands from Turkey, and advocating for their annexation to Soviet Armenia. The 
party revived the Armenian Committee for Independence of Armenia (ACIA),232 renamed it to 
the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) and resumed its lobbying activism. 
Acting independently from the Armenian National Council of America, the Armenian National 
Committee also sent several petitions to Joseph Stalin, the leaders of the great powers and the 
representatives to the UN Founding Conference in San Francisco. In April 1945, a Dashnak 
delegation headed by Simon Vrats‘ian handed a memorandum to the delegates of the UN 
Conference in San Francisco on behalf of the Armenian National Committee in New York 
                                                
231 “The Tashnags turn to Soviet Russia.” Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Special Report. July 31, 1944. 
DOC:0001485030. p. 1. 
232 The ACIA was an Armenian lobbyist organization, founded by Vahan Cardashian in 1918 “to push the Armenian 
cause in the US” and to support the newly founded Republic of Armenia (Aftandilian 1981, 26-8). The active period 
of the ACIA was 1918-1927 but despite the Committee attracted the sympathies and support of many high ranked 
Armenian political and social activists it “was not powerful enough … to achieve any concrete results for the 
Armenians” (Aftandilian 1981, 65). 
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(Kirakosyan 2010, 201). The memorandum stressed the contribution of Armenians serving in the 
Red Army, the French and American armies in the fight against Nazi Germany and advocated for 
the annexation of the Armenian lands to Soviet Armenia, according to the map suggested by 
Woodrow Wilson in 1920. The same report contained a telegram by the ANC addressed to 
Joseph Stalin on April 7, 1945, which read: 
When the government of the USSR under Your leadership decided to sign a new pact with Turkey, 
Armenians, forcibly deported from Turkish Armenia, and currently being in destitute all over the world, are 
appealing to You hoping in their hearts, that You will remember their just cause. Armenians did not forget 
Your historical declaration on the rights of Turkish Armenia and strongly believe You are still considering 
these rights in the same spirit and sympathy. 
They believe that under Your leadership and help, the Armenians will be able to realize their national 
yearning for the Soviet Republic, as a result of which Armenians would be able to return to their homeland 
and devote themselves to peaceful work and happiness (quoted and translated in Kirakosyan 2010, 201). 
 
The ANC addressed several other pleas and petitions to the leaders of the great powers, the UN 
Conference in San Francisco, and the UN General Assembly in January 1946 with similar 
requests. In all petitions and pleas, even when addressing the conditions of the fall of the 
Republic of Armenia, the ANC and the Dashnaktsutyun carefully refrained from making any 
anti-Bolshevik or anti-Soviet comments. Such caution was explained by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Soviet Armenia as another “tactical maneuver” by the Dashnaks, who preferred the 
“lesser evil” of the annexation of the Armenian provinces in Turkey to Soviet Armenia over 
“leaving them in the hands of Turkey” (quoted in Kirakosyan 2010, 161).  
 
Regardless of whether it was a tactical move or an honest attempt to adjust and redefine Dashnak 
policies in a changing world, the Soviet authorities and the anti-Dashnak faction in America 
could not believe that the Dashnaktsutyun could revise its anti-Soviet orientation and act in 
accordance with what they defined as the all-Armenian national interest. The text of the 
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Armenian National Council’s memorandum addressed to the UN Conference in San Francisco 
published in the Armenian Mirror-Spectator in June 1945, communicated this concern explicitly:  
The Armenian National Council of America which is comprised of and supported by all the Armenian 
civic, social, cultural, and religious organizations in the United States except a small Fascist faction known 
as the Dashnags … presents the case of the Armenian people to the delegation of the United Nations 
Conference on International Organization organized in San Francisco (quoted in Phillips 1989, 135). 
 
The escalating hostilities since the assassination of Archbishop Tourian and the mutual 
denouncements and calumniations had eliminated all possibilities for reconciliation between 
anti-Dashnaks and the Dashnaktsutyun, even when, for the first time since the 1920s, both 
groups pursued identical goals. The response of the Dashnaktsutyun to the Memorandum 
appeared shortly in Hairenik, on June 21, 1945. The article first of all questioned the legitimacy 
of the title “Armenian National Council of America,” claimed by the “Communist-Ramkavar-
Hnchak” bloc, and went on to criticize the memorandum: 
The memorandum, which murders the King’s English - there are no less than thirty-five grammatical and 
dictional errors, demands nothing more nor in a better way than what the far more ably edited and dignified 
memorandum of the Armenian National Committee had already demanded (quoted in Phillips 1989, 136). 
 
In France, the adversarial parties refrained from discrediting each other. In the case of Lebanon, 
Hnchakyans and the Dashnaktsutyun even managed to forge an alliance in the parliamentary 
elections of 1943, and the same year the Dashnaktsutyun took part in the celebrations of 
November 29, the day of Sovietization of Armenia233 (Schahgaldian 1979, 197). No such 
compromise and flexibility could be shown on the part of the anti-Dashnak factions in the United 
States. The Dashnaks, on the other hand, could not bring themselves to cooperating with the 
“Communist-Ramkavar-Hnchak” bloc either, whom they had accused as agents of the Soviets 
and with whom relations had been almost non-existent since the assassination of Archbishop 
Tourian.  
                                                




The repatriation campaign in America acquired mostly a form of financial and moral assistance 
to the restoration of Soviet Armenia. In terms of the actual repatriates, the total number of 
Armenians, who moved from the United States to Soviet Armenia from 1946 to 1949, was very 
low, around 300 (cf. Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 241). The project, instead, mostly targeted the return of 
Armenians from the Middle East and Europe. The AGBU in America launched a Million Dollar 
Repatriation campaign in April 1946, which continued until June 1947. The campaign indeed 
raised more than a million dollars in America alone and close to another half a million in the 
other communities (Melk‘onyan 2005, 364). The Dashnaktsutyun also contributed to the 
repatriation and relief efforts independently. An article published in Hairenik on July 11, 1946 
reported that the Armenian Relief Society raised and sent to Armenia $45,000 for medications, 
clothes and necessities (Zadoian 2012, 18).  
 
The popular enthusiasm among the non-Dashnak factions for the Soviet support to the Armenian 
Cause was further highlighted in their decision to organize a world congress so that the voice of 
Armenians would be heard at the UN General Assembly and by the Allied powers. The 
Armenian World Congress convened in New York from April 30 through May 4, 1947, with 
more than 700 delegates from many different countries (Aharonian [1964] 1986, 197). The 
Dashnaktsutyun and the AGBU did not formally participate in the convention. The 
Dashnaktsutyun was not invited, while the AGBU refrained from officially participating in a 
“political activity,” even if several AGBU members and high-ranking leaders did so unofficially 
in their personal capacity (Melk‘onyan 2005, 366-68). The Congress succeeded to arrange a 
meeting with the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson in May 1947, hoping to bring the issue of 
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Armenian lands to the attention of the US Government once again. Much to their deep 
disappointment, a few months after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the Armenian 
territorial demands were even more at odds with US foreign policy interests, as Acheson 
confirmed (cf. Aharonian [1964] 1986, 199; Melk‘onyan 2005, 266; Walker 1990, 362). The 
wartime American-Soviet cooperation had by now come to an end, clearing the way for the 
resumption of anti-Soviet propaganda throughout the country. The Dashnaktsutyun was quick to 
respond to the new state of affairs. One of the first expressions of their renewed anti-Soviet 
policies was the active involvement of the Dashnaktsutyun in transferring former Soviet POWs 
and displaced persons of Armenian nationality from European camps to America.   
 
In the course of 1946, when the Soviet Union launched a repatriation campaign of all former 
Soviet POWs and displaced persons (DP), the US officials recorded several incidents of 
executions, exile and mistreatment of the returning POWs in the Soviet Union. This process 
discouraged thousands of refugees from voluntarily returning to Soviet Union (cf. Marrus 1985, 
313-17; Zadoian 2012, 12). Amid the congressional debates on whether the US should admit the 
former POWs and the DPs, in July 1947 the Dashnaktsutyun and the Armenian Relief Society 
also began looking into possibilities of bringing the Armenian DPs to the United States. The 
initiator of the idea was George Mardikian,234 a famous restaurateur from San Francisco, who 
had encountered many Armenian displaced persons during his extended trip to Europe in 1947 as 
a food inspector appointed by the US government in American-occupied former POW camps in 
                                                
234 Atamian stresses that neither Mardikian nor his companions were members of the Dashnak party, but they were 
Dashnak sympathizers. According to him, the Ramkavars, Hnchaks and Bolsheviks refused to help Mardikian and 
his compatriots as they thought of them as “Fascists” and “betrayers of the Soviet” (Atamian 1955, 404). John 
Calrson (also known as Avedis Derounian or Arthur Derounian), a prominent anti-Dashnak Armenian-American 
journalist, also suggested that even before the founding of ANCHA, Mardikian had supported the Dashnaktsutyun 
by speaking at various meetings and contributing to the party financially (Carlson 1949-1950, 28) 
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Germany, Austria and Italy. Mardikian proposed the creation of an American National 
Committee to Aid Homeless Armenians (ANCHA) “in order to work toward the transportation 
effort of the 3,500 Displaced Armenians” from POW camps in Europe (Zadoian 2012, 19-20). 
Mardikian was hoping to get some support from the AGBU, but the idea of transporting 
Armenian DPs from Europe to anywhere else than Soviet Armenia was inconsistent with the 
repatriation projects the AGBU had supported. Mardikian and his companion and attorney, Suren 
Saroyan, found support in the Dashnak camp. They addressed the Dashnak leaders and rank and 
file at the conventions of the Dashnaktsutyun and the Armenian Relief Society, as well as at a 
special meeting with the representatives of the AYF at Camp Hayastan (cf. Carlson 1949-1950, 
32-3; Zadoian 2012, 19-21). The ANCHA project was eventually realized as a joint effort of 
Mardikian and the Armenian Relief Society, fully supported and encouraged by the Dashnak 
party. Under the existing immigration restrictions, the transferring of the Displaced Persons to 
the Untied States proved to be an unattainable task until 1948. With the passing of the Displaced 
Persons Act in 1948 the transportation of the DPs commenced. Between 1948 and 1960 more 
than 700,000 men and women were admitted under the DP act, of whom an estimated 5,500 
were Armenians, supported by ANCHA (Schneider 2011, 236; Zadoian 2012, 54). 
  
The active involvement of the United States in the struggle against the Soviet expansion in 
Europe and elsewhere - through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and the hosting of the 
Displaced Persons - left the Armenian National Council in disarray and led to its eventual 
disintegration. The Communists in general, the Armenian Progressive League and all 
Communist-affiliated organizations were outright persecuted, suppressed and silenced 
throughout the country. As Phillips noted, even the clergy affiliated with the Eastern Orthodox 
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churches significantly suffered from the consequences of the tense anti-Communist policy in the 
United States (Phillips 1989, 138-41). The Hnchakyans, who had significantly declined even 
before the war, went on publishing Eritasard Hayastan without much public activism. The 
Ramkavars also recorded a decline in the United States and elsewhere in the 1950s due to self-
censorship and their attempts to keep low profile (cf. Dallak‘yan 2007, 181-82). The official 
newspapers of the pro-Soviet groupings, Eritasard Hayastan of the Hnchakyans, Baikar, The 
Armenian-Mirror Spectator and Nor Or (Fresno, California) of the Ramkavars and Lraper of the 
Progressive Armenians, ended up in the so-called “subversive list” of the US government (cf. 
Crisis 1958, 116; Phillips 1989, 141). Under heavy charges for pro-Soviet activism made by the 
Dashnaks, the Ramkavars became very cautious, significantly reducing their propagandistic 
campaign on repatriation and limiting the news coverage of Soviet Armenia to only economic 
and cultural developments (cf. Dallak‘yan 2007, 187-88). Facing similar charges, the AGBU 
leaders had to meet with some high ranking officials at the State Department to prove that funds 
raised for repatriation had been entirely used for that purpose and had not been transferred to 
Soviet officials (cf. Melk‘onyan 2005, 371-72). Formal and informal persecution significantly 
reduced the number of youth organizations affiliated with these organizations as well.235  
 
The Dashnaktsutyun, in contrast, benefitted from the anti-Soviet attitudes in the internal and 
external policies of the United States. Many Dashnak leaders resumed political and ideological 
activism. Dashnak affiliated organizations, media and newspapers flourished, and pervasive anti-
Soviet propaganda intensified. Now holding a distinctly advantageous position, the 
Dashnaktsutyun actively embarked on publicly exposing the pro-Soviet identities of its 
                                                
235 One witness of the events interviewed by Phillips (1989, 140) recalled how hard it was explaining to the children 
that Soviet Armenia was the homeland, when the same children were being taught in American schools that the 
Soviet Union was the enemy of the United States. 
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Armenian political opponents. Numerous articles and propaganda works by prominent Dashnak 
leaders and editors of the time reappeared in various Dashnak journals. If during the War years 
and up to 1947, the Hairenik monthly had become a bimonthly, having significantly reduced its 
size, scope and themes, and political essays by Reuben Darbinian and others had almost 
disappeared, as had anti-Soviet articles, it resumed as a monthly from 1948, covering far more 
topics than just literary-historical accounts and memoirs, and resumed its anti-Soviet propaganda 
produced by Reuben Darbinian and others. In the same year, the Hairenik association started the 
English language The Armenian Review, which was intended for a non-Armenian audience. In 
the inaugural editorial of the Review, the editor-in-chief, Reuben Darbinian, announced the two 
basic aims of the Review:  
…by acquainting the English speaking world with the cultural heritage of the Armenian people, to help 
enrich America’s culture; and by chronicling the story of Armenia’s emancipatory struggle, to support the 
present American effort for the extension and safeguarding of world democracy (Darbinian 1948, 5). 
 
The implicit reference to the fight against Soviet expansion as the second objective outlined the 
immediate course of the Review and its important role in introducing to the American public and 
government “Armenia’s emancipatory struggle,” as it was understood and interpreted by the 
Dashnaktsutyun. The resumption of the Dashnak anti-Soviet course in America were to have 
significant consequences in the Middle East, and especially in Lebanon, where the pro- and anti-
Soviet orientations had not been previously institutionalized in the political culture of Lebanon 
as a whole. The international effects of the Cold War made the pro- and anti-Soviet discourse 
relevant in most corners of the world, and it was against this background that affairs in Lebanon 






Armenians in Lebanon: From WWII to the Cold War 
 
The Nazi occupation of France in 1940 and the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 had many 
repercussions in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. The territories under French 
mandate, which came under the control of the Vichy government in 1940, were fought back by 
the allied British and the Free France forces in the summer of 1941. While the war was quickly 
spreading in Europe, the local political parties in Syria and Lebanon found the war conditions 
quite conducive for mobilizing against the French mandatory power. On November 26, 1941, 
George Cartoux, the general delegate of Free France in Syria and Lebanon, declared Syria and 
Lebanon independent (Schahgaldian 1979, 189; Traboulsi 2007, 104). Yet Caroux and the Free 
French government were reluctant to grant full independence to Lebanon, refusing to withdraw 
the French troops and to amend the Constitution, until a new treaty was signed instead of the 
1936 treaty. Under pressure from local factions, the French agreed to organize national 
parliamentary elections in 1943. The National Pact or the “unwritten compromise” between the 
Christians and Muslims reached around this time reconfirmed the consociational nature of the 
Lebanese political system. The Pact confirmed the distribution of the three major posts of the 
Lebanese political system, reserving the seat of the president for the Maronites, the seat of the 
speaker of parliament for the Shi’ites, and the seat of the prime minister for the Sunnis, and 
established the 6/5 ratio of Christian-Muslim sectarian quotas in parliament236 (Messerlian 1963, 
100-101; Traboulsi 2007, 106; 109-10). The new Chamber of Deputies was elected in August 
1943. On November 8 1943, the Chamber of Deputies voted for several constitutional revisions 
to eliminate articles referring to the French mandate. The French mandatory authorities 
                                                
236 The 6/5 ratio was believed to be roughly proportional to the size of various Christian and Muslim communities in 
Lebanon. The first parliament of the country comprised 55 seats, of which 30 were allocated to Christians and 25 to 
Muslims, according to the 6/5 ratio (Traboulsi 2007, 106). 
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responded harshly, arresting the President, several ministers and one member of the parliament. 
Under pressure from local movements and the British, the French had to release the detainees on 
November 22 and reluctantly declared the end of the French Mandate (Traboulsi 2007, 107-108). 
In the midst of WWII, while the Allied powers had been engaged in the fight against the Nazis in 
Europe, the Lebanese independence became fait accompli on November 22, 1943.237 
 
The external conditions of war and the internal movements for independence posed certain 
challenges to Armenian political organizations as well. As an expression of loyalty to the 
Comintern, the communists in the countries of the Middle East were among the first to join the 
anti-Nazi efforts. Armenian Communists in Syria and Lebanon initiated the Armenian Defense 
League of Syria and Lebanon in the fall of 1941. The League was soon renamed to the Hayastani 
barekamneru ěnkerut‘iwn (Association of the Friends of Soviet Armenia), which aimed at 
uniting all Armenian and Arab factions across the country against the Nazis. Following the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Lebanon and the USSR in 1944, the Association 
engaged and maintained direct correspondence with Soviet Armenia and became instrumental in 
the repatriation of 1946 (Top‘uzyan 1986, 250). On March 2, 1942, the Communist Party’s 
Armenian language organ Zhoghovurdi Dzayn (The People’s Voice) declared that fighting 
against the Nazis and “the traitors, who will try to promote [the Nazi] influence among 
Armenians” was the ultimate and most sacred national duty of all Armenians (quoted in 
Top‘uzyan 1986, 248). By traitors the newspaper probably meant the Dashnaktsutyun, which 
remained anti-Bolshevik and, as its opponents believed, was quite sympathetic towards the Axis 
powers (cf. Messerlian 1963, 101; Schahgaldian 1979, 106; Top‘uzyan 1986, 249). 
                                                
237 The French agreed to withdraw their troops only 1945 after the United States and the USSR recognized the 




The Dashnaktsutyun, however, toned down the anti-Soviet rhetoric in Lebanon as well. The 
upcoming elections of the Catholicos of the Cilician See in Antelias, which had been vacant 
since 1940, served as an excellent occasion for the Dashnaktsutyun to demonstrate a new attitude 
in the communal matters and an unprecedented willingness to cooperate with its Armenian rival 
adversaries. Even though the party controlled the majority of votes in the Electoral Conclave 
gathered on May 19, 1943, the Dashnaktsutyun agreed to the candidacy of Archbishop Karekin 
Hovsepian, the Primate of the Armenian Church in North America, proposed by their opponents  
(Messerlian 1963, 101; Schahgaldian 1979, 192). The Dashnaktsutyun’s move was unexpected 
against the background of the party’s refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the Diocese of 
Armenian Church in North America and the legitimacy of Karekin Hovsepian as the Primate. 
Such willingness could be least expected from a party, which had consolidated a considerable 
amount of power within the Armenian communal structures in Lebanon. It seems some of the 
party leaders in Lebanon came to the realization that continued opposition to the pro-Soviet 
factions would undermine the Dashnaktsutyun in the eyes of the Allied powers, the French, the 
British, as well as among some influential Lebanese circles. The cooperation with its Armenian 
political opponents expressed a tactical move on the part of the Lebanese chapter of the 
Dashnaktsutyun, by which the leaders sought to retain the party’s credibility. In the following 
months, the Dashnaktsutyun made an unprecedented alliance with the Hnchakyans in the 
Lebanese parliamentary elections of 1943. They made a similar alliance in the elections in Syria 
with the Ramkavars. To demonstrate their commitment to the anti-Nazi campaign, the same year 
the Dashnak central committee in Lebanon went as far as participating in the public celebrations 
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of the 23rd anniversary of the Sovietization of Armenia on November 29, 1943 (Khurshudyan 
1964, 68; Schahgaldian 1979, 197). On December 22, 1943, Aztag wrote: 
…Dashnak newspapers …[and] Dashnak ranks in all parts of the world have one major desire, one major 
wish  - not to see the defeat of Russia, which would mean the defeat and destruction of our beloved 
homeland. … There is no need to refer to facts in order to know from what sort of terrible danger the 
victory of the Russian armies had saved the world as well as our homeland… The Dashnaktsutyun is the 
supporter and the servant of that power, with all its strength and soul … Long live the glorious Red Army, 
long live Soviet Armenia (quoted in Top‘uzyan 1986, 333, endnote 12; cf. Khurshudyan 1964, 67-8). 
 
In the very same spirit the Dashnaktsutyun participated in the fund raising campaign for the 
“Sasunts‘i Davit‘” tank regiment, which continued through 1944. The establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Lebanon in 1944 further enhanced the spirit 
of cooperation among the Armenian organizations. Responding to the call of the Catholicos, 
several Lebanese Armenian organizations began independent fund raising campaigns, which 
were partly coordinated by the Catholicosate of Cilicia. The campaign brought together the 
Communists, Dashnaks, Hnchakyans, Ramkavars, and independents in their support for Soviet 
Armenia (Dallak‘yan 2007, 100-2; Eghiayan 1975, 549-50).  
 
Following the victory of the Allied powers in 1945 and the Soviet territorial demands against 
Turkey, the Armenian organizations, except the Dashnaks, came together to form the Armenian 
National Council of Syria and Lebanon in the summer of 1945. The Syrian and Lebanese 
Armenian delegates returning from the elections of Catholics in Ējmiatsin reported to public of 
the good conditions in Soviet Armenia, and of the favorable intentions of the Soviet government. 
Upon their return, the delegates addressed a petition to Joseph Stalin on behalf of “more than 
twenty-thousand Armenians” gathered at a public rally in Beirut in August 1945. Another 
petition followed a month later, sent by the Armenian National Council of Lebanon and Syria on 
behalf of “tens of thousands of Armenians” rallied in mass demonstrations in various towns of 
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Syria and Lebanon. Both petitions asked the leader of the USSR for a “fair resolution of the 
Armenian-Turkish conflict” and the return of the Armenian territories to Soviet Armenia 
(Kirakosyan 2010, 193; 195). On January 1946, the National Council addressed a petition to the 
first UN General Assembly session in London on behalf of the 200,000 Armenians of Syria and 
Lebanon, demanding the return of the Armenian territories to Soviet Armenia (cf. Kirakosyan 
2010, 93; Messerlian 1963, 136-37).  
 
In the course of 1946, with the launch of the repatriation program, the Dashnaktsutyun became 
very marginalized in Lebanon. The official note from Ējmiatsin regarding the Soviet Union’s 
approval of repatriation arrived in Lebanon in the spring of 1946 and, several months later, 
another note arrived demanding the creation of local Committees according to the instructions of 
the Repatriation Committee organized in Soviet Armenia. The enclosed instructions undermined 
the local Armenian communal structures and appointed Hrant Devedjian, the chairman of the 
Association of the Friends of Soviet Armenia in charge of forming the repatriation committee in 
Lebanon and Syria (cf. Eghiayan 1975, 607-8; Schahgaldian 1979, 201; Varzhabedian 1983, 
152). The Repatriation Committee of Soviet Armenia, in particular, favored to see certain kinds 
of Armenian “progressive” organizations represented in the committees: 
It is suitable that the leadership of the local committee be composed of persons who head the progressive 
organizations of the community and who have proven their dedication to Soviet Fatherland during the 
struggle against Fascism (quoted in Schahgaldian 1979, 201) 
 
The formation of the repatriation committees excluded the Dashnaks in spite of the significant 
efforts some Dashnaks had made to prove the party’s loyalty and dedication to the “Soviet 
Fatherland” since 1943. The repatriation campaign also revealed the internal discord within the 
Dashnaktsutyun in Lebanon between factions favoring and opposing the repatriation. As 
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Schahgaldian observed (1979, 203), while the Armenian-speaking party members favored the 
repatriation, a few Turkophone and Catholic party regulars opposed the repatriation or remained 
largely indifferent. The second group within the party, which opposed the repatriation, 
constituted the new generation of younger Dashnak activists, who were predominantly 
Armenophone, but coming from Turkophone Armenian families (ibid., 107). The party did not 
take any official stance toward the repatriation until the Fourteenth World Congress in Cairo, 
Egypt in September-October 1947. 
 
The repatriation campaign generated popular enthusiasm in Lebanon with huge numbers of 
people signing up to move permanently to Soviet Armenia. The first ship departed from Lebanon 
in June 1946 taking thousands of sympathizers of Soviet Armenia to the homeland. Six other 
ships followed it in 1946 carrying around 17,000 Armenians from Syria and Lebanon to Soviet 
Armenia (Varzhabedian 1983, 158). Referring to the popular enthusiasm and support for the 
azgahavak‘ (literally the assembling or reuniting the Armenian nation), Catholicos Karekin I of 
Cilicia compared the feeling of patriotism to a flood, which “overflows its banks and is difficult 
to control” (Eghiayan 1975, 610).  
 
The poor organization of the repatriation and the limited capabilities of Soviet Armenia 
prevented many potential repatriates from settling in Soviet Armenia. Attracted by the Soviet 
promises for Soviet citizenship and significant financial assistance upon arriving in Armenia, 
many had rashly sold their properties and quit their jobs; and yet many were not able to move to 
Soviet Armenia. The actual number of those who eventually repatriated was much lower than 
anticipated (Eghiayan 1975, 608-10; Messerlian 1963, 137; Saghatelyan 2008, 89). The longing 
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for Soviet Armenia deemed as patriotism and love for Armenia marginalized those unwilling to 
cooperate labeling them as “anti-Armenia” and “anti-homeland” (cf. Schahgaldian 1979, 201-2) 
Amid the popular enthusiasm for repatriation, the ‘patriots’, comprising the Communists, 
Hnchakyans and Ramkavars, seem to have overlooked the fact that close to 33,000 Armenians 
moving to Soviet Armenia from Syria and Lebanon potentially represented their sympathizers 
and electorate.  
 
In the new global political context, after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947 
on the eve of the Lebanese parliamentary elections, the internal hard-liner anti-Communist 
faction within the Dashnaktsutyun became vocal again, reasserting the party’s anti-Soviet stand 
(Messerlian 1963, 137; Schahgaldian 1979, 204). The United Front with the Hnchakyans could 
not be repeated because of the (re)turn of the Dashnaktsutyun to anti-Soviet propaganda. On 
May 1, 1947 the Hnchakyans, Ramkavars, Communists, and a number of compatriotic and other 
pro-Soviet organizations formed the Lebanese Armenian Democratic Front to run against the 
Dashnaktsutyun in the Parliamentary elections of 1947 (Messerlian 1963, 140-1; Migliorino 
2008, 95).  The Dashnaktsutyun’s ability to demonstrate greater influence among Armenians had 
won a place for their candidate on the Government supported list, while the Democratic Front 
joined the opposition list (Messerlian 1963, 139-41). Mutual accusations and recrimination 
intensified during the campaign. While the Dashnaks were labeled as “pro-Fascists,” Aztag 
wrote, “… the Front is led by Armenian Bolsheviks who are continuing their conspiracies to 
divide the Lebanese Armenians” (quoted in Schahgaldian 1979, 198). Tensions and violence 
intensified through the electoral campaign, as well as during and after the elections, which the 
opposition characterized as “the most notorious” in the history of Lebanon. A few violent 
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incidents of beating and injuries and even killings were reported on both sides (Messerlian 1963, 
147-53, 164-65; Schahgaldian 1979, 199-200).   
 
The Cold War marked a new phase for Armenian diasporic organizations and communities both 
in Lebanon and worldwide. If prior to WWII, compared to France and the United States, 
Armenian community matters in Lebanon had developed relatively independently of the 
ideological battles between the pro-Soviet factions clustered around HOKs and anti-Soviet 
Dashnak factions, the rise of the Cold War did away with the geographical, ideological and 
political distances separating the Lebanese and Armenian Americans. Almost overnight, they 
became interrelated and complementary. The political instability in Lebanon during the Cold 
War exacerbated the effects of the transnational polarization of Armenian diasporic factions on 







 ‘Patriots’ vs. ‘True Armenians’:  
Cold War and the Triumphant Resurgence of the Dashnaktsutyun 
  
The alliance of the United States with the Soviet Union during WWII and the worldwide 
mobilization of Communist-led national fronts to fight the spread of Fascism had created the 
most favorable conditions for the pro-Soviet Armenian factions in various countries for explicitly 
pursuing pro-Soviet policies and serving the war effort against the Nazis. In the immediate 
aftermath of the war, the Soviet territorial demands from Turkey and the repatriation to Soviet 
Armenia had initially mobilized all Armenian diasporic organizations regardless of their former 
stance towards Soviet Armenia. Yet, as the previous chapter argued, the efforts aiming at 
achieving the same ends of the annexation of Armenian lands in Turkey to Soviet Armenia 
remained largely uncoordinated among the Armenian organizations. While the pro-Soviet 
factions represented by the Communists (the Armenian Progressives in the USA), Hnchakyans, 
Ramkavars and others thrived, many formerly active Dashnak leaders assumed a passive and 
neutral stand in an international context where the Dashnaktsutyun’s anti-Soviet stance could 
have threatened the party’s viability. The antagonism of the pro-and anti-Soviet Armenian 
factions during WWII and the Cold War produced two sharply opposing narratives and shaped 
two major self-identification groups of the ‘patriots’ and ‘true Armenians’. Although not 
mutually exclusive, these self-labels, self-perceptions and identification groups, as this section 
will argue, became incompatible due to the institutionalized rivalry evolved around varying 




The pro-Soviet Armenia factions supportive of the war effort, benefitting from the overall pro-
Soviet and anti-Nazi international atmosphere, developed a self-perception of the [Armenian] 
‘patriots’. In France, the pro-Soviet Armenian factions organized an association, called 
l’Association des Jeunes Patriots Arméniens. The Front National Arménien, on the other hand, 
called on the Armenians to fight with the “Armenian patriotic militia groups” against the Nazis 
(cf. Le Tallec 2001, 170-71). In the French context during the war, the word patriotic acquired 
dual meaning expressing both the love for Soviet Armenia as the homeland,238 and loyalty to 
France as the new patrie. In Lebanon, Catholicos Karekin I characterized the orientation towards 
Soviet Armenia and repatriation as patriotism, and compared the feeling of such patriotism 
(longing for Soviet Armenia) to an uncontrollable flood (cf. Eghiayan 1975, 610, see the 
previous section). According to their definition, the ‘patriots’ included the Armenian 
Communists, Hnchakyans, Ramkavars, the AGBU, various compatriotic unions, as well as the 
Armenian Church.  
 
The establishment of Soviet Armenian Repatriation Committees in various countries, following 
the instructions coming from Soviet authorities in the immediate aftermath of WWII, manifested 
the attitudes of the ‘patriots’ against the Dashnaktsutyun. They began actively excluding the 
Dashnaktsutyun, its affiliate organizations and sympathizers, labeling them as “anti-Armenia” 
and “anti-homeland” (cf. Schahgaldian 1979, 201-202). Responding to such exclusions, in the 
height of the Repatriation campaign, on February 19, 1946 Haratch wrote: “…to be a patriot it is 
important that everybody talk about the repatriation, regardless of whether the speaker or the 
writer has an actual intention of returning to the homeland.” The exclusion of the 
Dashnaktsutyun from the repatriation campaigns was accompanied by continuous criticism, 
                                                
238 The word for patriot in Armenian is hayrenaser, which literally translates as “a person who loves the homeland.” 
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denouncement of the party for its anti-Soviet and allegedly pro-Fascist stand. This continued 
even after the party had abandoned the anti-Soviet rhetoric during the war and some of its 
members had cooperated or expressed a willingness to cooperate with the pro-Soviet factions in 
France and Lebanon.  
 
The exclusion of the Dashnaktsutyun in the Untied States from the pro-Soviet camp and the 
churches loyal to Ējmiatsin had been going on since the assassination of Archbishop Tourian. 
The WWII conditions provided added confidence to the opponents of the Dashnaks. The struggle 
between the Armenian factions in the Untied States acquired more ideological character given 
that the community had already been divided and possibilities for reconciliation had been 
exhausted. Each of the parties sought the support of the US government and public, in hope of 
defeating their Armenian opponents and thus ending the division in the church and community. 
In order to justify the legitimacy of the orientation they had adopted, both factions started 
elaborating their points in English language publications, periodicals and journals.  
 
The first major public charge against the Dashnaktsutyun in English came in a controversial 
book by John Roy Carlson, titled Under Cover, published in 1943. The author, originally Avedis 
Derounian, also known as Arthur Derounian, was a journalist, and the former editor of The 
Spectator,239 an anti-Dashnak English-language Armenian periodical in New York. Since the 
assassination of Archbishop Tourian he had grown into a rabid anti-Dashnak activist. In Under 
Cover, Carlson wrote:  
It is difficult to express in words the effect the brutal murder of Archbishop Tourian by Dashnag henchmen 
had on me. For a long time I was bewildered and then gradually I began to learn that the Dashnags, while 
                                                
239 In 1939 The Spectator and the Armenian Mirror joined to become the Armenian Mirror-Spectator, which 
continues until now. 
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they represented a vicious political clique of terrorists, were not the only fascistic organization then 
engaged in violating the principles of our Democracy (Carlson 1943, 20-1).  
 
 
While Under Cover aimed at exposing many “fifth column” pro-Nazi organizations in the United 
States and had not intended to focus exclusively on the Dashnaktsutyun, Carlson charged the 
Dashnaktsutyun for contributing to the spread of fascism and the destruction of American 
democracy. By pointing to the Dashnaktsutyun’s occasional relations to other pro-Nazi secret 
organizations operating in America, Carlson hoped the charges would entail similar 
consequences for the Dashnaks, as they would have on other organizations.  
 
Under Cover received coverage in The New York Times in an article entitled “Fifth Column - 
with American Labels” on July 18, 1943 and became an “instant best-seller.”240 The subheading 
of the book, very mysterious and provocatively, read: “My Four Years in the Nazi Underworld 
of America - The Amazing Revelation of How Axis Agents and Our Enemies Within Are Now 
Plotting to Destroy the United States.” The first chapter, entitled “A Black Christmas,” opened 
with the description of the assassination of Archbishop Tourian in December 1933 and the 
condemnation of the Dashnaktsutyun as a “sinister fascistic clique” (Carlson 1943, 17). In the 
subsequent parts of the book, in which Carlson exposed the pro-Nazi activism of several 
American organizations as an undercover member of many of them, he recalled to have met with 
two Dashnaks in one such organization, of whom he wrote: “These two Dashnags were the only 
Armenians I met in the subversive world in my four years as an investigator” (ibid., 81). He 
learned from these Dashnaks about the youth division of the party, known as Tseghakron, which, 
                                                
240 According to an article published in the New York Times on April 25, 1991 (Fowler, Glenn. “Arthur Derounian, 
82, an Author of Books on Fascists and Bigots.” The New York Times, April 25, 1991. 
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/25/obituaries/arthur-derounian-82-an-author-of-books-on-fascists-and-
bigots.html. Accessed August 26, 2014). 
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as he explained, was “coined from the Armenian words tzegh (race) and gron [kron] (religion).” 
He went on to comment that “the program and philosophy of these fascistic “race worshipping” 
nationalists were similar to the Hitler Youth” (ibid., 82). Despite some occasional allusions to the 
Dashnaktsutyun’s pro-Fascist affiliations, in Carlson’s exposition of the “American Nazi or the 
American Fascists,” the Dashnak party was not pictured in any leading role, even if its members 
were occasionally spotted by Carlson in various events of other similar organizations. The 
exposé made by Carlson led to several court cases against many of the pro-Nazi organizations 
and individuals, 241 but the Dashnaktsutyun was spared prosecution (cf. Atamian 1955, 388).   
 
Carlson continued his anti-Dashnak mission during the war and its aftermath. His article 
published in the first issue of Armenian Affairs, the official journal of the Armenian National 
Council of America, provided a more comprehensive criticism of the Dashnaktsutyun. The 
article, entitled “The Armenian Displaced Persons: A First-Hand Report on Conditions in 
Europe,” analyzed the Dashnaktsutyun’s support for ANCHA and the transferring of the DPs to 
the United States. The narrow scope of the title did not prevent the author from providing a 
comprehensive synthesis of charges against the Dashnaktsutyun made by the pro-Soviet 
opponents of the Dashnaks. In the early 1950s, the anti-Dashnak factions or the ‘patriots’, as 
they occasionally referred to themselves, charged the Dashnaktsutyun of fascism, political 
opportunism, terrorism, called them “priest killers,” agents of foreign powers, and Turkophiles.  
 
a) Charges of fascism. By the 1950s, it had become widely known that several former and active 
members of the Dashnaktsutyun in Europe had cooperated with the Nazis. This was an excellent 
                                                




tool in the hands of the anti-Soviet faction to reinforce these charges against the Dashnaktsutyun. 
Carlson’s article, in many ways expressing the shared view of the Armenian National Council of 
America, provided a detailed report on the formation of the Armenischen Nationalen Gremiums 
in Berlin,242 of its ranks, filled mostly with Dashnaks and their affiliates, of its program and 
activities during the War (Carlson 1949-1950, 17-21). His account was drawn from several 
articles published in the Mirror-Spectator and other newspapers on Dro Kanayan’s involvement 
with the Nazis, as well as from the Congressional Record of November 1, 1945, which charged 
Dro “with organizing a band of his own and following close on the heels of Nazi armies” (ibid., 
20). The author refrained from directly charging the American branch of the Dashnak party with 
fascism, but cast certain doubts that the American Dashnaks were also involved:  
When Dro Ganayan visited the Untied States early in 1949, he was sponsored by American Dashnags in a 
series of meetings from coast to coast on behalf of ANCHA. At these meetings this former follower of the 
Nazi armies, and a co-signer of the infamous agreement of the Armenian National Council of Berlin, 
helped raise funds for ANCHA. … It’s a fair inference that Ganayan was coming to the rescue of some of 
those with whom he collaborated while following the Nazi armies. Is ANCHA, an American organization 
financed by American capital, ignorant of Ganayan’s former role?  (ibid., 28) 
 
Despite being cautiously reserved, Carlson called on the US government to launch an 
investigation in order to reveal whether the ANCHA immigrants were “desirable” or 
“undesirable” from an American point of view (ibid., 34).  
b) Charges of political opportunism. The opponents of the Dashnaktsutyun, namely the 
Ramkavars and their affiliate organizations in the United States, found the party to be 
opportunistic and treacherous on account of its changing loyalties, starting as a socialist 
revolutionary party, then retreating into an anti-Socialist and anti-Bolshevik position from the 
1920s, and then making another switch to the pro-Soviet camp (Carlson 1949-1950, 24-5; 
Atamian 1955, 322-23;). The opponents of the Dashnaks charged the latter of political 
                                                
242 See in previous section. 
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opportunism, for changing colors between right and left, between socialism and nationalism, 
between the anti-Soviet and pro-Soviet camps. To support the charge, these critics referred to the 
articles reprinted by Hairenik and The Armenian Weekly during the War from Lraber, the organ 
of the Progressive Armenians, Sovetakan Hayastan, the official organ of Soviet Armenia, and 
other leftist publications (Carlson, 1949-1950, 23). Carlson even referred to the editorial 
published in The Armenian Weekly on May 19, 1944, to remind the Dashnaks of the ANC’s 
appeal to the UN Conference in San Francisco and their acceptance of Soviet Armenia as “the 
rightful political trustee of the Armenian Cause” (ibid., 24). The anti-Soviet propaganda of the 
Dashnaks, which resumed after 1948, added to their opponents’ conviction of the Dashnak’s 
political opportunism. 
c) Charges of terrorism: “the priest-killers.” The exclusion of the Dashnak party members and 
sympathizers from Ējmiatsin-affiliated churches, as shown in the previous chapter, was 
accompanied by dubbing them as “priest-killers” and “assassins.” As in Under Cover, so in the 
article on Displaced Persons, Carlson also placed a special emphasis on the Dashnak’s 
complicity in the assassination of Archbishop Tourian. He argued that “…Dashnaks abroad 
regularly used terror to silence opposition” (Carlson 1949-1950, 29).  
d) Charges of being affiliated with foreign intelligence. With the intensifying Cold War, the 
Dashnaks were increasingly charged by their opponents with serving foreign intelligence. In 
1950, Carlson (1949-1950, 26) speculated: 
It may be that certain American, English and Arab governmental agencies are exploiting Dashnags to 
further their own particular cause. In view of the fact that such dictatorships as Turkey and Spain, many 
Nazis in Germany and Fascists in Italy are now in the “friendly camp” … to say nothing of numbers ex-
fascists, ex-communists, spies and international gangsters now being used for the same cause, it’s possible 
that certain individuals within the ARF abroad have been recruited by certain American, English and Arab 




The primary suspects of Carlson’s speculation were Dro Kanayan and Artashes Abeghian, as 
both had “already run the gamut of political collaboration” with the Nazis (ibid. 26).  
 
The declining political future of the Dashnak opponents after the Truman Doctrine in March 
1947 was paralleled by the Dashnaktsutyun’s increasing self-confidence for resuming and 
intensifying its anti-Soviet rhetoric. The changing international conditions provided more 
favorable conditions for the Dashnaktsutyun to refute the charges made by its opponents and 
exact revenge for the marginalization of the party in recent years. Former Dashnak leaders of the 
Republic of 1918-1920 came back to action and the newer generations became more involved in 
the anti-Soviet struggle.  
 
A few months after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, the Dashnaktsutyun convened the 
party’s World Congress in 1947. With the Dashnaktsutyun archives remaining closed to 
researchers, it remains to future historians to find out such details as the agenda, participants, 
decisions taken at the Congress and the full line-up of the new Bureau. However, following the 
1947 World Congress, Dro Kanayan became very active in Lebanon; Simon Vrats‘ian assumed 
the directorship of Nshan P‘alanjian Chemaran in 1951, the most important Dashnak college in 
Lebanon; Vahan Navasardian remained the party’s primary figure in Egypt; and Reuben 
Darbinian resumed his fiery anti-Soviet editorials in the United States as the editor-in-chief of 
almost all Dashnak periodicals in Boston - Hairenik daily, Hairenik monthly and the newly 




Reuben Darbianian was among the first in the United States to take on the task of addressing the 
charges against the Dashnaktsutyun in a series of articles published in The Armenian Review 
from 1948 to 1955, justifying the Dashnaktsutyun in the eyes of Americans and revealing the 
future course of the party. By that time, the younger generation born and raised in the diaspora 
was coming of age and following the path set by the ‘old school’ leadership. One such bright 
Dashnak individual was Sarkis Atamian, born in Providence, Rhode Island in 1923, one of the 
earliest young Armenians to join Tseghakron under Garegin Njdeh in 1933.243 A graduate of 
Brown University and the University of Utah, a participant of WWII and a very active member 
of the Dashnak party, Atamian published a lengthy analysis in 1955 entitled The Armenian 
Community, The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict.244 Drawing on 
broad sociological and psychological literature, certainly valuable in many respects, the book 
ended up providing “scholarly” vindication for the Dashnaktsutyun and its anti-Soviet political 
course. In many respects, Sarkis Atamian was influenced by Reuben Darbinian during the years 
he worked as a contributing editor to The Armenian Review (Asbarez January 6, 2007) and 
certainly by his long years of affiliation with the AYF. In justifying the Dashnaktsutyun’s past 
activities, both Darbinian and Atamian resorted to counter-charges, in the process revealing also 
Dashnak self-perceptions and the future course of the party as it had been outlined at the World 
Congresses in 1947 and 1951.  
 
The revenge of the Dashnaktsutyun on its opponents, following the change in the balance in 
world politics, aimed to destroy all kinds of legitimacies its opponents could claim. “An 
                                                
243 “Long Time Activist Sarkis Atamian Passes Away.” Asbarez, January 6, 2007, http://asbarez.com/54408/long-
time-activist-sarkis-atamian-passes-away/. Accessed August 27, 2014. 
244 The manuscript was probably ready by 1953, as in the last chapter of the book, in reference to the death of 
Catholicos Karekin I on June 21, 1952, Atamian (1955, 442) writes “…although a year has almost passed” since the 
death, no Catholicos had been elected. 
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Introduction” by Reuben Darbinian in the first issue of The Armenian Review declared “A Free 
United and Independent Armenia” as “the supreme political ideal of the Armenians,” thereby 
inferring that the Dashnaktsutyun was the only legitimate representative of the Armenians:  
In the present ideological conflict which has divided the world into two hostile camps, one striving to 
impose its totalitarian tyranny, while the other is striving to save the world for democracy, the Armenians 
are convinced that they can best insure their complete independence only in so far as they contribute their 
modest share to the latter’s victory. As long as Soviet tyranny is firmly implanted in Mother Armenia, the 
Armenians can never hope to enjoy a free life. A Free, United, and Independent Armenia - the supreme 
political ideal of the Armenians - can only exist and thrive in a world which is completely rid of totalitarian 
scourge, unified under the aegis of international law and order (Darbinian 1948, 5). 
 
It is with reference to such claims that Carlson warned the “American, English and Arab 
officials” that the Dashnaktsutyun spoke for and represented only itself; that “[t]hey do not 
reflect those of the overwhelming majority of the Armenian community” in America or 
elsewhere; “[w]hen Dashnaks anywhere parade themselves as spokesmen for all “Armenians” 
they resort to nothing short of willful, deliberate misrepresentation” (Carlson 1949-1950, 25).  
Yet the Dashnak leaders strongly believed that the party was the only legitimate representative of 
the Armenians around the world since the time of the Republic of Armenia and even earlier, and 
they had no intention of abandoning their claims especially now that international political 
conditions favored them. Responses to charges made against the Dashnaks, appearing soon in the 
works of Darbinian, Atamian and other Dashnaks, were premised on the absolute conviction that 
the Dashnaktsutyun expressed the true voice of the Armenian people. 
 
a) Responding to the charges of fascism. Having survived the peal of anti-fascism in the United 
States during the years of WWII and its immediate aftermath, responding to charges of fascism 
in the intensifying Cold War conditions became a relatively easy task for the Dashnak leaders. In 
an article entitled “In Retrospect, A Glance at the Past Thirty Years” published in 1953 in The 
Armenian Review, Darbinian addressed the charges by analyzing the broader background of the 
 
 298 
Soviet involvement in the affairs of the Armenian communities abroad. He defined three phases: 
1922 to 1933, when the number of Armenian Communists in the US and elsewhere was 
negligible; 1933-1947, “the period of Communist Heyday,” and 1947 to his time (1953), the 
decline of Armenian pro-Soviet factions. Labeling the anti-Dashnak opponents as “Armenian 
Communists and their confederates” Darbinian framed the charges of fascism as an attempt 
made by this faction to “organize a united front against the Dashnaks, to discredit, wreck, and 
destroy them, and to declare their [the Dashnak - V.S.] organization outside the pale of the law.” 
“To this end,” he continued, “ working openly and in the dark, they tried to represent the 
Dashnaks and their affiliated organizations, the Armenian Relief Society and the Armenian 
Youth Federation as Nazis and Hitler’s agents” (Darbinian 1953, 53). In Cold War conditions, 
however, as Darbinian (1953, 62) sharply noticed, the “Communist and his fellow traveller” 
could no longer discredit the Dashnaks as Nazi or fascists because the whole world came to 
realize that “to the Communist and his fellow traveler all those who fight against them are 
fascists.” As to the charges of collaboration with the Nazis in Germany, Darbinian simply 
dismissed them as irrelevant.  
 
Sarkis Atamian (1955, 377-96) in his book summarized the accusations he collected from 
various anti-Dashnak articles, memoranda and reports since the assassination of Archbishop 
Tourian. In response to the charges, Atamian portrayed the Dashnaktsutyun as a victim of the 
pro-Soviet attacks during the years of WWII, rejecting any possibility that the Dashnaktsutyun 
could have thought to benefit from the Nazi victory: 
The United States-Russia alliance of the war could only mean a preservation of the minority status quo in 
the Soviet Union, while a German victory would mean the substitution of one ruling power for another. In 
this situation, Dashnak policy could have only one logical orientation, regardless of what individuals may 
have desired out of emotional considerations, the official policy of the organization was with the Allies - 
especially the United States (Atamian 1955, 387). 
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He quoted the decision of the Dashnaktsutyun’s Central Executive Committee of America 
published in the Hairenik Daily on December 24, 1941 to prove that the party had not taken a 
pro-Fascist stand during the war. He referred to the efforts of the anti-Dashnaks to outlaw the 
party in the United States during the War, as a result of which “[n]ot one Dashnak group was 
placed on a subversive list, none were disbanded, and the Dashnak community continued to 
prosper” (ibid., 388). Regarding Garegin Nzhdeh and the Tseghakron movement, Atamian first 
of all argued that Nzhdeh had been expelled from the party because of his racist views, and, 
secondly, that Tseghakron had nothing to do with racism (ibid., 390-1). Although not a linguist, 
Atamian delved into an etymological discussion of the word Tseghakron, to argue that the word 
did not mean “race worshippers” but rather “devotees of the race,” “followers of the race” or 
“believers of the race.” In terms of activities, as Atamian explained, “despite the label used,” the 
movement inculcated the youth with values “which sought to preserve the language, literature, 
and other cultural items and values;” it provided athletic, recreational and educational programs 
to the youth “which worked directly for [Americanism in the general connotation of the word] by 
stressing good citizenship and loyalty to the adopted country of the immigrant parent generation” 
(ibid., 392-3).  The change of the name from Tseghakron to Armenian Youth Federation (AYF), 
in 1941 Atamian explained by two reasons: first because the name was a “tongue-twister” for the 
second generation Armenians, and secondly because the Dashnak opponents interpreted it as 
“race worshippers,” “…which had a particularly sour connotation about the time that the Soviet 
became the friend of democracy and the Nazi became its enemy” (ibid., 394). Concluding the 
passage on Tseghakron/AYF, Atamian described the contributions of the AYF to the American 




Turning to the most grounded and gravest charges of the collaboration of the Dashnak leaders 
with the Nazis in Germany, Atamian (1955, 399) justified the actions of the Armenischen 
Nationalen Gremiums in Berlin by pointing to its affiliation with the anti-Stalinist liberation 
movement: an initiative mostly of former Soviet POWs fighting against Stalinism. Nzhdeh and 
Dro, in this context, were presented as the leaders of the Azadamardagan [Battle for Freedom] 
movement, who fought alongside the “anti-Stalinist liberation movement” (ibid., 401). The 
Azadamardagans, of which “there [was] nothing in print, to the best knowledge of the writer,” as 
stated by Atamian (1955, 399), “were a separate movement with their own organization, 
orientation, and leadership” completely independent of the Dashnaktsutyun. Among the leaders 
of the movement, only Dro was still a Dashnak, according to Atamian, whose role was to win 
“…Nazi leniency toward the Armenians in the Caucasus” (ibid., 401). Carefully bypassing the 
other names of the Dashnaks involved in the Armenischen Nationalen Gremiums, exposed by 
Carlson in Armenian Displaced Persons (1949-1950, 19) - Artashes Abeghian, Abraham 
Gulkhandanian, Harutyun Baghdasarian, Vahan P‘ap‘azian, David Davidkhanian - Atamian 
dissociated the Azadamardagan movement from the Dashnaktsutyun, claiming that the former 
mostly comprised “ex-Soviet Armenians” (Atamian 1955, 402). As for Dro, Atamian claimed 
that Dro’s efforts had saved the lives of 3,600 DPs, who lived “through the Nazi nightmare 
where others perished.” He argued further of Dro’s innocence since, even after his arrest by the 
American army, the case against Dro was dropped “after the facts became known” (ibid. 402).  
 
b) Responding to the charges of political opportunism. In a lengthy discussion of the social and 
ideological conflict among Armenians, Atamian portrayed the Dashnaktsutyun as always 
pursuing the same goal since the Act of May 28, 1919 - the creation of “United, Free and 
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Independent Armenia” (ibid., 216-218). It is due to the ultimate importance of this goal that the 
Dashnaktsutyun assumed a strong anti-Bolshevik stand following the Sovietization of Armenia, 
and out of the same reason, that the Dashnaktsutyun “lent its support … to the major powers 
(including Soviet Russia),” hoping to get the Armenian lands in Turkey reunited with Soviet 
Armenia in 1945. “The Dashnak rationale was obvious,” explained Atamian (1955, 406), “It was 
better to have Armenia united, partially at least, under any power, rather than allow it to remain 
dismembered where it was of no benefit to the people.” But this by no means meant that 
“aspirations for national independence were forgotten.” Regarding the Dashnaktsutyun’s support 
for the repatriation drive in 1946-1947, Atamian brought several motives for the change in 
Dashnak policies, explaining it as a result of the changes of policy towards the Soviets in 
America and the West:  
After twenty-five years of active propagandistic opposition to the Soviet, [the Dashnak leadership] saw the 
Untied States and the West, traditional enemies of the Soviet, working in what seemed to be close harmony 
with Moscow’s policy, despite Dashnak dogma of the incompatible coexistence of the two. This, more than 
anything else, may have led the Dashnak leadership to think that any further opposition to the Soviet was 
futile and Communism had finally become “acceptable” to the West (Atamian 1955, 408). 
 
Whether such, or any other explanation, could satisfy the anti-Dashnak Armenian opponents was 
not a big concern for Atamian and other Dashnak intellectuals and leaders of the time. Their 
major concern was justifying the policies of the Dashnaktsutyun in the eyes of Americans and 
expressing the loyalty of the party to America. To this end, the author made occasional 
references to articles published in The New York Times and other American periodicals in order 
to demonstrate that the Dashnak change of policy from anti-Soviet to pro-Soviet and back to 





c) Responding to the charges of terrorism -“the priest killers.” Responses provided by Darbinian 
and Atamian to the charges of Dashnak terrorism in reference to the assassination of Archbishop 
Tourian were summed up in portraying Abp. Tourian as the victim of Soviet penetration into the 
Armenian Church (cf. Atamian 1955, 357; Darbinian 1953, 52). Leaving aside the issue of 
Dashnak complicity in the assassination of the Primate, Darbinian expressed a regret that “the 
Soviet agents” took advantage of the assassination “to further deepen the division and to further 
prejudice an important part of non-partisans against the Armenian Revolutionary Federation” 
(Darbinian 1953, 52). Atamian, instead, discussed the incident in detail suggesting a theory that 
none of the convicted Dashnaks were guilty and the real assassin “planted by the Bolsheviks” 
was never captured245 (Atamian 1955, 369). 
 
The charges of the Dashnak affiliation with the British or American intelligence were never 
addressed by Darbinian, Atamian or other leaders of the party in the 1950s. Responding to the 
charges was not an end in itself. In the context of the Cold War, either disclosing or rejecting any 
cooperation with the intelligence services of the anti-Soviet powers could hardly render any 
service to the party. Instead, justifications provided by Darbinian, Atamian and other Dashnaks 
in the first half of the 1950s served the outlining of the current and future politics of the party for 
the rank and file, and for broader American audience.  
                                                
245 Atamian portrayed the Dashnaktsutyun and the nine Dashnaks arrested at the church as victims, rather than as 
perpetrators. As he noted, “nine Dashnak party members were present in church,” all of whom were arrested 
(Atamian 1955, 367). Following the incident the Dashnaktsutyun became defined as a “small terrorist clique,” and 
Dashnak notables and rank and file were persecuted and “terrorized” during the “turbulent days” (ibid., 367-8). The 
author entertained the idea that the incident could have been arranged by the Bolsheviks and the real assassin, Mr. 
X, should have escaped, “without being identified,” “to throw guilt on the Dashnaktzoutyoun” (ibid., 369). Under 
the Cold War circumstances, Atamian (1955) even questioned the legitimacy of the court decision and a possibility 
of reviewing the case of the two Dashnaks, who were sentenced to life imprisonment. By questioning the complicity 
of the convicted Dashnak members in the assassination of Archbishop Tourian, Atamian simultaneously denied any 
possibility of the party’s involvement in the planning and execution of the crime. “Had such a conviction been 
made,” he argued, “the possibility of outlawing the Dashnaktzoutyoun as a “secret, terrorist, or subversive” 




In Atamian’s book, the justification of the Dashnaktsutyun was part of the author’s broader 
intention, which, it seems, had been the defining of the essential role of the Dashnaktsutyun in 
modern Armenian history in comparison with and in contrast to the rival Armenian political 
parties. Referring to the revolutionary activities of the Hnchakyans and the Dashnaks in the 
Ottoman Empire, in the first chapters of the book Atamian concluded: 
The Hunchaks placed class interest above national interests, while the Dashnaks placed the interests of the 
nation above all classes. The distinction was crucial; it not only allowed the Dashnaks to enjoy undisputed 
leadership of the Armenian masses, it virtually made the concepts of Dashnatkzoutyoun and Armenian 
Nation synonymous… [emphasis added] (Atamian 1955, 99). 
 
He portrayed the Dashnaks as heroes who “fought and died like men” (265) during the genocide 
of Armenians, while their opponents were the “cowards who fled or died without a struggle” and 
were thus “unworthy of being Armenian.” “We fought and bled like men, what did you do?” 
(270), wondered rhetorically Atamian in response to the anti-Dashnak charges of Turkophilia 
and lack of patriotism. Summarizing the Dashnak values, attitudes and definitions, Atamian 
concluded: 
…the Dashnakzoutyoun and its adherents have an identity. They identify with a historical past in which 
there emerged the modern concept of the Armenian as a distinct national and cultural entity. Adherence to 
the Dashnakzoutyoun is not only an association with a political party. It is an identification with the symbol 
of a national entity. It is belonging to a people with a historical past, a culture, language and art which is 
different than those of Armenians who existed for six centuries without a fatherland in alien cultures and 
regimes as servile rayah without status and identity. In short, being a Dashnak is being an Armenian. 
Dashnaktzoutyoun is Armenian national consciousness [emphasis added] (1955, 272). 
 
If “being an Dashnak” meant “being an Armenian” and the Dashnaktsutyun was the “Armenian 
national consciousness,” the Ramkavars were labeled as “cowards” and “betrayers.” Their anti-
Dashnak stand was “a sub-conscious reaction against the guilt of betrayal imputed to Ramkavar 
identity” (ibid., 280). By associating Ramkavar identity with Armenian “traitors” or “betrayers,” 
Atamian used the occasion to justify the punitive actions of the Dashnaks, which the anti-
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Dashnaks labeled as “terrorism” (ibid., 278-1). “This is not to say,” wrote Atamian (1955, 281), 
“that genuine moral objections to Dashnak terrorism do not exist. It is to say that in given social 
situations, with concomitant conditions [refers to the conditions in late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century Ottoman Empire - V.S.], the Dashnak-terrorist stereotype plays a vital function 
in anti-Dashnak behavior which cannot be answered on moral and rational grounds only.”  
 
Even though Atamian’s generalizations were made in a certain context and must be addressed 
within that specific context, his beliefs more importantly reflected the prevailing self-perceptions 
of the Dashnaktsutyun and how the next generations were indoctrinated in the Dashnak circles. 
Sarkis Atamian’s perceptions of the Armenian political parties were entirely shaped by his 
experience in the AYF and his interactions with the Dashnak leadership and rank and file. If an 
American born Armenian, in his early thirties with an advanced scholarly mind, believed that 
“being a Dashnak is being an Armenian” and that the “the Dashnaktsutyun is the Armenian 
national consciousness,” many of lesser educated Dashnak comrades, both in the United States 
and elsewhere expressed similar convictions in everyday interactions with non-Dashnaks. For a 
long time during and after the Cold War, many non-Dashnaks remembered how the Dashnaks 
boasted “He who is not Dashnaktsakan, is not an Armenian.”246  
 
The antagonism of Armenian political factions in the United States after the assassination of 
Abp. Tourian in 1933 was exacerbated during WWII and the Cold War. The polarization of the 
Armenian community reinforced the mutually exclusive self-identifications of the ‘patriots’ and 
‘true Armenians’. In essence, both identifications were constructed on the rejection of their 
                                                
246 Many people from among the non-Dashnak circles recalled such statements in informal conversations with the 
author in Lebanon and United States. 
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Armenian rivals. The pro-Soviet factions constructed their identity of the ‘patriots’ not only on 
the premise of their unconditional support for Soviet Armenia, but also on the rejection of the 
Dashnaks as traitors, who struggled against the homeland. The Dashnaks, on the other hand, 
developed a self-perception of ‘true Armenians’, denouncing the Ramkavars and others as 
traitors and Communist agents, refusing to recognize the Soviet authorities in Armenia or any of 
their supporters as Armenians. If the orientation towards Soviet Armenia as the homeland was 
key in the identifications of the ‘patriots’, the existing homeland was not the defining attribute of 
the ‘true Armenian’ identity. The most important attribute of a ‘true Armenian’, as defined by its 
proponents, was belonging to the Dashnak party. The homeland - the independent Armenia in 
their perceptions, was imaginary, embodied in its symbolism, and to be achieved in some distant 
future. The clash of these mutually exclusive identification groups, which crystallized in the 




The Dashnak Anti-Communist Offensive and  
the Transnational Schism in the Armenian Diaspora 
 
The Dashnak Anti-Communist Offensive and the Community Conflict in Lebanon  
 
The Cold War polarized the world into the Soviet and Western camps. In the aftermath of WWII, 
most of the European countries fell within more or less demarcated Soviet or Western zones. 
Moreover, in their attempts to bring countries outside Europe under their respective spheres of 
influence, the Soviet and Western intelligence services became actively involved in the local 
politics of these countries, by supporting local sympathetic factions against the ideological 
enemy. While the Soviets could rely on their natural former Comintern allies in many countries - 
the Communist parties, whether operating legally or illegally,247 the newly shaping Anglo-
American intelligence networks in the immediate aftermath of WWII sought the cooperation of 
local anti-Soviet factions in many countries. The latter included significant number of anti-Soviet 
expatriates, many of whom had been freed from the Nazi camps by the Anglo-American troops 
in Europe.  
 
The Cold War made a direct impact on the relations of Armenian political parties and factions 
transnationally. The anti-Soviet rhetoric, reaffirmed by the Dashnaktsutyun shortly after the 
Truman Doctrine, was in perfect harmony with the policies of the Western bloc. While the party 
leaders in the United States, such as Reuben Darbinian, sought to get American support against 
                                                
247 The Communist Party was outlawed in Syria in December 1947 and in Lebanon in January 1948 (Communism in 
the Free World… 1953, 1). 
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their opponents, Dro Kanayan, another fierce enemy of the Soviets, became directly involved 
with the American intelligence service. Secret intelligence reports reaching headquarters in 
Washington revealed that along with other expatriates, Dro also agreed to cooperate with the 
British and American intelligence services in Europe as long as that cooperation would be 
beneficial for the liberation of Soviet Armenia.248 If Dro’s hope for the immediate liberation of 
Soviet Armenia vanished after the Nazi defeat, the growing hostility against the Soviet Union in 
the West inspired him with new hope for achieving this mission with the help of Americans. A 
CIA document prepared in August 1949 reported that in the fall of 1947 “Kanayan left Germany 
and went to Cairo to a [sic] Armenian conference from which he never returned to Germany,” 
and later “moved to Lebanon.”249 The same report ends by providing General Dro’s present 
address in Lebanon: 
D. Kanayan    Morses Dar Kaloustian [sic] 
Rue Kantari, Beyruth, Liban (Lebanon) 
 
Dro visited Cairo to participate in the Fourteenth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutyun in 
September-October 1947. The Congress must have exonerated Dro and approved his further 
involvement in anti-Soviet operations in the Middle East, since following the congress, Dro 
moved to Lebanon and assumed a very active role in regional anti-Soviet initiatives. Movses Der 
Kaloustian (1895-1984) (Movses Ter Galustian), whose name was misspelled in the CIA report 
and at whose place Dro resided in 1949, was the incumbent Dashnak deputy at the Lebanese 
Parliament, elected for the second consecutive term in May 1947. At the same time, Der 
Kaloustian was probably a member of the Dashnaktsutyun’s Lebanon Central Committee since 
                                                
248 Recently declassified CIA archives contain many documents from the 1940s and 1950s on the activities of the 
American Intelligence agency in Europe and elsewhere. Some of the documents are available online at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/. 
249 “Armenians.” August 1949. CIA, Doc No/ESDN: 51966ec9993294098d50a76f. 
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1943.250 In his first hand account, Antranig Dzarugian (Andranik Tsarukian),251 who was an 
active member of the Dashnaktsutyun at that time, personally encountered Dro on many 
occasions in Aleppo and Beirut. He later recalled that Der Kaloustian was the “number one 
advisor” of Dro (Dzarugian 1992, 195-6). Formal documentation on Dro’s activities in Lebanon 
are not available, but Dzarugian’s account suggests that following the World Congresses of the 
Dashnaktsutyun in 1947 and 1951, Dro became one of the most influential leaders of the 
party.252 Many people in Lebanon still remember how Dro quickly became powerful in the 1950s 
with the group of his recruits, whom the opponents labeled as “Droyi balikner” (Dro’s lads).253  
 
In cooperating with the American intelligence service, Dro advocated war against the Soviet 
Union, hoping to get (Soviet) Armenia liberated with the help of the United States.254 The CIA 
                                                
250 Zaven Messerlian interviewed Der Kaloustian for his master’s thesis, and believes that Der Kaloustian was a 
member of the Lebanese Central Committee and was later elected to the Bureau (Messerlian 1963, 329) 
251 Antranig Dzarugian was a well-known Armenian writer, journalist and publicist. Born in 1913 in Gürün, Turkey, 
he spent his childhood in orphanages in Aleppo and Beirut after his family fell victim to the genocide. He received 
primary education in Aleppo and later in Chemaran in Beirut. He was the student of Levon Shant‘ and Nikol 
Aghbalian (Bardakjian 2000, 553; Dzarugian 1980, viii). Dzarugian left the party in the 1950s and became a vocal 
critic of the Dashnaktsutyun. 
252 Schahgaldian attributes the resumption of anti-Soviet policies in Lebanon to the “neo-Dashnak” group of 
leadership, who came to power in 1947 following the Truman Doctrine. He does not mention any names of the 
“neo-Dashnaks,” except Movses Der Kaloustian, the leader of this group (Schahgaldian 1979, 107-108; 198; 221). It 
seems, however, Dro became more influential in Lebanon in the late 1940s and early 1950s thanks to the CIA 
backing. Dzarugian’s account suggests that Dro was quite influential among the Dashnak circles at the time. 
According to him, Dro had always kept distance from the ‘center’, the Bureau, but he became very involved in the 
1947 World Congress of the Dashnaktsutyun and could have an enormous impact on the elections of the new 
Bureau (Dzarugian 1980, 89-90). The same account suggests that Dro successfully received the approval of the 
World Congress for organizing paramilitary groups in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran (ibid., 94-104, Dzarugian 1992, 
181-82, cf. Chelebian 2003, 336; Khurshudyan 1964, 83-4). 
253 Dzarugian also mentions about Dro’s lads in his novel Verchin anmeghě [The Last Innocent] (Dzarugian 1980, 
107). Referring to an article published in Ararad on May 31, 1957, Khurshudyan states that some of Dro’s lads were 
even secretly sent to the United States for special training (Khurshudyan 1964, 84). 
254 A secret CIA document prepared on October 28, 1949 mentioned that Dro “was captured by US troops in 
Germany, but was later released; in 1946 visited US to consult with Tashnak leaders; June ’46 was approached in 
Stuttgart by SHADOV, representative of Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, in an effort to gain his support for ABN 
[Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations]; at that time subject was reportedly working for British IS; in November 1947 
subject was reportedly head of the Tashnaks in Munich; however at that time he was also supposedly attending a 
World Tashnak Converence [sic] in Egypt, and from that time on lived in the Middle East, first in Cairo and then in 
Beirut; now a citizen of Lebanon; came to US November 1948 on Lebanese passport; visited Washington, New 
York and other cities; returned to Lebanon spring of 1949; opposes cooperation with Britain and claims British 
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was also interested in cooperating with Dro and his “intelligence group,” as the report on 
October 23, 1951, confirmed.255 It valued Dro’s ability to provide information on Communist 
activities in Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Iran, and thought that his organization was 
“best qualified to run operations into the Iron Curtain countries and the Soviet Union.”256 Yet, 
American intelligence realized that Dro’s cooperation was limited to his own interests: “Subject 
would be of value as long as his attention is kept focused on the Communist Party and the Soviet 
Union. Other than those targets, little else would interest him,” concluded the report. As long as 
Dro found cooperation with the Americans beneficial for the prospect of liberating Armenia 
from the Soviet Union, he remained interested in cooperating with the CIA. In his 
correspondence with CIA agents, Dro made clear on many occasions that he (and the 
Armenians) would not demand lands from Turkey until the common enemy, Communism, had 
been defeated.257 By 1954 Dro controlled a group of 160 men in Iran, some with paramilitary 
training from the CIA, and was willing to join his efforts with the other “anti-Bolshevik groups 
in order to overthrow the present regime in the USSR.” Expectations for another world war were 
very high at the time, and Dro wanted to make sure that following the defeat of Communism, the 
United States would support “a free Armenia” at “the post World War III peace conference.”258 
Meanwhile, Dro occasionally reminded of the necessity of “US intercession with the Turks to 
                                                                                                                                                       
interest in the Middle East are not in harmony with those of the Tashnaks; disclaimed any knowledge of British I.S. 
operations; advocates war with USSR during which time he thinks that the Tashnak organization can be of service to 
the US…”  (“From an FDR Armenian Study; MGL-A-303, prepared 28 October, 1949.” CIA, Doc No/ESDN: 
51966ec9993294098d50a776). 
255 Apart from acknowledging the fact that Dro had “his own intelligence service,” the report did not mention any 
names associated with Dro’s group. 
256 Chief, NEA/SO. “Subject: Pelops.” October 23, 1951. CIA, Doc No/ESDN: 51966ec9993294098d50a781. p. 8. 
257 According to the report, “AIN had no demands on Turkey while the problem of the common enemy, 
Communism, remains. AIN wished to participate with the other anti-Bolshevik groups in order to overthrow the 
present regime in the USSR.” (Chief, NEA. “Meeting with Pelops, 16 January 1954.” January 18, 1954. Doc 
No/ESDN: 51966ec9993294098d50a75f). AIN, as the “Research Aid” on Cryptonyms and Terms in Declassified 
CIA files explains, was the term used for “Activities associated with the Armenians during 1952-1954. Drostamat 
[sic] Kanayan associated with Project.” 
258 “Recommendations for Meeting with Pelops” November 1953. CIA, Doc No/ESDN: 
51966ec9993294098d50a770. p. 4. 
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restrain them from wiping out the Armenians in an attack against Armenia.”259 He wanted to 
make sure that the Turks were not permitted to constitute “the sole element of an army” which 
would invade Soviet Armenia.260   
 
The Fifteenth World Congress of the Dashnaktsutyun convened in October-November 1951 in 
Cairo. It established the Dashnaktsutyun’s close cooperation and alliance “with all anti-
communist and anti-Soviet forces,” because the party viewed Communism as “the sworn enemy 
of the freedom, independence, and equality of all nations” (quoted in Schahgaldian 1979, 208). 
The congress also called for friendly relations between the Dashnaktsutyun and the “ruling 
forces” of those countries, who were viewed as “the best and the natural defenders of Armenian 
national interests” (ibid., 209). In compliance with the new course, the party joined the “Paris 
Bloc,”261 a union comprising Ukrainians, Belarusians, Georgians, Azerbaijani and other 
expatriate anti-Communists to fight against the Soviet regime (Abramtchik 1958, 5-6; cf. Walker 
1990, 365-66). It seems that the World Congress of 1951 had made a decision on this matter as 
well, as Armenians at the Paris Bloc were represented by the Delegation of the Republic of 
Armenia.262 Moreover, in the early 1950s Atamian defined the affiliation of the Dashnaktsutyun 
with the Paris Bloc as the party’s “only official international commitment” (Atamian 1955, 457). 
The Paris Bloc, and all other anti-Soviet initiatives in Europe and, later, in the Middle East came 
under the control of the CIA. 
 
                                                
259 ibid., p. 3. 
260 “Memorandum for the Record. Subject: Meeting with Pelops, 18 January, 1954.” January 19, 1954. CIA. Doc 
No/ESDN: 51966ec9993294098d50a76b. 
261 The League for the Liberation of the Peoples of the USSR, better known as the ‘Paris Bloc’, was founded in Paris 
in 1953. It launched the review Problems of the Peoples of the U.S.S.R in 1958. Mikola Abramtchik was the 
chairman of the League (Abramtchik 1958, 5-7; Doval 1958, 7-8). 
262 Among the member organizations of the Paris Bloc, Mikola Abramtchik, the leader of the Paris Bloc and another 
CIA recruit, mentions the Delegation of the Armenian Republic (Abramtchik 1958, 6). 
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Encouraged by the American foreign interests in the Middle East, the two consecutive 
congresses of the Dashnaktsutyun in 1951 and 1955 in Cairo resolved that “all traces of 
Communism and/or pro-Sovietism must be erased from the churches, schools, cultural and ethnic 
organizations” (quoted in Schahgaldian 1979, 209). The erasing of “all trances of Communism” 
translated into a fierce struggle against all Armenian pro-Soviet factions from the United States 
to the Middle East. The Dashnaktsutyun began labeling the others as “Communists and their 
fellow travelers” or as “tools in the hands of the Communists” (Messerlian 1963, 179, 210; 
Schahgaldian 1979, 212). Under the conditions of the Cold War, all Armenians and Armenian 
organizations were challenged to take a position. Even the church and charitable and 
compatriotic organizations were called on to affiliate with a certain political faction. Neutrality 
was no longer an option. “No nation, no political party can remain truly neutral toward the 
present world civil war which has wrongly been called the cold war. Any nation or any political 
faction which is not with the free world is actually on the other side of the enemy and aids the 
Soviet tyranny, directly or indirectly,” declared Reuben Darbinian  (1953, 55) in The Armenian 
Review. Following this reasoning, he denounced the “Communists and their fellow travelers,” 
who “…infiltrated the Ramgavar and Hunchak Parties, their friendly Armenian General 
Benevolent Union, the Knights of Vardan, ⁠⁠263 and a large part of Armenian Compatriotic 
Societies and … succeeded in bringing these organizations under their control” (ibid., 53). In 
practice, Darbinian defined all major Armenian organizations not affiliated with the 
Dashnaktsutyun as “Communists and their fellow travelers.”  
 
                                                
263 The Nights of Vartan was founded in Philadelphia in 1916 as a fraternal organization. Its purpose was to provide 
moral and material support to the Armenian Church and Armenian cultural, athletic, educational and charitable 
organizations (Peroomian and Avagyan, 2003, 58). 
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Darbinian apparently realized that the struggle between the diverse pro-Soviet factions and the 
anti-Soviet Dashnaktsutyun in the United States had effectively ended with the division of the 
Armenian Church since 1933. After all, apart from the discursive space, there was no physical 
Armenian space left where the representatives of the conflicting factions could possibly 
encounter. Benefitting from the internationalization of the Cold War, therefore, Darbinian 
envisioned a transnational struggle against Soviet influence in Armenian institutions. He defined 
“the most pressing problem of the Armenian Dispersion at the present time” to be the “freeing of 
Armenian churches of abroad from the clutches of a servile clergy” (Darbinian 1953, 59). In this 
respect, the death of Catholicos Karekin I Hovsepian of Cilicia in 1952 was a timely occasion: at 
the time, when the Dashnaktsutyun could benefit the most from the favorable conditions shaped 
by the Cold War, the seat of the Cilician Catholicosate was vacant. Darbinian realized that the 
right time for action in Lebanon was now: 
It is plain as daylight that, to win the fight against the Armenian Communists, the Armenian churches must 
be rescued from Soviet agents, and this is possible only if and when the throne of the Cilician Catholicosate 
is occupied by a man who is capable and courageous, independent-minded and completely free of Soviet 
influence, to assume the spiritual leadership of the Armenian people (Darbinian 1953, 62). 
 
In case the political opponents or the general public might wonder why a political organization 
would want to interfere in church affairs, Darbinian clarified:  
…the moment the Soviet government, which by nature is an enemy to both the nation and the church, 
started to infiltrate the church, to use it as a weapon for the enslavement of mankind, the church became a 
political factor. Therefore, from then on, for a political organization like the Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation, active participation in church affairs has become an essential part of the political fight (ibid.).  
 
Darbinian’s article in The Armenian Review, published in 1953, indirectly invited the American 
government and secret services to support the Dashnak mission of rescuing the Armenian 




Judging from the CIA secret correspondence and the Intelligence Digest264 published in Britain, 
the Dashnaktsutyun’s transnational intentions in the Middle East were in harmony with the 
Anglo-American interests. In March 1955, the Intelligence Digest reported on the Middle East 
and the Soviet’s policy there to encourage “communist or near-Communist parties and extremist 
movements like the Moslem Brotherhood.” The report continued to comment on the Armenians, 
according to which “no less than half the Armenian population in Syria and the Lebanon, have 
been won to Russia’s policy” (De Coursy 1955, 12-13). In this context, the Dashnaktsutyun’s 
anti-Communist initiatives in the Middle East were not only welcomed, but also encouraged and 
supported by Western intelligence services. 
 
In Lebanese politics the Dashnaktsutyun allied with the government, which in the 1950s grew 
more and more anti-Soviet (cf. Sanjian 2008a; 2012a). In the early 1950s, Camille Chamoun, the 
president of Lebanon since 1952, gradually adopted, in Traboulsi’s (2007, 109-28) words, a 
“pro-Western authoritarianism.” The alliance of the Dashnaktsutyun with the government was 
mutually beneficial. Despite the fact that Dro’s cooperation with the CIA had not been yielding 
any tangible results towards the realization of his hopes, American backing helped Dro and by 
extension the Dashnaktsutyun to significantly improve their position in Lebanon in the 1950s.265 
By the parliamentary elections of 1953 the Dashnaktsutyun had been able to demonstrate that it 
could effectively control the Armenian votes, and managed to place its candidates on the 
government list (cf. Messerlian 1963, 210-12; Schahgaldian 1979, 211-13). Movses Der 
                                                
264 Intelligence Digest was a monthly journal published by a British diplomat Kenneth De Coursy. It was quite 
popular among legislators both in Britain and the United States in the 1950s (Turchetti 2007, 140). 
265 A secret CIA report on November 1953 confirms that the CIA was ready to provide Dro’s intelligence group in 
Lebanon, Syria and Iran with “arms and ammo in small quantities” (“Recommendations for Meeting with Pelops.” 
November 1953. CIA, Doc No/ESDN: 51966ec9993294098d50a770). 
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Kaloustian, Dro’s “adviser,” was elected to the Lebanese parliament for a fourth consecutive 
term.  
 
According to the by-laws of the Cilician See, the elections of a new Catholicos in Lebanon after 
the death of Catholicos Karekin Hovsepian in 1952 were to be held within six months. But the 
seat remained vacant until 1956. The locum tenens made several attempts to gather an 
Ecclesiastical Assembly, but he had to postpone it every time, due to the tensions in the various 
Cilician dioceses (Eghiayan 1975, 650-55). While the pro-Soviet faction and the locum tenens 
wanted to preserve cordial relations with Ējmiatsin, the Dashnaktsutyun with the sympathizing 
clergy viewed Cilicia as an independent See and advocated for the organizing of elections 
without the approval of Ējmiatsin.   
 
The seat of Catholicosate in Ējmiatsin also became vacant in May 1954, following the death of 
Catholicos Gevorg VI. In September 1955, a new Catholicos was elected in Ējmiatsin. 
Archbishop Vazgen Baljian became very active in consolidating the influence of the Holy See of 
Ējmiatsin abroad. In February 1956, Catholicos Vazgen I visited Beirut hoping to bring the 
parties in Lebanon together and organize peaceful elections in the See of Cilicia (Eghiayan 1975, 
670). On this occasion, Intelligence Digest reported in January 1956: 
Further evidence of primary interest in the Middle East is provided by events in the Armenian Orthodox 
Church. This is probably the most important single channel of Soviet penetration in the Middle East.  
As a counter to Cardinal Agagianian’s (Head of the Armenian Catholics) anti-Communist leanings, the 
Soviet authorities brought about the appointment of a new Catholicos of the Armenian Orthodox Church. 
This Prelate - Vazgen Baldjian - is a well-trained Soviet agent who was formerly suspected of links with 
the Nazis.  
His Church is receiving financial help from the Soviet Union. A Seminary for the training of clergy has 
been opened in Erivan, which is, in fact, a political training centre for turning Armenian Orthodox clergy 




The authorization of the trip by Soviet government at the height of the Cold War was interpreted 
as the indication of Soviet meddling in the matters of the Armenian Church in the Middle East 
(cf. Migliorino 2008, 101).266 Certainly, both the supporters of Ējmiatsin and the opponents in 
the diaspora expressed similar concerns for the well-being and unity of the Armenian Church, 
but the matter by then had been extremely politicized. The Dashnaktsutyun’s anti-Communist 
offensive, which increasingly defined allegiances in black-and-white terms, would not tolerate 
any candidate other than its own for the Catholicosate of Cilicia, considering that the party had 
the votes. The mission of Catholicos Vazgen I was therefore a failure. Despite his attempts to 
bring together the opposing parties, he could not exert any influence on the fiercely anti-Soviet 
Dashnak majority of the electoral conclave gathered in February 1956. Enjoying the support of 
the Lebanese government, with most of the anti-Dashnaks withdrawn, the Dashnak controlled 
Assembly elected Archbishop Zareh Payaslian the Catholicos of Cilicia on February 20 
(Eghiayan 1975, 674-83 Sanjian 2008a; 2012a).  
 
The controversial elections of the Catholicos in Cilicia sparked a new wave of denunciations, 
tensions and hostilities between the Dashnaktsutyun and its opponents in Lebanon. The anti-
Dashnak faction refused to recognize the new Catholicos of the Cilician See, and following the 
consecration of Zareh Payaslian, they sent a petition to the Lebanese government asking to 
                                                
266 Several scholars addressed the relations of the Soviet authorities and the Armenian Church. While the Soviet 
influence on the Armenian Church is commonly acknowledged, the visit of Catholicos Vazgen I to the Middle East 
and Western Europe in 1956, his meetings with the highest ranking political figures and clergy in the Middle East 
and Western Europe cannot be solely explained by a mission to extend the Soviet influence abroad. As Felix Corley 
concludes, “Vazgen played the politics of the trip well, offering mild praise of the Soviet authorities in public, 
opening up both public and private direct channels of communication, gleaning useful information that he would not 
otherwise have learnt, establishing himself as an independent religious figure, positioning the Armenian Church in 
the Soviet Union as a Church outside the Soviet construct of denominations, … reinforcing … the place of primacy 
of Echmiadzin in the wider Armenian Church, and showing the diaspora Armenian Church that Echmiadzin was 
breaking free of the constraints of the past and was again able to play an active part directing church life” (Corley 
2010, 195). Moreover, Vazgen later acknowledged that he made a deal with the Soviet authorities that they would 
not interfere in his relations with the church matters in the diaspora in exchange for his loyalty to the Soviet state 
(ibid., 194, cf. Dallak‘yan 1998, 91-5, 113-14. 118-19). 
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recognize the creation of a rival “Independent community of the Catholicosate of Cilicia.” The 
Lebanese government refused to recognize another Armenian Orthodox community and resolved 
the issue in favor of the Dashnaktsutyun and the Catholicos-elect (Messerlian 1963, 219-20). The 
controversial elections in Cilicia affected first of all the prelacies under the jurisdiction of the 
Cilician Catholicosate. The Prelacy of Lebanon, controlled by the Dashnak majority Civic 
council, had no problem in accepting the legitimacy of elections. A few “dissident” churches 
under the Hnchakyan control remained distanced from the Catholicosate. In Syria, the Diocese 
split. While Aleppo remained under the jurisdiction of Cilicia, Damascus, under the control of 
the Hnchakyans and their allies, seceded and placed itself under the jurisdiction of Ējmiatsin 
(Migliorino 2008, 104).  
 
Growing hostilities between the factions following the elections of 1956 were further fueled by 
deteriorating international conditions and the policies pursued by the Lebanese government. The 
parliamentary elections of 1957 were accompanied with bloody encounters between the 
Dashnaks and their opponents (Schahgaldian 1979, 217).  
 
Meanwhile, in response to the Suez crisis of October-November 1956, the US President 
Eisenhower established what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. Very much in the same 
spirit as the Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957 expressed the US 
determination to protect the political independence and territorial integrity of countries in the 
Middle East and provide military aid for the fight against Communism. While the charismatic 
leader of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, opposed the Doctrine, President Camille Chamoun of 
Lebanon expressed willingness to adhere to the Doctrine. Chamoun, as a Christian, justified his 
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position by the necessity to struggle against the rising mostly Muslim anti-imperial movements 
in Lebanon, sympathetic to Nasser’s policies and believed to be backed by the Communists (cf. 
Schahgaldian 1979, 215-16). The victory of the government list in the Lebanese parliamentary 
elections of 1957, therefore, was a matter of utmost importance. While the opposition recorded 
many irregularities and an atmosphere of terror during elections, the government resorted to 
every means to secure a crushing victory. The polarization and tensions escalated between the 
Lebanese pro-Western government and pro-Nasser opposition eventually leading to the five-
month Civil War of 1958. Allied either with the pro-Nasser Muslim opposition or the pro-
Western government forces, Armenian factions violently targeted members of one another 
during the civil war and continued even after the Lebanese factions stopped fighting. Truce 
between the Armenian political factions was concluded only with the intervention of the 
Lebanese Minister of Interior on December 7, 1958, after 35 or so Armenians fell victim from 
both sides during tit-for-tat assassinations (Messerlian 1963, 265; Sanjian 2012a). The immediate 
bloodshed stopped, but tensions and conflicts continued on transnational and ideological levels, 
polarizing the Armenian community transnationally.  
 
 
Ideological Polarization and Territorial Division of the Armenian Community in Lebanon 
 
The elections of 1956 and the subsequent violent clashes had several repercussions. The 
Dashnaktsutyun’s anti-Communist struggle was not only fought externally, but also internally 
within its own rank and file. According to Schahgaldian’s estimates, between 1954 and 1956 
almost thirty percent of the regulars, including many “veteran party leaders in both Lebanon and 
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Syria,” deserted the party or were expelled (Schahgaldian 1979, 213-4). The party transformed 
into what he called a “secretive authoritarian paramilitary organization” (ibid., 221). Very much 
along the same lines as Darbinian defined, for the Dashnaktsutyun there could be no neutrals in 
the conflict. The party viewed all non-Dashnak Armenian factions, including the compatriotic 
unions outside its control, the AGBU, and those expelled from the party, as enemies and behaved 
accordingly (Schahgaldian 1979, 222). The most notable expelled members, such as Antranig 
Dzarugian or Khosrov T‘ut‘unjian, usually assumed a very anti-Dashnak stand, which in many 
ways played in favor of the Hnchakyans and the Ramkavars. 
 
The community schism was marked not only by social, political and ideological radicalization, 
but gradually also geographically. In the course of several years following the violent clashes of 
1958 in Beirut, the Hnchakyans came to fully control the Armenian neighborhoods of Nor 
Hachn, Khalil Badawi and Charchabouk, leaving the much larger Bourj Hammoud under the 
Dashnaktsutyun’s control. The River Beirut became a natural demarcation line, dividing 
neighborhoods controlled by the Hnchakyans from the Dashnak controlled Armenian quarters in 
Bourj Hammoud (Migliorino 2008, 102; Sanjian 2008b). The polarization of the Armenian 
community continued despite the changing political climate in Lebanon. The Civil War of 1958 
led to political change in Lebanon, and the new government tried to be more even-handed. In the 
face of rising anti-imperialist Arab nationalist movements in Egypt and Syria, the new president, 
Fuad Chehab, assumed a more moderate policy towards Arab movements and took a more 
neutral stand on the international arena267 (Migliorino 2008, 99; Schahgaldian 1979, 231-238). 
The atmosphere of reconciliation in Lebanon did not immediately affect the Armenians, and the 
                                                
267 The Armenians supported Chehab in the elections, and when he was elected, both Armenian parties sent separate 
delegations to congratulate him (Sanjian 2012a). 
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upcoming elections of 1960 only further aggravated the polarization inside the community. The 
“old configuration of forces was completely reversed,” as the Dashnaktsutyun expressed support 
for president Chehab and his list, while the anti-Dashnaks joined the new opposition movement, 
which also included the former president Chamoun (Schahgaldian 1979, 242). Amid continuing 
assassinations in the Armenian quarters, the Dashnaks again had all their candidates elected in 
1960. The violent electoral campaign stimulated the further crystallization of the Hnchak and 
Dashnak neighborhoods.  
 
The radical polarization of the Armenian community had an impact on all levels of social 
relations among Armenians. The Hnchak families were forced out of the Dashnak controlled 
territories in Bourj Hammoud, while the Dashnaks were forced out from the Hnchak controlled 
neighborhoods. Concerned of personal security, many Dashnak or Hnchak sympathizer families 
voluntarily left their old residence to move to a neighborhood controlled by their respective 
parties (Messerlian 1963, 312; Sanjian 2012a). On a more personal level, 
… intermarriage or even ordinary interpersonal relations between the two [factions] ceased altogether. The 
schools, churches, clubs and other public centers of one faction were closed to members or sympathizers of 
the other action. Entire Armenian neighborhoods in Beirut-Burj Hammoud, Khalil Badawi, Hajn and many 
others - were sealed off to members of the opposite camp… (Schahgaldian 1979, 221) 
 
The social distancing of the Dashnak and Hnchak neighborhoods through the 1960s put all the 
institutions, businesses, shops, schools and other organizations operating in those neighborhoods 
under the direct or indirect control of the respective Armenian parties. The neighborhoods grew 
into self-contained communities, where the political parties controlled and governed the entire 
communal life from matters concerning the entire community to settling occasional interpersonal 
disputes. Through their respective club networks the parties provided the security of the 
neighborhoods and businesses under their dominion. Both the Hnchakyans and Dashnaks 
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expanded the network of parallel youth, women, artistic and athletic organizations, and the 
upbringing and education of children was organized along strictly political lines. The 
Ramkavars, in contrast, had not been able to develop a strong community base in Lebanon. The 
party had a stronger base in Egypt and in the United States. In April-May 1954 the Ramkavar 
Ninth World Congress was held in Beirut, which decided to create youth organizations 
everywhere and initiate a more active recruitment policies, but most of the projects remained on 
paper because of the lack of administrative and financial resources (Dallak‘yan 2007, 199). In 
comparison to the Hnchakyans or Dashnaks, the Ramkavar party had not become as dominant 
among Armenians in Lebanon. The closer connections with the AGBU leadership and the 
presence of many Ramkavar members in the high ranked positions within the AGBU made the 
Ramkavar-AGBU affiliation an alternative to the Dashnak and Hnchak controlled 
neighborhoods.  
 
In the early 1960s the ranks of the Dashnaktsutyun were significantly augmented due to an influx 
of Syrian Armenian Dashnaks. The triumph of the Arab anti-imperialist movements in Egypt and 
Syria was marked by the proclamation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958 by 
the union of Syria and Egypt. The creation of the UAR had certain implications for the Armenian 
community in both countries. The victory of the Muslim Arab nationalism in Egypt and Syria 
notably worsened the conditions of Christians in both countries (cf. Fisk 2001, 70). The new 
suppressive regime outlawed all political parties in the UAR, significantly repressed cultural and 
religious freedoms. Armenian schools, press, social clubs, youth and other organizations were 
shut down or closely monitored. Nasser’s anti-Western policies targeted especially the 
Dashnaktsutyun. The discovery of huge depots of arms and ammunitions owned by the 
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Dashnaktsutyun led to the arrest of more than a hundred members of the party, including many 
leaders of the party. They were accused of “espionage” and connections with the CIA, Israel and 
Turkey. The UAR had a short life and was dissolved in 1961, but the suppression of the 
persecution of the Dashnaks did not end with the UAR. The trial of those arrested by the UAR 
occurred under the successor regime. The party had been significantly weekend in Syria 
following the events in the early 1960s, but it became stronger in Lebanon. According to 
estimates provided by various Lebanese Armenian newspapers, by 1970 the number of Syrian 
Armenians in Beirut was between 40,000 and 60,000, most of them being Dashnak sympathizers 
and affiliates (Migliorino 2008, 104; Schahgaldian 1979, 64). 
 
 
The Dashnak Anti-Communist Offensive and the Expansion of the Cilician See   
 
The Dashnak anti-Communist offensive, formulated in the fifteenth and sixteenth World 
Congresses and aiming at erasing all traces of Communism and/or pro-Sovietism from churches, 
schools, cultural and ethnic organizations, acquired new impetus after the election of Catholicos 
Zareh I. Since schools and cultural organizations throughout the diaspora had been controlled 
largely by the opposing Armenian factions, the only organization still uniting Armenians, at least 
formally, remained the Armenian Church. Following the election of Zareh Payaslian, several 
petitions from various Armenian churches and dioceses under Dashnak control began arriving to 
the Catholicos of Cilicia, requesting to join the jurisdiction of the Cilician Catholicosate. From 
the viewpoint of the Cilician See, as Biwzand Eghiayan explained, Catholicos Zareh I only 
reluctantly endorsed such petitions in response to the persistent refusal of opponents and 
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Catholicos Vazgen I to recognize his legitimacy (Eghiayan 1975, 718). “Clearly,” concluded 
Eghiayan, “it was only several months after the opposition front’s implementation of the 
divisionism, that Catholicos Zareh found himself justified before God and the Nation to respond 
to deeds based on the principle of divisionism by extending his aegis on diasporic dioceses, 
which had lived under spiritual deprivation for years” [emphasis original] (ibid., 718). From the 
viewpoint of the Dashnaktsutyun, however, many churches contained “communist and pro-
Soviet traces,” which had to be eliminated. The election of a Dashnak-supported candidate fit 
squarely with the party’s political agenda to challenge Ējmiatsin’s worldwide jurisdiction.  
 
The Dashnak-controlled churches in the US hailed the election of Zareh Payaslian and were the 
first to send a petition for joining the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Cilicia in February 
1957.  Catholicos Zareh approved the petition of these churches in October 1957, and sent the 
Prelate of the Church in Lebanon, Khoren Paroyan (Khoren Baroyan), on a mission to America. 
Paroyan had a productive trip to the United States. Upon arrival, he participated in the 
consecration of the St. Stephen’s Church in Watertown and was received by some eminent 
members of the Syrian and Lebanese diplomatic missions in America and the United Nations 
(Eghiayan 1975, 744-45). In the era of McCarthyism and the “Great American Red Scare,”268 the 
anti-Ējmiatsin activities of the Catholicosate of Cilicia were truly appreciated by the American 
officials. On October 28, 1957, Paroyan was received by vice-president Richard Nixon, who 
praised the contribution of the Cilician See to the common fight against Communism by stating: 
“[i]t does not suffice to fight against dark and sinister forces with only military and economic 
weapons. It is absolutely necessary to fight spiritually and I am happy that has been done in your 
                                                
268 Joseph R. McCarthy was a Republican Senator, who accused many high-ranking State Department officials, 
often falsely, in subversive activities in the early 1950s. The term ‘McCarthyism’ came to be associated with the 
“the great American red scare.” For further details on McCarthyism and the American Red Scare see Fried (1997). 
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Church” (quoted in Phillips 1989, 153). A few months later, in February 1958, the US 
Department of State issued a statement, which recognized the legitimacy of the Prelacy of 
Armenian Church affiliated with the Catholicosate of Cilicia: 
 
There has recently developed in the Armenian Apostolic Church a considerable body of opinion, which 
opposes allegiance to the Armenian Catholicos (Patriarch of the Church) who resides in Etchmiadzin in 
Soviet Armenia. This group favors recognition of the spiritual jurisdiction of the Catholicos of Cilicia who 
resides in Antelias, Lebanon. The Catholicos of Cilicia, Zareh I, recently sent a personal emissary to visit 
Armenian churches in the United States. 
The Department of State does not as a matter of policy intervene in the affairs of the churches in this 
country or abroad… While maintaining its policy of non-interference in religious affairs, the Department 
will continue to encourage the maintenance of cordial relations between officials of the United States 
Government and officials of the Armenian Apostolic Church under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of 
Cilicia (quoted in Crisis 1958, 7). 
 
Encouraged by this statement, the Central Diocesan Board of the Armenian National Apostolic 
Church of America published a lengthy Memorandum in English. Claiming to represent the 
“majority of Armenian American faithful,” the memorandum denounced the Catholicosate of 
Ējmiatsin as the “political instrument of the Soviets,” and the prelates of the “minority” 
“dissident” North-American Diocese of Armenian Church as “Soviet agents” (Crisis 1958, 34-
59). In order to justify the legitimacy of their religious assembly and prelacy, the Memorandum 
quoted various articles from American newspapers, which contained references to the pro-Soviet 
activities of their opponents. The Memorandum also made a reference to the report of 
Intelligence Digest published in 1956, which denounced Catholicos Vazgen I as a “well-trained 
Soviet agent.”269 In response to the opponents’ charges of the illegality of Catholicos Zareh’s 
election, the Memorandum questioned the election of Catholicos Vazgen I of Ējmiatsin (ibid., 
22-32; 187). Some of the statements in the Memorandum echoed Reuben Darbinian’s article in 
the Armenian Review published two years earlier in 1956. He also compared and contrasted the 
elections of Vazken I of Ējmiatsin and Zareh I of Cilicia to claim that while Zareh I’s election 
                                                
269 See the text quoted above. 
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was held at a “perfectly legal assembly,” Vazken I’s election was a “shocking sham” at the 
“Soviet-packed consistory of Etchmiadzin” (Darbinian, 1956, 6). In the list of supporters of the 
“dissident church,” i.e. Ējmiatsin-affiliated Dioceses, the Memorandum mentioned all major 
Armenian-American organizations, except the Dashnaktsutyun and Dashnak affiliated Armenian 
Relief Society, Armenian Youth Federation and ANCHA. The list included the following “pro-
Soviet” and “anti-American” supporters of the so-called “dissident church:” 
 
(a) The “Armenian Progressive League of America” - the Armenian Communist Party in America, 
(b) The “Armenian Democratic Liberal Political Party” (Ramgavar) a left-wing pro-Soviet political 
organization, 
(c) The “Armenian Huntchakian Party” - a Marxist, pro-Soviet party. 
(d) The “Armenian National Council” - a cooperative, “clearing-house” unit serving all three parties         
above. The Council is Communist in character. 
(e) The “Armenian General Benevolent Union” - a so-called charitable and educational organization 
which is the treasure-chest of the Armenian pro-Soviet front. 
(f) The “Knights of Vartan” - a secret, ritualistic organization supposedly dedicated to the support of the 
church, but political and pro-Soviet in character [emphasis in original] (Crisis 1958, 110) 
 
In addition, the Memorandum went on to comment that “a group of other organizations 
consistently support the dissident church. These include a number of “compatriotic” 
organizations” (ibid., 125). In order to dispel any doubts that their opponents might be in the 
majority, the Memorandum clarified: 
Note: The list above may lead … to believe that the dissident church has an imposing following. Nothing is 
further from the truth. 
Membership in these organizations is held usually by the same group of people - for instance, an AGBU 
member is usually a member of or supporter of the Knights of Vartan, the ADL, etc. The combined 
membership of all organizations is ridiculously low. The dissident church group makes up for its lack of 
numbers by the din it makes, by the mission it so relentlessly follows, by the resources it has at its 
command (ibid., 125). 
 
The debates of whose church and position was legitimate and who had the right to represent the 
Armenian-Americans continued through the 1960s (cf. Alexander 2009, 81). The 
Dashnaktsutyun continued enjoying the benefits of the anti-Soviet rhetoric as the number of the 
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party’s sympathizers grew with the continued influx of the DPs from Europe and elsewhere.270 
Yet, the task of erasing “Communist and/or anti-Soviet traces” from churches remained 
unachievable in the United States. The few Dashnak-affiliated churches initially in jurisdictional 
limbo, joined the Catholicosate of Cilicia, and were organized as the Prelacy of Armenian 
Church in the Untied States. The Prelacy continued constructing new churches, wherever the 
Dashnak communities still did not have churches. The majority of churches, however, remained   
under the jurisdiction of the Diocese of Armenian Church, which continued to be affiliated with 
the Catholicosate of Ējmiatsin.271  
 
The Dashnaktsutyun’s anti-Communist campaign extended beyond Lebanon and the United 
States. The Dioceses of Armenian Church in Greece and Iran, all controlled by the 
Dashnaktsutyun, seceded from Ējmiatsin and joined the Cilician See in 1958-1959. Due to the 
immediate proximity to Ējmiatsin and with more than 70 Armenian churches, the three Dioceses 
of Iran were of special importance (cf. Eghiayan 1975, 746-49; Sanjian 2012a). In the course of a 
few years, thanks to the active work of the Dashnaktsutyun in those communities, the 
Catholicosate of Cilicia expanded its jurisdiction beyond the limited jurisdiction the See had 
acquired in the Middle East in the late 1920s.272 But the attempts in France failed because the 
Dashnaktsutyun had been significantly weekend during WWII, and the party was still slowly 
                                                
270 By the mid-1950s ANCHA and its leader had become closely affiliated with the Dashnak circles. George 
Mardigian was one of the delegates to visit Antelias in 1958 representing the Board and the Armenian National 
Church of America (Eghiayan 1975, 746). The arriving Armenian DPs through the channels of ANCHA, therefore, 
were more sympathetic to the Dashnak-affiliated organizations and churches, who had assisted them. 
271 The Prelacy developed parallel administrative structures to the Diocese. Similar to the Diocese, the Prelate was 
the spiritual and administrative leader of the Prelacy. While the Diocese was run by the Diocesan Council, the 
Prelacy was run by the Central Executive Committee. Both were made up of lay and clergy members. The Diocesan 
Council was elected at the Diocesan Assembly, and the Prelacy Central Executive Committee at the National 
(Prelacy) Assembly (cf. Phillips 1989: 161). 
272 Before 1956 only Dioceses of Aleppo, Damascus, Cyprus and Lebanon fell under the jurisdiction of the 
Catholicosate of Cilicia (Dallak‘yan 2004, 154) 
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recovering and expanding the network of its clubs, youth and sports organizations, and chapters 
of Croix Bleue des arméniennes.  
 
By the 1960s, the Armenian community had significantly declined in Marseille, Paris and 
elsewhere mostly due to assimilation. Yet the community life did not disappear. Haratch 
occasionally reported on Armenian events happening in various towns in France. By the 1960s, 
although several new churches had been established in Issy-Les-Moulineaux, Chaville, Decines 
and Valance, other churches had become inactive following the death of priests or after the 
Armenian community nearby had scattered or assimilated. This was the situation in some 
churches in Marseille in 1960, which did not have permanent priests and organized Parish 
councils. At the same time, Marseille had been the center of the Diocese of Southern France 
since 1927 and hosted the largest number of Armenian churches. The Harach editorial on 
January 7, 1960 by Hrant Samuelian reflected the dire situation of Armenian churches in Paris, 
Lyon, Marseille or elsewhere, expressing hope that the situation would improve in 1960. It was 
in such context, that some Dashnak controlled church parishes in Marseille actively sought to 
connect with the Cilician See. Several petitions were made to Catholicos Zareh I, requesting to 
appoint new priests. In response, Catholicos Zareh I sent Father Shahan Dedeyan to serve the 
flock at St. Loup Armenian church in Marseille in 1962 (Eghiayan 1975, 779-80). The following 
year, amid conflicts and disagreements, the Dashnak initiated Diocesan Assembly elected Bp. 
Ardavazt Terterian the Primate of the Diocese of Southern France. Terterian was a member of 
the Cilician Brotherhood, who had spent several years in France studying in seminaries 
(Eghiayan 1975: 780-81). Questioning the legitimacy of the Assembly, some churches refused to 
recognize his authority, and this situation prevailed until 1970 (Eghiayan 1975: 781-85; 
 
 327 
Boghossian 2005: 156-9). Several events happening in the 1960s, which will be discussed in 
detail in the following sections, eventually led to the failure of the Dashnaktsutyun to connect the 
Diocese of Southern France to the Cilician See. 
 
As a result of the Dashnak campaign of erasing the “Communist and pro-Soviet traces” in 
Armenian churches abroad, some churches eventually came under the control of the 
Dashnaktsutyun, rather than becoming independent. The Cilician See, which had adopted rules 
inspired by the Ottoman Armenian Constitution of 1863, allowed significant participation of lay 
individuals in the governance of its Dioceses and the community. According to this constitution, 
each Diocese had a National Assembly (Azgayin eresp‘okhanakan zhoghov), Religious and Civic 
(Executive) Councils, as well as various boards appointed by the Civic Council (cf. 
Kanonadrut‘iwn 2010). By securing uncontested majorities in all these councils and boards, the 
Dashnaktsutyun gained direct access to controlling the schools, properties, and finances of the 
Prelacy, especially in Lebanon, where the Lebanese consociational political system granted 
broad autonomy to religious communities. By connecting other Dioceses to the Cilician See and 
by actively excluding the opponents in the antagonistic bipolar Armenian world, the 
Dashnaktsutyun could in the same way exert more influence on the management of properties, 
finances and overall diocesan affairs elsewhere. Had the Cold War continued with the same 
intensity as in the 1950s, the Dashnaktsutyun would have probably been able to control a greater 
number of Dioceses in France and in other diasporan communities. But the thaw in the Soviet-
US relations in the early 1960s, following the Cuban missile crisis, marked a new phase in the 
Cold War in which the anti-Communist rhetoric and struggle gradually lost its urgency in 
American political discourse (Alexander 2009, 81). The Cold War rhetoric of the Armenian 
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parties was yielding to rising anti-Turkish sentiments among Armenians worldwide. The gradual 
emergence of the Armenian Genocide as a prevailing discourse among Armenians, the 
reestablishment of active relations between various diasporic circles and Soviet Armenia and 
Ējmiatsin in the 1960s, and a number of other events eventually pushed the Dashnaktsutyun to 
abandon the policies of erasing “Communist and pro-Soviet traces” in Armenian churches. The 
Dashnak anti-Communist offensive of the 1950s, as much as the party leaders justified it as a 
struggle against denationalization and destruction of the Armenian Church by the Soviets, 
resulted in the further institutional and administrative separation of the Catholicosates of 








Towards Reconciliation: The Soviet Thaw, the Genocide Convention and the Change of 
Political Course in the Armenian Diaspora 
 
 
While the Armenian political factions fought each other, allied with the pro-Soviet and pro-
Western blocs in Lebanon in the 1950s, the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted in 1948, and changes in the Soviet policies 
following Stalin’s death in 1953 and Khrushchev’s accession to power began having their 
somewhat delayed effects on Armenian political thinking and institutional structures worldwide. 
Under such conditions, as this section will discuss, the approaching fiftieth anniversary of the 
Great Crime (Mets Eghern)273 in 1965 acquired a special meaning both in Soviet Armenia and in 
the diaspora, which determined the change in the political agendas and the course of the formerly 
hostile Armenian camps.   
 
The official renunciation of territorial claims against Turkey by the Soviet authorities following 
the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953 exacerbated the conflicts among Armenian factions in the 
diaspora. The Dashnaktsutyun grew more confident in its claims that Soviet intentions had never 
been honest. Yet, the change of Soviet leadership entailed certain revisions and retreat from the 
Stalinist policy lines, which had certain repercussions on Soviet Armenia and Armenians in the 
                                                
273 Before the invention of the word ‘genocide’ Armenians generally referred to the massacres of 1915 as Mets 




diaspora.274 At the level of constituent Soviet Republics, de-Stalinization led to some 
decentralization of power and the toleration of expressions of national sentiments. With 
relaxation, local officials of the constituent republics were granted more autonomy to make 
decisions on the economy, industry, culture, education and other social matters. As the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Armenian genocide approached, the Soviet authorities largely tolerated the 
growing national sentiments in Soviet Armenia, because they were anti-Turkish in nature and 
posed no threat to the Soviet rule (Suny 1993, 186). Even though the Soviets had renounced the 
territorial claims against Turkey, Turkey’s adherence to NATO in 1952 had placed her in the 
Western camp.  
 
Meanwhile, from about the mid-fifties, but especially from the early sixties, the plan to establish 
relations with diaspora was adopted (Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 361). In a number of respects the 
Soviet leadership remained satisfied with Vazgen I’s extended trip to the Middle East and 
Europe in 1956. Upon his return, Vazgen I was received by the Premier of the Soviet Union and 
he made some requests on behalf of the Armenian Church. Using the occasion, he even raised 
the issue of the possible annexation of Nagorno-Karabagh and Nakhijevan regions to Soviet 
Armenia (Corley 2010, 196).275 The more favorable attitude towards the Armenian Church 
opened up new perspectives for reestablishing relations with the diaspora. In 1960 the Soviet 
authorities invited many representatives of the friendly Armenian diasporic organizations to 
participate in the fortieth anniversary of the Sovietization of Armenia. These delegates were 
received personally by the leader of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev. Using the occasion, 
                                                
274 Nikita Khrushchev’s speech at the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party in February 1956 caught 
many by surprise and astonishment as he harshly condemned the totalitarian policies of his predecessor - the purges, 
the cult of personality and abuse of power. The speech at the height of the Cold War marked the beginning of social 
and political relaxation in the USSR (see Taubman 2006, 268; Suny 1993, 181-82). 
275 Nagorno-Karabagh and Nakhijevan were autonomous regions attached to Soviet Azerbaijan. 
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they referred to their hope to see the annexation of historical Armenian territories in Turkey, as 
well as in Soviet Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabagh and Nakhijevan) to Soviet Armenia. 
Khrushchev was expected to be present at the celebrations of November 29, 1960 in Armenia, 
and some diasporans hoped that he would make a statement on Karabagh and other Armenian 
territories, but the visit and celebrations were postponed until May 1961 (Sanjian 2012b). 
Despite the fact that the issue of territories were not addressed, relations with the diaspora 
continued to improve. On August 12, 1961 the Soviet Council of Ministers officially endorsed 
the resumption of repatriation in response to petitions from Soviet Armenia and the diaspora 
(Melik‘set‘yan 1986, 154). In parallel to organizing repatriation, the Communist party of 
Armenia developed a plan of actions for establishing relations with the diaspora. From the late 
1950s, but especially in the 1960s, Soviet Armenian dance troops, bands, composers, athletic 
collectives, performers, and scientists had been occasionally sent to various diasporic 
communities; more regularly, many publications and films on the progress of the economy in 
Soviet Armenia, culture and science, music LPs, newspapers, and photos were dispatched to the 
diaspora (Dallak‘yan 2007, 228; Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 361). In the host countries, unions like the 
JAF and the UCFAF in France or the Ramkavar Tekeyan Cultural Association,276 the Hnchakyan 
Nor Serount Cultural Association277 in Lebanon proudly hosted these collectives arriving from 
homeland to underline the fallacy of the Dashnak claims that Armenian culture was threatened in 
Soviet Armenia.  
  
                                                
276 Tekeyan Cultural Association was founded in 1947 in Beirut by some prominent Ramkavar leaders (Dallak‘yan 
2007, 150-153). 
277 This should not be confused with the Dashnak Nor Seround youth organization in France (see Chapter 4.1). The 
Nor Serount Cultural Association was founded in Beirut in 1955 by some prominent Hnchakyan intellectuals 
(Sanjian 2003, 311). 
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From 1958 the diaspora Armenian youth were offered scholarships to study at the institutions of 
higher education in Yerevan. From about the mid-sixties the number of such students and 
scholarships grew steadily and rapidly (cf. Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 426-28). In 1962 the Soviet 
Association of Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries established a special Department of 
Relations with the Diaspora Armenian Communities for the purpose of connecting with 
Armenian associations abroad. The department shortly established contacts with more than 500 
Armenian organizations abroad. In a few years the scope of its activities had expanded to such an 
extent that the Soviet Armenian government decided to establish a separate committee for 
cultural ties with diaspora Armenians. The committee, officially named Sp‘yuṙk‘ahayut‘yan het 
mshakut‘ayin kaperi komite [Committee for Cultural Relations with Diaspora Armenians], but 
more commonly known as Sp‘yuṙk‘i komite [Diaspora Committee], was founded in May 1964. It 
significantly expanded the scope and depth of relations with the diaspora. Besides cultural 
projects, the Committee also contributed to the advancement of educational, scientific, and other 
efforts in the diaspora. The Committee began issuing Hairenik‘i dzayn (the Voice of the 
Homeland) weekly from August 1, 1965, which along with the already existing radio broadcast 
and the monthly Sovetakan Hayastan (Soviet Armenia),278 established regular contacts with 
diaspora Armenians in many countries. Increasingly, the Diaspora Committee promoted itself as 
the shield against the assimilation of Armenian in the diaspora (Dallak‘yan 2007, 228-30; 
Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 367-68; 375-82; Ter-Minassian 1997, 42).  
 
As relations grew closer, Vazgen I undertook several extended trips throughout major Armenian 
diasporic communities in the Middle East, Europe, North and South America. The trip to 
                                                
278 The Soviet Association of Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries, established in 1944, issued the monthly 
Sovetakan Hayastan (Soviet Armenia) from 1945 (see Babloyan 1986, 241).  
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Jerusalem in 1963 was particularly significant, as Vazgen met with the newly consecrated 
Catholicos of Cilicia, Khoren Paroyan. Prior to 1963, several attempts of reconciliation between 
Ējmiatsin and Cilicia bore no fruit. The expansion of the Cilician See had made the matters 
worse. The death of Catholicos Zareh I, on February 18, 1963, and the succession of Khoren 
Paroyan created new possibilities for rapprochement. The meeting of the Catholicoi, which 
occurred in Jerusalem on October 26, 1963, was labeled as voghjagurum (embracement), 
symbolizing the formal rapprochement between the Sees (cf. Eghiayan 1975, 772-75). The 
persisting problem between the two Sees, namely, the matter of subordination and the expansion 
of the Cilician See, however, remained unresolved. The Ramkavars were quick to describe the 
voghjagurum as an “unconditional surrender.”279 However, despite the fears, the reconciliation 
essentially put an end to the further expansion of the Cilician See in Europe and elsewhere and 
prevented the further deepening of the schism in the church (cf. Eghyaian 1975, 777-78).280 The 
meeting was important in another respect as well. Towards the fiftieth anniversary of Armenian 
genocide commemorations both Catholoci realized the importance of the unity of the church and 
of the Armenian people. 
 
As the Armenian world remained bedeviled until the early 1960s with ever widening divide, the 
Nuremberg Trials and “Genocide,” a term a Polish Jewish lawyer coined, emerged as a rallying 
cry and provided an international context for the Armenian Genocide. In parallel to the 
                                                
279 The Ramkavar Central Committee of Lebanon issued a special announcement and expressed concerns that the 
endorsement of the Cilician See would continue rather than prevent the Dashnaktsutyun’s undermining of Ējmiatsin 
(Dallak‘yan 2007, 234) 
280 In 1963, diocesan matters in Marseille remained uncertain due to the reluctance of Catholicos Khoren to dispatch 
Artavazt Terterian, as the Prelate of the Diocese of Southern France, without having the matter cleared with 
Catholicos Vazgen. Terterian finally arrived in Marseille in February 1964. In 1970, however, Catholicos Vazken I 
announced Bishop Hakob Vardanian as the representative of the Catholicosate of Ējmiatsin in Marseille, refusing to 
recognize Terterian as the representative of the Armenian Church. This put an end to the uncertain situation in 
Marseille, and Terterian returned to Antelias (Boghossian 2005, 159; Eghiayan 1975, 784-85). 
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intensifying relations of Soviet Armenia with diaspora and of Ējmiatsin with Antelias, both in 
Soviet Armenia and in the diaspora Armenians of various factions began articulating the 
Armenian massacres or the Great Crime (Mets Eghern) within the frameworks of the recently 
adopted UN convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.281 The 
Armenian diasporic circles, closely following the political developments of the late 1940s, had 
not missed the adoption of the Convention, and several papers began considering the 
applicability of the convention to the Armenian case. A Haratch editorial of May 25, 1948, 
entitled Genocide wondered if it was necessary that another “storm to explode in the world,” so 
that people could learn the word Genocide. It went on to comment: 
The mass assassination attempt against the Armenian people - Genocide - had served for filling up books 
and manuscripts, or for spilling rhetorical jewels. But the other [the Jewish Holocaust - V.S.] immediately 
led to a logical end - trial and execution. Certainly, because the Armenian [genocide] was of  “local” 
significance, far removed from their markets of profit. But the other [had] an international weight. It was 
Europe’s heart that was being cut apart through conquest.  
 
Haratch also addressed the adoption of the UN Convention in an editorial on November 27, 
1948, which argued that the massacres of Armenians, Greeks and Kurds in Turkey between 1914 
and 1922 were also genocide, regardless of the fact that the term did not exist at the time. The 
author, Shavarsh Missakian, ended the article by referring to Turkey as “the classical country of 
Genocide.”  
 
The term was discussed in several other editorials and articles in Haratch as well as in other 
Armenian diasporic newspapers in the late 1940s. But in the chilling Soviet-American relations 
the opposing Armenian camps had been so much obsessed with the pro- and anti-Soviet 
struggles that genocide remembrance and recognition had not been publicly articulated in unison. 
                                                
281 The Convention was adopted on 1948 and came into force in 1951. 
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While annual commemorations of April 24 continued, different Armenian factions usually held 
separate private services amid political tensions and sometimes even clashes. The growing 
attention towards the Jewish Holocaust and excessive retributions imposed on Germany 
eventually made the genocide discourse in Armenian periodical press more prevailing in the 
1960s.  
 
The Soviet relaxation and international responses to the Jewish Holocaust, having their delayed 
effects on Armenians in the form of intensifying Armenia-Diaspora relations and new 
perspectives for the pursuit of the Armenian Cause, slowly but steadily softened the mutual 
intolerance of the political factions. Towards the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide, 
the Armenian political factions especially in Lebanon had reconsidered the effects of their 
strategies. More and more the political press of opposing factions began addressing themes 
regarding the shared history of the massacres, the need to preserve Armenianness against the 
threats of assimilation, and often, in between the words, the need for unity. Anti-Turkish 
sentiments and references to Armenian Genocide by Turkey began increasingly articulated in all 
Armenian newspapers.  
 
In August 1964, both Catholicoi issued encyclicals calling on the Armenian people and factions 
worldwide for unity in the commemoration events of the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian 
genocide. All Armenian newspapers promptly and prominently disseminated the lengthy 
encyclicals. In the following months, talks were initiated at the highest levels of political party 
leaderships in Lebanon. On February 1, 1965, an announcement of the Dashnak Bureau 
published in Aztag revealed that talks to have a united commemoration by the three parties had 
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failed. The front page Announcement regretfully noted that a group of Armenians created a 
committee and issued an appeal to the Armenian people, but their committee represented only 
the Hnchakyans and Ramkavars. The Announcement referred to the appeal of the “Interim 
Central Committee for the Pursuit of the Armenian Land Cause” published in Zartonk on 
January 17, 1965. The failure to create a joint committee demonstrated the unwillingness of the 
Armenian political parties to put aside narrow interests and become vehicles of unity. The stalled 
negotiations between the parties resumed with the participation of the church. In February 1965, 
the Committee for the fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the Armenian Genocide was 
formed at the Cilician Catholicosate. The Committee included representatives from Armenian 
political parties and was to be co-chaired by the spiritual heads of the Armenian Apostolic, 
Catholic and Evangelical communities (cf. Aztag, February 13, 1965; Zartonk, February 14, 
1965; Ararad, February 16, 1965).282  
 
During his visit to France in January-February 1965, Catholicos Vazgen I emphasized the 
importance of creating unity among all the Armenian organizations, factions and parties for the 
commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide. On March 18, 1965, Haratch notified 
its readers of the creation of a committee in Paris, which brought together representatives of the 
three Armenian political parties and confessions, as well as of 42 other organizations and unions. 
Even in Marseille, where the community had been divided, an April 24 Commemorations 
Committee was established under the chairmanship of Rev. Haroutioun Helvadjian, an 
Evangelical Armenian pastor (Boghossian 2009, 217-18). 
 
                                                
282 Haratch in France was closely following the development of events in Lebanon. The entire text of the Call was 
copied from Zartonk on January 19, 1965 issue, and the Dashnak Bureau announcement was printed on February 5, 
1965. On February 24, 1965, Haratch notified of the creation of the Central Committee in Lebanon. 
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On April 24, 1965, more than ten thousand Armenians marched down the Avenue des Champs-
Élysées from the Armenian Cathedral of St. Jean Baptiste to the Arc de Triomphe in Paris. The 
next day, on April 25, several thousand Armenians attended the mass at the Notre Dame led by 
the Exarch of the Armenian Catholic church (Haratch, April 27, 1965; Achkhar May 1, 1965). 
The same day, more than eighty thousand Armenians gathered at the stadium in Beirut, where 
the leaders of Armenian churches of all confessions in Lebanon held a joint requiem for the 
victims of the Genocide. The leaders of all three Armenian political parties gave lengthy 
speeches, sharing the same stage and united around the same cause.283 The unprecedented unity 
of the community laid the foundations for a common agenda in the form of growing anti-
Turkishness. Even the Dashnaktsutyun, some of whose leaders had been ready to cooperate with 
Turkey against the Soviets in the 1950s, now disseminated anti-Turkish propaganda on a much 
larger scale through its official organ Aztag in Lebanon. The Dashnak Central Committee of 
Lebanon issued an address on April 24, 1965, which explicitly charged Turkey of committing 
genocide against Armenians.284  
 
Genocide commemoration services were held in a number of other countries as well. In the 
United States, massive commemoration services of the fiftieth anniversary were held in various 
towns and cities, but the fiftieth anniversary did not unite the Armenian-American community.285 
Perhaps most surprisingly for all Armenian communities in the diaspora was the spontaneous 
rally in Soviet Armenia. On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary, on April 24, 1965 tens of 
thousands flooded the Lenin Square in Yerevan and chanting “our lands, our lands” moved to the 
                                                
283 Aztag (April 26, 1965); Ararad (April 27, 28 1965), Zartonk (April 27, 1965). 
284 The address was published in Aztag on April 24, 1965. 
285 The approaching fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide did not unite Armenians in the United States, 
since the community had been divided not only politically, but also institutionally. Even after the reconciliation of 
Ējmiatsin and Antelias, the institutionalized divisions in the community could not produce any joint action in 1965. 
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Opera House, where the representatives of various Soviet Armenian institutions were holding an 
unprecedented special session dedicated to the fifteenth anniversary of the Genocide286 
(Zarobyan and Grigoryan 2004; Dallak‘yan 1998, 131-33). It seemed the entire Armenian 
universe was connected across countries and continents through massive events in Yerevan, 
Beirut, Paris, New York and elsewhere.  
 
In the morning of April 24, 1965, as Haratch reported on April 29, several “Turkish 
Armenians”287 as they referred to themselves, gathered at the Taksim Square in Istanbul to place 
flowers at the Republic Monument in honor of Mustafa Atatürk as an expression of “appreciation 
and brotherhood to the Turkish nation.” The crowd observed three minutes of silence in 
commemoration of “the souls who died for the great Turkish nation and the dear Turkish 
fatherland.” While Armenians worldwide mobilized around the commemoration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, Armenians in Istanbul found themselves in a very 
difficult situation. In response to the involvement of the Armenian Church in the mobilization of 
efforts toward the fiftieth anniversary commemorations the Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul, 
Archbishop Shnrok Kaloustian (Shnork‘ Galustian), issued a statement on April 9, 1965. Many 
newspapers in the diaspora translated and published the text shortly afterwards. The statement, 
published in Haratch on April 16, 1965, partially read: 
…It is a historical truth that the Turks and Armenians had lived in a brotherly and good-neighborly 
atmosphere since the first day. As the greatest proof of this reality we must remember the decision of Sultan 
Mehmet Fatih, which is already part of history.288 Fatih the Great … had issued a decree and had settled 
Armenians in all corners of his wide Empire. Since then, for many centuries, the Armenian Community has 
                                                
286 Things got out of control in Soviet Armenia and the authorities could not stop the demonstrators from breaking 
into the Opera House and disrupting the meeting. The Armenian newspapers in the diaspora, however, like Harach, 
mentioned about this incident only in passing, emphasizing instead the massiveness of the rally in Yerevan (see 
Haratch, April 30, 1965). 
287 Haratch published two excerpts in Armeno-Turkish, one of which ended with a signature “Türk Ermeniler.” 
288 Refers to the establishment of the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul and the recognition of the Armenian millet. 
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always been useful to the society, as a loyal element, and many Armenians have assumed the highest 
political and administrative responsibilities and provided successful results. 
In the last years of the Ottoman Empire, several foreign powers, aiming to rob privileges from the Sultans, 
to continue with the Capitulations and, finally, to divide the Ottoman State, tried to use various 
communities as tools, including the Armenians. Thereby, the exploiting countries wanted to disunite the 
two nations, who have lived together in brotherhood for centuries. The consequences of this and [other] 
events that happened have been recorded in history as instructive samples, and are meant to strengthen our 
human and brotherly sentiments, and which indeed mean the same to us.  
Commemorating the dead is the right and moral responsibility of all people. It’s just that such expressions 
of respect should not sow enmity in the hearts of nations… 
As for us, the Armenians of Turkey, we have been a society, which had lived in the Turkish Republic and 
raised by the ideas of Atatürk, who in the past forty years has shown its civic honest, constructive and loyal 
feelings. We have the fortune to witness the sentiments of brotherhood and trust that today continue to exist 
among our fellow-countrymen. Some of our fellow co-religionists abroad do not have the right to cast a 
shadow on these relations of love and respect. Turkish Armenians consider themselves as the inseparable 
part of this country. This is why they will consider any movement against the interests of this country as 
absolutely improper. 
 
The deportations and genocide of Armenians during WWI eliminated the Armenian presence 
from especially the Armenian provinces. Despite the fear that hundreds of Armenian notables 
were arrested on April 24, 1915, and later were put to death in the interior, the Armenian 
Patriarchate and a small number of Armenians remained in Turkey throughout the Republican 
period and developed a vibrant community. The Armenians of the Republic of Turkey had 
remained uninvolved in the political struggles and the processes of Armenian diaspora since the 
1920s, as the country had prohibited ethnic political parties (cf. Akçam 2004, 23ff). In the 
absence of Armenian political parties the pro- and anti-Soviet orientations, orientation towards 
Soviet Armenia, participation in or opposition to repatriation and many other burning agenda 
items for other diasporic communities had been irrelevant for Istanbul Armenians. Instead, the 
Istanbul Armenians had developed a sense of Armenianness without contrasting it to Turkey and 
the Turks. They had come to consider the events of 1915 as historical lessons, which should be 
remembered in order to strengthen “human and brotherly sentiments” among the Armenians and 
Turks, rather than instill hostility between them. If before 1965 the Istanbul Armenians had not 
been actively involved in the political and ideological struggles of the diaspora, the events of 
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1965 directly posed some questions to their loyalty and future in Turkey. The statement of the 
Patriarch and the symbolic gesture of a “Turkish-Armenian” crowd at Taksim square were first 
and foremost an assurance of loyalty to Turkey, and secondly, represented acts of distancing 
themselves from events happening both in Soviet Armenia and the diaspora.  
   
The year 1965 marked a turning point both in Soviet Armenia and in the diaspora for a number 
of reasons. First of all, the theme of genocide became dominant in Armenian transnational 
discourse, stretching from Soviet Armenia to the Middle East, Europe and the Americas. With 
some exceptions, genocide became central in the discourse of the Armenian periodical press of 
the time in the diaspora, providing a major impetus to the unprecedented expression of national 
sentiments in Soviet Armenia. The fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian massacres in Turkey, 
now firmly identified as genocide, became the most crucial factor capable of bringing together 
previously antagonistic Armenian factions. Secondly, Ējmiatsin and Antelias were able to act in 
concord on this issue. Even though the matter of subordination and jurisdictions persisted, 
previous antagonism had significantly declined and the state of no relations disappeared. The 
Dashnak newspapers, which used to be extremely critical of Catholicos Vazgen I and more than 
once had labeled him as a KGB agent, now provided lengthy coverage on his 1965 visit to 
France and England, praised his sermons, speeches and activities in the diaspora.289 Thirdly, if 
from the 1920s through the 1940s relations between Armenian confessions had been 
competitive, in 1965 the heads of the Armenian Apostolic, Armenian Catholic and Evangelical 
Armenian churches came together in Lebanon to preside over the April 24 committee and the 
commemoration events. Fourth, the year marked an unprecedented unity of the Armenian 
political factions in Lebanon, who only few years ago had been engaged in deadly clashes among 
                                                
289 Aztag, February 8, 9 issues of 1965; Haratch, February 2, 1965. 
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themselves.290 Finally, the year was crucial in Soviet Armenia, as the leadership of Soviet 
Armenia enthusiastically and the leadership of Soviet Union reluctantly endorsed the expressions 
of Armenian nationalism as long as they targeted Turkey and not Soviet Union.  
 
The Khrushchev relaxation was having its delayed effects on the Armenian community 
transnationally even after the Soviet leader was removed from his post in 1964. The Brezhnev 
era did not alter the basic course taken by the government of Soviet Armenia regarding the 
expressions of national sentiments and relations with the diaspora. In the second half of the 
1960s several important monuments were erected in Armenia, marking a significant symbolic 
departure from “socialist in content.” The Soviet Armenian government embarked on 
constructing a genocide memorial complex in Yerevan. The memorial was ready by 1967 and 
the opening ceremony took place on November 29, 1967, on the forty-seventh anniversary of 
Soviet Armenia.291 The same year, the 98-foot-tall pedestal on a hilltop in Yerevan, which 
contained a museum dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, and used to support Stalin’s 55-foot-
tall statue until 1962,292 was decorated by a magnificent 72-foot-tall statue of a woman with a 
sword in her hand and a shield under her feet symbolizing Mother Armenia. In 1968 another 
memorial was erected in the historical battlefield between Armenians and Turks in Soviet 
Armenia (cf. Hambardzumyan 1984, 227-28).  
 
                                                
290 See the previous section. 
291 History of Tsitsernakaberd Memorial Complex. Armenian Genocide Museum. http://www.genocide-
museum.am/eng/Description_and_history.php. Accessed September 9, 2014. 
292 The base and the museum were built in 1950 and Stalin’s statue was erected in 1951. The denunciation of Stalin 
by Khrushchev led to the removal of Stalin’s statue in 1962. The pedestal was vacant until 1967 (“HH PN Mayr 
Hayastan Zinvorakan Tangaran” [“Mother Armenia” Military Museum of the RA Ministry of Defense]” 
http://www.mayrhayastan.am/history.html. Accessed September 9, 2014)). 
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The monuments became the expressions of the retreat from Stalin’s “socialist in content” and 
symbolically marked the permanence of the shift towards “national in content.” Increasingly, the 
Soviet government of Armenia began promoting Soviet Armenia as the overall homeland, ready 
to provide all kinds of assistance to Armenians abroad and to support the preservation of 
Armenian identity. Despite the limited number of repatriates after 1962, the influence of Soviet 
Armenia in various Armenian communities abroad continued to grow. In parallel to the growth 
of national sentiments and the resumption of active policies towards the diaspora, from 1963 the 
government of Soviet Armenia and the Soviet secret services also began intensively working 
towards the Dashnaktsutyun, hoping to bring the party to a more pro-Soviet position. Besides, 
the Dashnaktsutyun was targeted by the KGB as the strongest of all Armenian organizations 
operating in the Middle East (cf. Corley 2001, 4). In a book published in 1994, a KGB Major 
General and the former Chief of Counter-Intelligence Oleg Kalugin mentioned the 
Dashnaktsutyun among other anti-Soviet organizations in the West, infiltrated by the Soviet 
KGB.  
…the émigré organization we most thoroughly infiltrated was the Armenian exile group, Dashnak Tsutiun 
[sic]. Once it had been a staunchly nationalist group that campaigned for an independent Armenian state. 
Over time, we placed so many agents there that several had risen to positions of leadership. We succeeded 
in effectively neutralizing the group, and by the 1980s Dashnak Tsutyun [sic] had stopped fighting against 
Soviet power in Armenia. The organization and some of its members had been coopted by the KGB 
(Kalugin 2009, 221). 
  
 
In a more recent article, Felix Corley (2001, 7-9) quotes some lengthy passages from secret KGB 
books and documents to demonstrate how the KGB was able to recruit some party members, 
even from among the “most authoritative Dashnak leaders.”293 While the extent of the KGB 
                                                
293 Hrayr Marukhian’s name was often mentioned in connection with the KGB-Dashnak cooperation (see Panossian 
2006, 373). Marukhian denied his or the party’s involvement with the KGB, admitting, however, that there had been 
certain contacts with the representatives of Soviet Armenia from the early 1960s (see Marukhian 1992, 69-71; 
Panossian 2006, 374). 
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influence on the change of the Dashnak policies still remains to be fully uncovered in documents 
still unavailable, the Dashnaktsutyun’s change of political course from anti-Soviet to pro-Soviet 
seems to have occurred in response to several other factors. First of all, by the 1960s, most of the 
representatives of the older generation leaders had passed away or had lost influence because of 
advanced age. Levon Shant‘, Ruben Ter-Minasian, Dro, Vahan Navasardian passed away in the 
1950s, Simon Vrats‘ian and Reuben Darbinian died in the late 1960s. Among the new generation 
leaders many were not as radically opposed to the USSR as their predecessors. Many in the party 
interpreted the changing conditions in Soviet Armenia as public displays of commitment to the 
national cause, to something the Dashnaktsutyun had fought for many decades (Schahgaldian 
1979, 110). Secondly, local political developments in the Middle East and France in the 1960s 
also seem to have facilitated the change of the Dashnak policies towards a more neutral or pro-
Soviet orientation. After the denouncement of the crisis of 1958 in Lebanon, President Fuad 
Chehab, who succeeded Camille Chamoun, gradually distanced Lebanon from the alliance with 
the US to a more neutral ground between the United States and Arab national movements. The 
French orientation at the time seemed to be the most suitable for Lebanon in the US-Soviet 
bipolar world, as France under President Charles De-Gaulle was emerging as an influential 
European power aspiring to an equal status with the US within NATO294 (cf. Howarth and 
Varouxakis 2003, 190; Schahgaldian 1979, 232). President Chehab’s French orientation certainly 
influenced the Dashnaktsutyun. The party supported Chehab in the presidential elections of 1958 
and participated in the parliamentary elections of 1960 on the government list. Having suffered 
the consequences of their anti-Sovietism in the UAR in 1961, the Dashnak leaders in Lebanon 
were cautious of not provoking the government against the party, and subscribed to the mildly 
                                                
294 De Gaulle eventually withdrew from NATO’s military command structure in 1966, although France remained 
within the organization (Howarth and Varouxakis 2003, 190) 
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pro-Western policies of the new president. In addition to all these factors, the unprecedented 
unity during the commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide in 
Lebanon and the significant shift towards reinforcing Armenian national identity in Soviet 
Armenia made the Dashnaktsutyun rethink its policies and make certain adjustments under the 
new conditions. At the Nineteenth World Congress in 1967 the Dashnaktsutyun officially 
endorsed temporary visits of its followers to Soviet Armenia and expressed its support for 
repatriation (Corley 2001, 5). The tactical program was significantly revised and the anti-Soviet 
policies were abandoned in the twentieth World Congress in 1972, with a new accentuated shift 




                                                
295 Gaïdz Minassian calls this process La révolution culturelle haïtadiste [The Haidatist Cultural Revolution]. Hai 





WWII and the Cold War significantly determined the transnationalization of political agendas 
and identity politics in the Armenian diaspora. While in the first years of WWII Armenian 
political parties in the diaspora demonstrated certain flexibilities within certain country contexts, 
the Cold War affiliations with the pro-Soviet and pro-Western blocs polarized the Armenian 
political factions in the diaspora transnationally.  
 
As shown in the previous chapter, during WWII the decentralized nature of the Dashnaktsutyun 
permitted its central and local committees to define their positions in response to specific 
conditions in their respective countries. If in the United States local chapters significantly 
retreated from anti-Soviet rhetoric after the American alliance with the USSR, in Lebanon the 
party organ hailed the advances of the Red Army toward the end of the war and expressed full 
support to Soviet Armenia. If in France the local chapters became practically inactive during 
WWII, in Germany many active and former Dashnak leaders cooperated with the Nazis, hoping 
to liberate Armenia after the defeat of the Soviets. Similarly, if the pro-Soviet Armenian factions 
took advantage of conditions in France and the United States to define themselves as the 
‘patriots’ and to denounce the Dashnaks as ‘traitors’, in Lebanon a more cooperative atmosphere 




The Cold War conditions determined the transnational cohesion of the pro- and anti-Soviet 
Armenian diasporic factions and identities. If the pro-Soviet factions took advantage of the 
conditions during WWII to denounce and alienate the members of the Dashnaktsutyun especially 
in the United States, the Cold War provided more favorable conditions for the Dashnaktsutyun. 
Encouraged by the US policies against the Soviet expansion and enjoying the Western support, 
the aggressive anti-Soviet offensive launched by the Dashnaktsutyun transnationally, extending 
from the Untied States to the Middle East and France, made the party transnationally more 
influential compared to its pro-Soviet adversaries. Yet, the Dashnak mission of “erasing all 
traces of communism” remained incomplete. Instead of bringing all Armenian churches outside 
the Soviet Union under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Cilicia, the expansion of the 
Cilician See in Iran, Greece and the United States, with the powerful and pro-active engagement 
of the Dashnaktsutyun, escalated hostilities and caused a transnational schism in the Armenian 
diaspora. 
 
The shift from pro- and anti-Soviet antagonism to shared anti-Turkish and Armenian genocide 
recognition campaigns in 1965 marked the beginning of a new era in the Armenian diaspora. As 
the Armenian factions came together in commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Armenian 
genocide in 1975, in Lebanon the Armenian parties joined their efforts in defining a common 
stand toward the political crisis and civil war, which quickly engulfed most of the country in the 
spring of 1975. If the violent clashes of Armenian factions in Lebanon in 1958 were the 
reflection of the radical polarization of Armenian political factions in the 1950s, the policy of 
“positive neutrality,” adopted by the Armenian parties in the second Lebanese civil war of 1975-
1990, was the reflection of a more cooperative political culture shaped in the 1960s and the early 
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1970s.  The formal unity, achieved in many countries at the time of the fiftieth anniversary 
commemorations of the Armenian Genocide, however, existed only at some level, and 
institutionalized divisions, as the following chapter will discuss, prevailed. Formally united, yet 
politically and institutionally divided, the Armenian communities in different countries 
continued forging different types of Armenianness. While the mutual exclusions in the self-
identifications of ‘patriots’ and ‘true Armenians’ were significantly toned down, conflicting 
affinities toward Soviet Armenia or for a future independent Armenia, as the following chapter 
will demonstrate, remained an integral part of the identity politics, pursued by various Armenian 











Chapter 5  
 
Divided in Unity: Armenian Factions, Diasporic Identities and  
Subethnic Communities in France and the United States 
Introduction 
 
The 1970s and 1980s were marked in the Armenian diaspora by three parallel processes. First of 
all, the Armenian political and lobbying efforts in Europe and North America on the whole failed 
to achieve any tangible results in the quest for the recognition of the Armenian genocide or in 
claiming the Armenian lands, which were roughly defined by all as the Armenian Cause. This 
resulted in the marginalization and radicalization of certain Armenian youth circles, who sought 
alternative means of political struggle. Secondly, the unstable situation in the Middle East, 
namely the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), the revolution in Iran (1979), the crisis in Turkey (in 
the early 1980s), as well as the relaxation of emigration policies in the Soviet Union produced 
massive waves of Armenian emigration from these countries to various destinations, often 
ending in Europe and North America. The newcomer Armenians brought different mentalities, 
habits, linguistic and cultural traits, which came into contact and conflict with local Armenian 
identities in the West. Finally, while the Armenian organizations put aside the Cold War 
hostilities, and the antagonistic political culture of the 1950s was replaced by a more cooperative 
political culture in the 1960s and early 1970s, institutional divisions in the diaspora continued to 
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prevail. Each of the three sections in this chapter discusses these processes in detail to argue that 
despite the temporary unity achieved in 1965 and later, and despise the fact that genocide 
increasingly became the common denominator of Armenianness in the world, the Armenian 
diaspora became more fragmented across subethnic296 and institutional affiliations in the United 
States, France and elsewhere in the West, and remained transnationally divided.  
 
The first section explores the emergence of Armenian lobbying and radical organizations for the 
pursuit of the Armenian Cause and the effects of their activities and rivalry on Armenian 
political factions in the diaspora. It particularly examines how the radically different and 
changing tactics of various Armenian lobbying groups and other organizations in the pursuit of 
the Armenian Cause in France and the United States determined the allegiances of diaspora-born 
generations and defined the identities of those organizations. It argues that while the efforts of 
peaceful lobbying attracted many supporters from among the American or French-born 
generations of Armenians, organizations directly or indirectly encouraging more radical and 
violent means of struggle alienated many American and French-born generations and became 
predominantly represented by the Middle-Eastern-born Armenians. The Armenian genocide, 
however, became the common denominator of Armenianness, regardless of these divided efforts, 
subethnic and organizational affiliations. 
 
The second part of the chapter explores the particularities and differences of Armenian 
experiences and identities shaped under different host-country conditions in the Middle East, 
France and the United States. It goes on to address how these identities came into clash in France 
                                                
296 This term is borrowed from Sabagh, Bozorgmehr and Der-Martirosian (1990) to denote Armenians originating 
from different countries. 
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and the United States following the influx of the Middle Eastern Armenians in the 1960s and 
1970s, in the contexts in which the emancipatory social movements in both societies had resulted 
in increased tolerance towards pluralism and difference. By relying on interviews conducted by 
author with some notable representatives of Armenian subethnic communities in France and the 
United States, as well as on other primary and secondary sources, this section examines the 
possibilities of constructing homogeneous Armenian identities through education and schools in 
Lebanon, France and the Untied States, and the efforts of the Armenian elites and institutions to 
that end. It goes on to discuss the processes of stereotyping, inclusions and exclusions between 
Armenians originating from different countries in the United States and France, in order to stress 
the heterogeneity and fluidity of Armenian diasporic identities.  
 
The chapter concludes with the analysis of certain continuities in diasporic identities and 
discourses, which had been shaped by the rivalry of the pro- and anti-Soviet diasporic factions, 
to argue that by the 1980s two clearly distinct paradigms of Armenian diasporic belongings and 
identities had emerged. While the exclusive self-identifications of the ‘patriots’ and ‘true 
Armenians’ were replaced by more moderate discourses, the institutionalized divisions 
reproduced the conflicting perceptions of the Armenian homeland with their attendant 
identifications, policies and programs. These continuities shaped new transnational paradigms, 
emphasizing either the role of homeland or the potential of the diaspora in matters that both 
factions came to perceive as common. The more moderate ‘homeland-centered’ and ‘diaspora-
centered’ paradigms, the former shaped within pro-Soviet circles, and the latter within formerly 
anti-Soviet Dashnak circles, continued forging alternative diasporic identities transnationally, 
providing spaces of belonging beyond subethnic identities. While the proponents of the former 
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paradigm continued encouraging relations with Soviet Armenia, the actual homeland, the 
proponents of the latter continued forging the loyalty to the symbols of the “United” Armenia, 






The Campaign for the Armenian Cause:  
Political Lobbying, Transnational Terrorism and Effects on Diasporic Political Factions 
  
The fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the Armenian Genocide marked the beginning of a 
steady turn in the priorities of all Armenian diasporic political factions towards the Armenian 
Cause. The commemoration events of April 1965 had signified that the Armenian Genocide 
commemorations had the potential of mobilizing and uniting the rival Catholicosates of 
Ējmiatsin and Antelias, as well as masses in Soviet Armenia, Lebanon, France and elsewhere 
around the same goals. The transnationally institutionalized Armenian organizations in the 
established diaspora were now in power to exert influence on host-countries. The emergence of 
the Armenian Cause as a top priority in the political agendas of the Armenian political parties 
was expressed in the creation of special Hay Dat (Armenian Cause) committees. In parallel with 
the Armenian National Committee of America, the Dashnaktsutyun created in 1965 branches of 
the Committee for the Defense of the Armenian Cause (Comité de défense de la cause 
arménienne - CDCA) in France,297 Lebanon and elsewhere (Ter-Minassian 1997, 37; Migliorino 
2008, 150). The Dashnaktsutyun’s ultimate abandonment of its anti-Soviet orientation was 
another milestone, accentuating the Armenian Cause in the party’s new political agenda. By 
1970, the Ramkavars had also founded a lobbying branch in the United States, known as the 
Armenian Rights Movement, renamed to Armenian Rights Council of America in 1983 
                                                




(Dallak‘yan 2007, 356; 408).298 The reviving Hnchakyan chapters in California and Europe 
because of the new immigration from the Arab world initiated the Armenian Council of America 
and of Europe for similar purposes. Despite the common interest in lobbying activities, these 
organizations acted independently. The first all-Armenian attempt of a joint action in 1965, as 
impressive as it had been especially in Lebanon, France and elsewhere, had not materialized in 
the United States due to long-standing hostility, conflict and alienation within the community. 
But as the sixtieth anniversary of the genocide approached, unity in the United States took on a 
greater urgency.  
 
 
The Armenian Assembly and the Joint Commemorations of the Sixtieth Anniversary of the 
Genocide   
 
Two Armenian-American professors, residing in a small Armenian community in metropolitan 
Washington for years, both working at George Washington University, had never encountered 
one another before they met in an event at the Iranian Embassy in 1971. One of the professors, 
Haikaz Grigorian, was a Dashnak Central Committee member affiliated with the Prelacy parish 
in Chevy Chase, Maryland. The other was John Hanessian, respected among the anti-Dashnak 
circles and a member of the St. Mary Church - a Diocesan parish in Washington (Grigorian 
1995, 3-4). Despite their affiliations with hostile camps, these academics found common grounds 
and agreed that “the time was ripe to bring the Armenian groups of all persuasions together” in 
an assembly (ibid., 5). Grigorian and Hanessian were able to bring together a Steering 
                                                
298 The October 1972 World Congress of Ramkavars in Beirut regretfully recorded that the party’s branch in France 
had been in a crisis for a quite long time (Dallak‘yan 2007, 293). 
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Committee of well-known Armenians from among various academic and political circles, as well 
as secure support from some prominent Armenian-American businessmen and philanthropists, 
such as Stephen Mugar, Alex Manoogian and Hrayr Hovnanian. These efforts resulted in the 
establishment of the Armenian Assembly of America in 1972 through the generous contribution 
and enthusiastic support of Stephen Mugar.299 The primary goal of the Assembly was “to serve 
as a forum and to provide a national framework or the promotion of communication within the 
Armenian-American community” (ibid., 15). It became an umbrella organization that brought 
together the Armenian factions by securing equal representation from the Dashnaks and 
Ramkavars, in addition to double representation from a group of the so called “neutrals,” with no 
party affiliation (ibid., 1995, 16; Phillips 1989, 200-201). With some reservation and reluctance, 
the Dashnak and Ramkavar committees in the United States also became interested in uniting 
their efforts in a common organization. To this end, the annual report of the Ramkavar Regional 
Committee of America and Canada recorded in 1974: 
Since the first day the ADL [Ramkavars] assumed a friendly, but reserved stand towards the “Armenian 
Assembly,” which is the initiative of a well-known wealthy individual with limited experience in 
[Armenian] national affairs, and one or two ambitious young men [probably referring to Grigorian and 
Hanessian - V.S.] (quoted in Dallak‘yan 2007, 328). 
 
The initial success of the Assembly was because of the commonly recognized need for joint 
action to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide. The need to act in unison was 
reconfirmed in the joint appeal of the top executive bodies of the Armenian political parties. On 
September 2, 1974 the Central Committees of Armenian political parties, all based in Beirut, 
issued a joint statement calling on the Armenians to put aside all disagreements and unite for the 
sixtieth anniversary throughout the world. The Armenian Mirror Spectator published the English 
version of the appeal on September 28:  
                                                




The Armenian Democratic Liberal Party [Ramkavar], the Armenian Revolutionary Party [Dashnaktsutyun], 
and the Social Democratic Hnchakyan Party feel that the time has come to present a united front to the 
world on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the genocide executed on the Armenians. Putting aside, 
on this occasion, the differences of political and sociological concepts which exist in different areas among 
these parties, the three Armenian national political parties deem it necessary that sixtieth anniversary 
commemoratives be held jointly together in all communities where Armenians reside, remember the 
genocide, and demand justice. 
 
The Appeal stressed the importance of the joint will and efforts so that the demands for the 
realization of the Armenian Cause, namely the return of Armenian lands to their only rightful 
owners - the Armenian people, could not be hindered by internal disagreements (ibid.).  
 
The reemphasized need for joint action in the United States made negotiations between the 
Ramkavars and Dashnaks possible within the framework of the Armenian Assembly. Following 
the creation of a Pan-Armenian Central Committee for the Commemorations of the Armenian 
Genocide, several April 24 Commemoration committees were established in various towns 
across the United States. Armenian Assembly representatives participated in the committees to 
facilitate negotiations between the Dashnak and anti-Dashnak factions. The usage of the 
Armenian Tricolor during the commemorations posed a major issue of disagreement between the 
parties. While the Dashnaktsutyun insisted on its display, the anti-Dashnak factions were against 
using the flag. Eventually, the parties came to an agreement of not displaying any flag of 
Armenia during the commemorations (Phillips 1989, 174-75). The compromise, reached through 
numerous meetings and thanks to the efforts of the Armenian Assembly, was effective, as the 
joint commemorations of the sixtieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide brought the 
Armenians in the United States together as never before. Many of the leading American 
newspapers reported on the Armenian demonstrations and commemorations in various towns 
and cities. An article in The New York Times on April 24, 1975 introduced the Armenian 
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Genocide to its readers and notified them of the Armenian demonstrations and other 
commemoration events planned by Armenian churches and political parties in New York. The 
next day, the Washington Post reported on the Armenian marches on April 24 from the Capitol 
to Lafayette Park to “recall the Day of Massacre.” The same day, Los Angeles Times reported on 
the march of 2,500 Armenians from Broadway to the City Hall “for an observance recalling the 
genocide suffered by Armenians at the hands of the Turks.” The Boston Globe reported on 3,500 
Armenian-Americans and “Armenian sympathizers” demonstrating at the Rockefeller Center and 
the United Nations area in New York. The widespread commemoration events on April 24 
throughout the US were paralleled by similar events in other major capitals in Europe, in Soviet 
Armenia and elsewhere. On April 26 Haratch reported about the massive commemorations in 
Yerevan, with tens of thousands Armenians participating in the silent walk. The paper provided 
extensive coverage of marches in Paris, Lyon, Marseille and other small Armenian communities 
in France.  
 
The unprecedented mobilization of the Armenian diaspora on the occasion of the sixtieth 
anniversary, while rewarding in many respects, failed to achieve any tangible political results in 
the United States, France or anywhere else. In the context of strained relations between Greece 
and Turkey over Cyprus and the UN involvement in the crisis, the efforts of the Dashnak CDCA 
to have the Armenian Genocide recognized by the UN Human Rights Council in 1974 were 
blocked by the representatives of Turkey (Minassian 2002, 36). In the United States, while the 
Armenian Assembly coalition lobbied to make the US Congress recognize the Armenian 
Genocide, the resolution of the House of Representatives of April 8, 1975 recognized April 24 as 
a “National Day of a Remembrance of Man’s Inhumanity to Man,” carefully avoiding any direct 
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reference to the Armenian Genocide and Turkey.300 In the appeal made in April 1975, the Pan-
Armenian Central Committee of the Sixtieth Anniversary Commemorations of the Armenian 
Genocide from Beirut recorded that the current political conditions were not favorable for the 
advancement of the Armenian Cause, but called on the Armenians to stay determined toward the 
Armenian demands.301 The failure of the Armenian organizations in the past decade to achieve 
any advancement in what they defined as the Armenian Cause created much discontent among 
Armenians of various partisan affiliations and soon turned into pernicious apathy.  
 
 
Armenian Terrorism and the Advancement of Armenian Cause  
 
On January 28, 1973, The Los Angeles Times reported the assassination of two Turkish LA 
Consulate officials by Gourgen Yanikian, a “Turkish-born Armenian,” 77 years of age.302 
Describing the event as an act of vengeance against the Turks for killing his entire family, for 
exterminating 2 million Armenians and taking over Armenian lands, Yanikian reportedly called 
on the Armenians to launch “this new type of war” against Turkish representatives (Los Angeles 
Times, January 30, 1973). Yanikian’s act was not claimed by any Armenian political party or 
organization. However, it reverberated across the Armenian world. About two years after 
Yanikian’s attack, an Armenian secret organization revealed its radical means of struggle by 
detonating explosives in Beirut over a course of less than a month. The first explosion on 
                                                
300 “The Great Armenia debate: House Manages to Keep Eye on the Little Picture,” Los Angeles Times, April 11. 
“Armenian Genocide Issue Proved to Be Touchy,” Washington Post, April 12. 
301 Haratch published the full text of the appeal on April 27, 1975. 
302 Yanikian invited the Turkish diplomats to a luncheon at the Baltimore Hotel cottage near Santa Barbara, where 
he killed both. He lured them by insisting that he had been in possession of a century-old stolen painting from the 
Sultan’s palace and intended to return to Turkey (cf. Hyland 1991, 25). 
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January 20, 1975, targeted the building of the World Council of Churches, for “promoting the 
emigration of Armenians to the United States” (Hyland 1991, 26). The act was against the 
Dashnak-affiliated ANCHA, known in the 1960s and 1970s for its partnership with the World 
Council of Churches to help Armenians move permanently to the United States (Sanjian 2007, 
278; Zadoian 2012, 72-3). In less than a month, another bomb destroyed the Turkish Airline 
offices in Beirut. Both acts were claimed by a certain Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation 
of Armenia (ASALA) (Hyland 1991, 25-6).  
 
The emergence of a terrorist Armenian organization in the heart of Lebanon in 1975 was not 
accidental, as the country had already been immersed in the Middle Eastern crisis, escalated by 
the new wave of expulsion of Palestinians by Israel in 1967. If the assassination of two Turkish 
diplomats in a remote corner of the world inspired the founding of ASALA, the social-political 
conditions in the Middle East had a direct impact on the transformation of a number of desperate 
Armenian youth into resistance fighters. The Palestinians’ guerrilla fights to regain their 
homeland inspired some of the founders of the ASALA, who became personally involved in the 
PLO (Hyland 1991, 24-27; Migliorino 2008, 148-55). At the same time, the leaders of the 
ASALA shared with Yanikian the sense of frustration with the failure of Armenian organizations 
to achieve tangible results on the sixtieth anniversary of the Armenian genocide. Turkey still 
refused to recognize the deaths of Armenians and so did the world powers including the United 
Nations.   
 
ASALA appeared as a radically different movement, promoting not only radical means of 
struggle but also adhering to a leftist ideology. Similar to the Hnchakyans and Ramkavars, the 
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organization unconditionally acknowledged the legitimacy of Soviet Armenia, believing that the 
liberated Armenian territories of Eastern Turkey should be annexed to Soviet Armenia. On July 
10, 1978, ASALA revealed its political platform. The first part of the document defined the 
political alliances of ASALA with the leftist, anti-imperialist and anti-Turkish movements and 
countries. The government of Turkey, the allies of the Turkish State and those who failed to 
recognize the Armenian genocide were announced as enemies. Consequently, those fighting 
against Turkey and “American imperialism” were defined as friends. The Turks and Kurds 
“oppressed by the [Turkish] state” were seen as the “only official allies” of ASALA, and the 
Soviet Union was projected as a “friendly country.” The second part of the document expressed 
ASALA’s utter disappointment with the Armenian political parties and declared its political 
stand vis-à-vis the Armenian organizations and Soviet Armenia:  
5. The leaders of the Armenian political parties have not obtained any result in sixty years; the time 
of the ARF is long gone; 
6. All Armenians look up to ASALA, as it fulfills their needs perfectly; ASALA … aims at bringing 
together all political currents, at drawing closer the bonds among all Armenians…; 
7. The Armenian Church … must again assume the role it played the past [sic] by becoming a torch 
illuminating the path of the Armenian people and its revolution; 
8. The ASALA fighter is not a terrorist but a pure revolutionary; 
9. ASALA is alone, independent, … It does not compromise. … It does not owe something [sic] to 
anyone; 
10.  Soviet Armenia is the unique and irreplaceable basis of the Armenian people; it is a free Armenian 
land… (quoted in Hyland 1991, 27) 
 
 
Claiming that “the time of the ARF303 is long gone” in the context of the Lebanese civil war was 
a bold statement by ASALA. First of all, the Dashnaktsutyun had by then grown into the most 
influential Armenian political party in Lebanon and had managed to bring under its control both 
the Catholicosate of Cilicia and the Prelacy of Lebanon with all their community structures. The 
Dashnaktsutyun had a quasi monopoly in Armenian representation in the Lebanese parliament 
and maintained good relations with the Lebanese government and the ruling elites. Secondly, the 
                                                
303 Armenian Revolutionary Federation - the Dashnaktsutyun. 
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ASALA statement was released in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, when the three Armenian 
political parties had agreed on a policy of “positive neutrality,” and the Dashnaktsutyun and 
Hnchakyans had organized militia groups to defend the Armenian neighborhoods from possible 
outside threats.304 An organization challenging the Dashnaktsutyun in the 1970s in Lebanon had 
to have absolute confidence in the legitimacy and potential popularity of its course. The 
confidence of ASALA was built on the prevailing discontent among the Armenian youth toward 
the activities of traditional political parties. The leader of ASALA, nicknamed Mujahid, and 
known among fellow Armenians as Hagop Hagopian, was a young Armenian engaged in the 
Palestinian struggle in Lebanon. Like him, many young Armenians were inspired by the PLO in 
Lebanon. If the Palestinians were ready to fight for the restoration of their rights and their 
homeland, many young Armenians in Lebanon thought the Armenians could similarly defend 
Armenian rights (Schahgaldian 1979, 255). ASALA was largely responding to such aspirations, 
articulated by certain radical youth groups. In a short span of time, ASALA was able to develop 
small support groups (Popular Movements) in France, Great Britain, Italy, Cyprus, Greece, Iran, 
the United States, Canada and elsewhere (Hyland 1991, 30). In some cases, the new recruits and 
sympathizers of ASALA came from the ranks of the Dashnak youth. Having its base in West 
Beirut, far from the Dashnak-controlled Bourj Hammoud, ASALA’s challenge to the 
Dashnaktsutyun was not just verbal, it had practical violent implications.    
 
In response to the creation of ASALA and anticipating the kind of support the organization 
would enjoy among the youth, the Dashnaktsutyun initiated the creation of a similar organization 
                                                
304 During the first years of the Civil War, the Maronite political leadership in Lebanon did not welcome the 
Armenian “positive neutrality,” considering it treacherous. In an attempt to involve Armenians in the war against the 
Palestinians, the Maronite militia forces even launched limited attacks on Bourj Hammoud in October 1978 and 
again in 1979 (Migliorino 2008, 153; Minassian 2002, 54). 
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shortly after the first attacks of ASALA in Beirut. The appearance of ASALA with its dismissing 
of the Dashnaktsutyun as the party whose time had long passed, could not be tolerated by the 
party. Justice Commandoes of the Armenian Genocide,305 as the terrorist organization became 
known, apparently enjoyed the backing of the Dashnaktsutyun. The Dashnak leadership never 
acknowledged it publicly, but members of the Justice Commandoes were known to be affiliated 
with Dashnak chapters in various countries (Hyland 1991, 61-3; Migliorino 2008, 155; 
Minassian 2002, 43; 77). With the creation of the JCAG, a rivalry with ASALA for recruiting 
young sympathizers began. While ASALA represented a political organization with a distinct 
ideology, the JCAG was apparently the action wing of the Dashnak party with limited purposes. 
Therefore, while both organizations fought for the Armenian Cause, their political platforms and 
perceptions of this cause significantly differed. If ASALA was fighting for the liberation of 
Armenian territories in Turkey to be annexed to Soviet Armenia, the JCAG was created to 
realize the Dashnaktsutyun’s pursuit of the “United” Armenia. If ASALA was strongly pro-
Soviet, the Dashnaktsutyun was more reserved toward Soviet Armenia. As before, “Free, United 
and Independent” Armenia was still part of its program with a growing emphasis on the “United” 
rather than “Free and Independent” (cf. Libaridian 1999, 128). If ASALA was Marxist at least in 
rhetoric, the Dashnaktsutyun, and especially the JCAG commandoes were nationalist.  
 
The first murder perpetrated by the JCAG was the assassination of the Turkish Ambassador in 
Vienna on October 22, 1975. Two days later, the JCAG assassinated the Turkish ambassador to 
France and his driver (Minassian 2002, 44; Hyland 1991, 67). Affiliation with the Dashnak party 
was an advantage for the Justice Commandoes compared to the ASALA. If ASALA had to 
                                                
305 Gaïdz Minassian argues that the creation of JCAG was the anticipated outcome of the haydatist revolution of the 
Dashnaktsutyun and ASALA only facilitated the process (Minassian 2002, 35). 
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solicit supporters from the Middle East, Europe and elsewhere, the transnational network of the 
Dashnaktsutyun, as well as their youth groups in various countries provided readily available 
infrastructure for JCAG activities in Europe and elsewhere. The JCAG closeness to the 
Dashnaktsutyun had also some down sides, however. In contrast to ASALA, instead of recruiting 
some of its youth from among the locally born Armenians in Europe or the United States, the 
JCAG commandoes were mostly recruited from among more militant Middle Eastern born 
Armenians.  
 
In the 1970s, Middle Eastern Armenians began to dominate the Dashnak leadership and chapters 
transnationally. At three consecutive World Congresses, between 1972 and 1985, the members 
of the Dashnak Bureau predominantly represented two countries - Lebanon and Iran.306 As the 
number of Middle Easterners began to rise in the West from the 1960s, tension between the 
Middle Eastern and Western-born Dashnaks became more pronounced in France and the United 
States. By 1965, due to the active work of ANCHA many Armenians from Eastern Europe and 
the Middle East, mostly of Dashnak leaning, had also settled in California. The 1965 Hart-Cellar 
Immigration Act eliminated the national origins quota system in the United States, making 
emigration to the United States much easier. Immigration to France had been easier for Middle 
Eastern Armenians, as the country had more liberal policies of immigration for francophone 
                                                
306 At the Twentieth World Congress of the party in 1972, Hrayr Marukhian, an Iranian born Armenian was elected 
the chairman of the Bureau. He was based in Lebanon since the mid-1960s. Initially, Marukhian enjoyed the support 
of another prominent Middle Easterner, Sarkis Zeitlian, who was elected a Bureau member in 1972 (Minassian 
2002, 38). The two, however, had different perspectives on the future of the Dashnaktsutyun. Marukhian represented 
the socialist wing and Zeitlian, the nationalist wing within the Bureau. Marukhian was the proponent of 
rapprochement with the Soviets, while Zeitlian represented the anti-Soviet faction. The common fight for the 
Armenian Cause united their efforts, but tensions between the two remained until Zeitlian mysteriously disappeared 
in West Beirut on March 28, 1985 and was never seen again. According to some accounts, the KGB was involved in 
Zeitlian’s abduction and executed him in the Soviet Union (Minassian 2002. 50-1; 70-1; 104). 
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immigrants (cf. Weil 2008, 231). The worsening conditions in Lebanon in the beginning of the 
1970s further encouraged emigration of Armenians to Europe and the Americas.  
 
Following the Twentieth World Congress of 1972, the structure and organization of the 
Dashnaktsutyun underwent certain changes. They were expressed in the centralization of 
governance, the abandonment of anti-Soviet and the assumption of anti-Turkish policies, the 
implicit endorsement of terrorist acts for the advancement of the Armenian Cause, and the 
ensuing rise of Middle Eastern Armenians to the leadership. All of these were certainly going to 
have repercussions on the chapters in the Western countries. Many of the Western-born 
Dashnaks were opposed to the centralization, to terrorism and to the party policies dictated from 
abroad, because they thought such policies were detrimental to the activities of the party in the 
West. As Gaïdz Minassian notes, the opposition group in the West denounced the “Middle-
Easternization of the Dashnak identity” and condemned the “imperialist methods” of the 
Dashnak Bureau (Minassian 2002, 45). To deal with the opposition, the party leadership resorted 
to purges and expulsions. In France, between 1972 and 1977, several promising French-
Armenian young activists were expelled from the Dashnaktsutyun and the Dashnak controlled 
Armenian Students Union of Europe (l’Union des étudiants arméniens d’Europe). Among them 
were Ara Toranian, Christian Der Stepanian and Kegham Kevonian, who became quite 
prominent with the movements and organizations they started shortly afterwards. Similarly, in 
the Untied States, hundreds of members of various Dashnak affiliated organizations and chapters 




Consistent with changing priorities concerning the political course and preferred methods of 
struggle, the party quit the Armenian Assembly in 1983 and strengthened the ANCA to continue 
as an independent lobby group in the United States307 (cf. Minassian 2002, 46; 49). The purges 
certainly privileged the Middle Eastern Armenians within the party chapters. If the Western-born 
Dashnak youth were brought up under the strong influence of the individualistic culture of host 
countries and were trained in the educational systems of the Western world, the Middle-Eastern-
born Dashnak generation of the 1960s grew up in a more communitarian conservative Dashnak-
Armenian milieu: they were brought up in militant Dashnak families of the generation of the 
1950s, were educated in (Dashnak-controlled) Armenian schools, Dashnak clubs, athletic and 
youth organizations, socializing in Dashnak-controlled neighborhoods. Due to the difference in 
mentalities, value systems and priorities, the average Middle-Eastern-born Dashnak could easier 
pledge loyalty to authority and unquestionably follow the decisions taken at higher levels, than a 
Western-born Dashnak brought up and educated in the individualistic milieu of Western 
societies. If resorting to violence and terrorism could be more acceptable in the Middle East and 
for the Middle Eastern Dashnaks, many Western born Dashnaks, who had established friendly 
relations with influential political leaders and parties in Europe and the United States, opposed to 
such means.  
 
On September 24, 1981, four ASALA commandoes occupied the Turkish Consulate-General in 
Paris. The incident acquired much publicity. For hours numerous channels reported in their news 
programs of Armenians and the Armenian Cause. This was a shocking experience for many 
French-born Armenians. As several news programs on public TV and radio addressed Armenian 
                                                
307 Armenian Reporter published the news on July 28, 1983 in “ARF quits Armenian Assembly over Dispute in 
Interpretation of Mission & Voting system.” 
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issues, the genocide and the Armenian Cause, to shed light on the reasons behind terrorism, 
many young people suddenly rediscovered their “Armenian roots” and wanted to be part of the 
movement. Many young Armenians perceived the attackers of the Consulate as fighters for the 
Armenian Cause, rather than terrorists (Minassian 2002, Ter-Minassian 1994, 228). By then, the 
periodical Hay Baikar, started by Ara Toranian in 1977, had already given birth to the 
Mouvement national arménien (MNA), which served as ASALA’s political support arm in 
France (Minassian 2002, 46). ASALA continued receiving publicity, as Ara Toranian, the leader 
of the MNA, made several appearances on TV and radio, negotiated with French political parties 
and the government, making good connections with some prominent French leaders. Toranian 
represented the generation of young people, born and raised in France, who were very inspired 
by the Armenian armed struggle. In his own words, before ASALA “…there was no pride in 
being Armenian, we had failed, we were finished. Everything we had were old stuff, 
conservative, narrow, caricatured… ASALA brought us pride!”308 Benefitting form such popular 
support, ASALA sought to bring the French-Armenian community under its dominance through 
Ara Toranian’s MNA  (Minassian 2002, 65-6). The lack of ideological and organizational 
centralization provided ASALA with more flexibility. Not all ASALA adherents and ASALA 
popular movements shared its Marxist and leftist ideology, yet the armed struggle for the 
Armenian Cause and the liberation of Armenian territories united them all.309 
 
In response to the increasing popularity of ASALA among French-born Armenian youth, the 
Dashnaktsutyun made coordinated efforts to portray the JCAG commandoes as exemplary role 
models for Armenian youth by glorifying their actions. On July 27, five young Armenians from 
                                                
308 Interview with Ara Toranian. October 25, 2012. 
309 Ara Toranian defined himself as more nationalist, than socialist, which had not been a problem for being the 
spokesperson of ASALA in France. 
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Lebanon, aged 19-21, launched an attack on the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon. The attack was 
claimed by the Armenian Revolutionary Army, an organization also closely affiliated with the 
Dashnaktsutyun and, according to Hyland (1991, 61), the successor of the JCAG. Having to 
change their plans and improvise on the spot, the ARA commandoes only killed the wife of one 
of the Turkish diplomats and a Portuguese policeman, while all of them got killed as a 
consequence of an explosion in the attack (cf. Hyland  1991, 69). The incident was publicized by 
many Dashnak newspapers, requiem services were held in many Dashnak organizations and 
churches in Lebanon and the Untied States. The Dashnak youth organizations (such as the AYF, 
Homenetmen or Nor Seround310 in France) were especially active in organizing such memorial 
programs in many countries. In France, where the church was not under the total control of the 
Dashnaktsutyun, the party organizations put much effort to organize memorial services for the 
Lisbon group. The regional committee of the Croix bleue des Arméniens de France encouraged 
such services in all Armenian churches of France on July 31, 1983. Concerned that not all 
churches would hold memorial services, the committee ended the brief message published in 
Haratch with an admonition: “Every Armenian must feel obliged to commemorate the young 
Armenians, who sacrificed their lives for the Homeland, on the Altar of Freedom.”311 The 
admonishment did not seem to help much, and the Dashnak-affiliated organizations had to exert 
additional pressure on Armenian churches. A few months after the Lisbon incident, succumbing 
to pressure, the Armenian Cathedral of St. Jean Baptiste in downtown Paris opened its doors at 
7:00pm on Saturday, September 17, for an overnight vigil, and held a memorial service the next 
day. A huge red poster with the pictures and names of the martyrs of the group, known as “the 
                                                
310 The Dashnak youth organization in Paris, founded in 1945. The organization published a monthly organ 
Haiastan (see previous chapter). 
311 “Hogehangist: Nahatak hing hay eritasardnerun hishatakin.” [Requiem: In Memory of the Five Armenian Young 
Martyrs]. 1983. Haratch, July 30-31. 
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Lisbon Five,” at the church entrance was decorated by three wreaths laid by the Dashnak Party 
Paris Committee, Nor Seround, and Homenetmen-France, the Dashnak affiliated athletic and 
scouting group.312 On October 1, 1983, the Board of Trusties of the Association culturelle de 
l'Église Apostolique Arménienne de Paris et de la région parisienne released a statement, 
clarifying that the Prelate reluctantly opened the doors of the church on Saturday evening in 
order to avoid “unpleasant events.” The Board expressed sorrow for the deaths of five 
Armenians in Lisbon, but reminded that the church was a spiritual institution that could not 
permit non-religious gatherings.313 If many Armenians and certain Dashnaks wondered about the 
Lisbon failure and condemned the suicidal nature of the act, the dominant Middle Eastern 
comrades in the Dashnaktsutyun considered the Lisbon incident as an act of heroism and an 
expression of the highest form of patriotism (cf. Minassian 2002, 92-93). Framing the act as a 
sacrifice “on the Altar of Freedom,” as an example of ultimate devotion to the Armenian Cause, 
could make a deep impression on the radicalized Armenian youth worldwide. In their rivalry 
with ASALA, this strategy was perceived to work in favor of the party.314   
 
While the glorification of the JCAG and ARA commandoes by the Dashnaktsutyun had a long 
lasting effect on the party and its sympathizers in general, ASALA’s popularity was short lived. 
ASALA attacks had occasionally targeted civilians and citizens of non-Turkish origin as part of 
the struggle against imperialism and against pro-Turkish countries. The arrest of ASALA 
members in France triggered attacks against France and French organizations elsewhere. France 
became an important target country for ASALA as the organization had the largest network in 
                                                
312 “Hskum ew hogehangist Lisboni hing andznazoh eridasardnerun hamar.” [Watch and requiem for the Young 
Martyrs of Lisbon]. 1983. Haratch. September 20. 
313 “Haghordagrutyun” [Press Release]. 1983. Achkhar. October 1. 
314 Until nowadays, Dashnak circles all over the world hold annual commemoration services in memory of the 
Lisbon Five on July 27. 
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France. Most of the ASALA incidents happened in France315 (cf. Minassian 2002, 44). 
Following the arrest of Monte Melkonian, one of the prominent ASALA leaders in November 
1981, ASALA bombed the Air France office and the French Cultural Center in Beirut. Such 
indiscriminate attacks continued in France, targeting a McDonalds restaurant and a train station 
in Paris. The attacks on non-Turkish objects and civilians created profound disagreements within 
the ASALA leadership in the Middle East, as well as between the latter and their political 
support groups in Europe. By 1982, Mujahed (Hagop Hagopian), the most radical leader of 
ASALA, dissolved all of the ASALA supporting movements (ASALA-PM) in many countries. 
Ara Toranian also began distancing the MNA from ASALA (Ter-Minassian 1994, 228; Hyland 
1991, 30-1; 50-1). By now, ASALA ranks had become divided between radical and moderate 
wings. The radical wing under the leadership of Mujahed indiscriminately targeted Turkish and 
non-Turkish objects as opposed to the moderate wing, led by Monte Melkonian, who thought the 
struggle was against the Turkish government only. The internal tensions erupted after July 15, 
1983, when a bomb at the Orly Airport in Paris killed eight civilians and wounded fifty-four. 
Following the incident, the moderate wing broke away from ASALA under the leadership of 
Monte Melkonian and formed the ASALA Revolutionary Movement. Ara Toranian’s MNA also 
broke away from ASALA in support of the ASALA Revolutionary Movement. The factions 
turned against each other, killing many of the experienced commandoes, which significantly 
weakened the organization and repelled many of the ASALA sympathizers (Hyland 1991, 38-1; 
52-3; Minassian 2002, 90).  
 
                                                
315 According the Geographic Distribution of Incidents table provided by Hyland (1991, 233), France topped the list 
of countries with 36 incidents in total, followed by Lebanon (29), Turkey (29) and Italy (18). According to the table, 
ASALA instigated only 4 acts within the United States. 
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By 1986, as the European political circles were becoming more aware of the Armenian Cause 
and more willing to address the issue publicly, both ASALA and the JCAG/ARA worldwide 
refrained from violence. Back in April 1981, on the eve of the Armenian Genocide 
commemoration, François Mitterrand, then a presidential candidate, made a most significant 
statement: “It is impossible to erase the trace of genocide with which you were struck” (quoted 
and translated from Minassian 2002, 69). Three years later, on January 7, 1984, President 
Mitterrand paid a surprise visit to the Armenian community in Vienne, Isère, where local 
Armenians were celebrating Armenian Christmas at the municipality. The President began 
addressing the community by appreciating the presence and contributions of Armenians in 
France and emphasizing Missak Manoushian’s invaluable input in the Resistance. As the speech 
unfolded, President Mitterrand made a few references to the 1915 events, eventually declaring 
France’s stance towards the Armenian Cause:  
Wherever France has something to say, it wants to remind on every occasion that the Armenian identity is 
marked by the great tragedy of genocide.316  
 
Occasions for expressing the French attitude towards the Armenian Cause were plenty at the 
United Nations, the European Parliament and the European Community, as the president had 
hinted. Recalling his words expressed three years earlier, Mitterrand condemned the acts of 
violence in France, which had been hospitable and friendly country to the Armenians: 
Sometimes, witnessing certain dramatic [events] which occurred when the Armenian Cause had been, in 
my view, misguided by violence …, I said to myself that there is no misunderstanding and there cannot be 
any misunderstanding between the Armenians and France. France is a country of welcome [host country], 
hospitality, and the sons and daughters of those who suffered so much know well that they have all been 
totally accepted in the French community… 
Certain elements, who generally come from outside, wanted to carry out acts of violence against France, 
whose responsibility had been only friendly; acts, of which we all have suffered. This is not an acceptable 
method and surely I will never accept it (ibid.). 
                                                
316 “Allocution de Président de la République (texte intégral).” 1984. Haratch, November 1. 
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A minor speech made in front of a small Armenian community in Vienne was a remarkable 
event for the Armenian community. For the first time the president of a major European country 
was acknowledging the events of 1915 as genocide. To what extent the statement made by 
President Mitterrand was determined by Armenian “armed resistance,” is hard to estimate. But it 
was widely believed among Armenians that terrorism did have an influence on the politics of the 
Armenian Genocide recognition in France. While ASALA and the JCAG/ARA had been 
involved in planning and launching attacks in France, their political and diplomatic wings, the 
MNA and CDCA negotiated with various French political circles and parties a way out of the 
social-political crisis (Minassian 2002, 75; 96). Changes in the attitude of the French authorities 
towards the Armenian Genocide between the 1970s and the 1980s had been enormous. Many 
Armenians, especially in Marseille, still remember how back in the early 1970s the city 
authorities resisted the opening of a genocide memorial on the premises of the Cathédrale 
Arménienne Apostolique Serpotz Tarkmantschatz (Saints Traducteurs) on Avenue du Prado. The 
memorial was scheduled to be dedicated in April 1972, but the provincial authorities, concerned 
about the inscription on the memorial, held up its opening. The inscription, particularly, read:  
A la mémoire des 1.500.000 Arméniens victimes du génocide ordonné par les dirigeants turcs de 1915. A la 
gloire des Combattants et Résistants Arméniens morts pour la Liberté et la France.  
[To the memory of 1,500,000 victims of the genocide ordered by the Turkish leadership in 1915. To the 
glory of Armenian Combatants and Resistance Fighters, who died for Freedom and France]. 
 
Several months later, with the support of some influential French politicians sympathetic to the 
Armenian Cause, the memorial was dedicated on February 11, 1973 with the text of the 
inscription intact317 (Boghossian 2009, 220-5). After a decade long Armenian “armed struggle,” 
the attitude of the French authorities had changed to such an extent that the President of the 
                                                
317 As an act of protest against France, Turkey recalled its Ambassador from France. Next ambassador, Ismail Erez 
was appointed more than a year later, in November 1974, who was assassinated by ASALA on October 24, 1975 (cf. 
Boghossian 2005, 397; Hyland 1991, 67; “Fransayi Turk‘ despaně sppanuats” [Turkish Ambassador of France 
Killed] 1975 Haratch, October 26). 
 
 371 
country explicitly referred to the events of 1915 as genocide. The East-West détente in 
international politics, Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, military coup in Turkey of 1980 and 
the subsequent restoration of democracy a few years later, the prevailing attitudes in Europe 
towards Turkey and the United States, all these events certainly provided the background against 
which President Mitterrand openly referred to the Armenian Genocide. But the reference to the 
“acts of violence” perpetrated by some foreign [Armenian] elements in France in the speech was 
a salient indicator that the president wanted an end to Armenian “violence” in France. In 
exchange for his acknowledgment, the president demanded to stop the unacceptable acts of 
violence once and for all. Following the President’s speech, Armenian terrorist attacks ended in 
the territory of France.  
 
If in the period between the fiftieth and sixtieth anniversaries of the Armenian genocide the 
activities of various Armenian organizations did not yield any tangible gains, by the seventieth 
anniversary the militant Armenian organizations could claim some achievements. The president 
of France privately recognized the genocide, and the European Community became more aware 
of the Armenian Cause. On June 18, 1987, the European Parliament adopted a resolution “On a 
Political Solution to the Armenian Question.” It recognized the massacres and deportations in 
1915-1917 as genocide “within the meaning of the [UN] Convention of the Prevention and the 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”318 Along with other unmet conditions, the European 
parliament considered Turkish refusal to acknowledge the Armenian genocide as another 
obstacle to Turkey’s accession to the European Community.319 The act of the European 
                                                
318 “Resolution on the Political Solution to the Armenian Question,” 1987. Official Journal of the European 
Communities. July 20. C 190/119. 
319 The article read in full: “[The European Parliament] believes that the refusal by the present Turkish Government 
to acknowledge the genocide against the Armenian people, committed by the Young Turk government, its 
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Parliament effectively put an end to Armenian terrorism that had threatened various European 
countries in the past decade.  
 
 
The Effects of Armenian Terrorism on Armenian Political Factions in the Diaspora 
 
The decade of Armenian terrorism had a profound influence on Armenian diasporic dynamics 
both locally and transnationally. Locally, the ASALA and to a lesser extent the JCAG/ARA 
operations made a profound impact on Armenians in France, as the majority of ASALA and 
significant amount of the JCAG/ARA acts were carried out in that country (cf. Hyland 1991, 
233-34). These activities had a two-fold effect in France. On the one hand, the terrorist attacks 
alienated number of French-born Armenians, who refused to be associated with terrorism, and 
introduced new tensions between Armenian organizations, especially between ASALA 
sympathizers and Dashnak supporters. On the other hand, the struggle for the Armenian Cause 
instilled a sense of pride and aroused national sentiments among some French born Armenian 
youth, which led to occasional solidarity between the otherwise opposing camps. As a side 
effect, the ASALA and JCAG attacks gave birth to what Ter-Minassian (1994, 231) calls a “true 
“Armenian movement,” (véritable “movement arménien”) referring to the emergence of various 
new organizations and the revival of others. Among the newly formed organizations, Ara 
Toranian’s MNA, Kegham Kevonian’s Terre et Culture and Christian Der Stepanian’s Solidarité 
                                                                                                                                                       
reluctance to apply the principles of international law to its differences of opinion with Greece, the maintenance of 
Turkish occupation forces in Cyprus and the denial of the existence of the Kurdish question, together with the lack 
of true parliamentary democracy and the failure to respect individual and collective freedoms, in particular freedom 
of religion, in that country are insurmountable obstacles to consideration of the possibility of Turkey’s accession to 
the Community” (ibid.). 
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Franco-Arménienne became quite notable.320 While Ara Toranian’s MNA allied itself with 
ASALA, the other two represented more neutral organizations between ASALA and the 
Dashnaktsutyun. The actions of ASALA and the JCAG/ARA also contributed to the revival of 
the Dashnak-affiliated organizations, such as the youth chapters of Nor Seround, the charitable 
Croix-Bleue and CDCA (Boghossian 2005, 399; Ter-Minassian 1994, 231). Along with the 
MNA, CDCA became actively involved in the promotion of the Armenian Cause in France and 
Europe, representing the lobbying arm of the Dashnaktsutyun in France. Regardless of the other 
organizations’ attitude towards ASALA and the JCAG/ARA, inspired by the new wave of the 
Armenian revival in France, most had become actively involved in activities focusing on 
Armenian Genocide related issues in one way or another.  
 
As the oldest “national” institution, the Armenian Church had to adopt a stand on the actions 
stigmatizing the Armenians in France. Shortly after the first attacks of ASALA and the JCAG in 
Europe had shaken the French media and society, Archbishop Serovpé Manougian (Serovbe 
Manukian), the Prelate of the Armenian Church in Paris, publicly and fervently condemned the 
acts of violence (Boghossian 2005, 397). The JAF and the UCFAF were also quick to express 
against terrorism. The organizations found that these “acts of violence and terrorism” caused 
serious harm to the calls for recognizing the Armenian Genocide, as well as raised prejudice 
against “…the Armenian community in France.”321 Yet many of the JAF and the UCFAF 
affiliates (some of them former Communists) were quietly sympathetic towards ASALA’s anti-
                                                
320 Terre et Culture was founded in 1976 (formally 1978) and aimed at the preservation of Armenian cultural 
heritage by reconstructing Armenian monuments in Iran, Syria and elsewhere (Interview with Kegham Kevonian. 
November 9, 2012; cf. Ter-Minassian 1994, 231). Solidarite Franco-Arménienne was founded in 1983. The 
organization mostly introduced Armenian culture, history and the Armenian Cause to the Europeans through 
publications in French (Hovanessian 1992, 258; Ter-Minassian 1994, 231). 
321 “Communiqué.” 1976. Ashkhar, June 5. 
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imperialist struggle (Ter Minassian 1994, 228). Impressed by the modest gains in the pursuit of 
the Armenian Cause, many activists from both the JAF and the UCFAF in the 1980s participated 
in demonstrations for the release of the Armenian “political prisoners” in France. The trial of 
Max Hraïr Kilndjian of JCAG in January 1982 at the Criminal Court in Aix-en-Provance had 
mobilized all organizations in Marseille. Kilndjian was arrested in February 1980 for a failed 
attempt against the Turkish Ambassador in Berne (Switzerland). The UCFAF sided with their 
rivals, the Dashnaktsutyun, and others in demonstrations for the release of Kilndjian. The result 
was more than rewarding, as the Court sentenced Kilndjian to a two-year imprisonment, the time 
he had already spent in detention (Les Arméniens 1983, 213). Similarly, in January 1984, the trial 
of four ASALA members for their September 1981 attack on the Turkish Embassy brought 
together in solidarity various Armenian political factions in Paris (cf. Ter-Minassian 1994, 
228).322 While the JAF had not been involved in any terrorist attacks and had always officially 
rejected violence, an explosion in a trash container shattered the JAF headquarters in Marseille 
on March 17, 1984. Armenian organizations in Marseille condemned the act in a joint 
communiqué, suspecting Turkish organizations in instigating the attack.323  
 
Occasional solidarity between rival Armenian organizations in France, produced by the activities 
of ASALA and the JCAG/ARA, did not turn into permanent communal solidarity, as the 
entrenched differences between the anti-Dashnak factions and the Dashnaktsutyun persisted. 
United around some common short-term goals, the JAF/UCFAF and the Dashnaktsutyun still 
                                                
322 Apparently, the Orly bombing and President Mitterrand’s condemnation of violence influenced the verdict, as all 
four of the detainees were sentenced to seven years, despite the demonstrations and lobbying of Armenian 
organizations (“Chors hay eritasardneru datavarutiwně” [The Trial of Four Armenian Young Men]. 1984. Haratch, 
February 2). 
323 “Vochrap‘ordz Marseili “JAF” shenk‘in aṙjev” [A Terrorist Attempt in Front of the JAF Building]. 1984. 
Haratch, March 20. 
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represented opposite poles on many other accounts. Since the 1970s, the JAF/UCFAF had 
developed close cultural ties, exchanges and frequent visits to Soviet Armenia. In contrast, the 
Dashnaktsutyun still publicly remained very diaspora-oriented, despite a limited, yet steady 
change in its political course after 1972. Secondly, in contrast to the JAF/UCFAF, the Dashnak 
chapters in France were administratively subordinate to the central headquarters of the party.324 
The generational, organizational and ideological transformations the Dashnaktsutyun underwent 
worldwide, as well as the influence of the JCAG/ARA activities, led to significant changes in the 
French chapter as well. Even if the Armenian Genocide recognition campaigns created an 
accessible common ground between the JAF/UCFAF and the Dashnaktsutyun, the centralizing 
policies of the Dashnak Bureau, which led to the gradual domination of the Middle-Eastern-born 
Dashnaks within the party, reinforced the exclusive Dashnak identity even further.  
 
Transnationally, if the JCAG/ARA activities made a direct and long-lasting impact on the 
Dashnaktsutyun and its affiliate organizations worldwide, ASALA’s impact on Armenian 
organizations outside France was indirect at best and relatively insignificant, because of the 
internal rift it suffered in the early 1980s and the rapid decline of the transnational network of 
ASALA after 1982. While many of the former ASALA members, who had survived the strife 
dispersed by the end of the 1980s, the JCAG/ARA fighters continued to be glorified as heroes 
within the Dashnak circles worldwide. The day of the Lisbon 5, July 27, became a day of solemn 
remembrance in the calendar of the Dashnaktsutyun. Since 1984, Dashnak youth chapters from 
Lebanon to the United States have devoted works of poetry, songs, and eulogy to the memory of 
the five Armenian “martyrs” in Lisbon. Scout groups organize marches and keep vigil, and 
memorial services are held at the Cilician See churches. These commemorative events always 
                                                
324 The headquarters of the Dashnak party were based in Beirut until the early 1980s. 
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serve as important instructive occasions for relating and relaying the legacy of Lisbon Five to the 
current challenges faced by the party and for heightening the sense of loyalty to the 
Dashnaktsutyun and the Armenian Cause.  
 
Simultaneously, the Dashnaktsutyun fashioned heroes from out of the JCAG commandoes, 
imprisoned in the United States. The July 1984 issue of Haytoug, the organ of the Western 
chapter of Armenian Youth Federation, memorialized the martyrdom of the “Lisbon 5” and other 
Dashnak martyrs, demanded freedom for Armenian political prisoners (i.e. imprisoned members 
of the JCAG/ARA), and published the photographs of and brief messages by the imprisoned 
commandoes. One of the prisoners, Hampig Sassounian, thanked his AYF peers for “all the 
sacrifices made for the benefit of the Armenian Cause” (Haytoug 1984, 9); Dickran Berberian, 
another prisoner, warned that imprisoning the commandoes “cannot stop the determination of the 
struggle of Armenian youth. The Armenian Youth has decided to struggle until total victory [is 
achieved]” (ibid., 15). Some of the imprisoned commandoes continued to regularly contribute 
articles and poetry to Haytoug. Through publicizing the JCAG/ARA peers in youth periodicals, 
such as Haytoug of the AYF-Western region, Haiastan of Nor Seround in France or Razmik of 
the Dashnak youth organization in Lebanon, through annual commemoration services and 
speeches, as well as various actions and fund raising campaigns for the release of Armenian 
prisoners, the Dashnaktsutyun worldwide encouraged values of loyalty and dedication among the 
youth. Repellent to many outside the party circles, the process solidified the loyalty of the rank 
and file and sympathizers. The Dashnaktsutyun emerged from the decade of 1975-1985 more 
centralized, organized, solidified in the ranks, and more transnationally mobilized (cf. Tölölyan 




The Hnchakyan and Ramkavar parties, by contrast, distanced themselves from the ASALA and 
JCAG/ARA actions in the West. By the 1970s the Hnchakyans had an insignificant presence in 
France and the United States. The organ of the party in the Eastern United States, Eritasard 
Hayastan, ceased publication by the end of the 1970s, and the party did not exist as an 
organizationally active entity. Similarly, the Ramkavar party chapters were almost dissolved in 
France, as the World Congress of 1965 had recorded (cf. Dallak‘yan 2007, 243-45). This 
condition in France continued through the next decade, as the Ramkavars failed to recruit young 
members from among the upcoming generations. The Sixteenth World Congress of the 
Ramkavar party in 1982 recorded that the party had been completely absent in France (cf. 
Dallak‘yan 2007, 388). Although the Ramkavars had not been directly affected by the activities 
of ASALA or the JCAG/ARA in Europe, the Central Board of the party expressed against 
terrorism and violent means of struggle on number of occasions (Dallak‘yan 2007, 346-49; 388-
89).  
 
In the United States, the Ramkavars refrained from entering into direct confrontation with the 
Dashnaktsutyun because of the precarious conditions in wartime Lebanon, but they followed the 
Dashnaks in withdrawing from the Armenian Assembly (Dallak‘yan 2007, 397; Grigorian 1995, 
18). The political unity of the 1970s, achieved with much difficulty in the United States, fell 
apart by the early 1980s. While sharing a common goal, the radically different means that the 
Assembly, the Dashnaks and Ramkavars envisioned for its achievement, rent the organization 
apart. If in France, the detention of Armenian commandoes occasionally generated solidarity 
among the rival organizations, in the United States terrorism further polarized the community. In 
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June 1982, the Diocesan Assembly of Armenian Church of the See of Ējmiatsin condemned the 
acts of terrorism, while the Cilician See Prelacy refrained from making any statement on 
terrorism in its assembly held around the same time.325 The compromised political unity in the 
United States prevented joint commemorations of the 1985 seventieth anniversary of the 
genocide (Dallak‘yan 2007, 405-406). If the major issues separating the factions prior to 1965 
had mainly been ideological, stemming from profound disagreements around the legitimacy of 
Soviet Armenia, in 1985, the major factor for the disunity in the United States became the 
disagreement around the pursuit of the Armenian Cause, which at least nominally was shared 
among all factions.  
 
Despite the divided efforts, the struggles for the recognition of the Armenian genocide eventually 
made the genocide an important marker of Armenian identity transnationally. Yet as the 
following section will discuss, the increasing influx in the 1970s and the 1980s of the Middle 
Eastern and Soviet Armenians, all with their own backgrounds, gave rise to new tensions over 




                                                
325 “Diocese of the Armenian Church Condemns Violence at Assembly.” 1982. Armenian Reporter, June 10, 6; 
“Prelacy Annual Assembly Fails to Endorse Statement on Terror,” 1982. Armenian Reporter, June 10, 4. 
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Debating Armenianness: Immigration Flows,  
School Movement and the Clash of Identities in the Diaspora 
 
 
As the diaspora-born generations of the 1960s and 70s came into their own, the intensifying 
East-West migration of Armenians and their concentration in various towns and cities in France 
and the United States revealed the existing multiple expressions of Armenian identities. The 
heterogeneous compatriotic cultures, dialects, localized customs and habits of the 1920s, which 
had created the diversity of the first Armenian settlements in the host countries, had been largely 
erased by the 1960s, yielding to a more homogeneous Armenian identity in some countries and 
to acculturation and assimilation in others. The countries in the Middle East bore the legacy of 
the Islamic empires, notably the Ottoman and Persian, where Christian religious minorities had 
been granted certain internal autonomies, and religion provided a thick barrier against quick 
assimilation. Consequently, Armenian institutions had been able to lay stronger foundations and 
forge a more cohesive Armenian identity through the growing network of community 
organizations and schools in the 1920s and 1930s. In the West, the initial diversity of Armenian 
immigrants had been erased by the coercive education systems of the host nation-states. This 
section will discuss different types of Armenian identity shaped under different sociopolitical 
contexts, which came into clash after the 1960s with the intensifying immigration of Armenians 





Production of Armenianness in France and the United States 
 
France, the United States and other Western countries, where church was separated from the 
state, had produced different policies and attitudes towards religion and church. Although not 
formally endorsed as it has been stated in chapter 2, Protestantism in the United States 
constituted a key marker of an American identity. Even after the elimination of religious 
instruction from public schools in the 1920s, the American public remained highly religious. 
Many of the American political leaders and even the presidents continued resorting to religious 
terms and language in their public addresses (Little 2007, 41-3).  By contrast, the cultural 
principle of laïcité in France, as argued in chapter 2, defined the unpopularity of church 
attendance among Frenchmen. Church attendance or affiliation, therefore, was not as high as in 
the United States. If Armenian churches in the United States became important community 
centers, always at the center of the activism of various Armenian-American organizations, 
Armenian churches in France, with some exceptions, particularly in Marseille, up to the 1960s 
were not as central in community affairs. 
 
Varying state policies towards religion and religious communities, local cultures, social-
economic integration perspectives, as well as policies towards immigrants and minorities in 
different host-countries had made an enormous impact on the formation of respective Armenian 
communal institutions and the upbringing and education of the diaspora-born generations. If the 
varying degrees of tolerance towards confessional communities in the countries of the Middle 
East had created conditions for the establishment of a multitude of community organizations and 
institutions, including community schools for teaching the Armenian language, literature, 
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culture, and history, the assimilationist policies of the United States and France had been directed 
first of all against the preservation of non-American or non-French identities.  
 
Even though Armenians had not been formally integrated into French society until the end of 
WWII, the early attempts by the Armenian refugees to establish day schools in France remained 
largely unsuccessful due to the prevailing assimilationist policies of the state (see chapter 2). By 
the 1970s, only two Armenian private boarding schools had been operating in the entire France, 
both in the Paris region. Even though they could not compete with free, compulsory state 
controlled national public schools in France, they provided at least an alternative to the 
ineffective weekly or evening Armenian classes offered by various Armenian organizations and 
institutions. The all-boys Mouradian School (collège Samuel Moorat) of the Armenian Catholic 
Mekhitarist order was quite old, having been founded in Paris in 1848. The school moved to 
Venice because of the Franco-Prussian war in 1870, and then reestablished in Paris (Sèvres) in 
1929326 (cf. Bardakjian 1976, 22; Mouradian and Kunth 2010, 45). The other school was the 
secular all-girls Tebrotzassère (Dprotsaser). The school was founded in Constantinople in 1879 
by some Armenian educated women. It was transformed into an orphanage during WWI, and 
then moved first to Salonica, Greece in 1922, then to Marseille in 1923, and finally, established 
in the Le Raincy suburb of Paris in 1928. In 1970 the boarding school was reorganized into a co-
educational day school, offering primaire and college327 level education (Historique; cf. 
Mouradian and Kunth 2010, 46; Mouradian and Ter-Minassian 2003, 638).  
                                                
326 The college was turned into a biweekly Armenian school in 1980, which only provided classes in Armenian 
language, history and culture from primary to high school levels. The program was designed to prepare students for 
the foreign language requirement test at the end of lycée (high school) for acquiring a graduation certificate 
(baccalauréat) and being able to enter institutions of higher education (Interview with Rev. Fr. Haroutioun 
Bezdikian, the principal of the College. October 30, 2012). 




In the United States, no Armenian day school was founded until the mid-1960s. Quite naturally 
and consequently, under the secular homogenizing social milieu of the American and French 
nation-states generations of Armenians of diverse compatriotic origins were assimilated into 
American and French societies. The founding of various Armenian youth and athletic 
organizations, coffee houses and clubs, churches and political circles by the first generation 
certainly provided spaces for socialization, for connecting with other Armenians and remaining 
involved in Armenian life, but increasingly French (in the case of France) and English (in the 
case of the United States) came to replace Armenian within the organizations (see chapter 2). 
Even if a relatively small portion of the second generation, born and raised in France or the 
United States, learned some Armenian at home, by taking private lessons or by attending weekly 
language courses (usually on Saturdays) provided by churches and other organizations,328 
Armenian was no longer the primary language of communication for the second (and 
consequently third) generation coming of age. The number of second generation Armenians with 
good Armenian-language training in France and the United States was extremely low compared 
to the estimated numbers of Armenians in those countries. By the 1970s, some among these 
small groups with good knowledge of Armenian had acquired important positions within various 
Armenian organizations, but the Francophone or Anglophone French- or American-born 
generations were represented heavily among the leadership and membership of the same 
organizations. Conditions in France and the United States had been unfavorable for the 
                                                
328 The exclusion of religious instruction from public schools both in France and the United States left religious 
education up to the respective church communities. Many churches in France and the United States organized 
Sunday classes of religious instruction. Copying from the Western model of Sunday schools, Armenian churches in 
the United States and France began offering weekly Armenian language classes alongside religious instruction (cf. 
Kooshian 1987, 98-100; Svajian 1987, 112-3) These weekly classes, however, were not enough for the preservation 
of the language. The second generation in both countries, therefore, grew increasingly Francophone or Anglophone. 
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production of a linguistically homogeneous Armenian community. Yet, the difficulty of learning 
Armenian had not prevented some French or Americans of Armenian origin from developing a 
certain sense of commitment and belonging to Armenianness and from getting involved, actively 
participating in and often leading various Armenian organizations in these countries. 
 
 
Production of Armenianness in the Middle East  
 
Compared to the West, the Middle Eastern countries provided a diametrically different picture. 
Sociopolitical conditions in these countries were quite favorable for the reorganization of the 
Armenian Church and political parties and for the resumption of nation-building attempts in the 
host-countries. In his comprehensive analysis of the emergence and variations of Armenian 
nationalism and the Armenian nation, Razmik Panossian writes: 
If what was going on in the Armenian SSR was ‘Soviet-style’ nation-building, in the communities abroad it 
was ‘diaspora-style’ nation building - particularly in the 1920s and 1930s. The process was typical of elite 
mobilization efforts intent on moulding a conscious nation, except that it was done outside a homeland and 
without state institutions. If Stalin and Russification were the main threats in Soviet Armenia, parochialism 
and voluntary assimilation were the main threats in the diaspora. Nonetheless, under the leadership of 
competing organizations, a heterogeneous group of people with fundamental differences in terms of 
regional identity, religion (Apostolic, Catholic and Protestant), language (Armenian, Turkish, dialects), 
occupation and class, social status (refugees, assimilated elites, intellectuals), political loyalties and cultural 
influences from host-states were moulded into a relatively coherent community with a collective 
consciousness as a diasporic nation. In short, ‘Armenianness’ as the most important identity category was 
either created or reinforced in the diaspora, superseding the differences within and between the 
communities [emphasis in original] (Panossian 2006, 292). 
 
As the “best analytical commencing point” Panossian emphasizes the case of “diasporic nation 




Lebanon, as well as most of the former Ottoman countries, indeed, provided ideal conditions for 
the reorganization of Armenian churches, political parties and the resumption of the nation-
building efforts through regular Armenian language schooling. Shortly after Armenians settled in 
refugee camps in Syria and Lebanon, in parallel with schools organized in the Armenian 
orphanages by various international or Armenian relief organizations, such as Near East Relief or 
the AGBU, Armenian churches and political parties also began opening schools (see chapters 2, 
3, cf. Libaridian 1999, 121; Migliorino 2008, 70). Through the 1920s and 30s the number of 
Armenian schools in Syria, Lebanon and Egypt increased rapidly. By 1965 there were more than 
65 Armenian schools (including 5 religious seminaries) in Lebanon,329 about the same number in 
Syria and about a dozen in Egypt. The standardizing Armenian dialect of Constantinople 
(Western Armenian), which had been the language of instruction in Armenian schools 
throughout the Ottoman Empire by the late nineteenth century, had been adopted by schools 
establishing in various Armenian diasporic communities. The increasing intervention of the 
Syrian and Egyptian governments in their respective education systems and state-promoted 
Arabization policies significantly affected the Armenian schools in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 
1960s, both in Syria and Egypt, Armenian schools and Armenian-language instruction recorded 
significant decline (Migliorino 2008, 116-17; 120). In contrast, with the swelling of the number 
of Armenians in Lebanon due to immigrating Syrian and Palestinian Armenians, Lebanon in the 
1960s was emerging as the most important Armenian political and cultural center in the Middle 
East. From the late 1940s the country had attracted the leadership of all Armenian political 
parties, where they had a real chance to get involved and participate in local politics. Armenian 
schools, on the other hand, had been remarkably free on curriculum, mostly focusing on 
                                                
329 In 1964 Aztag editorial board in Lebanon initiated a survey of Lebanese-Armenians educational organization. 
Several articles published in Aztag from November 4, 1964 provided general descriptions of the Armenian schools 
operating in Lebanon. The editorial of November 6 reported of 68 Armenian schools in Lebanon. 
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Armenian instruction and gradually from the 1960s adjusting to the Lebanese national 
curriculum (Migliorino 2008, 117). Schools flourished and various Armenian cultural 
organizations and printing houses proliferated. The abundance of Armenian organizations, as 
well as the existence of Armenian neighborhoods outside the school provided spaces for 
socialization where the Lebanese born second generation Armenians could mingle with other 
Armenians, spend days, weeks, months and years within an Armenian setting. Various youth and 
athletic organizations and clubs maintained by the political parties, churches, cultural unions, 
Armenian language newspapers and books, served as primary and secondary agents of Armenian 
socialization and homogenization. The standard Western Armenian, rather than Arabic, replaced 
the diversity of dialects and languages spoken by the first generation refugees. Many Lebanese 
Armenians still remember campaigns against Turkophone Armenians, when party activists 
posted announcements on the doors and windows of Armenian businesses with a brief note: 
“Respond in Armenian to speakers of Turkish.”330 The heterogeneous community of refugees of 
the 1920s had yielded to a linguistically homogeneous, self-conscious and self-sustained 
Armenian community in Lebanon by the 1960s.  
 
By 1965 Armenian Catholic and Protestant communities had also become very active and 
competitive in the domain of Armenian education in Lebanon. Despite their relatively small 
numbers compared to the Apostolic Armenians, both Catholic and Evangelical Armenian schools 
were quite successful in soliciting Armenian students beyond their respective Catholic or 
Evangelical Armenian families. The Lebanese educational system required instruction of science 
either in French or in English. Accordingly, the Catholic schools placed more emphasis on 
                                                
330 Avedikian, Hagop. 2013.  “Hay yerg u yergaran.” [Armenian Song and Songbook]. Azg daily. May 4. 
http://www.azg.am/AM/culture/2013050401. Accessed September 27, 2014.	  Sometimes, the line “Remember the 
one million” was added (author’s personal correspondence with Ara Sanjian, February 26, 2015). 
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French and prepared students for the French Brevet diploma or the French Baccalaureate, 
alongside the Lebanese national certificate and baccalaureate programs.331 The Evangelical 
Armenian schools emphasized English in their curriculum, and their secondary schools prepared 
students for the Lebanese baccalaureate and entrance exams to the American University of 
Beirut, the Beirut College for Women332 and Haigazian College.333 Haigazian College, 
established in 1955, was another contribution of the Evangelical Armenians to the Armenian 
community in Lebanon. By 1965 Haigazian had grown into a four-year college program, 
offering Bachelors of Arts degrees in several majors. It became the only institution of higher 
education in the diaspora established and managed by an Armenian organization (Aztag Nov. 7, 
1964; Sanjian 2000, 9; 11-2). Although the college was not exclusively for Armenians, it placed 
significant emphasis on the Armenian component of its curriculum. For overseeing the 
instruction of Armenian Studies courses and promoting research in Armenian studies, the college 
had an Armenian Studies chair from the beginning. It also had a BA degree in Armenian 
Studies.334  
 
The nature of Armenian identity produced in Lebanon, Syria and Egypt, however, was strongly 
defined by partisan and lesser so by confessional affiliations. Despite the fact that Western 
Armenian was the most important homogenizing common median for Armenians of various 
                                                
331 As reported in Aztag, by 1965 the Mekhitarist secondary school (founded in 1937) and the Hripsimeants‘ college 
of the Armenian Sisters of Immaculate Conception (founded in 1922 in Junieh) prepared students for the French 
baccalaureate exams; the Mesrobian College (founded in 1939) and Srpouhi Agnes (founded in 1937) in Bourj 
Hammoud prepared for the Lebanese state certificate and the French Brevet (Aztag, Nov. 16; 18; 26, 1964) 
332 Now Lebanese American University. 
333 Armenian Evangelical College (founded in 1923) in Beirut, Armenian Evangelical Central High School (founded 
in 1922) in Achrafieh, Beirut, prepared for the state baccalaureate and the AUB entrance exams. The Shamlian-
Tatikian Evangelical School (founded in 1939) in Nor Marash, Bourj Hammoud, and the Gertmenian school 
(founded in 1931) prepared for the Lebanese state certificate (Aztag, Nov. 7; 16; 18; 26, 1964) 
334 Initially, Armenian students admitted to the college were required to take classical Armenian, Medieval and 
Modern Armenian literature and history of Armenian Church (Sanjian 2000, 11). 
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partisan and confessional affiliations, the content of Armenian subjects, especially when it came 
to modern Armenian history, significantly differed from one school to another and depended on 
their sponsor political party’s or confessional community’s definition of the Armenian. The 
majority of Armenian Apostolic schools in Lebanon had been under the indirect control of the 
Dashnaktsutyun, as the party’s lay members and sympathizers dominated the “national bodies” 
(azgayin marminner) of the Prelacy of Armenian Church in Lebanon - the Diocesan Assembly 
(the legislative body of the Apostolic community), and its executive wing, the Civic Council, and 
all the other sub-councils, including the Educational Council. By 1965 the Armenian Apostolic 
community formally had more than 25 schools, predominantly under the control of the 
Dashnaktsutyun. The Hnchakyans retained control over Sahakian school from the early 1920s, 
which did not become part of the Prelacy school system. By the 1960s the AGBU had 
established five schools, while the Ramkavar Tekeyan Cultural Association had founded the 
Tekeyan school in 1951 (Varzhabedian 1981a, 435-37). Except for the Armenian “azgayin” 
schools,335 the Dashnaktsutyun directly controlled Chemaran, which was also not affiliated with 
the Prelacy.  
 
In contrast to the “‘soviet-style’ nation-building,” with the absence of a centralized coordinating 
body between the Prelacy affiliated and other schools, as well as among the three Armenian 
confessional communities, the “‘diaspora-style’ nation-building’” while homogenized the 
Armenians ethnically, around the common language, common past/ancestry/history, reproduced 
heterogeneities on political and confessional grounds. Thereby, it contributed to the 
consolidation of the existing fragmentations in the community. In the 1920s, when the school 
                                                




movement just had commenced in Lebanon, as Schahgaldian notes, “the only mission of … 
schools was the creation of a new breed of Armenians in the image of what the [Dashnak] party 
considered ‘true Armenians’, conscious of their history and culture, well-versed in their mother 
tongue and dedicated to the ideals of Armenian nationalism” (Schahgaldian 1979, 165). The 
situation had not changed much by 1965, as everything from the interior design of schools to 
their curriculum and syllabi expressed the presence of a certain ideology in the schools. The 
Prelacy and other Dashnak-affiliated schools could easily be distinguished with the presence of 
the Armenian tricolor flag in a public place, the maps of “United Armenia” and pictures of 
various Dashnak heroes decorating the hallways and classrooms of the schools. Similar partisan 
symbolism was present in Hnchakyan, Ramkavar and even Ramkavar-friendly AGBU schools. 
The instructive materials reflected partisan ideologies as well. Most of the teachers of Armenian 
subjects within the Armenian Apostolic community schools were cardholder members or 
affiliates of political parties. Most textbooks were written by party intellectuals336 (cf. Panossian 
2006, 297).  
 
Armenian neighborhoods and the social milieu reinforced these partisan identities outside the 
schools. As Migliorino observes, “…an ideal Dashnak-leaning family would live on the Bourj 
Hammoud side of the Armenian areas, send children to a Dashnak-friendly school, attend a 
Dashnak-friendly church, read a Dashnak newspaper, support the Homenetmen sports club, 
attend Hamazkayin cultural events, etc. Hnchak families would affiliate with their own sets of 
                                                
336 In the report on Armenian Educational Institutions in Lebanon the pro-Dashnak author expressed a concern that 
the AGBU Tarouhi Hagopian (Daruhi Hakobian) all-girl high school used Kersam Aharonian’s (Gersam Aharonian) 
editorials, published in a single volume as a history textbook for upper classes. (Aztag, 11 November 1964). Kersam 
Aharonian at the time was a member of the Ramkavar Central Board, held an influential position within the AGBU 
Educational Council and taught history at the AGBU affiliated high schools (Aharonian 2006, 201-3). Similarly, 




institutions, and so on…” (Migliorino 2008, 116). Clubs established by the political parties also 
constituted a significant element of the social structure in Lebanon’s Armenian neighborhoods, 
with their triple social functions of socialization, group formation and social control. Party clubs 
operating daily from early morning till late night served as places for various gatherings, 
mingling, social and leisure events. Heavily decorated with partisan symbolism, the clubs 
welcomed only members and sympathizers of all generations, demarcating in-groups and out-
groups, promoting exclusive identities among Armenians of various affiliations. Predominantly 
among the Dashnaks and Hnchaks, who controlled Armenian neighborhoods, the trinity of club, 
school and church generated the new “breed” of Armenians, with deeply partisan and often 
mutually exclusive identities. However fragmented and partisan, (Western) Armenian was the 
everyday language of these clubs, Armenian schools and churches, as well as the Armenian 
quarters in Bourj Hammoud and Beirut. By the end of the 1960s the Armenian community in 
Lebanon had grown predominantly Armenophone with Western Armenian established as the 
primary language of communication among Armenians of various affiliations. 
 
It must be mentioned that the “‘diaspora-style’ nation building,” as Razmik Panossian noted in 
his book, was not strictly typical to Lebanon. It can also describe the forging of an Armenian 
identity in Egypt and Syria, but especially in Iran and Istanbul, which had been quite different 
from the rest of the Arab Middle East. The formal toleration of the Armenian church and 
Armenian Apostolic community both in Turkey and Iran allowed the Patriarchate in Istanbul and 
the community in Iran to operate Armenian schools and offer Armenian-language classes to the 
community. Through the network of schools the Armenian Patriarchate in Istanbul continued 
producing generations fluent in Armenian in the Republican Turkey. Even though Armenian 
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schools were limited to teaching the Armenian language and religion, and no Armenian history 
classes were allowed, sciences, Turkish history and geography were often taught in Armenian as 
well. The partisan aspect of Armenian upbringing, compared to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and 
elsewhere, was completely absent among Armenian families and schools in Istanbul.337 In Iran 
the Armenian community had also been able to produce a relatively homogenized Armenian 
community, but the common denominator here was Eastern Armenian, in contrast to the rest of 
countries in the Middle East. A number of Armenian churches and schools throughout the 
country had been established long before the twentieth century.338 Politically, Iran had served as 
an important base for the activities of especially Dashnak revolutionaries at the turn of the 
century. Since then the Dashnaktsutyun had maintained continuous presence in the Iranian 
Armenian communities and had acquired much prominence in the course of the twentieth 
century,339 but the church remained loyal to Ējmiatsin until the second half of the 1950s. The 
Dashnak control of the Cilician See and its subsequent expansion brought the three Armenian 
Church dioceses in Iran with their communal structures and schools under the control of the 
Dashnak party as well (see chapter 4).  
 
Different types of Armenian identities, thus, had been shaped under different host-country 
conditions in the Middle East as well. If prior to the 1960s and 1970s these differences in 
                                                
337 Interview with Kurken Berksanlar, the former president of the Organization of Istanbul Armenians in Los 
Angeles. March 8, 2014.  
338 In Iran, Armenians constituted significant numbers long before the twentieth century. Until 1828, Eastern 
Armenia had been part of the Persian Empire. In 1604-05 the Armenian population residing at the Ottoman-Persian 
borderland had been deported to the interior of the Empire by the Safavid ruler Shah Abbas I, giving birth to 
Armenian communities in New Julfa, Isfahan and elsewhere. 
339 The party had become influential in Iran from the early 1920s, but especially in the years of Cold War, thanks to 
the activities of Dro and his intelligence group and the support from the Shah (see chapter 4). The other parties, 
notably the Hnchakyans and Ramkavars, never had any significant presence in Iran. The non-Dashnaks gathered 




Armenian identities had not been conspicuous in the dynamics of the Armenian diaspora, the 
intensifying East-West migration flows in the 1970s created concentrations of Armenians of 
various host-country backgrounds in the West, in which Armenians originating from different 
countries became more aware of the particularities of their Armenian identities. These in turn 
created tensions and conflicts, new bases for inclusions and exclusions. 
 
 
Armenian Immigration and Changing Social-Political Contexts in the United States and France 
(the 1960s and 1970s) 
 
Decolonization, changes in international political conditions and national crises in the countries 
of the Middle East produced waves of Armenian emigration to the countries of Western Europe, 
North and South Americas, where differences in the perception of Armenianness came into 
contact and conflict. From as early as the 1960s Armenians began emigrating from the Middle 
East to Western Europe, the Americas, Australia and elsewhere. The emigration of Armenians 
intensified in the late 1960s through the early 1980s due to political instability and discriminating 
policies against the Armenians in Turkey, the Arabization policies in Syria and Egypt, the 
Lebanese civil war, and the Islamic Revolution in Iran. At the same time, the exodus from Soviet 
Armenia began in the mid-1970s and continued in ever-greater numbers under Gorbechev’s era 




France and the United States were among the most attractive destinations for the new waves of 
immigrants.340 The 1965 Hart-Cellar act abolished quota restrictions on immigration to the 
United States, opening the country to an influx of skilled and unskilled workers.  At the time the 
booming French economy also attracted workers from abroad (cf. Batalova and Terrazas 2013, 
29; Weil 2008, 151-3). In the wake of the Arab-Israeli war of 1973 and the international oil 
embargo, France stopped accepting immigrants in July 1974. This ban, however, did not stop the 
flow of Armenians, as France remained committed to the UN 1951 Geneva Convention on 
Refugees and continued accepting refugees fleeing their countries “owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion” (Geneva Convention, article 1.2; cf. Hargreaves 1995, 20). 
Armenians, fleeing Turkey, Lebanon and Iran fit this category of refugees. Similarly, Armenians 
fleeing the Soviet Union could claim persecution on political grounds. Naturalization terms had 
been relaxed and the five-year residency requirement was lifted for people entering France under 
the Geneva Convention, from Francophone countries or from countries formerly under French 
mandate (Weil 2008, 231). For many Armenians, France thus provided real possibilities for 
permanent settlement. 
 
Armenians from the Middle East, especially from Lebanon, had begun arriving in the United 
States from the late 1950s and early 60s through the ANCHA, even before the elimination of the 
quota system (cf. Mirak 1997, 383; Sanjian 2007, 278). The early arrivals mostly represented the 
anti-Communist camp, the Armenian DPs from Bulgaria and Romania. Upon their arrival in 
New York, they were met by the representatives of ANCHA and the Armenian Relief Society, 
                                                
340 Canada and Australia also attracted large number of Armenian immigrants from the Middle East. 
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and after a few days of briefing and orientation at St. Illuminator’s Cathedral in New York341 
they were sent off to their final destinations. For many, Los Angeles was the preferred 
destination (Zadoian 2012, 84-6). Many Lebanese Armenians had also arrived to Los Angeles 
mostly through the transnational network of the Dashnaktsutyun. By 1965, metropolitan Los 
Angeles hosted a noticeable number of former DPs, commonly referred to as Ṙusahays (Russian 
Armenians), and Armenians from Lebanon, known as Beyrut‘ahays (Armenians from Beirut). 
While the Ṙusahays mostly settled in Montebello, the Beyrut‘ahays preferred the San Fernando 
Valley342 (cf. Zadoian 2012, 98). The number of Armenian immigrants to the US grew rapidly 
especially after the elimination of the quota system in 1965.   
 
Compared to the first Armenian immigrants from the Ottoman Empire, the new immigrants to 
France and the United States benefitted from more favorable social-political conditions and 
organized closely-knit communities. If the former had experienced the coercive effects of 
Frenchification or Americanization, the rise and spread of civil rights movements from the 1960s 
had resulted in more liberal conditions for human rights, equality and expressions of 
difference.343   
                                                
341 St. Illuminator’s Cathedral in New York served as the headquarters of the Antelias affiliated Prelacy of the 
Armenian Church since 1958. 
342 Interview with Walter Karabian. March 6, 2014. 
343 The massive strikes and demonstrations of May 1968 in France, combined with the effects of decolonization, as 
well as the influx of immigrants had an enormous impact on the leftist political parties, especially the Socialists, the 
Dashnaktsutyun’s counterpart in France. The Socialists began advocating multiculturalism and pluralism. Le droit à 
la difference (‘the right to be different’) acquired an enduring popularity in France, especially in the 1970s. During 
his campaign for the presidential elections in 1981, François Mitterrand publicly endorsed it. In the 1980s, the 
concept was materialized into a law, which removed restrictions on foreigners’ rights of association (Hargreaves 
1991, 88-9). The French government even provided subsidies to foreign associations, whose activities helped the 
immigrants to integrate in French society. A limited amount of instruction in the mother-tongue was provided in 
French public schools (ibid., 193-95). Similarly, in the Untied States, the Civil Rights movement radically affected 
perceptions of racial, ethnic and other minority groups in the 1960s, leading to a fast growing sensitivity towards 
people of various racial, ethno-religious, gender and other minority backgrounds. The movement had an impact on 
education nationwide, as many schools began introducing curricula focusing on pluralism and multiculturalism (for 




For many American-born Armenians, who had in various ways clung to their roots, the Civil 
Rights movement provided a welcome impetus. Many others, especially the oldest immigrants of 
the 1880s and 1890s, who had been detached from Armenian organizations and institutions in 
Fresno, Worcester and elsewhere, began discovering certain aspects of their Armenian identity, a 
side “which had a history of 3000 years, a side which developed its own alphabet, had its own 
literature, its own church” (Hagopian 1984). They were also challenged by the newcomers, a 
different breed of Armenians, who now claimed leadership roles in the community, especially in 
California. If earlier in the century, assimilation into American and French societies was the only 
way to integration, from the 1960s both societies increasingly adopted difference, 
multiculturalism and plural identities, whether ethnic or linguistic, religious or cultural. 
Benefitting from the changing conditions in the United States and France, Armenians arriving 
from especially Lebanon, after a brief period of adjustment, became actively involved in 
Armenian organizations and institutions, created new organizational structures after Middle 
Eastern models, and gradually squeezed many Armenian-Americans out of the leadership 
positions in Armenian organizations. 
 
 
Armenian Immigration and the School Movement in the United States and France 
 
In 1955 two parallel events in Boston and Los Angeles set the stage for Armenian education and 
Armenian studies in the United States. In Boston, a group of Armenian visionaries started the 
National Association for Armenian Studies and Research. Inspired by Richard N. Frye, a 
Professor of Iranian and Central Asian studies at Harvard University, who emphasized the need 
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for creating Armenian Studies chairs in American universities, this group aimed at establishing 
an endowed professorship in Armenian Studies at Harvard and later in other leading 
universities.344 In Los Angeles around the time of the creation of NAASR, Mateos Ferrahian, a 
first generation Armenian-American attorney, bequeathed $300,000 for the purpose of 
establishing an Armenian high school in America (cf. Kossakian 2014).345 The American-born 
Boston Armenians realized their dream by establishing an endowed chair in Armenian studies at 
Harvard. In California ten years after the passing of Mateos Ferrahian two Armenian groups of 
newcomers began competing for the establishment of a daily Armenian high school. The timing 
for founding an Armenian school could not have been more favorable as the ethnic school 
movement was proliferating in the Untied States in the 1960s (Ordjanian 1991, 80).346 The 
Ṙusahays in Montebello and the Beyrut‘ahays in San Fernando Valley raced to get a certificate 
from the state to receive the Ferrahian funds. Both groups were affiliated with the Dashnak 
faction, and the Prelacy of the Armenian Church decreed that two-thirds of the funds should go 
to the Beyrut‘ahay initiative, and one-third to the Ṙusahay. With the support of the Holy Martyrs 
Armenian Church board, Gabriel Injejikian, a young educator from Lebanon, founded the first 
Armenian day school in Encino (San Fernando Valley, Los Angeles) in September 1964. A year 
later the school was named Holy Martyrs Ferrahian School after the major benefactor (Kossakian 
2014). Around the same time, in 1965 the Ṙusahays started Mesrobian School in Montebello.347  
 
                                                
344. Interview with Raffi Yeghiayan. May 16, 2014; “History” NAASR. http://www.naasr.org/index.php/about-us-
site-map-menu-93/history-site-map-menu-123. Accessed October 3, 2014. 
345 Interview with John Kossakian, the principal of Ferrahian School. March 4, 2014. 
346 Anahid Ordjanian (1991, 79) defines “ethnic school” as “an educational institution, which teaches a collective 
political identity which differs in some way from the collective political identity taught in public schools of the 
dominant nation-state in which it is located.” 
347 Interview with Walter Karabian. March 6, 2014. Interview with Vatche Semerdjian. February 20, 2014. 
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The lifting of the immigration restrictions to the United States in 1965 cleared the way for the 
unrestricted flow of Armenians from the Middle East, who settled in various parts of the US with 
the help of Armenian organizations and institutions. Some of them were brought over to meet the 
need for journalists fluent in (Western) Armenian for Armenian language periodicals. The 
existing Ramkavar and Dashnak networks were able to recruit and transfer new cadres from the 
Middle East. The Ramkavar Nor Or, published in Fresno since 1921 moved to Los Angeles in 
1964, where a generation of Middle Eastern Armenians actively contributed to the paper and 
gradually assumed its editorship.348 Baikar and Mirror-Spectator	  in Boston also benefitted from	  
similar	   contributors.349 Similarly, a generation of Middle Eastern Armenians came to staff 
Asbarez in California and Hairenik association in Boston.350  
 
The pace of the Middle-Easternization of Armenian political parties and affiliated organizations 
in France and the Untied States accelerated in the 1970s, especially after the outbreak of the 
Lebanese civil war in 1975. The Middle Eastern Armenians, arriving in France and the United 
States, often found institutions and organizations resembling the Armenian institutional 
structures of Lebanon (Syria or Egypt). The network of Armenian churches, regardless of the 
Dashnak and non-Dashnak divide, as well as the Dashnaktsutyun, Ramkavars and the AGBU 
with their affiliated organizations and associations, provided familiar structures through which 
                                                
348 Among the editors of Nor Or, Antranig Poladian (1957-58), Noubar Berberian (1958-1960), Misak Haigents 
(Kupelian) (1963-68), Oshin Keshishian (1968-70; 1977-78) and Vatche Semerdjian (co-editor in 1977-78; 1981-86 
coeditor) had been active within the AGBU/Ramkavar circles in the Middle East prior to their arrival to the United 
States (see Antreassian 1981: 63-6; Aharonian 2006, 202; Danielian 1982,17-8;  “Nor Ori” Kmbagirnerě,” 2013). 
349 Edmond Azadian, who was born in Lebanon, worked several years as the assistant editor of Zartonk in Beirut, 
then as the editor of the Ramkavar organ Arev in Cairo. He assumed the directorship of the Baikar Association in 
Boston in 1967. He coordinated the publications of Baikar in Armenian and The Armenian Mirror-Spectator in 
English (Azadian 1999, I-II; Dallak‘yan 2007, 361; Interview with Edmond Azadian. June 29, 2013). 
350 Minas Tölölyan arrived from the Middle East in 1960, assumed the editorship of Hairenik in 1962. After Reuben 
Darbinian passed away in 1968, he also succeeded Darbinian as the editor of Hairenik Quarterly (former Hairenik 




many Lebanese Armenians could integrate into the local Armenian community. For the Dashnak 
sympathizers this coincided with the beginning of the activities of the Justice Commandoes and 
the export of some radical Middle-Eastern Armenians to the West. The Bureau leaders, who 
needed to engage the party’s transnational network in support of the activities of Justice 
Commandoes in Europe and the United States, launched a series of internal reforms, which 
significantly centralized the party and marginalized many influential leaders from the European 
and American regional committees (see previous section). The party rank and file or 
sympathizers originating from the Middle Eastern communities largely benefitted from the top-
down centralization, as the highest ranked party leadership was interested in their inclusion and 
advancement in American and French chapters.351  
 
Wherever the Middle Eastern Armenians found familiar organizations and institutions in their 
new host countries, they joined them, thereby integrating themselves into local Armenian affairs. 
Wherever the Lebanese Armenians could not find familiar institutions and organizations, they 
created new ones in close resemblance to structures in Lebanon. Due to the sizable numbers and 
                                                
351 As the number of Middle Eastern Armenians grew, local chapters of the Dashnaktsutyun and its affiliate 
organizations in Los Angeles became gradually dominated by Armenians from the Middle East (Interview with 
Viken Hovsepian, the Chairman of the Dashnaktsutyun Western USA Central Committee. March 5, 2014). In New 
England and New York the pace of the Middle-Easternization of the Dashnaktsutyun was slower due to several 
factors. First of all, the headquarters of the Dashnak party had been in Boston since the establishment of the party in 
the United States at the turn of the century. Throughout the next decades the New England chapters had been more 
influential than the chapters in California. By the 1960s, the Boston region published four periodicals - Hairenik and 
Hairenik Monthly in Armenian, Armenian Weekly and Armenian Review in English, while the California region 
published only Asbarez. Secondly, if the concentration of the DPs and the Middle Eastern Armenians in Los 
Angeles from the 1950s and 1960s began changing the balance between the American-born and the 
Ṙusahay/Middle-Eastern Dashnaks, in Boston area the American-born Armenians outnumbered the Armenians 
originating from the Middle East. In 1978, for example, almost all members of the Central Committee of the Eastern 
USA were American-born Armenians (Sarkisian 1995, 22). Finally, with the support of the party leadership, many 
radical Middle-East-born Dashnaks became involved in the party’s youth organization (AYF) and began filling the 
ranks of the party in California at a much faster pace. Similarly, the influx of the Middle Eastern Armenians to 
France in the 1960s and 1970s, combined with the centralization and disciplinary measures undertaken by the 
Dashnak Bureau leadership, brought many of the Dashnaks of Middle Eastern origin to leadership positions within 
the party chapters in France (see previous section; Interview with Dikran Terterian. September 20, 2014). 
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concentration of the Middle Eastern Armenians in California, by 1982 Los Angeles had grown 
into a unique Armenian universe, where an Armenian “could spend an entire day among 
Armenians as an Armenian” (Tölölyan 1983). Various estimates put the number of Middle 
Eastern Armenians in Los Angeles in the 1980s between 50,000 and 75,000.352 In such a 
community, where there had been no Homenetmen353 chapters, the Middle Eastern Armenians 
founded a local chapter of Homenetmen in 1968, despite the fact that local chapters of Armenian 
Youth Federation organized sports events and annual Olympic games. Similarly, following the 
Lebanese-Armenian model of  “nation-building,” the Middle Eastern activists sought to recreate 
the club-church-school trinity in the United States. If in the decade of 1964 - 1974 only five-six 
daily Armenian schools had been established in various regions of the Untied States, by 1985 
more than a dozen Armenian day schools had opened nationwide, with the overwhelming 
majority in Southern California (Peroomian and Avagyan 2003, 52-5). By the end of the 1980s, 
Western Prelacy354 of the Armenian Church had the largest number of schools in California.  In 
close resemblance to those in Lebanon, many of the school buildings were next to the Prelacy 
churches. Alongside schools and churches, the Middle Eastern Armenians also established party 
“clubs,” even though, as they realized, such “clubs” could not perform the same scope of social 
functions as they had in Lebanon and served basically as community centers for occasional 
gatherings, events and leisure.  
 
                                                
352 Reflecting on his impressions in Los Angeles in Haratch (May 6, 1983), Khachig Tölölyan put the number of 
Middle Eastern Armenians between 50,000 to 75,000. Based on the US census of 1980, Sabagh, Bozorgmehr and 
Der-Martorisian (1990, 4) suggest that the number of foreign-born Armenians in LA was 52,400. 
353 Hay marmnakrt‘akan ěndhanur miut‘iwn (Armenian General Athletic Union). 
354 The Western Prelacy of the Armenian Church was established in 1973 under the direct jurisdiction of the 
Catholicosate of Cilicia. The rise of the number of Armenians in California determined the need for establishing a 
separate Prelacy (“Prelacy History” http://westernprelacy.org/prelacy-history/. Accessed October 4, 2014. 
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Armenians affiliated with the Hnchakyan, Ramkavar, and AGBU circles and arriving from the 
Middle East were also active in establishing community structures. Regardless of which faction 
founded Armenian schools, the fact that establishing Armenian schools was possible in the 
United States inspired many.355 During his visit to Lebanon in 1963 Alex Manoogian, the 
president of the AGBU, acknowledged that for the preservation of Armenian identity the 
“American-Armenians needed the help of the Middle East” (cf. Melk‘onyan 2005, 474). In 1967 
in his address at the AGBU Annual General Assembly in New York he stressed that the 
organization was going to embark on establishing Armenian day schools in the Untied States 
(Armenian Reporter, December 2, 1967). Through the involvement of the Middle Eastern 
Armenians, in 1969 the AGBU founded an Armenian day school in Southfield, Michigan. In 
1976 the AGBU also established Manoogian-Demirdjian school in Canoga Park, Los Angeles. 
The Ramkavars, along with reviving Nor Or, their newspaper, organized several chapters of the 
Tekeyan Cultural Association across the United States, started the Armenakan youth movement 
in 1974 in California and established the Arshag Dickranian Armenian day school also in 
California in 1981 (Dallak‘yan 2007, 395-99). The arrival of the Middle Eastern Armenians 
revived the Hnchakyan chapters in California as well. By the end of the 1970s the Hnchakyans 
arriving from the Middle East organized not only the party chapters, but also the youth 
organization Gaydz, began issuing Massis, the organ of the Hnchakyan Western region from 
1981, and established a branch of the Nor Serount Cultural Association in America.356 
 
                                                
355 On December 2, 1967 the Armenian Reporter wrote: “The examples set by the two Armenian day schools 
founded three years ago in the Los Angeles area - the Holy Martyrs Armenian School and the Ferrahian School [sic] 
- will enhance the efforts of those who will work toward that end, as it has become obvious - and proven - that 
Armenian day schools can succeed in this country.” Holy Martyrs and the Ferrahian were the same school. The 
other was the Mesrobian School in Montebello. 
356 Interview with Hampig Sarafian. March 4, 2014; interview with Harut Der Tavitian. February 26, 2014; 
interview with Sevak Khachatourian. March 2, 2014. 
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Compared to the United States, the process of Armenian immigration to France from the Middle 
East had been more spontaneous in the 1960s and accelerated only from the second half of the 
1970s. First of all, there was no ANCHA counterpart in France to facilitate the immigration and 
establishment of Armenians in France from the Middle East and elsewhere in the 1950s and 
1960s. Secondly, if the continuation of Armenian language periodicals in the United States had 
been dependent on the “fresh blood” from the Middle East, in France, the Mekhitarist Armenian 
Mouradian college prepared a generation of French-born Armenians, fluent in Armenian, who 
assumed leading positions in the community and occasionally contributed to Haratch and other 
Armenian language publications. If in the United States the Dashnaks arriving from the Middle 
East challenged the American-born Armenians for not speaking Armenian, in France some of 
their French-born party comrades and strong sympathizers were quite fluent and quite as 
passionate about the Armenian language and culture.357 The changes in French society following 
the events of 1968 prompted some of these young and enthusiastic individuals to take advantage 
of the droit á la difference and establish Armenian cultural centers. Having been integrated into 
French society and politics, these French-Armenian activists even managed to get the support of 
local municipalities in establishing and running ethnic cultural centers. In the 1970s several 
Maisons de la culture arménienne emerged in many regions of France, in places where 
Armenians and especially the Dashnak sympathizers constituted significant numbers. In the mid-
1970s, when disagreements over the “special affairs”358 marginalized many of the French-
Armenian Dashnaks, several Maisons de la culture distanced themselves from the 
Dashnaktsutyun. In places where Maisons de la culture arménienne remained affiliated with the 
party, the Middle Eastern Armenians became heavily involved in their activities. In places where 
                                                
357 Kegham Kevonian and Garo Hovsepian were quite prominent from among the graduates of the Mouradian 
College within the Dashnak circles. 
358 The Dashnaktsutyun referred to the terrorist acts of the Justice Commandoes as “special affairs.” 
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they were dissociated from the party, as in Marseille, the Middle Eastern Dashnaks created their 
own akumbs (clubs), usually in densely populated Armenian neighborhoods, in the proximity of 
an Armenian church.359 In parallel, the Middle Eastern Armenians actively got involved in 
school building efforts, as well as establishing Armenian kindergartens in their neighborhoods of 
concentration.360  
 
The growing number of Armenian language newspapers and periodicals, Armenian kindergarten 
and schools both in France and the United States increased the need for school principals, 
teachers, editors, artists fluent in (Western) Armenian, and therefore the need for more 
professionally trained Armenians. These were mostly available in the Middle East. Since the 
1970s the Chemaran and the Prelacy schools in Lebanon began supplying community leaders, 
editors and teachers for the Dashnak-affiliated organizations in the West. In 1974 the 
Hamazkayin started a special teachers’ preparation program for the diasporan Armenian schools 
in Chemaran.361 The Melkonian Educational Institute in Cyprus362 and schools affiliated with the 
Ramkavar, AGBU and Hnchakyan circles in the Middle East also became instrumental in 
                                                
359 In Marseille Garo Hovsepian was instrumental in the establishment of the Maison arménienne de la jeunesse et 
de la culture de Marseille in 1976. The internal disagreements gradually marginalized his faction, and the Maison 
separated from the party by the end of the 1970s. Even though it continued serving the Dashnak affiliated Croix 
Bleue, Nor Seround, Scouts and the Athletic club for various occasions and events, the Maison did not come under 
the control of the Middle Eastern faction. The Middle Eastern Dashnaks and sympathizers, who began concentrating 
in Beaumont quarter, eventually established the Hraïr Maroukhian Agoump (Akumb [club]) near the Armenian 
Church in Beaumont (Interview with Dikran Terterian. September 20, 2012. Interview with Garo Hovsepian. 
September 18, 2012). 
360 The school movement in France was not as prominent as in the United States. Between 1975 and 1980, only two 
Armenian daily kindergartens were founded in Alfortville (1978) and Marseille (1980). St. Mesrob in Alfortville 
became a pre-school in 1992. The other kindergarten in Marseille grew into a full lycée in 1994 with the support of 
the Hamazkayin Educational and Cultural Society. By the end of the 1980s, only 5 daily Armenian kindergartens 
and schools operated in France: the Mekhitarist Mouradian School in Sèvres, Tebrotzassère in Le Raincy, St. 
Mesrob in Alfortville, Hamazkayin in Marseille and Markarian-Papazian established in 1988 in Lyon (Mouradian 
and Ter-Minassian 2003, 635-37). 
361 “Hayagitakan bardzraguyn himnark” [Higher Institute for Armenian Studies]. Haratch. October 6, 1974. 
362 The Melkonian Educational Institute was a co-educational boarding school, established by the Melkonian 




meeting the same for their respective organizations. The Lebanese Armenian community thus 
produced editors, journalists, teachers, artists, and community leaders, who began assuming 
leading positions within political parties, the AGBU, Armenian churches, newspapers and 
periodicals, all-day and one day schools in France, the United States and elsewhere. By 1975 
Lebanon was referred to as the cultural center of the Armenian diaspora, and Beirut as the capital 
of the Armenian diaspora (cf. Takooshian 1987, 136). However, the dispersion of the Lebanese 
Armenians and their assumption of leading positions in their new communities created some 
tensions both with the established Armenian community in France and the United States and 
with Armenians arriving from elsewhere. 
 
 
The Clash of Identities in the United States and France  
 
The influx of the Lebanese Armenians to France and the United States not only supplied “new 
blood” to what the newcomers perceived as the assimilated Armenian communities in the West, 
but they also brought a whole set of values, mentality, perceptions and perspectives of 
Armenianness. In the United States the influx of the Middle Eastern Armenians initiated what 
Zadoian (2012, 103) calls “culture wars” between “Armenian-Americans and Armenians from 
the Middle East.” The clash of identities was more pronounced in the United States, where 
Armenian churches had been important community centers and generations of American-born 
Armenians remained actively connected to and involved in church affairs. Especially in the 
Prelacy affiliated churches, where the Middle Eastern newcomers and the American-born 
Armenians would often meet, the Middle Eastern Armenians looked down on American-born 
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Armenians, who could not speak their ancestral language and to them, did not have an Armenian 
identity. For the newcomers regular church attendance or regular activity within organizations 
without speaking the language could not make someone enough Armenian. As Schahgaldian 
observed in 1979, the Lebanese Armenians boasted of their community as the “most Armenian” 
of all diaspora communities. “The community was often called “the second Armenia,” and its 
schools, clubs, and publications were often said to be the most noteworthy achievements of the 
Armenian people in the entire diaspora” (Schahgaldian 1979, 255-56). The newcomers, 
originating from this milieu, blamed the Armenians-Americans for not speaking Armenian and 
for forfeiting the Armenian culture. As an Armenian from Lebanon put it: 
We were the cream of the crop over there. The Arabs looked upon the Armenians that way. The Armenians 
were the skillful people, the clever people, and the educated people. We didn’t care about the Arabic 
language. We went to our own private Armenian schools and we started with Armenian language, 
Armenian history, Armenian geography. Everything was Armenian. Many Armenians never even bothered 
to learn Arabic. We conversed with the Arabs in French. This was the educated class of Arabs. So it’s a 
shock for the Armenians to come over here and see our language and culture becoming Americanized 
(quoted in Phillips 1987, 208-209). 
 
Another newcomer was quoted saying: “Most of them don’t know our language, and to me that 
means they can’t call themselves Armenian.”363 Without considering the social-political 
conditions that made the very fact of Armenian schools, Armenian clubs or going-by-without-
learning-Arabic possible in Lebanon, without necessarily realizing that the Lebanese and Syrian 
type of Armenianness was one of the many possible expressions of Armenian identity in the 
diaspora, the Lebanese and Syrian Armenians embarked on ambitious plans of (re)creating 
communities in close resemblance to Lebanon and Syria and imposing their Armenian culture on 
the American-born Armenians and Armenians from elsewhere. Due to their relatively large 
numbers and especially active involvement within organizations, in predominantly Prelacy-
affiliated churches and Armenian schools, the Lebanese-Armenians imposed a new definition of 
                                                
363 “How Others See Us/Armenians in Watertown, Mass.: Pride, Rivalry among the Armenians.” Armenian 
Reporter, May 18, 1978. 
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what it meant to be an Armenian in the diaspora. They offered a new ‘standard’ of Armenian 
identity, with the fluency in (Western) Armenian at its core (Panossian 2006, 305). Referring to 
the same process, Libaridian wrote: “…while no ideal or pure Armenian culture has ever existed 
or can exist, since the 1950s, the Near Eastern, increasingly the Aleppo-Beirut model, has been 
promoted as the ideal, making people from that part of the world a natural elite for the leadership 
of communities worldwide” (Libaridian 1999, 122-23). Reflecting on the tension between the 
Middle Eastern and American Armenians, on May 18, 1978, an Armenian Reporter contributor 
wrote about the Armenian community in Watertown:  
An even greater source of friction in recent years … has been the relationship between US-born Armenian 
Americans and the new immigrants. New comers feel the US-born Armenians have become too 
Americanized. 
 
Most of the newcomers in Watertown joined the St. Stephens church364 and began actively 
marginalizing the American-born Armenians. In response, some Dashnak leaning Armenian-
American youth were even ready to join the Ramkavar leaning St. James church because the 
Middle Eastern kids pushed them out (Phillips 1989, 246). 365  
 
The new ‘standard’ of Armenianness imposed on the American-born Armenians provoked 
different reactions. Many felt great resentment for, even though they did not speak the language, 
they were nevertheless connected with churches, and they had kept their organizations going. 
But, most importantly, as they thought, their parents had done everything to raise them as 
Armenians. As one Armenian-American described: 
…Our mothers and fathers came here penniless and they made do. They even sent their sons and daughters 
to college. They had a very tight family structure and they brought their children up, to the best of their 
                                                
364 St. Stephens church was consecrated in 1957, following the 1956 Catholicosal elections in Lebanon. It joined the 
Dashnak Armenian National Apostolic Church and came under the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Cilicia. 
365 “How Others See Us/Armenians in Watertown, Mass.: Pride, Rivalry among the Armenians.” Armenian 
Reporter, May 18, 1978. 
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abilities, as good Armenians. Yet these new people think that we don’t have an Armenian identity. We may 
not know the language, but we sure know where we come from (quoted in Phillips 1989, 208). 
 
To cope with their frustration and resentment, many American-born Armenians refrained from 
interacting with the newcomers, socially distancing themselves from them. In the time when 
ASALA and the JCAG were actively targeting Turkish officials in Europe and the United States, 
certain stereotyping also determined attitudes towards the newcomers. Many American-born 
Armenians declared the newcomers as “a different group altogether” (Waldstreicher, 1989, 92). 
Some viewed them as “foreigners, possibly chauvinists or political radicals,” who had yet to 
“shed their Old World ways” and who tarnished the Armenian-American image (Takooshian 
1987, 146). Not all American-born Armenians, however, felt resentment and bitterness against 
the newcomers. Some, who were involved within various organizations, welcomed the arrival of 
Middle Eastern Armenians as an important “asset to the prosperous Armenian-American 
community” (ibid., 146). 
 
As a way of addressing and channeling the growing influence of Middle Eastern Armenians, one 
of the participants of the California Regional Assembly of the Armenian Assembly in April 
1978, reportedly circulated a position paper, which partially read: 
The new immigrant comes into a strange land which has unfamiliar political habits. The immigrant speaks 
little or no English, and he is likely to take refuge in an Armenian ghetto, a tiny Armenian universe. How 
can the immigrant best be reached, so that our community can achieve optimal political effectiveness? The 
immigrant needs to become a citizen, to register to vote, and to vote fervently. He needs to know the 
primacy of personal contacts with elected officials, the importance of his attending and contributing during 
a fundraising event for a candidate, and of his encouraging his children to do volunteer campaign work. He 
needs to be exposed to American politics, to see the opportunity which political mobility affords to 
encourage his children into political careers (quoted in Sarkisian 1995, 20). 
 
Rather than emphasizing the role of the Middle Eastern Armenians in retaining Armenian 
identity, the author suggested that the Middle Eastern Armenians should be helped to integrate 
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into the American political system and should be trained on how to be active in politics. He 
further proposed that since the ANC (Dashnak) and the Armenian Rights Movement (Ramkavar) 
had Armenian-speaking staff and ran Armenian-language periodicals, they were “best suited” to 
help the immigrants “acclimatize.” Meanwhile, the paper reserved the task of developing “the 
American-born resource” for the Armenian Assembly, because lobbying in the United States 
needed people who were “fluent in English,” who had gone to a public school, had “been 
exposed to American entertainment media, and developed a large circle of non-Armenian 
friends,” who could “mix easily and feel comfortable at American functions,” and could 
“understand best the American way of thinking” (quoted in Sarkisian 1995, 20-1). The report, 
produced five years after Gourgen Yanikian assassinated two Turkish Embassy officials in 
California, and when ASALA and the JCAG had been targeting Turkish officials elsewhere, 
implicitly seemed to call the ANC and the ARM who had certain influence among the Middle 
Eastern Armenians to channel the newcomers’ energies towards ‘more acceptable’ means of 
political struggle. More explicitly, the report differentiated between the two groupings – the 
American-born Armenians and the Middle-Eastern Armenians, and considered the ANC and 
ARM as best suited to deal with the Middle Eastern Armenians, while the Assembly was 
reportedly well equipped for dealing with the American-born Armenians. 
 
This paper was prepared at a time, when internal tensions among the different wings of the 
Assembly were growing. The Dashnaktsutyun/ANC, headquartered in the East Coast, could not 
accept such a proposal. In response to the report, Leo Sarkisian, an American-born Armenian, a 
former AYF activist and a prominent member of the ANC, published a lengthy criticism of the 
report in Armenian Weekly on December 23, 1978, entitled “To Increase our effectiveness, 
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“American-born” and “Newcomer” Armenians Must Work Together!” Sarkisian emphasized 
certain strengths of the Middle Eastern Armenians which the American-born Armenians lacked, 
pointing to their aggressiveness and boldness to “confront public officials, even the police when 
necessary” (Sarkissian 1995, 22). Regarding the “stereotyping of ANC (and therefore, ARF) as 
an immigrant-oriented organization,” Sarkisian thought it resulted from “a narrow (California) 
focus” and that “the national- and state-level leaders and representatives of ANC represent[ed] “a 
healthy mix of American-born and “newcomers.” Sarkisian acknowledged the existence of many 
immigrants within the ranks of the Dashnaktsutyun, but he also reminded that the party’s Central 
Committee of Eastern United States was predominantly made up of American-born members.    
 
Even though Sarkisian and many others realized the consequences of generalizations and the 
juxtaposition of the American-born and the “newcomers,”366 the very fact that this dichotomy 
became a topic for discussion within the Armenian Assembly, in The Armenian Weekly and other 
English- and Armenian-language periodicals of the time reproduced these generalizations and 
stereotyping. Certainly, not all the Middle Eastern Armenians were actively involved in the 
organizations marginalizing the American-born Armenians, and certainly, not all American-born 
Armenians felt resentment in their encounters with the Middle Eastern Armenians. Yet these 
generalizations and stereotyping were further reinforced, as the Middle Eastern Armenians 
became more visible within Armenian political organizations, the Prelacy churches and schools, 
and became more pro-active in dictating a new ‘standard’ of Armenianness.  
 
After the Dashnak and Ramkavar withdrawal from the Armenian Assembly the differences in the 
Armenian subethnic composition of the organizations became even more pronounced. The 
                                                
366 In the 1970s the term was predominantly used to refer to the Armenians arriving from the Middle East. 
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Armenian Assembly grew into predominantly an American-born Armenian represented 
organization, the Ramkavars into predominantly more Middle Eastern represented party, while 
the Dashnaktsutyun with its affiliate organizations provided a mixed representation. In California 
the Dashnaktsutyun, ANC and other affiliate organizations were increasingly staffed by the 
Middle Eastern Armenians. In Boston and East Coast, the party and the ANC represented, as 
Sarkisian noted, a mix of American and Middle Eastern born Armenians. 
 
The parallel influx of new cohorts of Armenians from Turkey, Iran and Soviet Armenia in the 
1970s and 1980s almost remained marginal in the “culture wars” between the Middle Eastern 
Armenians and American-born Armenians, as neither of these cohorts were aspiring for the 
positions occupied by the American-born Armenians or increasingly by the Middle-Eastern 
Armenians in various Armenian organizations. In contrast to the Middle Eastern Armenians,367 
these cohorts of Armenians, having developed different kinds of Armenianness and having been 
shaped by different dominating cultures and country specific social-political contexts,368 in most 
cases could not relate to Armenian institutions and organizations, as well as to peculiar 
institutional and communal cultures.  
 
Armenians from Turkey came from different regional backgrounds but shared a strong affiliation 
with the church. Even though they preferred to be identified as Polsahays [Istanbul Armenians] 
many among them originated from different provinces in Anatolia. Among the Polsahays, some 
had developed a negative image of the Armenian diaspora in general since the 1965 joint actions 
                                                
367 In these generalized perceptions Armenians from Turkey and Iran were differentiated from those coming from 
the Arab countries. Armenians from Lebanon (Syria and Egypt) were generally labeled as the “Middle Eastern 
Armenians,” while the former were referred to as Iranian- or Istanbul-Armenians respectively. 
368 Anny Bakalian (1993, 231) uses the expression “separate ethnogenesis” to explain the reasons of differences 
between various Armenian subcommunities. 
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against Turkey and they refused to be associated with the diaspora (see chapter 4). Others, 
usually a very small number, who had been sympathetic to the activities of Armenian political 
parties, refrained from being affiliated with them because of the fear that it would be detrimental 
to their families, relatives or friends back in Turkey. For most Armenians arriving from Turkey, 
encountering other Armenian organizations was an entirely new experience. In Istanbul most 
Armenians had never been instructed Armenian history and had not learned of the Armenian 
political parties and organizations. Armenian churches, therefore, were the only institutions to 
which Armenians from Turkey could relate.369 Both in Watertown and in Los Angeles the 
Polsahays (Istanbul Armenians), as this group of Armenians self-referred and was referred to by 
others, became gradually involved and represented within the Ējmiatsin affiliated churches. In 
both places they soon established organizations of Istanbul Armenians aiming to provide a “taste 
of home,” a community center, and various kinds of services to the immigrating compatriots.370  
 
The Iranian Armenians, whose immigration to the West intensified after the Iranian revolution of 
1979, constituted cohorts of Dashnak members and sympathizers, and more neutral or often anti-
Dashnak currents. Upon their arrival, many Iranian Armenians felt comfortable joining the 
Dashnaktsutyun and its affiliate organizations. Most, however, could not easily integrate into 
existing Armenian organizations in the United States. Their fluency in Eastern Armenian, rather 
than Western Armenian, along with differences in customs and traditions made them less 
compatible with the dominating Western-Armenian-speaking Armenians and their culture, and 
                                                
369 Apart from the church, a very small number of Istanbul Armenians later joined the apolitical AGBU, and only a 
few representatives got involved in other Armenian organizations by supporting the ANC, the Armenian Assembly 
or other local initiatives. 
370 The choice of “Istanbul Armenians” was a strategic decision by the founders of the organizations in order to 
avoid the alternative of being referred to as “Turkish Armenians.” (Interview with Kurken Berksanlar. March 8, 
2014; interview with Fr. Arakel Aljalian. May 7, 2014). 
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even less compatible with the American-born Armenians. Even before the massive influx after 
1979, significant numbers of Iranian Armenians who had arrived in the United States primarily 
as students, had established Iranian Armenian clubs. In Los Angeles, New York, Watertown and 
elsewhere Iranian Armenian clubs and societies had existed from the 1950s and 1960s, but they 
became prominent organizations only after the post-1979 influx.371  
 
The Soviet Armenians constituted an entirely different breed, originating from the homeland, 
where they had never felt the need to define their Armenian identities or question their 
Armenianness. The descendants of repatriate families from 1946-49 constituted the bulk among 
the first waves of Soviet Armenian immigrants after 1975. While the repatriate families had 
some idea of the conditions in the diaspora, upon their return most refrained from participating in 
any organizations. From among the non-repatriate families, similar to Armenians from Turkey, 
most Soviet Armenians had not gotten an opportunity to learn about the Armenian political 
parties, the AGBU, or other diasporic organizations. Secondly, even though many of them might 
have had some exposure to Western Armenian through some occasional encounters with the 
repatriated Armenians in Soviet Armenia, the unfamiliar organizations, with their Middle 
Eastern Armenian or Armenian-American culture, made those organizations less relatable for 
Soviet Armenians. Thirdly, the difference in the Eastern and Western Armenian languages and 
their orthographies made the Soviet Armenians less competitive in finding jobs in Armenian 
schools, in Armenian-language periodicals, radio stations and elsewhere. Finally, in contrast to 
Istanbul Armenians, for most Soviet Armenians, the church had not been part of their Soviet 
                                                
371. Interview with Tomik Alexanian, the President of the Armenian Society of Los Angeles (Society of Iranian 
Armenians). March 1,3 2014; interview with Arax Badalian. May 14, 2014. “Iranian Armenians to Honor SHAH.” 
1967. Armenian Reporter, Nov 02, 1. While the Iranian Armenian societies preserved the word “Iranian” in the 
Armenian version of their association, in English both associations in Watertown and Glendale are registered as 
“Armenian Society” of Boston and of Los Angeles respectively. 
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secular upbringing. Consequently, they did not get involved in the Armenian Church affairs in 
the diaspora as dues-paying parishioners. In most cases Soviet Armenians remained uninvolved 
in any diasporic organization. Their growing numbers and occasional delinquent behavior made 
this group also a target of stereotyping by the American-born Armenians (cf. Takooshian 1987, 
146). 
 
The clash of identities was not as pronounced in France, but in general, similar patterns 
manifested among Armenian subethnic groups. Even though Haratch had been sounding alarms 
about assimilation for many decades, except for establishing some weekly Armenian-language 
instruction schools under the aegis of Armenian churches and various organizations, the French-
born second and third generations, who remained mostly uninvolved in Armenian organizations, 
were indifferent or at most slow in responding to such concerns. The school movement of the 
1980s, although not as widespread as in the Untied States, was largely thanks to the efforts of the 
Middle-East-born Armenians. While comparative research will shed more light on immigration 
and settlement patterns of Armenians arriving to France and the United States from the Middle 
East and Soviet Armenia, it seems in France Armenians from the Arab countries were similarly 
active in joining various existing organizations and especially the Dashnak-affiliated ones; the 
Iranian Armenians did not form a visible subethnic community; and the Soviet Armenians with 
some exceptions remained largely uninvolved in the existing structures. Compared to the United 





Turkey-born Armenians began arriving in France in the late 1940s. The “Wealth tax” introduced 
in 1942 and levied on the wealthy citizens in Turkey targeted heavily the non-Muslim minorities, 
including Armenians. At the same time many Armenians were enlisted in the army during 
WWII. They were basically used as soldiers in labor battalions, in road construction and other 
projects.372 Although the tax was abolished in 1944, the unfair treatment of Armenians during the 
war caused a major outflow of Armenians from Istanbul, mostly to France. Another outflow of 
Armenians from Istanbul was caused by the outbreak of violence against Greeks and, to a lesser 
extent, Armenians in Istanbul on September 6-7, 1955.373 Finally, the persecutions of the 
Communist party in Turkey during the Cold War forced many communists, including some 
Turkey-born Armenian members of the party, out of country. From the late 1940s and until the 
early 1960s many Istanbul Armenians thus kept arriving and settling in France. For the 
Communist Armenians France provided more favorable conditions, where the JAF and the 
UCFAF were certainly pro-Communist organizations. Despite sympathizing with the JAF and 
the UCFAF, the Armenophone Communist Istanbul Armenians, however, were not satisfied with 
the French language organ of the JAF, Notre Voix, and founded the Achkhar weekly in Armenian 
in 1960.374  
 
                                                
372 In retrospect, many Polsahays believe had the Nazis succeeded at Stalingrad, the Armenians enlisted in the army 
would have never returned (Interview with Berdj Maslak. October 29, 2012; interview with Kurken Berksanlar. 
March 8, 2014). 
373 On September 6, 1955, the news of an explosion near the Atatürk Museum, Mustafa Kemal’s birthplace in 
Thessaloniki, Greece quickly spread in Istanbul. Although perpetrators were not identified, the incident caused 
large-scale persecutions of Greeks in September 6-7, 1955. Along with the Greek stores some Armenian owned 
stores, buildings and businesses were also significantly damaged. 
374 The founder and first editor of Achkhar was Avedis Alixanian, who was born in Istanbul in 1910. Alixanian was 
a member of the Communist party in Turkey. He arrived to France in the 1950s, escaping anti-Communist 
persecutions. He founded Achkhar on May 7, 1960 and edited it until his death in 1984. Achkhar was very close to 
the JAF and the UCFAF and occasionally published JAF/UCFAF press releases and other news (Interview with 
Berdj Maslak, the Editor of Achkhar. October 29, 2012). 
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Except those involved with the Dashnaktsutyun and its satellite organizations, the French-born 
Armenians, if involved in Armenian matters, had mostly established organizations peculiar to the 
French context. The newcomer Armenians from Arab countries, therefore, who sought to get 
involved in and integrate into more familiar organizational structures in the West, did not pose a 
challenge to this category of French-born Armenians. In contrast to the American-born 
Armenians, the French-born Armenians were less involved with the Armenian Church, and 
consequently, tensions between the newcomers and the French-born Armenians were less acute. 
The influx of the Middle-Eastern-born Armenians to France in the 1970s and 1980s coincided 
with the time when the French-born Armenians were experiencing a certain renaissance after the 
joint actions during the commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the genocide and because 
of the changing French context in the 1970s. The concept of arménité emerged in the 1970s 
among the Francophone third and fourth generations as a way of expressing their difference from 
their French coworkers and classmates. In search of what it meant to be an Armenian, most of 
these youth returned to their source of origin, the genocide and their ancestors (Hovanessian 
1992, 250-52). The decade of Armenian terrorism (1975-85) evoked different modes of 
embracing arménité. Some representatives of the French-born third generation preferred to avoid 
any affiliation with the Armenian community, while continuing their own personal quest for 
family stories and reclaiming their Armenian origins. Others found the expression of arménité in 
becoming more active in politics, more involved in various Armenian organizations, as for the 
first time the French newspapers and periodicals began writing about the Armenians and their 
cause. And finally, for some others the terrorist acts served as a wake-up call to begin their quest 
for arménité (cf. Hovanessian 1992, 255-57). In the process, similar to other minorities in 
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France, the French-born Armenians began increasingly emphasizing the origin of their identities, 
as français d’origine arménienne.  
 
In a comparative perspective, different modes of self-identifications, formed under different 
country conditions, seem to have determined the intensity of tensions between the Middle 
Eastern Armenians and second and third generation Armenians born in France and the United 
States. In the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, for example, the Armenian identity had been 
ascribed to a person at birth.375 Shortly after their settlement in Lebanon, Armenians had been 
defined as Armenians (whether Orthodox, Catholic or Evangelical) and given rights to 
participate in the country’s social-political life as Armenians. At the same time, they had been 
Lebanese, enjoyed full rights not because they assimilated in the dominant Arabic-speaking 
culture, but precisely because they represented separate Armenian confessional communities. 
Increasingly Western Armenian became the common denominator in all Armenian schools, 
regardless of confessional or partisan affiliations. Within these communities Armenians became 
more cohesive like a nation not only thanks to the “elite mobilization efforts,” as Razmik 
Panossian argued in the passage quoted above, but also largely due to the external sociopolitical 
conditions. Second and third generation Armenians born in Lebanon, especially those within the 
Apostolic Armenian community, did not have much choice but to develop primarily an 
Armenian identity.376 As paradoxical as it could sound in the contexts of France or the United 
States, growing up as an Armenian in Lebanon was completely compatible with the Lebanese 
political identity. As Migliorino notes: “…the politico-institutional make-up of the country has 
                                                
375 With varying degrees this seems to be true for the Middle East in general, including Iran and Turkey. 
376 According to Schahgaldian (1979: 52), Catholic Armenian families often did not feel a strong desire of culture-
specific education. They would often send their children to either French or Maronite schools. Elsewhere, 
Schahgaldian suggests that by 1970 no more than 50% of Catholic Armenians in Lebanon could speak Armenian 
(ibid., 230, footnote). 
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somehow objectively contributed to the remarkable resilience of Armenian cultural diversity in 
Lebanon,” allowing Armenians to feel “100% Armenian and 100% Lebanese at the same time” 
(Migliorino 2009, 480). Self-identifying as an Armenian, therefore, was more natural for most 
second and third generation Armenians, than self-identifying as Lebanese. They grew up 
Armenophone and they could in theory spend an entire life within Armenian circles and not feel 
the need to interact with other confessional communities.  
 
In contrast, by the 1960s in France and the United States retaining an Armenian identity needed 
extra efforts and was not encouraged by the social-political conditions. Quite the contrary, 
conditions in both countries provided limited possibilities for developing an exclusively 
Armenian identity.  Unlike Lebanon, being an Armenian in both these countries meant an 
attainment of an identity, a choice rather than ascription by birth. The immediate social 
environment in France or in the Untied States expected that the descendants of the first 
generations would become fully-fledged French or Americans, even when the coercive policies 
of assimilation had mostly waned by the 1960s. Under such conditions both in France and the 
Untied States, the second and third generations grew predominantly Francophone and 
Anglophone. On the other hand, even if some French-born generations remained active within 
various community organizations, most grew disassociated from the Armenian churches, while 
the cultural peculiarities in the United States encouraged many of the American-born to remain 
affiliated with an Armenian church. If there was an Armenian church in the proximity, the 
American-born Armenians would most likely remain connected with that church.377 Through 
church affiliation the American-born Armenians developed a certain shared sense of belonging 
                                                
377 According to Bakalian (1993, 78), about two-thirds of American-born Armenians in New York and New Jersey 
are affiliated with the Armenian Apostolic Church and only about one-fifth “have left ethnic churches to join other 
nonethnic denominations or are not interested in organized religion.” 
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to an Armenian community, to a parish congregation, in a private, yet, at the same time, public 
Armenian space. Affiliation with the church also meant being directly or indirectly signed-up to 
certain political ideologies, especially since the split of 1933. The church and political parties 
were more important in shaping the shared perceptions of what it meant to be Armenian for 
American-born generations (cf. Bakalian 1993, 90). What they had in common at the church and 
at church events was precisely what made them different from other Americans as a collectivity, 
and what constituted the Armenian part of their collective hyphenated identity. The French-born 
Armenians, with rare exceptions, did not have any Armenian public spaces to develop a shared 
sense of belonging, a shared sense of Armenianness. They had been “struggling for escaping the 
stigmatization of their migratory reality” and blending into the French society (cf. Hovanessian 
1992, 301ff). The quest for arménité, emerging in the 1970s, was very much a private experience 
of one’s own dealing with the past, with his or her origins, and therefore, the attendant 
behavioral patterns greatly differed. In the realization of their arménité some joined Armenian 
churches, others became engaged in Armenian organizations, some got involved in politics, 
while others practiced the oriental cuisine, learned Armenian or worked with other Armenians 
(Hovanessian 1992, 260).  
 
The influx of Middle Eastern Armenians created much tension with the American-born 
Armenians precisely because the newcomers became involved in the very same public spaces 
and began imposing new perceptions of Armenianness. It was in churches and within 
organizations that the “culture wars” between the Middle Eastern and American-born Armenians 
were fought. To borrow Anny Bakalian’s (1993, 6) terminology, to the “voluntary, rational and 
situational” “symbolic” identities of the American-born Armenians, the Middle Eastern 
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Armenians contrasted their “ascribed, unconscious, and compulsive” “traditional” identities, 
challenging the American-born Armenians’ shared perception of Armenianness. With the arrival 
of the Middle Eastern Armenians, suddenly, the American-born Armenians were told that 
whatever they had developed had nothing to do with Armenianness, that they were not 
Armenians. In more practical terms, it meant that the American-born Armenians were no longer 
welcomed to the very same Armenian public spaces which they had developed, to the very same 
organizations and institutions which they had established. Such a clash of identities increasingly 
formed two categories: by the end of the 1970s through the 1980s the concept of Armenian-
American came to mean essentially the American-born Armenians and was contrasted to the 
“newcomers,” even though many of the newcomers were soon acquiring US citizenship. In 
France tensions between the Middle Eastern Armenians and the French-born Armenians were 
less acute. Those among the second and third generations, who had been able to develop some 
proficiency in Western Armenian in France and had been active within organizations, did not get 
challenged by the Middle Eastern Armenians within those same organizations, because they 
spoke the same language and felt closer to them.378 Tensions and disagreements between them, 
notably within the Dashnaktsutyun, were over political tactics, rather than identity issues. For the 
majority of French-born second and third generations, who had little or no knowledge of 
Armenian, the perceptions of arménité were predominantly a private, individual or family, past-
oriented experience, detached from any organizational affiliation. In contrast to the crystallizing 
Armenian-American category in the United States, which implied the existence of certain 
communal traits among the American-born Armenians and which was challenged by the 
newcomers, the developing identity d’origine arménienne among the French-born Armenians 
did not imply any communal features delineating an identifiable French-Armenian community. 
                                                
378 Interview with Hasmik Nadirian-Kevonian. October 11, 2012. 
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As a result of private and individual quests for arménité, many returned to the roots, to the 
genocide, the dispersion, and the routes of how they ended up in France. Within the context of 
such a perception of arménité, affiliation with the Armenian political parties or churches were 
not essential, although they certainly provided some outlets for diasporic involvement. Similar 
perceptions of Armenianness also developed among some American-born generations, who had 
not been affiliated with Armenian churches or Armenian organizations.  
 
Despite the attempts of the Middle Eastern Armenians to impose their exclusive ‘standard’ of 
Armenianness on the American and French-born Armenians, the latter had many other ways of 
expressing their Armenianness. This was done through individual involvement in Soviet 
Armenia and Armenians-related matters through original initiatives or by involvement with 
country-specific Armenian organizations in the United States or France, such as the Armenian 
Assembly, the Knights of Vartan, the JAF or the UCFAF, even the Dashnak-created ANC and 
CDCA. The changing social-political conditions in Soviet Armenia after 1965, as well as the 
crystallizing self-reflexive discourses on the homeland and the diaspora, as the following section 






Homeland and Diaspora Reconsidered. The Crystallization of Transnational Political 
Paradigms in the Post-Genocide Armenian Diaspora 
 
 
Several months after the joint commemorations of the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian 
Genocide, on the eve of the anniversary of the Sovietization of Armenia on November 28, 1965, 
Haratch outlined in an editorial: 
The barren dispute on the surrounding conditions of the Sovietization of Armenia and the ways of its 
implementation is still going on between the two adversary fronts abroad. Our [the Dashnak - V.S.] front 
declares...: “The current regime is neither what we wanted, nor what we sought, and [is] not what we 
ordered… It was imposed on us by a stronger neighbor…” Another front, for reasons comprehensible to 
them and, perhaps to us, “corrects” us: “No, you are very wrong… We, the naked [Armenian] people were 
in need of robust and strong-armed defender and we found [it]… And we were saved… Independence is 
both a danger and a luxury for us.” These two viewpoints are as different in nature from one another as 
black and white… 
 
The year 1965 opened a new era in relations among the formerly hostile diasporic factions. The 
joint commemorations almost in every Armenian community had been quite promising, as 
thousands of Armenians of all political persuasions and spectrums, originating from diverse 
confessional, compatriotic, cultural and host-country specific backgrounds, from Soviet Armenia 
to the Middle East and Europe, were ready to shed the Cold War hostilities for the sake of a 
higher goal. Several months later, when the massive April 24 demonstration in Soviet Armenia 
and the impressive marches by large numbers of Armenians in the capitals of many countries did 
not yield any tangible outcome, life returned to its ordinary routine. Remaining loyal to the 
decades-long established traditions, the anti-Dashnak factions were preparing to celebrate 
November 29, the day of the Sovietization of Armenia, while the Dashnak factions continued 
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rejecting it, preferring May 28, the Independence Day of the 1918 Republic of Armenia. The 
“two viewpoints” as Haratch pointed to, continued to prevail.  
 
The difference from the pre-1965 state of affairs was the increasing presence of Soviet Armenia 
in the activities of the diaspora. Unlike the 1920s, when the chapters of HOK had been operating 
in many countries and were directly involved in diaspora matters, the involvement of Soviet 
Armenia from the mid-1950s was rather indirect. From the mid-1960s it became more intense 
mediated by the Yerevan based Diaspora Committee and the Soviet embassies abroad,379 
through the radio program, the weekly Hayrenik‘i dzayn (The Voice of the Homeland), the 
monthly Sovetakan Hayastan (Soviet Armenia), plus through a number of publications, booklets, 
films, photos, newspapers, bands and dance troops occasionally touring in various diaspora 
communities, as well as through other means of cultural exchange. Increasingly, Soviet Armenia 
was becoming a center, claiming to be the homeland of all Armenians. The active 
(re)involvement of Soviet Armenia in the matters of the Armenian diaspora in the 1960s was 
more ambitious than the policies pursued through the HOK chapters in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Increasingly, self-promoting as the homeland, Soviet Armenia began acting as an aid provider 
than receiver, and was “perceived to be the bastion of Armenianness, coming to help its 
culturally ‘poor’ brothers in exile” (Panossian 2006, 371). The ‘patriots’, as the pro-Soviet 
faction had been self-identifying from the late 1940s, could only welcome the involvement of 
Soviet Armenia in the diaspora. The renewed possibilities to visit Soviet Armenia, to study at the 
institutions of higher education in Yerevan and to have some actual contacts with intellectuals, 
                                                
379 In Lebanon, for example, from 1960 to 1991 there was a constant “Soviet diplomat of Armenian ethnicity” at the 
Soviet Embassy, usually with the rank of an attaché. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia obtained 
appointments in a number of foreign Soviet embassies in countries where there were Armenian communities 
(Sanjian 2007, 275). 
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scholars and professionals, artists and musicians visiting from Soviet Armenia strengthened ties 
with the homeland and enhanced the feeling of patriotism. The pro-Soviet JAF and the UCFAF 
in France, Hnchakyans and Ramkavars in Lebanon, as well as their sympathizers largely 
benefitted from the new possibilities, acting as the partners of Yerevan based Diaspora 
Committee in various projects. Meanwhile, from 1963 delegates from Soviet Armenia had been 
having regular, albeit secret, meetings with the Dashnak Bureau members (Sanjian 2007, 277). 
Even though these meetings probably led in the 1970s to some revision in the Dashnak anti-
Soviet policies, rather than becoming pro-Soviet Armenia and celebrating the achievements of 
Soviet Armenia, the party leadership and intellectuals, to all appearances, continued focusing on 
the diaspora.  
 
By the 1980s two transnational paradigms had developed on relations between the homeland and 
the diaspora. The pro-Soviet factions, who comprised different organizations and institutions, 
inspired by the revived relations with Soviet Armenia, generated a more homeland (Soviet 
Armenia)-centered paradigm, whereas the Dashnaktsutyun and its affiliate organizations favored 
a more diaspora-centered paradigm. Both paradigms drew on already shaped approaches to the 
homeland and the diaspora, but crystallized in the period of 1965-1980.  
 
After their exile from Turkey and the Sovietization of Armenia in 1920, the Hnchakyan, 
Ramkavar and Communist Armenian circles in the diaspora, as argued in the previous chapters, 
developed a pro-Soviet Armenia stand. The decades-long struggle against the Dashnaktsutyun's 
often aggressive anti-Soviet orientation produced among these diverse political Armenian 
groupings in various countries a shared common attitude towards Soviet Armenia as the 
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homeland. The Hnchakyans adopted a pro-Soviet and pro-Soviet Armenia attitude quickly after 
the Sovietization of Armenia in 1920. The party unconditionally supported Soviet Armenia 
thereafter. The immediate response of the Ramkavars to the Sovietization of Armenia in the 
1920s was to adopt supportive stand, but with certain reservations, as the party represented an 
ideologically opposite pole both to communism and socialism. Following the World Congress of 
1946, the party actively embarked on organizing the return of diaspora Armenians to homeland.  
So did the other pro-Soviet organizations. For the ‘patriots’ as the Ramkavar-Hnchak-
Communist factions began self-referring in the 1940s and 1950s, relations with Soviet Armenia 
were essential, albeit not always possible due to political ups and downs in the Soviet Union. The 
1960s gave a new impetus to the relations of the pro-Soviet factions with Soviet Armenia, as 
conditions in Soviet Armenia became progressively conducive to reestablishing and maintaining 
relations with various segments of Soviet Armenian society. Editorials in Ararad and Zartonk in 
Lebanon, letters addressed to the Diaspora Committee in Soviet Armenia kept on praising Soviet 
Armenia and confirming it to be the homeland of Armenians in the diaspora as well. One of such 
editorials in Ararad wrote in 1966:  
Armenia is the hope and belief of every Armenian. Diaspora Armenians [sp‘iwṙk‘ahayut‘yuně] embrace 
her as the meaning and the substance of their existence. The revived Armenia is the national pride of 
Armenians, the element that lends meaning to its presence and substantiates its future (quoted in 
Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 371). 
 
In a letter addressed to the Diaspora Committee, Bebo Simonian (Pepo Simonian), the Principal 
of the Hnchakyan-controlled Rupinian school in Beirut and the chairman of the Hnchakyan Nor 
Serount Cultural Association wrote in appreciation: “I find “Hayrenik‘i dzayn” extremely useful. 
The government of our homeland has done a tremendous job by initiating the publication of this 
weekly, which plays a great role in rallying diasporan Armenians around the homeland” (quoted 




From among the Ramkavars, Kersam Aharonian, the editor of Zartonk from 1948, also 
constructed the image of Soviet Armenia as the “Mother Homeland” through a series of 
editorials published in April-August 1964. Reflecting on the importance of the creation of the 
Ramkavar party in 1921, Aharonian wrote: 
It was necessary to keep firm the love towards the Homeland among the Armenian remnants, who survived 
the shipwreck; it was necessary to organize them and to keep them away from the abyss of hopelessness 
and assimilation as much as possible; it was necessary to advance and enhance spiritual unity and 
brotherhood between the Mother Homeland and the children of Armenian people in the Armenian diaspora, 
despite the unfavorable political conditions; it was necessary to keep alive the interests towards the sacred 
national cause and it was necessary to adopt a new orientation (Aharonian [1964] 1986, 177). 
 
Stressing the importance of homeland-diaspora relations, Aharonian devoted several editorials to 
the history, industrial and cultural advancement of the “Mother Homeland” in the 1920s and 
1930s; to WWII and the participation of Soviet Armenians in the war; to the conditions in the 
homeland following the war; and finally to the joint efforts of the homeland and the diaspora in 
pursuit of the Armenian Cause in the 1940s (ibid., 180-201). Overall, critical of the Soviet 
regime for the misfortunes of Armenians during the Stalinist repressions and for the abandoning 
of the Armenian Cause, Aharonian, nevertheless, created a positive image of Soviet Armenia as 
the “national home.” “Our people are fortunate to have their national home [azgayin ojakh] at the 
slopes of the Mount Ararat,” wrote Aharonian, adding that the job was incomplete: “Only one-
tenth of the homeland, 30,000 square kilometers are in their hands. The remaining nine-tenth is 
subjected to foreign domination. The big seizer, Turkey, has usurped more than seven-tenths of 
[Armenian] lands. And out of four and a half million population, only two million [Armenians] 
live in their national home; more than half of them are migrants, refugees, subjected to 
assimilation, subjected to dreadful threat of ‘the white massacre’ ” (ibid., 203). Soviet Armenia 
was portrayed as the “Mother Homeland,” yet the homeland did not end there. In Aharonian’s 
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discourse and for the Ramkavars, the Mother Homeland was both Soviet Armenia and the rest of 
Armenian lands. Therefore, he defined the liberation of the territories occupied by Turkey and 
the annexation of those lands to Soviet Armenia as the essence of the Armenian Cause (ibid., 
204).   
 
The discourse Aharonian created in the pages of Zartonk was quite authoritative, as his editorials 
were published in a single volume the same year in Beirut and became widely circulated and 
used as teaching material in Armenian history classes in two AGBU high schools in Lebanon. 
Besides occupying important positions within the Ramkavar party and the AGBU, Aharonian 
was also a teacher of history at Tarouhi Hagopian and Hovagimian-Manoogian AGBU high 
schools in Lebanon and used his own notes and essays for instruction (cf. Aharonian 2006, 201-
203). His book, entitled Mets erazi champ‘un vra (aknark haykakan harts‘i patmut‘yan vra), [On 
the Road to the Big Dream (A Review on the History of the Armenian Question)], acquired so 
much popularity, that in the following decades it was reprinted a second and a third time, last 
time in Los Angeles in 1986. The failure to achieve the demanded compensations in 1965 did not 
change the Ramkavar attitude towards Soviet Armenia. Subsequent World Congresses in 1969, 
1972, 1977 and 1982 reconfirmed the party's position towards the homeland. Soviet Armenia 
was perceived as the guarantor of the “national physical existence of the Armenian people” 
(quoted in Dallak‘yan 2007, 267; cf. 291; 391). The preservation of Armenian identity in the 
diaspora (hayapahpanum), which the Ramkavar and AGBU circles emphasized as the most 
pressing matter in the 1960s and 1970s, could be attained only by intense relations with Soviet 
Armenia. “Without the spiritual and intellectual relations with the homeland,” wrote the AGBU 
monthly Khosnag in 1970, “our efforts for the preservation of the Armenian nation 
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(azgapahpanum) will turn into worthless endeavor. The homeland with all its resources - radio, 
periodical press, books, cultural relations, mutual visits - fully contributes to our struggle for 
“being” (quoted in Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 373). 
 
 
In France, where the Hnchakyans and the Ramkavars had no visible presence after WWII, the 
pro-Soviet Armenian periodical press, as well as the activities of the JAF and the UCFAF380 
produced similar discourses on Soviet Armenia-diaspora relations. The “patriotic” organizations, 
as they quite often identified themselves, became more visible and active in the 1960s. Since its 
founding in 1960, the bi-weekly Achkhar, emphasized the relations with the homeland, (Soviet) 
Armenia, in a number of editorials and articles. JAF leaders also found the relations with Soviet 
Armenia important in the efforts of the diaspora to resist assimilation. “Diaspora Armenians,” 
they wrote on the occasion of the creation of the Diaspora Committee, “with their modest 
resources have been struggling and will struggle against that danger [assimilation - V.S.]. But 
[they] have always had the conviction that it is the mother homeland who can stop the alarming 
danger of assimilation with her charms and practical means, until the fortunate day, when she 
will be able to accept her vagrant children into her bosom” (quoted in Melik‘set‘yan 1985, 371-
72). In the 1960s, the members of the JAF and the UCFAF began regularly visiting Soviet 
Armenia and hosting visitors, guests, dance groups, choir collectives and musical bands from 
Soviet Armenia. The celebrations of November 29 became more pronounced by the regular 
presence of guests and artistic groups from Soviet Armenia. The confidence of the JAF and the 
UCFAF was growing in parallel to the improving relations with Soviet Armenia. On the fiftieth 
anniversary celebrations of the Sovietization of Armenia in November 1970, organized by the 
                                                
380 According to Ch‘ormisian (1975, 216), the UCFAF was not able to regroup the “patriotic” mass of the 
community and the pro-Soviet faction had scattered after the dissolution of the Front National Arménien. 
 
 426 
UCFAF, the Soviet Ambassador in Paris paid a visit to Marseille. On this occasion, for the first 
time, the residents of Marseille saw the red-blue-red flag of Soviet Armenia with the hummer 
and sickle in the upper left corner, erected on the stairs of the municipality building381 (cf. 
Boghossian 2005, 307). 
  
In this euphoric context, and in the course of a decade in the 1970s, Lewon Ch‘ormisian 
published a multi-volume history of the past century of the “Western Armenians,” the fourth 
volume of which was devoted to the history of “French-Armenians.” Ch‘ormisian was a former 
member of the Dashnak party until his ouster from the party in late 1930s. He travelled to Soviet 
Armenia in 1945 as one of the delegates to the elections of the Catholicos, and until 1959 was a 
UCFAF member (Ch‘ormisian 1975, 100; 199; 211; 225). After parting with the UCFAF, 
Ch‘ormisian remained non-partisan, but loyal to the “patriotic” faction, as he often referred to the 
pro-Soviet faction in his works. Even though he lived most of his life in France, his books were 
published in Beirut. Critical towards all Armenian political parties, Ch‘ormisian’s major target 
nonetheless remained the Dashnaktsutyun. In his earlier work on the Armenian political parties 
published in 1965, Ch‘ormisian believed that “the political parties stopped having a national 
consciousness” and had created instead a “national partisan spirit” (azgayin kusakts‘akan ogi) 
which did not coincide with the “Armenian national consciousness” (Ch‘ormisian [1965] 1995, 
217). This was an implicit criticism of the Dashnaktsutyun, many representatives of which had 
believed and, in the case of Sarkis Atamian (1955, 272), had even expressly argued, “the 
Dashnaktsutyun is the Armenian national consciousness.”382 For Ch‘ormisian, Soviet Armenia 
                                                
381 Stephan Boghossian was an eyewitness to the events, a long time member of the JAF and the UCFAF. In 1970, 
he was the secretary of the Marseille Regional Board of the UCFAF, one of the organizers of the fiftieth anniversary 
celebration events (Boghossian 2005, 306) 
382 See chapter 4. 
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represented the homeland and the only legitimate agency to claim Armenian historical lands and 
to produce unity in Armenian language and history (Ch‘ormisian [1965] 1995, 250-51). He was 
more accepting of the Ramkavars and Hnchakyans, because for them the “homeland was of more 
importance, than party affiliations” (ibid., 289). “The homeland,” elaborated Ch‘ormisian in his 
next book, “is not only the reality that provides bread, but also the basis and pedestal of the 
national existence. The preservation of the nation without the homeland is inconceivable” 
(Ch‘ormisian 1975, 122). Similar to Kersam Aharonian earlier, Ch‘ormisian also believed that 
the preservation of Armenian identity in the diaspora was very much dependent on the 
homeland. Reflecting on Dashnak policies towards the homeland in the 1920s, Ch‘ormisian 
(1975, 123) wrote in retrospection:  
The intention to govern Armenia from outside is meaningless and ridiculous, indeed. Was it possible to run 
the Homeland [affairs] from Paris, New York, Cairo, Beirut? If not, what was the meaning of the national 
policy pursued by Armenians abroad? One of its two irreconcilable reflections - the opposition, the struggle 
against the Homeland government - could have no justification either practically or ideologically.  
 
Although Ch‘ormisian was overall critical of the Communists and the UCFAF as well, he 
admitted that the UCFAF enjoyed the “sympathy and support of the Association for the Cultural 
Ties with the Diaspora” (ibid., 225-6). 
 
Increasingly reassured by the improving Soviet Armenia-diaspora relations, the pro-Soviets, 
gathered around Achkhar, the JAF and the UCFAF, actively constructed their discourse against 
the Dashnaktsutyun. Often exaggerating and idealizing positive things in Soviet Armenia, similar 
to Ch‘ormisian, they spent much effort on emphasizing the centrality of Soviet Armenia as the 
“homeland of all Armenians” (Amenayn hayots‘ hayrenik‘383), juxtaposing it to the Dashnak 
                                                
383 Avedis Alixanian ended one of his editorials in Achkhar by declaring Soviet Armenia the “Homeland of All 
Armenians” (Achkhar. October 1, 1966). 
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“anti-homeland” policies. Despite the temporary unity around the commemorations of the 
genocide, anti-Dashnak criticism prevailed in the pages of Achkhar in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Closer to the sixtieth anniversary of the Genocide commemoration in 1975, Achkhar and the JAF 
condemned the Dashnaktsutyun for using the occasion to strengthen their influence over 
Armenian communities. Several weeks after the joint commemorations of the sixtieth 
anniversary, on June 6, 1975, the Dashnak CDCA gathered a large crowd of Armenians in one of 
the convention centers in Paris to discuss the future steps in the pursuit of the Armenian Cause. 
An article in Achkhar published on October 28, 1975, rebuked the Dashnaktsutyun and the 
CDCA for not mentioning a word about the thousands of peoples in the homeland (Soviet 
Armenia), who participated in the commemorations at the Genocide Monument in Yerevan. A 
JAF press release, issued on March 17, 1976 condemned the CDCA for attempting to take the 
lead and organize separate demonstrations. The statement called the Dashnaks and the CDCA to 
remain faithful to the “Call of Ējmiatsin, which had allowed from the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Massacres” to reassemble the entire Armenian community (Achkhar, March 27, 1976).  
 
Discourses produced by Hnchakyan, Ramkavar and other pro-Soviet circles, often independently 
from each other in the Middle East, France, the United States and elsewhere, produced a 
transnational homeland-centered paradigm, which emphasized the priority of the homeland 
(Soviet Armenia) over the diaspora, and envisioned the role of Soviet Armenia as instrumental in 
the continuation of the diaspora. Soviet Armenia was “abstracted and idealized,” to borrow 
Libaridian's (1999, 124) description, yet at the same time it remained actual and tangible through 




The Dashnaktsutyun and the Dashnak affiliated circles, however, had developed a different 
perception of the homeland and of its role in the diaspora since. The controversy around 
Hovhannes K‘ajaznuni's pamphlet within the party, resolved in favor of the anti-Soviet stand of 
Vrats‘ian and others at the party’s Tenth World Congress in 1924-1925, determined the 
Dashnaktsutyun’s orientation towards the affairs in the diaspora (see chapter 3). By the mid-
1950s, such an orientation produced a widely shared conviction among the party members and 
sympathizers that the party had symbolized “the Armenian national consciousness” and that they 
represented the “true Armenians” in the diaspora. Soviet Armenia had no place in this discourse, 
except as a small part of the greater homeland, which needed to be liberated on the road to the 
creation of the “Free, Independent and United Armenia.” Even if the anti-Soviet rhetoric of the 
leaders had significantly softened by the mid-1970s, the leadership was not going to, and, even if 
they wanted, they would hardly be able to uproot certain values firmly embedded in Dashnak 
identities and in the party’s organizational culture. In other words, if the Dashnak leaders 
eventually were able to redirect the party's energy from the anti-Soviet to the anti-Turkish 
struggle by toning down the anti-Soviet and intensifying the anti-Turkish rhetoric, certain 
symbols that had constituted the core of the Dashnak identity could not be challenged or 
changed. For many decades Dashnak identity had been constructed through an absolute loyalty 
to the goal of a “Free, Independent and United” Armenia and to the symbolism of the Republic 
of Armenia - the tricolor flag, the national anthem and emblem, and the celebration of May 28. 
As inalienable parts of Dashnak identity, these value-symbols were fundamentally incompatible 
with November 29 or the symbolism of Soviet Armenia. The adoption of a more pro-Soviet 
orientation, therefore, in the case of the Dashnaktsutyun could not extend beyond certain limits. 
The institutionalized organizational culture predetermined that a more diaspora-, rather than 
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Soviet Armenia-oriented paradigm had been forged and favored by active and former members 
of the Dashnaktsutyun, and by periodicals directly or indirectly representing the Dashnak 
perspectives.   
 
By the 1970s, the Hairenik Monthly and The Armenian Review in Boston had mostly lost their 
leading role in outlining and shaping the Dashnak discourse and policies transnationally. The 
Hairenik Monthly became more like a literary journal in the 1960s, and due to the declining 
numbers of the Armenophone readership and subscribers in the US, it was turned into a quarterly 
in 1968 and altogether ceased publication in 1970.384 The Armenian Review became a more 
scholarly journal in the 1970s addressing various aspects of Armenian culture, history, language, 
religion and the Armenian Cause.385 With the decline of Hairenik Monthly and, then, Quarterly, 
the other Dashnak affiliated papers from the United States to the Middle East began to provide 
scattered alternative spaces for the production of the Dashnak discourse. The advancements of 
the age and improved communication systems made this discourse transnational. Articles from 
the Beirut-based Aztag daily appeared more frequently in Boston's Hairenik Weekly and vice 
                                                
384 In his last editorial published in the second issue of the Hairenik Quarterly in 1968 Reuben Darbinian had mostly 
retreated from his former beliefs and even praised the achievements in Soviet Armenia. Despite being “not free and 
not independent,” Darbinian thought Soviet Armenia still carried the legacy of the Republic of Armenia. “Every 
Armenian can admit today with satisfaction,” concluded Darbinian, “that contrary to the cruel Bolshevik regime, but 
due to the relatively peaceful conditions created by them, and particularly due to the well-known constructive spirit 
and work capacity (ashkhatunakut‘yun) of the Armenian people, Soviet Armenia had strengthened so much 
economically and militarily during the past 50 years, that she is already able to take the fate of the freedom-desiring 
(azatatench‘) Armenian people into her hands, if only the mighty Russia for any reason leaves our mother homeland 
to [determine] her own fate” (Darbinian 1968, 3). The events happening in Soviet Armenia in the 1960s certainly 
impressed Darbinian and for a while many other Dashnaks, but the former Republican official in an advanced age 
and much deteriorated health could no longer shape a new discourse. Darbinian passed away on June 6, 1968, and 
shortly after his death the Hairenik Quarterly also came to an end. 
385 The journal became fully scholarly in 1982, when Gerard Libaridian assumed the editorship (author’s personal 
correspondence with Gerard Libaridian, February 5, 2015). 
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versa. Haratch386 in France, also occasionally copied editorials and articles from both Aztag and 
Hairenik.  
 
In the 1970s, many editorials and analytical articles began appearing in Haratch focusing 
predominantly on the problems of the diaspora. The coverage of Soviet Armenian issues did not 
go beyond occasional news of apolitical nature under the rubric “Yerevan-Paris Teletype.” In 
analytical pieces and editorials, Soviet Armenia, if figured, was usually presented in critical 
light. Hrant Samuel(ian)’s editorial-report on conditions in the homeland and the diaspora in 
1973, published on January 8, 1974, stood for this kind of approach, where Soviet Armenia was 
criticized and the diaspora given a more important role. While referring to Soviet Armenia as the 
homeland, he criticized the Diaspora Committee because of its discriminatory approach towards 
Armenian organizations in the diaspora (Haratch, January 8, 1974). If the pro-Soviet 
organizations benefited greatly, the Dashnaktsutyun was usually left out of any assistance. For 
Samuelian, therefore, in the course of 1973, the Diaspora Committee had widened the gap 
between the two factions in the diaspora. If this was the case, that is, if the homeland was 
reluctant to provide the Dashnaktsutyun with support, as it did with others, what would the party 
do now? As the former president of the Delegation of the Republic of Armenia, Samuelian 
believed that Soviet Armenia had no capacity to pursue the Armenian Cause, and the matter was 
left on the shoulders of Diaspora Armenians. The devoted Dashnak believed that his party had a 
particular role in the pursuit of the Armenian Cause, as it had been the “native reflector of the 
Armenian political and national demands.” “The leaders of the homeland (hayrenik‘i 
varich‘nerě)” declared Samuelian, “do not have the right to be interested in the Armenian Cause. 
                                                
386 After the expulsion of its editor, Arpig Missakian, from the Dashnaktsutyun, Haratch became more independent, 
but continued to represent the Dashnak perspective with most of its contributors being active or former members or 
sympathizers of the party (Author’s personal correspondence with Gerard Libaridian, February 5, 2015). 
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Armenia is not independent and is obliged to follow Moscow’s policy in all spheres, and that 
policy is in total contradiction to the essential interests of the Armenian people” (ibid.). While 
referring to Soviet Armenia as the homeland, Samuelian refused to recognize the legitimacy of 
its “administrators,” as the homeland was not independent. Consequently, there could be no 
horizontal political relations between the homeland and the diaspora. Instead of focusing on the 
prospect of homeland-diaspora relations, Samuelian suggested to focus on the diaspora (and 
particularly the Dashnaktsutyun), as the diaspora (and particularly the Dashnaktsutyun) remained 
the only legitimate pursuer of the Armenian Cause. 
 
Along much similar lines, on February 12, 1974, Haratch reprinted an editorial from Hairenik 
(Boston). “Diaspora is a Strength and Value,” as the piece was entitled, drew on Krikor Zorhab’s 
late 19th century article on “Russian Armenian Literature,” in which Zorhab argued: “The 
chauvinists of the Caucasus  [Russian Armenians - V.S.] kept forgetting that Polis 
[Constantinople - V.S.] was the center of the cultivation of Armenian thought; and with sharp 
and bold views on every subject, they looked down on us with contemptuous disrespect.” The 
author of the article suggested replacing the words “Caucasus” and “Polis” with “Homeland” and 
“Diaspora” to argue that the rest of Zohrab’s worlds were quite relevant in the 1970s. The only 
thing that the Diaspora lacked was organization. The author concluded: 
The Armenians abroad (haykakan artasahmaně) are in need of organization, extra travail and means of 
self-protection. Nobody should neglect our weaknesses or be content with what we have. But to bend or 
retreat thinking that [the current situation] is an impossible struggle, is a desertion, if not suicide. 
Diaspora is strength; Diaspora is value. Let’s not allow that the well-known concerns turn into the 
inferiority complex among the exiled masses (Haratch. February 2, 1974). 
 
The focus on the diaspora rather than on the homeland was in perfect harmony with the 
abandonment of the anti-Soviet orientation of the Dashnaktsutyun. The Dashnak retreat from the 
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anti-Soviet propaganda yielded a more neutral, but not necessarily a positive orientation towards 
Soviet Armenia. If the anti-Soviet rhetoric was significantly toned down, the party organs, as 
well as affiliate newspapers, remained critical of Soviet Armenia and began emphasizing the 
organization of the diaspora as a way to balance the growing influence of Soviet Armenia in the 
diaspora. In an article published in Haratch on July 25, 1974, A. Surdukian suggested organizing 
the diaspora by creating pan-diasporic political, economic and educational councils. The author 
believed that better organization and the coordination of diaspora activities could potentially 
yield more tangible results for the Armenian people.387 Diaspora Armenians, “who did not have a 
state and a flag,” Surdukian thought, had “equal rights to be part of the universe as had the Great 
Duchy of Luxembourg (area 2,586 sq. km, population 393,484)” (ibid.). Contrasting the diaspora 
to a nation-state, such as Luxembourg, and implicitly to Soviet Armenia, in the author’s 
imagination, the diaspora simply and merely lacked a better organization to be able to earn its 
place in the “universe” of nation-states.  
 
The focus on the diaspora and the emphasis on its organization were reflected in many articles 
published in Haratch during 1974-1975. These addressed various problems the Armenians faced 
in the diaspora: the decline of the Armenian language, the prevalence of mixed marriages; 
assimilation; and the need for better Armenian schools and instruction. The fight against 
                                                
387 Some of the ideas expressed in this article, particularly regarding the necessity of pan-diasporic councils, were 
similar to ideas expressed in Eritasard Hay (Young Armenian) weekly in Beirut earlier. Eritasard Hay was founded 
by some young individuals in 1969 to provide an alternative venue to the established partisan periodical presses. The 
founders were inspired of the Palestinian movement after 1965 and the events of 1968 in France. Representing 
different political and confessional backgrounds, but united around the belief that alternative approaches were 
needed in the diaspora against the prevailing views of the older generations, the founders of Yeridassart Hai 
especially stressed the importance of unity in the diaspora (cf. Terzian 1981, 72, 88). In one of the articles published 
in 1969, one of the contributors expressed a belief that there was a need to create “an Economic Center of the 
Diaspora, an Educational Center of the Diaspora, a Journalistic Center of the Diaspora.” Based on these three, the 
author proposed to create a Political National body, which would oversee the activities of those centers. The author 
thought this could be realized through the joint efforts of the Armenian political parties (Terzian 1981, 75). 
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assimilation and the pursuit of the Armenian Cause were of utmost importance requiring a better-
organized diaspora. This was highlighted by Papgen Papazian (Babken P‘ap‘azian) in a July 
1975 article in Haratch entitled “No Armenian Community Has the Right to Navigate 
Aimlessly.” The prominent leader of the Dashnak party emphatically insisted on the need to 
mobilize the Armenian communities worldwide in order to halt assimilation and uproot apathy in 
the diaspora. Uppermost in his mind were those who, “while preserving the Armenian language 
lost Armenian traits.” As examples, he referred to Armenophone parents, who sent their children 
to non-Armenian schools and spoke with them in a foreign language; to Armenophone, who 
married ‘foreigners’; to Armenophone immigrants from the Middle East, who disowned their 
Armenian identity once in the West. The ubiquitous threat of assimilation would destroy the 
diaspora inevitably: 
The life of Armenians in the Diaspora is currently in such a stage that a very serious examination of our 
realities throughout the worldwide diaspora and of the state of Armenianness, with its retreats and 
transformations, as well as achievements, is of sharp necessity. [Such an examination is necessary] in order 
to exit the current route of peaceful navigation which, despite its appearances, leads the Diaspora Armenian 
vessel laden with rich cargo to shipwreck (Haratch, July 28, 1975). 
 
Papazian called on the intellectuals, teachers, religious and lay leaders of the diaspora to embark 
on a new mission of defining the “spiritual centers” of the Armenian diaspora. 
It is time that the members of every community constituting the Diaspora, especially those who are in 
leading positions, ask themselves and those surrounding them, ask publicly, if needed, without fearing self-
criticism, where is the spiritual center of Diaspora Armenians? What is it that can become this center? And 
what should be done so that [such] a spiritual center is [created] in every single community, in every single 
unit? …  
The aimless navigation for the preservation of a passive existence must come to an end. Every single 
community must rise within itself, first of all for its own sake, but always bearing in mind the Wholeness of 
Armenianness (hayut‘yan amboghjut‘yuně) and the spiritual center of that whole… 
All colonies of the diaspora should consider themselves as a “center” for Armenianness, which must place 
itself in a single whole with all other colonies [sic]. This center is Armenianness as a national unit, which 
provides that whole with a possibility to rediscover its spiritual center, [and its] spiritual trait, which is 





Papazian did not elaborate on his own particular understanding of a “spiritual center” and left its 
fashioning to local communal intellectuals and leaders; they were to define, create and lead such 
centers. In this sort of a decentralized centralization of the diaspora, as Papazian imagined it, 
Soviet Armenia had no role at all. While also critical of the Dashnaktsutyun and the communities 
in the Middle East, Papazian favored and implicitly expected the Dashnaktsutyun with its leaders 
and sympathizers to lead the effort in every single Armenian community.  
 
The need for better organization, expressed by the proponents of this diaspora-oriented 
paradigm, found its resonance in the Dashnak press worldwide. In a series of articles in August-
September 1976, Khachig Tölölyan, who was born and raised in a Dashnak milieu in the Middle 
East and had ultimate familiarity with the diaspora and the party, offered an incursive analysis of 
the possibilities of the organization of the “Armenian colony in North America.” Contrary to 
Papazian, who had averred that aimless navigation would inevitably lead to the demise of the 
diaspora, Tölölyan proceeded from the premise that the phenomenon of diaspora was durable, 
even permanent. He believed that there was some consensus in the diaspora on the “credo and 
dream” of the “united, free and independent Armenia,” but that even if the “united, free and 
independent Armenia” were to materialize in the near future, not all Armenians would 
spontaneously return to the homeland. Drawing parallels with the Jewish case, Tölölyan had this 
to say to his readers:  
Diasporic [emphasis in original] reality is one of the bedrocks of the identity of many people, and will 
continue to be, especially in a universe, in which countries are both separated due to political realities, and 
are closer to each other than in the past due to speedy traffic. We are much fortunate than the Jewish 
diaspora in the past, and our Diaspora should have much more durability. They didn’t even have a piece of 
homeland for nineteen centuries…, while we have part of our dismembered homeland, and every year 15-
20 thousand Armenian tourists from abroad visit that piece of the homeland… Therefore, the Diaspora (or a 
Diaspora) is the continued reality of our future regardless of what happens in Armenia. All our 
organizations, be they political, cultural, church or other, should proceed from this reality (quoted in 




Theoretically, because the Jewish diaspora survived for many centuries and because “diasporic 
reality” constituted part of the identity of many peoples, Tölölyan seemed to suggest that there 
was no need to fear for the eventual assimilation and disappearance of the Armenian diaspora. In 
practice, however, Tölölyan shared the conviction that the Armenian diaspora needed better 
organization. Tölölyan realized that the fate of a diaspora was significantly affected by the social 
milieu in host countries. Therefore, instead of “ghettoes,” Tölölyan suggested to organize the 
communities as “active units” and learn how to self-reflexively “adapt” to the conditions in host 
countries (Tölölyan 1980, 14-5). He attributed a special role to the diasporic organizations and 
institutions in the process of adaptation, especially within civic societies in the West and North 
America (ibid., 16). He then, in the same vein, addressed the weaknesses of the Armenian 
organizations and made suggestions as to how to be better organized politically, economically, 
and internally. Both in theory and practice, Tölölyan envisioned no role for the homeland in the 
organization or perpetuation of the diaspora.   
 
Tölölyan developed the premise of his argument, i.e. the permanence of the diaspora, in 
Harach's literary supplement “Mitk‘ ew aruest” (Thought and Art): 
I think our current existence has reached a point when even our oldest, believers longing for Erkir [“the 
country” or homeland - V.S.] and dreaming visionaries admit (whether consciously or unconsciously) that 
we will not return to Mets Hayk‘388 in the near future. Our future is a Diasporic future and destiny; our 
society will be an ethnic one, especially in the Untied States and Canada, where state institutions now 
encourage the organizational efforts of some ethnic minorities. But everywhere, however, in France, South 
America, etc., our future fate of an almost everlasting Diaspora is the same (Tölölyan 1980, 166). 
 
 
                                                
388 Greater Armenia. In many Armenian history textbooks, the term refers to ancient and medieval Armenian 
kingdoms, symbolizing the historical Armenian homeland. 
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Tölölyan hoped to take this discussion in “Mitk‘ ew aruest” to a more open-minded intellectual 
level, beyond exclusivist and often narrow-minded partisan debates. And then, he posed the 
question of the return again (perhaps having the anti-Dashnak faction in mind): 
If the Soviet Union tomorrow miraculously doubled the territory of Armenia and announced repatriation, 
how many Diaspora Armenians would respond? “Ten to twenty percent of the Armenians abroad” would 
respond the most optimist among us. No, the Diaspora is a durable phenomenon and the problem is to make 
it successfully durable, to draw and create an Armenian profile in it (ibid., 166).    
 
First and foremost, this statement was thrown at the proponents of the homeland, Soviet 
Armenia, who ascribed the reluctance to return to Soviet Armenia to the limited territorial 
capabilities of the country. Tölölyan confidently countered that return was no longer part of the 
diasporic existence and focused instead on its durability, and he invited the intellectuals to come 
together and ponder how “to make it successfully durable.” In a nutshell, “...a church, a school, 
an association…,” Tölölyan argued, “should be the means and methods, the units of larger 
structures, whose purpose is to perpetuate the diaspora with all its subdiasporas and 
communities” (Tölölyan 1980, 165). He maintained that the “Mitk‘ ew aruest” supplement of 
Haratch was ideal for launching such a theoretical discussion, for “only a newspaper printed in 
Europe,” far from the “suffocating” atmosphere in Beirut or the “obscure - indifferent” 
atmosphere in the United States, could provide a forum for launching theoretical 
“reconsideration” of Armenian diasporic life. A “reconsideration” such as this, according to him, 
could not happen within the confines of existing Armenian organizations, because it needed an 
honest exchange of opinions in an absolutely free environment (ibid., 155). Tölölyan proposed to 
create a “sp‘yuṙk‘yan namakani” (Letters from diaspora) section in “Mitk‘ ew aruest,” to publish 
and discuss theoretical and practical articles on various aspects of the Armenian diasporic 
experience. Two years later he regretfully noted that the section never really got off the ground 




While Haratch distanced itself from the Dashnaktsutyun, the opponents of the Dashnaks, it 
seems, could not observe much of a political course change, as the paper continued representing 
the Dashnak perspectives in many regards. The diaspora-centered discussion, promoted by 
Haratch and proposed by Tölölyan, therefore could hardly attract the opponents of the Dashnaks. 
The homeland-centered paradigm produced by the anti-Dashnak envisioned the active 
involvement of the homeland in the solution of the problem of the preservation of Armenian 
identity in the diaspora. Tölölyan, on the other hand, suggested to forget the homeland and focus 
exclusively on diaspora matters. Not surprisingly, the Dashnak-leaning faction became more 
involved in such a diaspora-centered discussions proposed by Tölölyan, albeit not in the format 
he envisioned.  
 
Discourses produced by various former and active Dashnak intellectuals and periodicals, thus, 
produced a more diaspora-centered transnational paradigm, which emphasized the durability of 
the diaspora and emphasized the need for its better organization. The proponents of the diaspora-
centered paradigm, much like the homeland-centered one, had some variations in their individual 
discourses, yet the primary emphasis on the diaspora created the common ground. For more 
politically oriented and passionate Dashnak leaders, such as Hrant Samuelian, the primary 
mission of the diaspora was the pursuit of the Armenian Cause and the creation of the “free, 
independent and united” Armenia. For some representatives of this line of thought, the 
restoration of the homeland in Turkey would eventually mean a return to the homeland and the 
end of diasporic existence. More theory oriented leaders and intellectuals, who in the 1970s 
realized that the restoration of the homeland was not achievable in the near future, emphasized 
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the very existence and perpetuation of the diaspora as a matter of immediate priority. The 
supporters of this line of thought, such as Papgen Papazian or Khachig Tölölyan, did not reject 
the Armenian Cause as a matter of policy; rather, they attached a far greater attention to the 
perpetuation of the diaspora. If Papazian was more pessimistic on the future of diaspora's 
“aimless navigation,” Tölölyan was more optimistic believing that diaspora could be durable. 
Both urged, however, that it had to be fashioned through pubic intellectual discussions and 
required better organization.  
 
Despite these varying approaches, the proponents of the diaspora-centered paradigm shared the 
following common principal points. First and foremost, the diaspora was to be the point of 
departure. Most even began writing the word “diaspora” with a capital “D” to signify that it was 
something more than just a dispersed population. Contrary to the homeland-centered paradigm, 
the homeland, Soviet Armenia, had little or no role at all in the pursuit of the Armenian Cause or 
in the solution of problems in the diaspora. For Tölölyan, the diaspora represented a self-
sufficient phenomenon, capable of producing durability and permanence. Secondly, regardless of 
whether they prioritized the realization of the Armenian Cause, the creation of “spiritual centers” 
or fashioning a durable diaspora, they all emphasized the need for a better organization of the 
diaspora. Some Dashnak-leaning intellectuals, such as Surdukian discussed above, or Levon 
Marashlian, even proposed to establish diaspora-wide councils, coordinated by a single 
“political” or “national” all-diaspora body.389 The common ground, which the proponents of the 
                                                
389 At a conference in San Francisco, Levon Marashlian argued for the necessity to create a diaspora-wide “national 
body,” which would be formed of elected representatives from among Armenian diasporic organizations and 
independent Armenians. Marashlian was born in the Middle East, but moved with his parents to the United States at 
a very young age, when he was 11. He had a PhD in History and was teaching at Glendale College at the time. 
Khachig Tölölyan reported on Marashlian’s presentation in Haratch (January 10, 1982) expressing skepticism for 
the proposal. For Tölölyan, it was a “healthy dream,” because the diaspora, especially in the United States, was not 
capable of producing such a “national body” at the time. 
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diaspora-centered paradigm shared, had been shaped by identical patterns of socialization within 
the same political faction. They had been part and product of and often active participants of the 
party’s “diaspora-style nation-building” efforts, which had largely been constructed in opposition 
to Soviet Armenia. As Khachig Tölölyan recalled in one of his later articles,  
 
 
The ruling assumptions of my diasporan youth were that intellectuals especially and all people, ideally, 
owed allegiance both to their nation and to a wished-for, worldwide brotherhood of peoples which, we 
hoped, would one day be guided by socialist ideals. The Armenian nation existed both on a fragment of its 
homeland and in diaspora. A portion of the homeland endured as the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic, 
one of the fifteen national republics of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As a party of nationalist and 
socialist intellectuals, the Dashnaks were rhetorically ardent in their opposition to Soviet perversions of 
socialism and cynical manipulations of nationalism, yet my generation of young diasporan Armenians were 
educated not simply as the citizens of the many states in which we lived, but also as the diasporan wing of 
the Armenian nation.... In diaspora, we were the heterogeneous and hyphenated Armenians who lived in or 
aspired to live in bourgeois democracies; they [Armenians in Soviet Armenia - V.S.] were the 
unhyphenated, “pure” Armenians of a homeland that resented communist rule, lived officially as Soviet 
citizens, but as even their internal passports stated on the line devoted to nationality, were “Armenian.” Our 
diasporan task was to develop and maintain an alternative view of Armenian nationhood, one which aspired 
to an independent national homeland and understood that the diaspora would both support and help to 
reshape that homeland by financial, intellectual and cultural resources (Tölölyan 1996b, 7) 
 
Rather than focusing on an actual, albeit not independent, Soviet Armenia, the socialization 
within the Dashnak milieu instilled in the youth an aspiration for an ideal, even if imaginary, 
“independent national homeland.” Rather than focusing on ways to connect the diaspora youth 
with that of Soviet Armenia, the diaspora was to produce an “alternative view of Armenian 
nationhood.” In a Haratch editorial of July 27, 1983, entitled “Sp‘iwṙk‘i hay azgě” [The 
Armenian Nation of the Diaspora], G.H.390 (Garo Hovsepian), having observed that the diaspora 
under foreign skies had internalized “the mentality of the people in their host countries and 
adapted to their environments,” went on to conclude that “…the organizational life of the 
communities - a church, school, periodical press, national and cultural centers, political party - 
[and] the consciousness and engagement of the youth, as an army for the Armenian national 
                                                
390 After the death of Hrant Samuelian in 1977, Garo Hovsepian assumed the co-editorship of Haratch with Arpig 
Missakian, who continued as the editor in chief. In 1975-85, Haratch only occasionally published editorials, some of 
which were written by Hovsepian. 
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struggle, form the Armenian Nation of the Diaspora.” The belief that Armenians constituted a 
diasporic nation was widely shared especially among the Dashnak-oriented generations.  
 
The homeland-centered and diaspora-centered paradigms were more sharply defined through 
youth-oriented programs run by the respective political factions. The proponents of the former 
approach instilled a sense of loyalty to Soviet Armenia, as the only surviving stretch of 
Armenian land, as well as encouraged personal and organizational involvement with Soviet 
Armenia. The relaxations in the Soviet Union and Soviet Armenia in the 1960s and the 
increasing direct public contacts made the homeland-centered paradigm emerge as real and 
plausible. The Dashnak proponents had a much harder task of promoting the diaspora-centered 
paradigm for an imaginary, “spiritual” homeland, the “idealized Armenia ... that did not exist” 
(Libaridian 1999, 135). The party used all the azgayin (national) structures under its influence - 
church trustees, assemblies and schools, as well as party-affiliated clubs, youth, scout and 
athletic organizations and camps, as agencies to produce loyalties to the “free, united and 
independent” Armenia, to the symbols of the 1918-1920 Republic of Armenia, and to its nation 
in the diaspora. Often blurring the boundaries between the partisan and the national, the Dashnak 
style nation-building brought up generations with the conviction that Armenia was lost to the 
Soviet Union and Turkey, and had to be (re)created by the immediate efforts of the diaspora.391 
Even after the gradual change of its political course in the 1970s, the Dashnaktsutyun continued 
emphasizing and instructing its youth with the idea of a “free and untied” Armenia.392 The 
                                                
391 One of the interviewees of Jenny Phillips, who grew up within a Dashnak milieu in Iran, recalled: “We took part 
in events like the Commemoration of May 28th, April 24th, and February 18th [anniversary of Armenian revolt 
against Soviet regime in Armenia - 1921 - J. Ph.], but we never felt these were Tashnak events. To us they were just 
Armenian events” (Phillips 1989, 260). 
392 For the construction of the “spiritual” Armenia-homeland, the Dashnak affiliated schools in the Middle East 
almost always used maps of greater Armenia. The tricolor flag materialized the image of a “free Armenia” and 
symbolized absolute loyalty to it. Children born into Dashnak families were exposed to the tricolor from a very 
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excerpt below from an interview Jenny Phillips conducted with an AYF leader, provides a 
glimpse of the kind of instruction the younger generation received at Camp Hayastan in Franklin, 
MA in the mid-1970s: 
To teach kids history, you need to fire them up….It’s very difficult for these American kids to comprehend 
what it means when you say “Free Armenia.” What is Armenia to them? To make the land more 
immediate, we laid out the camp so it would geographically conform to the provinces of Armenia. Then we 
took them on a tour of “Armenia.” When we went to Kars [in modern Turkey - V.S.], which means “rock” 
in Armenian, it was a rocky area in the camp (Phillips, 1989, 266). 
 
If the discourses of the pro-Soviet ‘patriots’ and the anti-Soviet ‘true Armenians’ of the 1950s 
constructed their identities by excluding their political opponents, the paradigms crystallizing 
after the fiftieth anniversary of the Genocide in 1965 significantly refrained from such mutual 
exclusion. From the 1960s, this exclusionary vocabulary began to subside, and expressions like 
Armenia, Armenian territories, homeland, diaspora, return, preservation of Armenianness, 
Armenian Cause were widely promoted by the proponents of both paradigms. The radicalized 
and often exclusive perceptions of the Armenian homeland from the 1920s until the 1950s were 
also replaced by more moderate viewpoints. The proponents of the homeland-centered paradigm 
accentuated the role of Soviet Armenia as the homeland, but never rejected the Armenian Cause, 
the struggle for Armenian lands and the demand for the restoration of a larger homeland. The 
proponents of the diaspora-centered paradigm envisioned the creation of a “free Armenia” in 
some future time, but from the late 1960s, they also significantly softened their criticism of 
Soviet Armenia, and some even began referring to it as the homeland. 
                                                                                                                                                       
young age. The tricolor was erected in Dashnak affiliated churches, schools, clubs, and unfurled abundantly during 
celebrations. The tricolor was used much more frequently, than the official red flag of the Dashnak party. To the 
contrary, the flag of “free Armenia” was overlooked and dismissed as an old flag, irrelevant to contemporary 






Dynamic processes in the Armenian diaspora in the 1970s and 1980s revealed its enormous 
diversity on institutional, communal, and individual levels. The 1965 joint commemorations of 
the Armenian Genocide seemed to have the potential for reconciling the formerly hostile 
Armenian political camps in the diaspora. Moreover, the Armenian Cause, vaguely defined by all 
the Armenian factions as the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and claims for Armenian 
lands created some common ground among them. The initial success, but the ultimate failure, of 
the Armenian Assembly to bring together the institutionally divided Armenian camps in the 
United States, paralleled by a decade-long transnational struggle and rivalry between the 
ASALA and the Dashnak-supported JCAG/ARA, revealed that the Armenian Cause could also 
be a separating factor as much as it had the potential to create a common ground. While the 
genocide had become the common denominator of Armenianness in the diaspora and, by the 
second half of the 1980s, Armenians of all affiliations had come to agree on more peaceful 
means in the pursuit of the Armenian Cause, unity among the institutionally divided 
communities was achieved only occasionally, usually around the joint commemorations of the 
Armenian Genocide, or over some other local matters of concern for all Armenians, like the civil 




On communal and individual levels, in the 1980s the Armenian diaspora represented a mosaic of 
identities, subethnic groupings, communities and organizations, and this became especially 
pronounced in the West. Due to intensified East-West migration flows, while the Armenian 
communities in the Middle East decreased in number, communities in France and the United 
States grew with the influx of new Armenian immigrants. If in the Middle Eastern countries 
Armenian identity was defined first of all by a person’s affiliation with an Armenian church at 
birth, by ascription rather than attainment, in France and the United States, Armenian identity 
was defined first of all by descent and self-identification, and both Armenian identity and 
involvement in the Armenian churches and organizations was a matter of choice rather than 
ascription at birth. The diversity of individual and collective identities in the diaspora came to the 
fore with the growing numbers of Armenians from Syria and Lebanon, and also from Iran and 
Turkey, in France and the United States, resulting in generalizations and stereotyping, clash of 
different perceptions of Armenianness and exclusions. Despite these exclusions, Armenians 
originating from different countries, often identified with their hyphenated identities, as 
Beirut/Lebanese-, Aleppo/Syrian-, Istanbul-, Iranian/Persian-, American-, or French-Armenian, 
continued to staff and represent different institutions and organizations, as well as continued 
individual or organizational involvement with the homeland or in Armenian matters in the 
diaspora.  
 
Affiliations with the Armenian church, political parties or other Armenian transnational 
institutions often transcended these individual and communal identities, bringing together 
individuals and groups originating from different countries and providing yet another level of 
diasporic belongings. Unwilling to give up their spheres of influence, the political factions 
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continued promoting different perceptions of the homeland, setting different goals and offering 
different perspectives on matters of common concern in the diaspora. The exclusive self-
perceptions of the ‘patriots’ and ‘true Armenians’ of the formerly pro- and anti-Soviet camps 
had been replaced by more moderate discourses by the 1980s, but, on the institutional level, the 
prevailing orientations towards the actual homeland, Soviet Armenia, or the ideal homeland, the 
projected “United” Armenia, produced more homeland- or diaspora-centered transnational 
paradigms, identities and belongings. 
 
These paradigms continued shaping diasporic identities and belongings transnationally up until 
the independence of Armenia in 1991. In many diasporic communities, however, some elements 
of these paradigms are still being reproduced, as the active and direct involvements of Armenia 
in the matters of the diaspora and the Armenian diasporic political parties in Armenia have not 





Conclusion and Closing Remarks 
 
 
Theoretical works in diaspora studies have mostly treated the Armenian diaspora from a 
comparative perspective, describing it as one of the ‘archetypal’ (Armstrong, 1976; Safran, 
1991), ‘stateless’ (Sheffer, 2003) or ‘victim’ (Cohen, 2008) diasporas. Such ‘ideal type’ 
generalizations sometimes are helpful in developing comparative frameworks, but most often 
provide lip service to the discipline. While stressing on the diversity of diasporic identities and 
the phenomenon of a diaspora in general, the ‘ideal type’ generalizations, as well recognized by 
Cohen (2008, 159), often exaggerate and downplay the enormous diversity of the same 
diasporas. Instead of adopting any of these paradigms, this study followed in part Kim Butler’s 
(2001) framework by focusing on relations of the dispersed Armenians with the homeland, their 
relations with the respective host-countries, and interrelationships within the various 
communities of the diaspora. It also followed the recent trend in diaspora studies, as identified by 
Khachig Tölölyan (2007, 648-51), by examining the conditions and the process of the 
transformation of the Armenian dispersion into a diaspora. Building on Tölölyan’s (2000) 
argument on the role of elites and institutions, this dissertation argued that while elites and 
institutions are also important agents in the formation of diasporas and diasporic identities, their 
ideologies and policies, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of diasporic institutions locally 
and transnationally, are shaped by and often change in response to dynamic international, host-




This dissertation has arrived to these conclusions by focusing on three post-genocide Armenian 
diaspora communities in countries, where Armenians have maintained a significant presence 
since their settlement and throughout the twentieth century, namely in the United States, France 
and Lebanon. Based on an extensive study of primary accounts by the elites representing various 
Armenian institutions in more than two dozen periodicals, as well as in many pamphlets from the 
1920s until the 1980s, as well as the author’s interviews with many notable Armenian activists in 
these countries, this dissertation analyzes changing international and host-country conditions, the 
rivalry among Armenian elites and political parties in their relations with and orientations 
towards Soviet Armenia, as well as diasporic discourses and debates, all of which transformed 
the dispersion of genocide survivor refugees into a transnational diaspora.  
 
This study lends support to one, original observation, lacking in general frameworks in diaspora 
theories: the bifurcated self-perception the Armenians developed in the course of much of the 
twentieth century, a dichotomy that separated the Armenians who accepted Soviet Armenia as 
the homeland and those who envisioned a more abstract homeland to be attained in future. In this 
regard, Armenians in the course of the twentieth century developed characteristics of both a 
state-linked and a stateless diaspora. The conflicting interests and efforts of the Armenian elites 
and institutions replaced commitments to ancestral villages in the Ottoman Empire of the first 
generations with competing allegiances to Soviet Armenia or to a more abstract, spiritual 
Armenia. Different perceptions of the Armenian homeland coexisted and clashed, giving birth to 
often incompatible self-perceptions in the diaspora and producing mutually exclusive diasporic 
discourses and identities. The struggles of the elites and institutions for representing the 
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Armenians in the respective host-countries, the conflicting perceptions of the Armenian 
homeland and national symbolism, the policies of the host-countries directly or indirectly 
encouraging or discouraging certain orientations and transnational loyalties, as well as the 
international political circumstances, eventually led to a transnational schism in the Armenian 
Church and the post-genocide Armenian diaspora. Although the elites and organizations were 
able to put aside hostilities and occasionally unite their efforts to commemorate the Armenian 
genocide after 1965, institutionalized divisions continued to prevail, reproducing conflicting 
identifications and identities, policies and programs, discourses and disunities. 
 
This work also reveals that from the beginning of the post-genocide dispersion, through four 
generations in the twentieth century, the diaspora Armenians have represented diverse cohorts of 
self-identification groups and institutional, organizational loyalties. Religious, political, 
educational and other institutions and organizations have been essential in the production and 
reproduction of Armenian diasporic cultures and identities. But it was under the more favorable 
sociopolitical conditions in Lebanon that the efforts of the Armenian elites and institutions 
forged a more homogeneous Armenian identity out of the many, initially diverse Armenian 
refugee groups. It also argues that institutions can often become agencies of exclusion as well. 
The transnational network of Armenian political parties eventually made a certain type of 
Armenian identity dominant in the diaspora, thereby often excluding alternative expressions of 
Armenian diasporic identities.  
 
Another theme, that this dissertation extensively addressed, but will need further elaboration 
when revising this dissertation for publication as a book, is related to diasporic identities. 
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Diasporic identities, as this study showed, may evolve both under the influences of diasporic 
elites, institutions and often of a homeland state, and also in spite of the activities of elites and 
various institutions, through family stories and memory, through self-identifications, and 
eventual involvement with the homeland or the diaspora. This suggests that diasporic identities 
are about descent, self-identification and involvement in diasporic initiatives, institutions or other 
homeland or diaspora related activities. In this sense, unlike national or ethnic identities, 
diasporic identities represent a choice, rather than ascription, and this is more so especially in the 
West. The emancipatory social movements of the 1960s in Europe and the Untied States, as this 
work has demonstrated, created conditions in which many of the assimilated descendants of 
Armenians in France or the United States (re)discovered their ethnic roots and chose to embark 
on individual or collective projects by getting directly or indirectly, formally or informally 
involved in homeland-related or diaspora-oriented activity. Regardless of traditional or symbolic 
identities, therefore, in the case of Armenians, all the descendants of the Armenian refugees and 
immigrants can be considered potentially diasporic. It seems, whether diaspora-born generations 
will develop a more traditional (ethnic) Armenian identity or an affinity with their ancestors and 
ethnic group symbolically will depend on certain family conditions, host-country contexts, as 
well as the proximity and efforts of Armenian diasporic institutions. In any case, these identities 
may or may not materialize in diasporic involvement, activism and production, and become 
overtly diasporic. The question, particularly, which will need further investigation, is around this 
paradox of how exactly ethnic identities, on the one hand, necessary, as they after all define 
(ethnic) diasporas, such as the Armenian, become, at the same time, not as much defining in the 
diaspora. And if this is so, what is the role of ethnic schools and ethnic instruction in the 
diaspora, if learning the ethnic language or knowing the ethnic history is not the integral 
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component of diasporic identities? In addressing these questions, I would like to further explore 
the role of Armenian schools especially in the West, their goals and actual accomplishments, as 
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